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Abstract 
Without Apparent Occasion: Melancholy and the Problem of Motive in Baroque England 
 
Timothy J. Barr, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. Melancholy primarily presented itself to the English seventeenth century as a problem 
concerning the causes of passions that were, in the words of Robert Burton, “without any apparant 
occasion.” The configuration of this problem varied as it moved through a range of discourses. In 
this dissertation, I attend most closely to those configurations in medicine, dialectic, theater, and 
an emergent civil science. The desire to discover the possible causes of melancholic passions led 
medical texts to reproduce nearly the whole range of causality. The baroque medical texts, then, 
produced a “topics,” a collection of potential arguments, of the causes of melancholy. 
Melancholics also developed their own set of topical practices, adopting the methods of humanist 
dialectic for articulating their experience. In the theater, the problem of the melancholic's passion 
served as a form of encounter between a civil logic that sought to determine its causes and the 
melancholic articulation of the situation through their own passion. Finally, I argue that the modern 
architecture of the state as envisioned in Hobbes' Leviathan is premised upon the power to 
eliminate collective melancholy, that is, the arousal of “causeless fears” while instituting a power 
that keeps the imagination of the people in fear of the sovereign's punishments. I show that this 
vision of the state required a repression of the image of the melancholy tyrant. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Emotions contain judgments about the world. Our anger, joy, fear, and grief take objects—
we are angered by insult or injustice, joyed at success, fearful of coming evil, grieved by loss. 
Should the object of our emotion should change, the feeling changes in kind. The salience and 
quality of our experiences are disclosed through such passionate judgments. In this sense, emotions 
are apprehensions of and orientations in a diversely interpreted world. However, as the animal’s 
gaze in Rilke’s First Duino Elegy reminds us, we never are truly at home in this interpreted world. 
The causes of emotions are not always clear. What then are we to make of emotions whose object 
is unclear or when their causes cannot be accounted for? If one were to experience grief but could 
not articulate what had been lost or feel fear without the ability to name a future ill, what could we 
say was the meaning of this feeling? Here, the object and the cause of a passion are distinguished. 
Emotion, its cause and meaning, becomes a site of inquiry.  
My dissertation studies the problem of emotions “out of tune” with the social situation 
through the historical reconstruction of melancholy in the English Baroque. Melancholy appeared 
as a problem of articulating the 'occasion' for a passion whose cause was not apparent. This archive 
is particularly well-suited for such a problem for two reasons. First, the problematic of melancholy 
took on a cultural prominence in the English Baroque that brought it to bear on a wide range of 
social formations. Second, the social dimension of this problematic was occluded early in the 
eighteenth century by developments in medicine and other spheres of cultural and economic life.  
Robert Burton, author of the encyclopedic work The Anatomy of Melancholy, first appearing in 
1621, offered many definitions of melancholy. However, the one I foreground in this dissertation 
understands it as “a kinde of dotage without feaver, having for his ordinary companions, feare, and 
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sadnesse, without any apparant occasion.”1 As the title of this dissertation suggests, I have laid 
emphasis in this study on his final codicil. It is in the absence of an “apparant occasion” that the 
social problematic of melancholy was formed. Tracing the enormous variety of uses of this 
problem gives this project a wide scope of primary sources to study, including medical literature, 
theatrical texts, emblem books, works on logic, meditations, treatises on the passions, and political 
theory. While this means that the dissertation risks a dispersal of its attention into many different 
areas, this danger is offset by its ambition to understand melancholy as a problem that appears in 
various discourses. Each appearance shows how the distinctive means of that discourse offered a 
medium for grappling with the problem.  
The thesis of this dissertation is that English Baroque melancholy constituted a problem 
within the common inference that there was a causal relation between passion and action that 
could be understood as motive. I understand motive to be a probable inference connecting an actor 
with an act or a passion and with a reason for the action or passion. This is not far removed the 
question Kenneth Burke opened his Grammar of Motives with: “What is involved, when we say 
what people are doing and why they are doing it?”2 My inquiry into early modern melancholy 
looks at what is involved when one cannot say why they—or we—are doing or feeling what is 
being done or felt. It is, with Burke, a rhetorical inquiry. Unlike cause, motivational probability is 
grounded in discourse in the sense that certain inferences appear more “likely” than others within 
a certain interpretive community. In brief: I see patterns of imputed motives as evidence for a habit 
                                                 
1 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K. Kiessling, Rhonda L. 
Blair, and J. B. Bambourgh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 1:162 [I.1.3.1.]. Hereafter, AM. References to Burton’s 
original textual index are bracketed. 
2 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009), xv.  
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of motivational inference-making. The assumptions of motivational probability reside in some 
social group’s sensus communis, a tissue of unreflective norms and presuppositions accumulated 
through the habits of a common lifeworld. In this sense, motive is not a mentalist construct. 
Motives have their life in the mesh of discourse, practice, and inquiry within a community, not in 
a single determinate judgment of a person or action.  
Let me offer a word on “Baroque melancholy.” The etymology of the term “Baroque” 
shows a connection between a literary style and the unlikely formality of syllogistic inference. 
When the humanist Juan Luis Vives used Baroco as a term of abuse, calling certain members of 
the Parisian faculty “sophists in Baroco and Baralipton” he was ridiculing them for a kind of 
scholastic logic used to defend weak, partial conclusions. “Baroco” and “Baralipton” are the 
mnemonic names for two figures of the syllogism. Baroco has an affirmative universal major 
premise (All P are Q), a minor premise that is particular and negative (Some Q are not R), and 
therefore a particular, negative conclusion (Some P are not R). Of course, it would be absurd to 
attempt to assign this syllogism explanatory power in explaining the inferences of motive we 
encounter in the Baroque discourse on melancholy. It is, however, suggestive. The general is 
affirmed, the particular denied. One is left with a partial form of knowledge, a negative conclusion. 
The figure of Baroco epitomizes the thematic division we find in the various attempts to explain 
problematic cases of melancholy passions. A general form of received wisdom or medical 
aphorism is denied as an explanation for the individual’s sorrow, fear, love, or any unexplained 
passion. What results is simply the conclusion that this passion is not to be known in that way. 
Moreover, this inferential form is of a piece with an essential Baroque intellectual practice: 
commonplacing. A commonplace book's excerpted wisdom, sententiae, maxims, aphorisms, and 
apothegms are warrants for particular conclusions. Melancholic mood is sustained by the 
 4 
passionate and rhetorical elaboration of melancholy commonplaces that forego a decision about 
particular causes.  
 It may seem strange to take a term whose purview is aesthetics to designate phenomena 
that are not being evaluated for their aesthetic merits. But precisely because it has been developed 
within a field of art and music history, it “cannot be defined as a class-concept in logic can be 
defined.”  Unlike an example subsumed under a concept, “the work of art is not an instance of a 
class, but is itself a part of the concept of a period which it makes up together with other work.”3 
In this dissertation, the Baroque does not refer to a set of stable characteristics but a tension 
between distal positions taken up around the common problem of melancholy. By identifying my 
object as Baroque melancholy in England, I am claiming a recursive relationship between my 
archive and the context that warrants movement between its items. The principle behind this 
archive is my hypothesis, in each case, that the artifact has a relation, either as response or 
illumination, to the problem of melancholy as a problem of motives. Just as one discovers 
something about friendship through various and very different relations with one's friends, or the 
meaning of love through trysts, heartbreaks, and marriages with, perhaps, many lovers, we 
nevertheless realize that one cannot simply take each friend or lover as an instance of friendship 
or love. So it is with melancholy and its many melancholics. At the same time, one of my concerns 
in this study is to offer something like a reconstruction of period perception. My object is to 
recover some of the conflicts, inferential habits, desires, and controversies that made melancholy 
a fascination of the Baroque and an inextricable element of its style.  
                                                 
3 Rene Wellek, “The Concept of the Baroque in Literary Scholarship,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 5, no. 2 (1946), 87.  
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By invoking the Baroque and melancholy together, I am also witnessing a commitment to 
a modern intellectual tradition, one that conjures the spectre of Walter Benjamin. This project is 
willfully haunted by his preoccupation with the melancholic in his work on the Baroque tragic 
drama. All who have entered into the thickets of that work’s difficult prose and profound insight 
cannot fail to recognize the distinct importance of melancholy to Benjamin’s thought, one that 
extends beyond the Baroque into his work on nineteenth-century Paris, photography, Baudelaire, 
and his philosophy of history. Scholars like Ilit Ferber and Max Pensky have fruitfully thematized 
melancholy in reading the Benjaminian corpus as an enduring attempt to deal with the problematic 
of melancholy. In Benjaminian thought, melancholia’s history joins its personal and political 
dimensions. Melancholy is not inherently pathological, but it nevertheless requires remedy. The 
tension in Benjamin’s work between a critique of “left melancholy” [Linke Melancholie] and his 
own development of critique, both Baroque and Baudelairean, out of melancholy, is not a 
contradiction but an insight into the curious demand made upon the subject by melancholic 
passion. Its opacity before explanation is not incidental, but the source of the melancholic’s insight: 
in melancholy, the contradictory nature of the social situation itself are represented in the intimate 
form of passion “without any apparent occasion.” It is for this reason that “the expert on the history 
and phenomenology of the occult history of saturnine melancholia, and the savage critic of the 
‘tortured stupidity’ of the ‘newest’ phase of melancholia's ‘two-thousand year history’ are one and 
the same.”4 The remedy to melancholy, that is, to the enduring of melancholic passion, cannot be 
the explication sought for it my medicine or moral philosophy. Rather, the melancholic must seek 
                                                 
4 Max Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics: Walter Benjamin and the Play Of Mourning (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2001), 14. 
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to objectify the passion, to express it in such a way that it becomes a power of acting differently. 
By construing melancholy as a problem of motive I make a new departure that attempts to move 
further down Benjamin’s one-way street of decisive thought. By recovering the problematic of 
Baroque melancholy we are able to critique the enjoyment of melancholy passion without 
pathologizing it, demanding that it resist the attempts to isolate it from its own sensitivity to an 
opaque world.  
Yet one may still object to the idea of an English Baroque. Is the Baroque not principally 
a cultural formation of Tridentine Catholicism, foreign to the English seventeenth century 
perpetually suspicious of “popishness”? Indeed, one of the first to give scholarly attention to the 
Baroque, Heinrich Wöfflin argued that it was “incomprehensible without the spirit of the 
Counterreformation.”5 The simple answer is that this objection has been put to bed long ago.6 
Although it has been forgotten, there was a German philological tradition that identified a distinctly 
                                                 
5 Qtd. in introduction to Heinrich Wöfflin, Renaissance and Baroque, trans. Peter Murray (London: Collins, 
1964), 3-4. The original is translated from his appendix to another work, Principles of Art History, first published in 
1915.  
6 José Antonio Maravall's discussion of this point in 1975 already treated it as a development of the thought 
of a past generation: “In granting the Mediterranean and Latin countries such a preponderant role in the appearance 
and development of baroque culture, we cannot forget the significance of such central-European figures as Comenius, 
whose work as a pedagogue and moralist is decisive in any attempt to define the baroque, nor, on the other hand, 
English literature and the art and thought of the Low Countries. From this new perspective, the baroque, while in force 
in Europe, covered more ground than it did in those already outmoded explanations that presented it as a complex of 
literary or pseudoartistic aberrations saturated with the bad taste that counterreformist Catholicism had cultivated in 
countries subject to Rome.” See Maravall, Culture of the Baroque: Analysis of a Historical Structure (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 8.  
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English Baroque; indeed, some of the earliest usages of the term in scholarship are studies of 
Shakespeare,7 Donne,8 Dryden,9 and broad surveys of English literature.10 But despite this dusty 
literary precedent, I employ the Baroque as a provocation; tracing the problematics of melancholy 
leads us to a reconsideration of the supposed uniformity of English cultural expression and its 
“uniqueness” from intellectual, cultural, religious, and artistic trends developing 
contemporaneously on the continent. The tired image of the English radicals as disavowing 
ornamentation, collapsing style into earnestness, is belied everywhere in the melancholy archive. 
How else should we take this line by Milton, in his ode to melancholy, Il Penseroso, when he asks 
Melancholy, personified as a pagan goddess, to help him to “love the high embowed Roof,/ 
With antick Pillars massy proof,/And storied Windows richly dight,/Casting a dimm religious 
light,”—an image, clearly, of walking through the colored shadow cast by a stained-glass window 
in a cathedral, where Milton desired to hear “the pealing Organ blow,/To the full voic'd Quire 
below,/In Service high.” The Puritan's cathedral was a palace of the mind, but its interior was no 
less exquisite than Chartres for that.   
What I have termed “Baroque melancholy” has been deemed arid in comparison to its 
Renaissance forms. No distinctive contribution to the concept of melancholy can be awarded to 
the English seventeenth century. Stanley Jackson, in his oft-cited comprehensive history 
                                                 
7 Max Wolff, “Shakespeare als Künstler,” Internationale Monatsschrift, 11 (1917), 995–1021. 
8 Mario Praz, Secentismo e Marinismo in Inghilterra: John Donne—Richard Crashaw (Firenze: La Voce, 
1925).  
9 Wolfgang Mann, Drydens Heroische Tragodien als Ausdruck höfischer Barockkultur in England 
(Württemberg: Gatzer & Hahn, 1932). 
10 Friedrich W.D. Brie, Englische Rokoko-Epik (1710-1730) (München, M. Hueber, 1927). 
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Melancholia and Depression, notes only two figures in his short chapter on the period: Sir Richard 
Napier, doctor and astrologist, and Thomas Willis, whom I read as a transitional figure. Napier 
presents Jackson with an “unusual opportunity” to examine actual medical treatments of 
melancholia, but it is only Willis, at the end of the century, who makes “important conceptual 
changes.”11 This would suggest that melancholy is static in the period studied here. Yet at the same 
time, the Baroque is recognized as a particularly difficult and labyrinthine period in the history of 
melancholy. Attesting to this is the preface to Klibansky, Panofksy, and Saxl's famous Saturn and 
Melancholy, first published in 1964: “The limits set to this book excluded any endeavor to do 
justice to the complex and enthralling topic of Elizabethan and Jacobean melancholy.” The authors 
aver that although it was “[t]empting...to delve into the riches of Burton,” they “had to content 
themselves with paying homage to the great ‘melancholizer’ by prefixing his effigy to the present 
volume.”12 How can it be that a period so barren in contributions to the concept of melancholy 
could nevertheless have so dense a cornucopia of “riches” that it must be excluded because of its 
complexity? 
Within the last three decades, the literature on melancholia has grown significantly. I have 
elsewhere traced this broader trajectory, arguing that both the reworking of early modern and 
psychoanalytic interpretations of melancholia are grounded in common concerns.13 I will focus 
                                                 
11 Stanley W. Jackson, Melancholia and Depression: From Hippocratic Times to Modern Times (New 
Haven: Yale University Press 1986), 104. 
12 Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of 
Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art (London: Nelson, 1964), vi. 
13 Timothy Barr, “Without Apparent Occasion: Recent Literature on Melancholy,” The Journal of the History 
of Ideas 80, no. 2 (2019), 313-332.  
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here only on those works most pertinent to this dissertation project. Saturn and Melancholy, the 
joint work of Klibansky, Saxl, and Panofsky, laid much of the groundwork for future scholarship 
on the topic, and their narrative has since maintained a hegemony on the thought of early modern 
melancholy. Indeed, their narrative was so influential that at least one scholar (Hellmut Flashar) 
abandoned his plans to write a study of genial melancholy in the Renaissance, since “in light of 
the wealth of material presented in [Saturn and Melancholy] and its ingenious saturation 
[Durchdringung] of this area, I have completely abandoned my original plan to deal in detail with 
the after effects of ancient theories of melancholy.”14 Perhaps the inheritance of this dazzling 
wealth of materials has lulled its heirs into the complacency of those who hold “old money.”  
In the standard received narrative, Marsilio Ficino’s De vita triplicis was a handbook for 
the health regimen of the scholar, but its great popularity was due to its arguments for the 
melancholic nature of artistic, poetic, and philosophic genius. This position has its germ in the 
authority of the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata XXX.1, which asked the loaded question, “Why 
is it that all those who have become emininent in philosophy or politics or poetry or the arts are 
clearly melancholics, and some of them to such an extent as to be affected by the diseases caused 
by black bile?”15 This enigmatic account of “genial melancholy” afforded Ficino an opportunity 
to synthesize the Platonic divine mania afforded to poets, prophets, and philosophers in the 
Phaedrus with a medico-philosophical view of the natural causes of human excellence sealed 
                                                 
14 “Angesichts der in diesem Buch vorgelegten Fülle des Materials und seiner scharfsinnigen Durchdringung 
in diesem Bereich habe ich meinen ursprunglichen Plan, die Nachwirkungen der antiken Theorien über Melancholie 
im einzelnen zu behandeln, ganz fallengelassen.” Qtd. in Winfried Schleiner, Melancholy, Genius, and Utopia in the 
Renaissance (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1991), 19.  
15 Translation in Klibansky et. al., Saturn and Melancholy, 18.  
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under an Aristotelian imprimatur. The valorization of what came to be termed melancholia 
generosa into a cult of genius was a result of its popularity as a conceit among “men of letters” 
(viri literati) who brought the discussion of melancholia beyond the merely therapeutic indications 
found in “those of the almanacs and the booklets for the use of barbers” where it appeared as an 
unattractive malady.16 In this account, the association of melancholy with genius became 
ubiquitous. For example, the Wittkowers, authors of a 1963 work on the cult of the melancholic 
artist in the Italian Renaissance, argue that in order to make a claim to genius in that period, one 
had to fashion oneself as a melancholic. Therefore, it is “only to be expected that melancholy is an 
ever-recurrent topos in Vasari’s Lives” the famous compendium of the great artists’ lives and 
works. From this vantage, Burton’s work represents a falling out of “sympathy” with melancholic 
humor and a “growing interest of his age in the study of abnormal psychology.”17 Noel Brann’s 
account of the cult of genius holds that the Neo-Platonic synthesis of Aristotelian melancholic 
genius and Platonic frenzy disintegrated in the late Renaissance, becoming little more than a 
popular fad.18 Melancholy genius became “fashionable” melancholy, a pretense to profundity.  
However appealing it was to the Renaissance (not to mention the scholars who so often 
invoke its mystique), the idea of melancholic genius simply cannot account for either the ubiquity 
or variety of uses it finds in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Winfried Schleiner's more 
recent Melancholy, Genius, and Utopia in the Renaissance acknowledges that “[g]enial 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 254.  
17 Rudolf Wittkower and Margaret Wittkower, Born Under Saturn: The Character and Conduct of Artists: A 
Documented History from Antiquity to the French Revolution, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), 104, 107. 
18 Noel L. Brann, The Debate Over the Origin of Genius During the Italian Renaissance (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 
347. 
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melancholy's hold on the mind of the time can be easily overstressed.” This is not only because 
melancholy's cultural prominence included more than a claim to genius, but also because “certainly 
the link between melancholy and genius was in all senses of the word 'problematical'.”19 This pat 
dichotomy has given rise to a sort of compressed sense of melancholy's historical meaning—there 
is the Galenic and the Aristotelian, the fashionable and the truly pathological, the poetic and the 
medical meanings of melancholy. Lawrence Babb, a twentieth-century scholar of Burton and 
Elizabethan melancholy, established this distinction when he argued that “[a]ccording to the 
Galenic tradition, melancholy is a most ignominious and miserable condition of mind; according 
to the Aristotelian tradition, it is a most enviable and admirable condition of mind.”20 This 
distinction was taken up with great erudition in Panofsky et al.’s project. They argued that Dürer 
managed to “synthesize” the two strands of melancholy (genius-giving and pathological) that the 
authors distinguish in the Renaissance in his famous print, Melencolia I. Yet some seventy years 
on from the publication of this undoubtedly major work of scholarship, we might doubt whether 
these two strands were ever really distinct. Even the famous question from the Problemata quoted 
above saw a danger of excellence: they were inclined to fall into morbid, atrabilious states 
[ἀρρωστήμασιν]. The melancholic genius was merely a variety of pathology, proceeding 
according to Burton “from blood adust, or that there be a mixture of blood in it,” as this was what 
“Aristotle meant, when he said melancholy men of all others are most witty, which causeth many 
times a divine ravishment, and a kind of enthusiasmus, which stirreth them up to be excellent 
                                                 
19 Schleiner, Melancholy, Genius, and Utopia, 31.  
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philosophers, poets, prophets, &c.”21 Burton thus glosses the Aristotelian maxim “no great genius 
without some madness mixed in” (nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementiae) with the 
pithy “they have a worme as well as others.”22 Burton's gloss belies the view that there was an 
oscillating possibility between “two conceptions of melancholia” in the Renaissance. But the 
Baroque inclusion of genius within the orbit of melancholy is rather a tragic view that even the 
genius must struggle against the baleful influence of her own condition. 
The status of the idea of melancholy plunges us into a seeming-dead twentieth-century 
dispute between Panofsky and Benjamin concerning the appropriate interpretation of and 
relationship between symbol and allegory. This dispute centered on the figuration of melancholy. 
For Panofsky, Dürer’s achievement was a “synthesis of allegorical pictures” into a “triad of Saturn, 
Melancholy, and Geometry.”23 Allegory was the raw material out of which the great artist of the 
Northern Renaissance was able to fashion a new “ideal” of melancholy. Benjamin never read 
Saturn and Melancholy, but he did have available to him the earlier, much shorter German-
language 1923 monograph by Panofsky and Saxl on Dürer’s print. Working out a theory of the 
Baroque Trauerspiel or mourning-play, Benjamin felt that Panofsky was a member of a long 
pageant of doctrinaire misapprehension of allegory in its Baroque manifestation. It was no doubt 
partly with certain members of the Warburg Circle in mind that Benjamin argued that it was the 
“illegitimate talk of the symbolic which permits the investigation of every artistic form ‘in depth,’ 
and has an immeasurably comforting effect on the practice of investigation in the arts.”24 He did 
                                                 
21 AM, 399, 400. [1.3.1.3.] 
22 AM, 100. 
23 Klibansky et. al., Saturn and Melancholy, 322, 335. 
24 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: Verso, 2009), 160.  
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not see Dürer’s sphere, placed at the foot of Melancholy, as the symbolic culmination of a 
Renaissance discourse on melancholy, but rather as the seed of “the allegorical flower of the 
baroque, still held in check by the power of a genius, [that] lies ready to burst into bloom.”25 As 
in Benjamin’s chiastic formula, we find that the “allegory of the seventeenth century is not 
convention of expression, but expression of convention.”26 Allegory was less a genre than an 
inferential practice, a concourse between matter and meaning, image and presence. 
 Doctrinaire preferences for symbol or allegory seem themselves rather parochial now, but, 
in a move that is important for this dissertation more generally, I take up Benjamin’s play on 
convention by emphasizing that the practice that finds expression by employing convention is the 
practice of topics. Topics were a technique of the ars topica, a technique of classical rhetoric for 
discovering arguments in any given case. The ars topica migrated from an antique oratorical 
practice to a branch of medieval logic and, in the Renaissance, to a humanistic account of general 
inquiry. Unlike medical or psychiatric observation, it was not a practice confined to a particular 
science with a set of guiding axioms. I argue that the distinctively Baroque use of melancholy can 
be seen by recovering the topical practices of the period. Topics were the invisible inventive logic 
whose central place in the humanistic curriculum repurposed the ancient rhetorical ars topica as a 
device for finding arguments in preparing oratory into a general method of inquiry into all 
uncertain matters. Only when we reconstitute the place of topics in thought and discourse of the 
period can we understand its cultural salience. The tension between the cultural prominence of 
melancholy in the English Baroque is at odds with the historical narratives that have attempted to 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 154. 
26 Ibid., 175. 
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read it as a passing fashion or an unexplained epidemic. It is because of a topical ordering of 
thought, imagination, and memory that the seventeenth century contributed little to the 
development of the concept of melancholy. It is for the same reason that this period is richest in 
the elaboration of this received material. Insofar as some object could bring to mind a new 
possibility of speech, reflective experience could function as topics or loci argumenti. The world 
was a great memento; under the melancholic gaze all occasions were “sicklied o'er with the pale 
cast of thought” and so lost “the name of action.”  
We can then speak of a “melancholy topics” as a rival to the humanist restitution of civic 
science. Hans Baron's thesis argued that “civic humanism” emerged in quattrocento Florence as a 
response of the intellectuals to the defeat of Florentine and Bolognese forces against the threat of 
a Milanese tyranny. While scholars have complicated or revised significant portions of Baron's 
thesis, the idea of a humanistic politics has remained a central theme in the works of eminent 
scholars, including J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner. Skinner especially has emphasized the 
role that rhetorical education and ideas played in this development. The humanists were compelled 
by rhetoric's power of capturing, motivating, justifying the “enterprises of great pith and moment” 
in and through eloquence. Working upon the same materials, the Baroque “pensée mélancolique,” 
as Starobinski called it, called into question the meaning and import of civic, religious, and 
economic motives. As I argue in this dissertation, the melancholy topics developed out of the 
foundation of humanist dialectic, but it was put to use not for motivating one side of a civic 
controversy but instead as a method of mediating and elaborating the experience of melancholic 
passion. 
Recent scholarship on early modern melancholy lays the foundation for my approach to 
melancholy as a problem rather than merely a disease, concept, or posture. Two works, by Angus 
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Gowland and Drew Daniel respectively, have both treated English Baroque melancholy within 
what could broadly be recognized as a problem-history, or Problemgeschichte, though both 
authors take a very different approach to their material. Gowland attempts to recover the contexts 
to which Burton was responding. His work recognizes melancholy as a problem, which “cannot 
be why so many suffered from the disease, but why so many were preoccupied with its assumed 
frequency.” He answers the question of why melancholy loomed so large in early modernity by 
arguing that “domain in which the concept of melancholy could be applied” increased.27 Its unique 
ability to enter into so many distinct arenas comes from its “flexible utility...in different religious, 
political and social contexts.”28 I agree that it is precisely the flexibility that is distinctive of the 
age, but I wish to specify this pliability further as emerging from a humanist training in topical 
invention. It is the practice of topics that supports a discursive, inferential tendency common to 
divergent discourses. Gowland argues that melancholy's extended range of relevance emerges 
from the rise of Protestant interest in the passions, occult humanist learning, and neo-Stoicism, but 
he concedes that neither “the humanist preoccupation with the passions” nor, “by extension, the 
perceived increase of melancholy in England or Europe generally, are simply reducible to a 
concern with the political-religious conflicts developing after the Reformation.”29 By recovering 
melancholy as a topics, we need not pin it to any single configuration of early modern concern; 
instead, it is the dark bloom of a confluence of inferential habits.  
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Where Gowland sees melancholy's problem as the cause of its frequency, Drew Daniel 
argues that it is in the judgment of the onlooker who decides whether an emotion is sincere or 
posed. Daniel argues that melancholy is to be taken as an assemblage in the Deleuzean sense, “a 
historically unique vector for a  phenomenologically  general  problem.”30  Although his archive 
of  “paintings, drama, prose works, and poetry” are mostly within the Elizabethan and Jacobean 
periods, his inquiry is focused on a transhistorical question about the nature of emotional display, 
using the works “that repeatedly stage the melancholic as an object of speculation and mystery” to 
inquire into “the philosophical problems triggered by doubts about the material support for 
melancholy.”31 But Daniel's sense of this problem rests upon the difference between a 
“fashionable” melancholy—that is, melancholy as a posture—and something that would count as 
real, or as he glosses it here, “material.”  Daniel's point is to show that such a determination is 
undecidable. Nevertheless, he wants us to understand melancholy on “a model based on social 
extension” rather than through “its connotations of solitude and interior essence.”32 While I agree 
that there was a “generative indeterminacy” in melancholy, I do not think that this is the result of 
two competing traditions that never achieved their desired synthesis. The problem of one who is 
“out of measure sad” is not whether this disproportion is a claim to a disease or a genius, but rather, 
in the words of Shakespeare's Don John, that “there is no measure in the occasion that breeds” the 
sadness. The question of a passion's fit, its embeddedness in a scene of social life, becomes a 
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question in the melancholic. When that question is raised, the broader question of what, as a rule, 
makes a passion appropriate or not is also at hand.  
The archive of this project is unusual as it developed alongside my argument. It is therefore 
simplest to explain its composition by giving a brief account of the intellectual development of my 
project. In the Fall of 2015, I began an independent study of Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy and 
its context with Prof. David Marshall. The archive for the project began as an unfolding of this 
works weave of references and citations. The intellectual milieu of late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century England was at once diverse, hybrid, polemical, and yet often organized in 
thoroughly conventional ways. There could hardly be a better representative of this seeming 
paradox than Burton’s Anatomy. As he himself admits, it is a cento—it is a “rhapsody of rags” a 
phrase that makes more sense when we recall that paper was produced from rag-pulp. That is, 
Burton’s work is a collection of quotations joined together through a topical analysis of his subject. 
But in spite of its constant cribbing (and voluminous citational apparatus), Burton’s work should 
not be seen as simply derivative, but an original production of a literary culture that celebrated 
rather than scorned erudition, imitation, and even superfluity.  
A Mellon Dissertation Fellowship allowed me to spend the 2017-8 academic year reading 
in London’s Warburg Institute. I arrived in London, then, with a handful of hypotheses but no plan 
for how to investigate them together. I returned again to Burton’s Anatomy and began to read his 
contexts in greater depth. This meant an immersion in the Latin medical works that dealt with the 
causes of melancholia. On other days, I pursued reading in the literary works that Burton cited, 
following those through the unique arrangement of Warburg’s library. This desultory reading, 
moving me not only between genres but physically through the floors of the library, presented 
itself as an intellectual problem about the coherence of Burton’s conception of melancholy. While 
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I was at first simply working through Burton’s “rhapsody,” I slowly began to recognize a division 
within the wide literature of melancholy. Those works that attempted to know or describe 
melancholy treated the passions as symptomatic of some cause that needed to be discovered. While 
many of these works were not medical in the strict sense, they adopted a medical frame of reference 
for understanding melancholy even when they wished to praise it or attempt to render it non-
pathological. This literature was the basis for Burton’s topical catalogue of the causes of 
melancholy.  
Yet another strain of the literature identified itself with the melancholic position. 
Sometimes this was explicit though in other cases it was strongly suggested through the repeated 
themes or commonplaces associated with melancholy, a number of which I discuss in Chapter 3. 
This literature did not seek to explain the melancholic’s passion but give it grounds for expression 
and articulation.  An enormous number of and kinds of texts offered themselves as candidates here. 
I chose those genres whose proximity both to topical method and melancholic passions was most 
salient. For instance, though I began by reading in the poetic tradition and have on occasion made 
use of these texts as evidence, I was confronted by difficulties in showing the topical character of 
poetic expression. This is both because we retain a bias (however much it has been argued against) 
of reading poetic works as products of an individual’s genius and because the commonplace 
character of melancholic expression in poems actually provided less nuance and complexity in 
articulating the problematic than I discovered in genres, like the emblem and occasional 
meditation, that seemed on face to be more formulaic. Nevertheless, should others wish to discover 
the melancholic topics at work elsewhere I imagine that they too will be embarrassed with riches.  
The division in the two literatures—the knowledge of and expression of melancholy— 
nevertheless both appeared to me, trained in the history of rhetoric, as having a common 
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background of topical method. I then began to read the Renaissance tradition of topics closely,  
suspending the received notion that it was only so much revivification of an antique tradition. 
Tracing through the various significant texts in this tradition, I began to recognize that the 
secondary literature’s emphasis on Ramist method mostly captured the practices that organized 
knowledge. The expressive dimension of topics had not fallen away with the rise of Ramism, 
despite Walter Ong’s famous thesis of Ramus inauguring the “decay of dialogue.” Rather, 
passionate expression made use of a logical division in the topics themselves. Rather than the 
dichotomizing tendency that worked to classify all objects according to their difference, 
copiousness could be more readily and powerfully found by attending to and attuning to similitude. 
This distinction of emphasis between essence as difference and copiousness from similitude 
illuminated the two strains of literature I had read out of Burton. Knowledge of melancholy was a 
constant attempt to organize all of the causes. This led to a fascinating effect—everything could 
potentially be read as a cause, however indirect, of melancholia. However, the passionate 
expression of melancholy and the genres developed for that purpose consistently relied upon 
metaphorical linkings of the predicates of objects to the underdetermined attitudes of melancholic 
passion. This too made sense of my hypothesis that melancholy was a problem of the motives of 
passion: the melancholic had to invent an object for her mood. The melancholy topics was a new 
mode of attuning passionately to a common humanist intellectual background and gave birth to a 
distinctly melancholic rhetoric.  
It was against this background of a division in the Burtonian literatures that I was able to 
perceive Shakespeare’s scenes of the “melancholic’s defense”, discussed in Chapter 4, as a 
dramatization of these alternate approaches to melancholy as a problem of unmotivated passion: a 
pattern emerges where the melancholic’s companions assign the passion to some of those many 
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catalogued by Burton from the wide-ranging medical and philosophical literature on the topic. The 
melancholic’s response in refusing these causes, then, was also made possible by a tradition. The 
conflict between melancholy as a problem that needed a cause versus a passion that required 
elaboration was repeatedly dramatized in the theater. This led to me a consideration of why the 
melancholic appeared in the theater at all. The dramaturgical interpretation of this conflict was, 
paradoxically, a way of developing a character that was complexly motivated. This set the 
melancholic off distinctly from earlier characters ruled by fate or those stock characters of the 
commedia dell’arte. Yet contrary to a common hypothesis that Hamlet and his kind resulted from 
an increased emphasis on interiority, I could now read this development of a complex 
representation of the passionate human out of the rhetorical practices of the topics.  
The melancholy rhetoric of the theater, however, was mediated through notions of the 
imaginative action that made passions possible. Here I turned to the early modern treatises on the 
passions. I discovered that just as the division between melancholy as a problem of cause or 
expression could be used to interpret Burton, so too the scenes of the “melancholic’s defense” 
could be seen to turn around opposing attitudes to the imaginative objects of the passions. Whereas 
the “civil imagination” proposed the imaginative function as supporting action, specifically in its 
instrumental and calculating orientation, the “melancholic imagination,” read by medical literature 
as diseased, was re-appropriated as a privileging the metaphorical potentials discovered in sense-
experience into the elaboration of the significance of the passions. This inversion of the order of 
motives—where action is taken for the expression of passion rather than passions motivating 
action—was a means in which the theater celebrated its own form of imaginative education, 
instructing its audiences to learn to see the alternatives to calculative action directed towards 
conventional goods.  
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The political dimensions of melancholic imagination discovered in the theatrical texts were 
already partly motivated by the influence of Hobbes upon my thought, for it was first in a graduate 
seminar reading of Leviathan that the connections between passion, imagination, motive, and the 
commonwealth that Hobbes premises the construction of his civic philosophy on that I had begun 
to formulate a hypothesis about the importance of motive in early modern discourse on passions. 
This coincided with an iconographical dimension of research followed from an immersion in 
Saturn and Melancholy while at the Warburg. It was in searching a database of images that I 
recognized the melancholic posture of Abraham Bosse’s L’Homme fourré de malice, discussed in 
Chapter 5. When I learned that the creator of this image, Abraham Bosse, had been identified as 
the engraver of Hobbes’ Leviathan frontispiece I became doubly intrigued. The foundation of 
Hobbes’ theory of the state was the appropriate function of what I had termed “civil imagination.” 
The state emerged as a constant organizing force in the mental deliberation of its citizens. What 
then to make of this “flipside” of the Leviathan, a melancholy lecher, wrapped in “malice”? I 
hypothesized that Hobbes’ work sought to overcome early visions of political knowledge. My 
reading had showed me that in the Renaissance discourse on the tyrant a continual focus on his 
passions was at the core of many arguments about the right of resistance to tyrannical rule. I 
therefore sought to create a genealogy of Bosse’s image as a way of glossing Hobbes’ Leviathan 
as a complex and serious exercise in constructing a civil imagination that would be free from 
passions that could not be made legible to others—that is, the melancholic problem.  
A problem remained of why melancholy as a problem of motives seemed to appear at a 
certain historical juncture. I hypothesized that this had something to do with the topical 
investments of the period. Yet I could not represent to myself what would have replaced this. In 
the summer following my time at the Warburg Institute I began reading the medical literature on 
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melancholia that followed the period I had been studying. I noticed that the catalogue of causes I 
had taken for granted as in the sixteenth and seventeenth century medical texts no longer appeared 
in the same form. The first chapter of this dissertation was then the last to be conceptualized, for 
it is there I set out my argument for the conditions that made the problem of melancholy able to 
appear. The medical works I chose were either those whose importance was marked by constant 
references to them by contemporaries, new articulations of the problem of melancholy, or 
significant passages that showed a reorientation towards the nature of causality in medicine.  
With the exception of Hobbes and Shakespeare, and, in a more distended way, Burton, my 
archive is not organized around authors. This may make its selection of various works as 
representatives of a genre appear arbitrary, as the conventions of a genre do not produce a 
homogenous field of discourse. But it is for this reason that the originality of a particular author’s 
formulation is not necessarily at odds with its representativeness. For instance, when I discuss 
Ercole Sassonia’s phrase of the “species insensibilis” I am treating what I believe to be a hapax 
legomenon in the medical literature. Yet this striking formulation clarifies a set problem of the 
object of melancholic imagination in a unique and illuminating way. Moreover, whatever is risked 
in attempting to work from such a diverse archive is made up for in the gains of recognizing even 
in dusty works of medicine, theology, or philosophy concentrations of a problematic that may 
speak outside of its outmoded disciplinarity. While I have inevitably made errors by venturing 
beyond what I can claim to have mastery in, I welcome those who have greater familiarity in these 
areas to correct and improve the argument I have begun here. For a dissertation, after all, is more 
valuable as one’s visa into professional academic life than it is as the death certificate of one’s 
graduate studies.  
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The term melancholy variously refers to a disease, a temperament, a humor of black bile 
in its natural form or “adust” derivatives, a mood, a disposition, and the passions associated with 
each and all of these. However, it is melancholy as a passionate problem that organizes the archive 
of this dissertation. Even when “melancholy” named a temperamental inclination or a single 
passion, it was rendered through the prism of the passionate symptom of the illness — the 
passionate response is “without apparent occasion.” Melancholic passions appeared problematic 
to contemporaries. Fear and sadness were the signs of melancholia. Although there were many 
medical and physical explanations of the cause of these passions, this did not satisfy the typical 
ascription of the cause of a passion to its object. Therefore, medical explanations of the 
pathological passions did not close a field of explanation but rather opened it. The imagined object 
of melancholic fear or sadness was at once part of a physical malady and also tethered to the 
physical explanation only in the most general sense.  
My own use of melancholy in this dissertation invokes the topicalized field of discourse 
organized around the melancholy passions. I read the various and sometimes deeply elaborated 
distinctions between various meanings of the term as part of a collection of plausible explanations 
for the problem of melancholy, a passion without apparent occasion. This is also a principle by 
which a certain set of texts have been excluded from my study, for instance, many of the works 
that focus on the temperaments where melancholy features as one among many. While we often 
find in these treatises the common ascription to the melancholic of fear and sorrow, these texts do 
not invoke melancholy as the name of a problem of passions but as a received category of 
temperament. While I have sometimes invoked various texts that have a non-problematic vision 
of melancholy in one of its various meanings, these are used to provide contextual or explanatory 
material rather than as an object of this study. At the same time, since one of the primary objects 
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of this archive are the results of practices of invention, a demand that the archive be representative 
of an “average” subject is unwarranted.  
Angus Gowland has noted that previous studies of melancholy are primarily concerned 
with “its internal theoretical structure or literary expression.”33 Rather than treating these are two 
distinct discourses, my thesis holds them in tension, seeing English Baroque discourse on 
melancholy as a tension between topical organization of knowledge about its causes (as well as 
treatment) and topical techniques for its expression. By centering melancholy as a problem of 
motives and the causes of passions, I hope to place it in a field of inquiry that broadens its interest 
beyond that of specialists of early modern medicine and letters. The peculiarity of melancholy 
passions is a way of approaching a diverse field of contemporary inquiry into the history and 
present significance of emotions.   
One important nexus of contemporary inquiry into emotions is grouped under the heading 
of affect theory. In a certain way the division between a focus on the cause and the meaning of 
emotions I discovered in the early modern treatment of melancholy reappears in this contemporary 
body of literature. Those who focus on the causes of affect emphasize its biological and therefore 
non-cognitive conditions. Both Eve Kofosky Sedgwick’s work and Brian Massumi is grounded in 
the inability of affect to be caused by a cognitive appraisal of the subject. But as Wetherell notes, 
though these theories focus on the immediacy of affects, this does not mean that they can be well 
understood when divorced from a social embeddedness, for often we witness “nonconscious and 
automatic, extremely rapid, socially learnt and influenced registrations and categorizations of 
                                                 
33 Gowland, “The Problem,” 79.  
 25 
contexts and situations.”34 And if the idea of affect as “contagious” seems at first glance to offer 
the promise of moving social and cultural research on emotions away from the individual subject, 
it just as easily risks a backwards movement to the nineteenth-century theory of collectivities like 
Gustave Le Bon’s “crowds” that act in synchrony by giving up their autonomy to a collective 
affect.  
Another strain of affect theory wishes to preserve the freedom to look at any and all social 
phenomena through the lens of affect but not to surrender its analysis to its precognitive and 
somatic effects alone. Sarah Ahmed emphasizes that emotions take objects and so imply 
intentionality. The “aboutness” of emotions means they involve a stance on the world, or a way of 
apprehending the world.35 Yet my own work on melancholy looks precisely at those cases where 
“aboutness” is problematic. I see this as a potential contribution and deepening of affect theory as 
melancholy offers to show us more distinctly features of emotional phenomena like intentionality 
and social embeddedness that are taken for granted when looking at affect in other domains. 
Moreover, the insight of affect theorists like Massumi and Sedgwick should not be entirely 
abandoned: there are indeed many sub- or preconscious factors that influence and orient emotions, 
moods, and affects. Yet melancholic rhetoric shows us that these can serve as meaningful 
orientations for the melancholic subject precisely by foregoing the reduction of the meaning of a 
passion to its cause. This allows us to navigate a pressing contemporary issue. On the one hand, 
those who defend the biological causality of depression, for instance, thereby wish to show that it 
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ought to be considered “real” in a way that subjective moods and judgments may not be. Those 
who resist the biological reduction of depression to physiological explanation wish to preserve it 
as a meaningful expression and response to the extraordinary complexity of contemporary life. 
The early modern problem of melancholy shows us how we might affirm the physical reality of 
the causes of depression while at the same time holding out the possibility that its meaning is not 
exhausted by its physical reality.  
It is not an accident that the writers of depression memoirs have turned to melancholia or 
its medieval analogues like acedia or the “noonday demon.” They wish to understand depression  
not (as it is often experienced) as an illness of devastating privacy but rather a psychic and corporal 
expression of a common form (or rather deformation) of life. Ann Cvetkovich turns to the history 
of melancholy “in search of resources for alternative understandings to the medical model and 
finds them in the early Christian category of acedia.”36 These depression memoirs, such as Jeffrey 
Smith’s Where the Roots Reach For Water or Andrew Solomon’s The Noonday Demon, take up 
critical or even polemical ends precisely because as they seek to establish depression within a 
cultural frame shared with their readers. It differs from certain narratives of trauma, like the 
bestselling A Child Called It, where moral responsibility and forgiveness enclose the personal story 
into one of overcoming adversity. (It is worth noting that this work was published by Health 
Communications Inc., a publisher of self-help books. Significant doubts have been expressed about 
the veracity of Pelzer’s account of his abuse.) Alain Ehrenberg has cogently argued that depression 
is not simply a “construction of the pharmaceutical industry but a pathology arising from 
inadequacy in a social context where success is attributed to, and expected of, the autonomous 
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individual.” The threat, then, is that if depression is understood as having only natural causes that 
can be understood in isolation from social histories it will forfeit any possibility of being 
interpretable or meaningful. While I strongly agree with the project that wishes to show that nature 
is not a causality independent from histories of racism, misogyny, and class struggle, causality 
itself is not the only locus for bringing meaning to affective states whose causes are obscure or 
overdetermined.  
However, the use of history as support for the analysis of a personal history can lead the 
memoirist to an aestheticist orientation towards historical matter, as when Cvetkovich admires 
“history as the dust and dirt of the items that come from other people’s pasts.” Where such an 
orientation to history may become fodder for a richly descriptive prose, it remains antiquarian even 
as it is anachronistic. Here I draw from the subdiscipline of the history of emotions, often pegged 
to an important article of Lucien Febvre’s from 1941 entitled “Sensibility and History.” Those who 
explicitly work under this heading, like Bill Reddy, Ute Frevert, Margrit Pernau, and many others, 
there are also scholars of an earlier generation who began work, often independently of one 
another, in unique directions, including Aby Warburg, Max Weber, Johan Huizinga, Jean 
Delumeau, Ernst Bloch, Piero Camporesi, and Raymond Williams. However, until recently and 
especially in the North American context, those identifying as historians of emotion have often 
posed their work against intellectual history, seeing it as a part of social history. This is in no small 
part due to the influence of Peter Stearns, an influential historian of emotions and founder of the 
Journal of Social History and his wife and intellectual partner, Carol Stearns. Their concept of 
“emotionology,” propounded in a much cited article, distinguished the “collective emotional 
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standards of a society from the emotional experiences of individuals and groups.”37 Although they 
hoped this new concept and program of research would inspire “new contacts” between social and 
intellectual historians, they cautioned the new “emotionologists” to “not neglect earlier discoveries 
about the limits of intellectual history in exploring popular culture and behavior.”38 Insofar as what 
is imagined by “intellectual history” is a history of ideas, we would do well to heed this advice. 
However, my dissertation takes the position that close engagement with intellectual contexts may 
serve to illuminate emotional practices that would otherwise not be appreciated in their complexity 
and full social significance, as when topical practices, purportedly used for training in eloquence, 
argument, and the organization of knowledge, are appropriated for the expression, articulation, and 
recognition of melancholy passions. Moreover, emotionology as a “collective standard” also does 
not adequately account for the idiosyncratic and problematic phenomena of social emotions. While 
their methodology significant in its ability to establish what Reddy has termed the “emotional 
regime” but it cannot continue to pursue an inquiry into those passions that are unable to be 
accounted for within it. These, of course, are precisely the object of my own dissertation, passions 
whose “occasion” are not apparent.  
 I cautiously advance the claim that the approach to the history of passions in this 
dissertation offers a distinct alternative both to an intellectual history that values the “influential” 
for its own sake and a social history that prizes the “representative” for its own sake. The historical 
formation of melancholy as a problem of motives resonates with us not only because of its 
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Standards,” The American Historical Review 90, no. 4 (1985), 813. 
38 Ibid., 816. 
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significance in its own period but for its power to illuminate our present concerns with the meaning 
of the present of emotional life. I also reject the opposition of intellectual and emotional life. Rather 
than beginning with a misogynistic logic that separates and then genders emotion and rationality, 
my project attempts to show that intellectual history and histories of emotion ought not to be seen 
as competing specializations but rather as different emphases of historical interpretation. My 
dissertation argues that these emphases need not be separated into distinct monographs and fields 
but instead can be drawn upon for illuminating various aspects of historical texts, artifacts, and 
practices. Yet I am wary of one approach to bridging this divide that describes emotions as having 
“rational content.” Rather, I find a richer ground for theorization in the early modern idiom of the 
imagination. In attending to early modern theories of the passions, especially as set forth in the 
genre of the treatise on the passions, the distinction between emotions as either rational or irrational 
is obviated—at least in the sense given to these terms in contemporary theoretical debates.  
My own approach to the problem of passions without occasion is that of a rhetorician.39 
My project engages with several contemporary discussions in rhetorical theory. A potential 
                                                 
39 I am not the first rhetorician to find in melancholia a provocation to rhetorical concerns. Perhaps most 
proximate to my own work, Susan Wells has read Burton’s discursive digressiveness as a model for reconsidering 
genre, thinking of it spatially rather than as instances of a type, or “species.” Her work is forthcoming in September 
2019 as Robert Burton’s Rhetoric: An Anatomy of Ealry Modern Knowledge, published by Penn State University 
Press. See also Barbara Biesecker’s Biesecker, Barbara. “No time for mourning: The rhetorical production of the 
melancholic citizen-subject in the war on terror.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 40, no. 1 (2007), 147-169, where she offers 
a psychoanalytic interpretation of the political will for invasion of Iraq, and Phillipe-Joseph Salazar's “Rhetoric on the 
Bleachers, or, The Rhetorician as Melancholiac.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 41, no. 4 (2008), 356-374, where he turns 
the term onto the field of rhetoric, descrying a permanent mood in the practice of rhetorical criticism. The melancholic 
rhetorician takes an indefinite nostalgia for some lost “rhetorical norms.”   
 30 
contribution of this project is a reassessment of the concept of the “rhetorical situation.” Whether 
one thinks the concept of situation is the lynchpin or the bête noire of rhetorical theory, its 
prominence in Anglophone literature is perennial. Lloyd Bitzer's early articulation of the 
“rhetorical situation” has generated a minor theoretical literature. Richard Vatz has argued against 
Bitzer with the opinion that rhetoric must constitute, rather than await, its situation and its 
audience. Vatz's position has been developed by many others, most notably Barbara Biesecker. In 
her 1989 article, “Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation,” she argues that a deconstruction of the 
both the position of speaker and audience as “constituted in and by the play of différance.”40 More 
recently, the pendulum has swung away from an emphasis on discursivity to one on materiality. 
One recent attempt to enlarge the scope of situated rhetoricity in this framework is Thomas 
Rickert’s Ambient Rhetoric. As the title implies, Rickert’s project doubles down on a Heideggerean 
attunement. The early modern archive of melancholy offers an antistrophe to Heideggerean 
attunement. Melancholy is a detunement from the ambiens. In early modern medical jargon, 
something is awry in the six non-naturals, one of which is “air.” Indeed, the melancholic was often 
compared to a “lute out of tune.” Moreover, it was precisely in this condition, when one’s 
surroundings are not ready-at-hand, that they require inquiry and investigation. We can see 
Burton’s project in the Anatomy as a historical and philosophical elaboration of all the possibilities 
of detunement: one must see whether there is some problem in the air, sleeping and waking, one’s 
diet, sexual life, the regulation of passions and bodily fluids, etc. This bringing to consciousness 
of the ambient in the melancholic inquiry brings out a level of depth and complexity we do not 
                                                 
40 Barbara A. Biesecker, “Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation from within the Thematic of 'Différance',” 
Philosophy & Rhetoric 22, no. 2 (1989), 126.  
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feel in the perfect fit of “attunement.” At the same time, the “detunement” of the melancholic is a 
problem that contains a trace of something extra-discursive to which it responds, encouraging us 
take up an inquiry that does not cease with deconstruction.  
The most obvious contribution to rhetorical history made by my project is its attention to 
an often-overlooked period. While intellectual, cultural, and literary historians have produced an 
enormous body of scholarship on early modern rhetoric, North American rhetoricians have given 
little—and typically unsustained—attention to all that falls between the ancient and the modern. 
To find book-length treatments of early modern rhetoric within communication or rhetorical 
studies we must cast a wide net in a back catalogue of graduate seminar readings. The older 
literature here tends to be from the media studies tradition. Walter Ong’s Ramus, Method, and the 
Decay of Dialogue suffers the fate of many academic “classics” (often cited, rarely read), but its 
discovery of a transformation in European thought in the works of the sixteenth-century pedant, 
Peter Ramus, showed that philological work on early modern sources could result in major 
theoretical insights. Elizabeth Eisenstein's 1979 The Printing Press as an Agent of Change remains 
a landmark text both in historical media theory and early modern studies. However, within the 
latter field it has been surpassed by works such as Ann Moss' 1996 Printed Commonplace-Books 
that show a more complex relation between the technology of printing and humanist techniques.  
Thomas Sloane’s 1985 Donne, Milton, and the End of Humanist Rhetoric sought to recover how 
in the seventeenth century English rhetoric learned to “think” again, discovering in Donne’s poetry 
the elaboration of controversia, “the search for probability by imagining the possible cases of 
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opponents in dispute.”41 A rhetoric lived on in modern English with the thinking-through of 
controversy, and the poets—rather than the pamphleteers—were responsible for its survival. As 
media theory developed its interest in early modern history has waned, as the dates of these works 
suggest.   
Closer to the interests of my study are several contemporary expeditions into the early 
modern archive that have stakes in current concerns within rhetorical studies. Daniel Gross’ The 
Secret History of Emotion reads early modern English and German sources to reveal a complex 
social understanding of emotional community and how differences in and claims to emotional 
response manifest relations of power. Nancy Struever’s Rhetoric, Modality, Modernity sets out a 
bold new agenda for rhetorical inquiry as civic inquiry into possibility, taking her lead principally 
from original readings of Hobbes and Vico. Several of Victoria Kahn's works, including 
Machiavellian Rhetoric and The Future of an Illusion, develop a hermeneutics of reading early 
modern texts “rhetorically”—that is, in opposition to rendering them as statements of “thematic or 
positive argument.” She instead attends to the period’s literary culture's techniques of “topics, 
maxims, commonplaces, and, in particular, argument on both sides of the question,” as a form of 
“dialectical thinking.”42 My work intends to deepen and further specify the initiatives set out in 
these works. With Gross, I attend to the economy of passions in the early modern, finding particular 
intensities and complications within the problematic of melancholy. With Struever, I read uses of 
the rhetorical vocabulary inherited from the ancients in light of early modern attempts to delimit 
                                                 
41 Thomas O. Sloane, Donne, Milton, and the End of Humanist Rhetoric (Berkeley : University of California 
Press, 1985), 287. 
42 Victoria Kahn, Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counter-Reformation to Milton (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 5.  
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possibilities, finding with her a special affinity between the medical and the literary elaborations 
of melancholic causes, symptoms, and effects. With Kahn, I argue for seeing in the rhetoricity of 
early modern melancholy a dialectical position that is not isolated from but stands in tension with 
civic humanism. 
Apart from the specific contributions to expanding the field’s sense of early modern 
rhetoric, my project also engages broader concerns with rhetorical historiography. The recent 
edited collection Theorizing Histories of Rhetoric represents the broad range of historiographical 
views within the field today and sets out an agenda for future research. My approach to historical 
practice finds kinship with Steven Mailloux’s articulation of “enactment” as method, an 
“explication of a past interpretation” rather than the “object-historical” approach that dominates 
rhetorical studies—an approach that “appropriates the otherness of the past into a present-day, 
object-filled framework for sense making.”43 A similar orientation guides my own project, but 
where Mailloux (and innumerable other scholars influenced by Foucault) seek to map out regimes 
of praxis, I focus on idiosyncratic enactments of common practices. My approach is a perhaps 
unholy alliance of various more or less recognizable historiographical positions, borrowing equally 
from the Collingwoodian “logic of question and answer” and the Foucauldian sense of a discourse 
as encompassing not only the “speech acts” that intellectual historians keenly read out in their 
archives, but also itself having to be actively “controlled, selected, organized, and redistributed by 
a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery 
                                                 
43 Steven Mailloux, “Enactment History, Jesuit Practices, and Rhetorical Hermeneutics,” in Theorizing 
Histories of Rhetoric, ed. Michelle Bailiff (Carbondale : Southern Illinois University Press, 2013), 38-9. 
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over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.”44 But because Foucault's 
focus was almost always on a “discours à prétention scientifique” to follow his example would 
denature the shape of Baroque melancholy at those sites where it crosses forms of speech and 
practice that were not considered scientific (in whatever sense one translates that anachronism into 
the seventeenth century). Indeed, it is not simply the use of knowledge that is the object of this 
study, but the use of doubt; they are two movements in push and parry around the figure of the 
melancholic.   
So far I have articulated the general orientation of this dissertation. In the remainder of the 
introduction, I will describe each chapter in turn. In the first chapter, “From Allegory to Asylum: 
The Problem of Melancholy in Baroque England and its Eclipse,” I argue that seventeenth-century 
medicine organized a topics of possible causes around the problem of melancholy. The best 
representative of this is Burton's Anatomy. In comparing the original 1632 frontispiece of his work 
with a later, nineteenth-century image of the melancholic, I argue that the problem of melancholy 
as a passion “without any apparant occasion” was occluded by developments in medicine that 
sought to reduce the scope of causality. In post-Newtonian medicine, melancholy becomes 
enclosed within the “animal economy,” a historical conception of the physiological space of the 
                                                 
44 “Voici l'hypothèse que je voudrais avancer, ce soir, pour fixer le lieu-ou peut-être le très provisoire théâtre 
du travail que je fais: je suppose que dans toute société la production du discours est à la fois contrôlée, sélectionnée, 
organisée et redistribuée par un certain nombre de procédures qui ont pour rôle d'en conjurer les pouvoirs et les 
dangers, d'en maîtriser l'événement aléatoire, d'en esquiver la lourde, la redoutable matérialité.” Michel Foucault, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 216.  
 
 
 35 
body's interior. The reduction of causality eclipses the social dimension of the problem of 
melancholy.  
Where in the first chapter I chart a “topics” of the causes of melancholy, in the following 
two chapters I set forth an account of a melancholy topics, one that resisted simple ascriptions of 
cause to melancholic passion and instead found in its underdetermination a resource for the 
articulation of melancholic experience. In the second chapter, “A Thousand Similes: Humanist 
Dialectic as the Foundation of a Melancholy Topics,” I offer a reading of humanist dialectic, 
particularly in its articulation in Rudolph Agricola's De inventione dialectica, as a form of 
imagination. I argue that the humanist rediscovery of inventio was incorporated into dialectic in 
such a way as to extend its scope beyond the situated controversies typical of the ars topica in the 
classical tradition. The expansion of inventional dialectic was premised upon a notion of natural 
similitude between all things. As dialectic became imagined as a natural faculty, the practice of 
recognizing topical similarity between things instituted a form of experience that would be taken 
up in the articulation of melancholic experience.  
I turn to the practices of articulating melancholy passions in the third chapter, “Melancholy 
Rhetoric: Commonplace and Emblem as Mood and Experience.” Here I return to Shakespeare's 
Jaques as an avatar for the rhetorical practices emerging from the “melancholy topics.” I show 
how the topicalized imagination developed into practices of the melancholy commonplaces, 
emblematic perception, and occasional meditation. The emblem book trained its readers in a mode 
of emblematic perception, attested to by vanitas painting and the popular genre of the “occasional 
meditation.” The collection of these practices generates a form of experience that serves as a 
counterpoint to the rival notion of experience as practical, political wisdom, seen in competing 
vision of what makes one a “traveler” in the world. These practices of discovering resources for 
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inquiring into the qualities and meanings of passion extended rhetorical invention into the intimate 
realm of private passions, or indeed, constituted them.  
The two competing topics of the causes of melancholy and the aritculation of melancholic 
experience confronted one another most fully in the representation of melancholics in the theater. 
In the fourth chapter, “The Motive and Cue: Melancholy in the Baroque Theater” I take up the 
question of the melancholic in the English popular theater. First, I show that popular theater 
developed techniques for the representation of motives. Then, I articulate the contemporary theory 
of motives through a reading of the relation between imagination and passion in seventeenth-
century treatises on the passions. Finally, I read the Shakespearean figure of the melancholic as a 
theatrical representation of a conflict between two imaginative orientations, the melancholic and 
the civil. I look to melancholic characters—Queen Isabel in Richard II, Romeo in Romeo and 
Juliet, and Antonio in The Merchant of Venice—to study the problems of motive the theater 
represents in each case. 
 If the theater demonstrates the problem the melancholic posed to a predictable system of 
motives, the institution of a stable administrative state was predicated upon suppressing 
melancholic passions. In the fifth chapter, “Tyrannophobia: The Baroque Image of the Tyrant,” I 
examine a particular use of the melancholic problematic in a political context: the image of the 
tyrant. Beginning with a discussion of Hobbes’ Leviathan, I offer an analysis of another engraving 
by Abraham Bosse, the Frenchman who composed the book’s famous frontispiece, reading both 
works as companion pieces. I argue that the image of a sad, lecherous king is a satire on the 
traditional iconology of the melancholic tyrant. I trace a genealogy of this figure through the Italian 
Renaissance writings of Poggio Bracciolini to the Latin closet drama and Monarchomach writings 
of sixteenth-century Scottish humanist George Buchanan. I argue that Buchanan’s depictions of 
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the sad and fearful tyrants are a vivid part of a tradition that argued for the need to check the king's 
power because of the inevitable effects absolute sovereignty would have upon a fallen nature. I 
conclude that the Leviathan, the first modern imagination of the state, is able to provide a cause of 
passions without suffering them itself. We may fear Leviathan, but Leviathan itself has no fear. It 
is this re-orientation of passionate motives that makes state-structure possible.  
Baroque melancholy was experienced as a state of uncertainty; its causes were at best 
probable, its symptoms various, its prognosis unclear. We might say that independent of the 
physicians, melancholy carried with it its own second opinion. All of that may apply also to this 
dissertation. It is a work also undertaken in the hopes of sustaining an uncertainty. If it cannot 
provide answers, my hope is that it can communicate a passionate question to those who follow its 
inquiry into the questions posed by the passions themselves. 
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2.0 Chapter 1: From Allegory to Asylum: The Problem of Melancholy in Baroque England 
and its Eclipse 
2.1 A Tale of Two Frontispieces 
I have before me, in rather poor condition, an 1857 reprinting of Robert Burton’s The 
Anatomy of Melancholy. This work is a library in one volume. It is a seventeenth-century 
compendium of all previous thought on the condition known since antiquity as melancholia. It is 
remarkable for the publisher’s decision to insert a second, contemporary image, giving the book 
two frontispieces on facing pages.  On the left, we find an engraving based on an design made in 
1804. On the right, a facsimile of the work's 1628 frontispiece.45 The difference between these two 
images suggests that a significant and perhaps even radical transformation had taken place in the 
meaning of melancholy. Yet they were prefaced to the same work, as if this difference was not 
perceived by the nineteenth-century publisher.  Taking them together, they become a condensation 
of a striking transformation that occurred in the discourse on this disorder over the course of almost 
two centuries. The task now is to articulate both the significance of these two images of melancholy 
and also how their alien perspectives could have been seen as two instances of the same 
phenomenon. I want to read these images together as a fraught unity: let it be the diptych of a 
difference.  
                                                 
45 I have here included an image not of the facsimile, whose quality is poor, but a reproduction of the original 
frontispiece. 
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Figure 1 — The 1632 frontispiece of The Anatomy of Melancholy 
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Figure 2 — A nineteenth-century engraving of melancholic madness 
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The original frontispiece (Fig. 1) first strikes the modern viewer with its copiousness. We 
find ten distinct pictures ranged around the title plate. Each is given a title, appearing on a scroll 
at the bottom of its frame.46 The upper corners show two woodland scenes, populated with a variety 
of fauna, respectively labelled Zelotipia—Latin for jealousy—and Solitudo. We read in the 
accompanying verse description that the “landscape of Jealousy” contains a “kingfisher, a swan, 
an hern” and “two-fighting cocks.”47 We find a reason for associating these animals with jealousy 
deep in the leaves of Burton’s tome. He tells us that, according to Vives, “Swannes, Doves, Cocks, 
Bulls, &c.” are particularly jealous creatures.48 The sleeping dog in the “portraiture” of solitude is 
a visual quote of Dürer’s famous allegorical print, Melencolia I. In this famous 1514 print, a dog 
sleeps at the foot of a winged figure, perhaps an angel, deep in thought, surrounded by the tools of 
a geometer. Between these two panels we find Democritus, the ancient atomist, in the posture of 
the melancholic thinker, made iconic by Dürer's print. His head rests on his hand as he gazes off, 
ruminating. He sits in an outcrop with a book across his lap. A walled garden behind him is littered 
with the carcasses of animals. This is an allusion to Burton’s interpretation of a classical passage 
                                                 
46 The enigmatic character of this image is not merely an effect of historical distance; it was a lure to the gaze 
of contemporary readers who delighted in visual allegories. Although the frontispiece appeared first simply as an 
image, in the fourth edition the frames were numbered, and a key was provided to their meaning in the form of a poem 
written by the author. This is an indication that readers had asked for a legend to decode this image, and yet Burton 
preserved an air of mystery in his riddling stanzas. There is nevertheless the complication that Burton’s accompanying 
poem sometimes references something clearly not part of the image, as in the “two raging bulls” of the stanza 
accompanying the first panel, nowhere to be found in the print. He seems aware of this possibility in the poem as it 
tells the reader to “[m]ark well: if ‘t be not as ‘t should be,/Blame the bad cutter, and not me.” 
47 AM, lxii. 
48 AM, 3.277. [3.3.1.1.] 
 42 
in the Hippocratean Letter to Damagetes. Democritus was “busie in cutting up severall Beasts, to 
finde out the cause of madnesse, and melancholy.”49 He was performing anatomies “to see the 
cause of these distempers, vanities, and follies,” though he admits “such proofe were better made 
on mans body,” if only his “kinde nature would endure” the sight.50 It is no accident that in the 
central panel, “Democritus Junior,” Burton’s nom de plume, visually descends from the ancient 
philosopher in central panel above him. This arrangement suggests that the Anatomy of Democritus 
Junior is an attempt to complete the anatomical inquiry begun in Democritus’ garden, turning it 
from the bodies of beasts to the bodies—and souls—of humankind.51 
The frontispiece's side panels present us with four figures, each representing a variation of 
melancholy. First, we see the Inammorato, a youthful, unmasked male lover of commedia 
dell’arte, or, following the fame of Boiardo's Renaissance epic, Orlando inammorato, a figure 
inflamed with a knightly love passion, prepared to duel for his lady's honor. At his feet are personal 
effects: a lute, laurels, a scroll with musical notation, some scattered papers. He is dressed in finery. 
A ruff, broad-brimmed hat, tight doublet, a cuirass at his side, perhaps a mark of the threat of 
romantic jealousy—all are mocked as “symptoms of his vanity” in Burton’s poetic gloss.  
The young lover seems at a great distance from the typical medical pathology of 
melancholia, marked by bodily pain, languor, constipation, and fatigue. This long medical tradition 
is captured in the figure of Hypochondriacus, a representative of ‘windy melancholy,’ so named 
because of the painful “wind” that was thought to originate in the left hypochondrium, the upper 
                                                 
49 AM, 1.33.  
50 AM, 1.36.  
51 Angus Gowland, The Worlds of Renaissance Melancholy: Robert Burton in Context (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 8-9.  
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region of the abdomen where the spleen is located. His floor is littered with empty vials and 
pharmacopoeic recipes. We sense he frequents the apothecary too often. He seems to be dressed 
in regal garments and donning something like a crown. This could be yet another symptom of the 
disease, since “melancholy men, and sicke men, conceave so many phantasticall visions, 
apparitions to themselves, and have such absurd apparitions, as that they are Kings.”52 He appears 
to be a man of means, even if his luxury brings him no relief.  
The bodily discomfiture of the “windy” melancholic has no obvious connection to the 
spiritual anguish we find in “religious melancholy,” here represented by a figure titled 
Superstitiosus. He is praying with the assistance of a rosary, bears a tonsure, and dons an austere 
habit. He is perhaps a Franciscan friar. Although Burton included the standard arguments against 
“popishness” throughout his work, here he nevertheless uses this image to shame the viewer. The 
stanza coupled with the image tells us that the man we see “for Hell perhaps he takes more 
paine/Then [sic] thou dost, Heaven it selfe to gaine.”53 He looks up, away from the viewer, to a 
cross, the subject of his meditations.  
Each of these figures can be seen as having a successively smaller contact with society: the 
lover abandons all of his beloved, the hypochondriac rarely leaves his private study, and the 
religious figure abandons the world for the asceticism of an anchorite. But it is with Maniacus, the 
final figure of the group, where we find a figure literally enclosed within a cell, shunned and 
abandoned by the world. He is dressed in rags and bound in chains that perhaps he has recently 
been able to break in an episode of furor. He seems to have only just broken the chain on one of 
                                                 
52 AM,1.252. [1.2.3.2.] 
53 AM,1.lxii.  
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his fetters. Again, the viewer is addressed in a tone of reproach. We are told to “observe him; for 
as in a glass,/Thine angry portraiture it was.”54 He wears rags and his hair is disheveled. He is 
likely a resident of Bedlam, the infamous madhouse.  
The 1804 image (Fig. 2) shows a portrait of a melancholic having descended into madness, 
as if we have retained only the figure of the maniac. Now he is rendered in greater detail and 
brought into a new time. A strait-coated55 figure, gaze distrait, is seated in a room of a private 
asylum. His children vainly clamor for his attention while his wife weeps in the corridor, muffling 
her sobs in a kerchief. She is too distressed to witness the scene placed before us, the impartial 
spectators. The man’s bulging eyes are directed to some unoccupied corner of the room. He grins—
or grimaces—stiffly.  We are witness to a domestic tragedy. Under the image, we read a caption: 
 
……………………forgotten quite 
All former scenes of dear delight, 
Connubial love – parental joy – 
But all is dark within………….. 
 
This fragment of verse is excerpted from “Madness” a poem of Rev. Thomas Penrose, first 
published in 1775. The selection is appropriate; Penrose’s rhapsody is almost certainly an 
imaginative description of Burton’s original frontispiece. In the stanza that supplies the excerpt 
selected for the caption, he writes of the madness of “the fetter'd Maniac” who “foams along,” but 
also of three other characters. We hear of a “the love-lorn maid” who is, perhaps, our Inammorato 
                                                 
54 Ibid.  
55 The “strait-waistcoat” was in use in private madhouses as early as the 1730s. Its first description in print 
can be found in David MacBride’s A methodical introduction to the theory and practice of physic (London: Strahan 
et al., 1772), 591-2.  
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with a telling change of gender.56 There is an obscurely sketched figure he calls “the Momus of 
the flighty train” but who is recognizable as Hypochondriacus when we are told he is “Blanket-
robed, and antick crown'd” a “mimick monarch.” Finally, the allusion to Burton's Superstitiosus is 
unambiguous when we come to “devotion's ruin'd child” whose mind is clouded by 
“Superstition.”57  
The final stanza of the complete, 1775 poem performs an abrupt halt to this pageant of 
figures: “too thick they croud, — too close they throng.” Madness has produced a whole troupe of 
characters, too many to name. We are instructed to “o'er the hapless groupe low drop Compassion's 
veil.”58 Where Burton wanted us to keep the madman’s image “still in [our] presence,” here we 
are instructed to not look too long—for pity’s sake.  
The movement of Penrose's “Madness” from a veiled ekphrasis of the Anatomy’s 
frontispiece to its appearance as a caption of the Thurston image, now also its frontispiece, is 
uncanny. We can trace its lineage through one more branching. We find a woodcut print published 
alongside Penrose’s poem in the January 1812 edition of Polyanthos, a literary review (Fig. 3).59 
In the copperplate iteration of this image reproduced above, we note that a chain hanging by the 
                                                 
56 James Hammond et. al., The Poems of Hammond, Shaw, Lovibond, Penrose (Chiswick, Press of C. 
Whittingham, 1822), 212.  
57 Ibid., 213.  
58 Ibid., 214.  
59 This image is itself curious, as it appears to be the only of its kind printed in the whole run of the review. 
Elsewhere, the only images appearing are standard portraits accompanying the ‘lives’ of prominent individuals. The 
portraits are provided, as noted in the June 1807 article on “Suliman Mellimelni,” “[t]o gratify the curiosity of our 
readers.”  
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young boy has been removed, perhaps in deference to a keener sense of the moral problematics 
surrounding the use of restraints. The image of “connubial love” is rendered explicit with the 
spouse, overwhelmed with grief, who stands outside the room.  Although Penrose took up the 
theme of madness as a conceit for expressing a variety of figures, the accompanying image reduces 
madness to the maniac.   
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Figure 3 — A woodcut of the melancholic madman 
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Where Burton's frontispiece gazed at the reader and rendered moral judgment upon the 
person who wished to distance herself from its figures, here the melodrama forestalls any 
possibility of commerce with the mad subject. Despite his seeming fixation on something “out of 
frame,” the verse caption, like the learned words of a psychiatrist, assure us that this is an illusion. 
He is a void. Though the mise-en-scène of this image places the mad melancholic in the center of 
a family portrait, this only heightens the distance of his diseased mind from society. The curious 
ekphrastic translation from image to text and back into a new image gives us insight into a shift in 
the imagination of melancholic mania. Penrose looked at Burton’s Maniacus and read into it the 
attitude towards the mad of his own day. Where Burton saw the madman as resembling, for 
instance, the rage of a gambling after losing and distinguished from melancholy by its vehemence, 
Penrose rewrites the Maniac as one who is not vehement at all but emptied of memory and contact 
with the concerns of the world.  
The difference between the two frontispieces is an index of profound discontinuity in the 
interpretation of the Anatomy and therefore of melancholy itself, the subject of Burton's work. 
What Burton meant by “melancholy” required a lush presentation of variety, one he identified with 
the theatrum mundi. The early nineteenth century found the epitome of the melancholic in the 
singular, gentleman patient, isolated in his own mental world. What was nature of this 
transformation of melancholy from allegory to melodrama? What can account for the movement 
from a superflux of meaning that required a legend in Burton’s book to an image that tells us 
meaning is forestalled within the melancholic, that “all is dark within”?  It is tempting to write 
down this difference to a simple opposition of style. The later image is a medicalized example of 
period melodrama, fit for a penny dreadful, while the Baroque image is typically allegorical, 
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copious, and polysemic. This, I think, would be a mistake. There was indeed a transformation in 
the meaning of melancholy in the first half of the eighteenth century.  
2.2 Melancholy and Baroque Causality 
My contention is this: in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, melancholy 
held a place in the English imagination as a general problem of motives. The formulation of this 
problematic had two characteristic features. The most marked symptom of pathological 
melancholy was an untethered passion, “fear and sadness without apparent occasion” as Burton 
puts it. That is, melancholic passions were those not legible as an appropriate response to a shared 
reality. Burton compares this characteristic of the melancholic symptoms to hounds that “many 
times run away with a false cry, never perceiving themselves to be at a fault.”60 The image is apt. 
The hound's cry is at once a response of fear or excitement to perceived danger or prey and a 
communication of this to others. Passions too are responsive to a perception of the world and 
communicate the subject's evaluation of it. Importantly, in the Renaissance, this was thought to be 
connected to motion towards a desideratum and flight from the feared. In this sense, the 
melancholic was a stand-in for errors of judgment and perception, like the dog who flees or chases 
nothing. Yet the metaphor contains another possibility; perhaps after all the hound does sense 
something, yet indefinite and not commonly perceived. The reason for the cry is not “apparent.” 
Much of the discourse on melancholy turns upon the question of whether an individual's passionate 
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response is sufficiently justified, whether it constitutes appropriate grounds for acting in 
accordance with its feeling or instead whether the passion must be corrected.  
The uncertainty of the causes of melancholic passions was uniquely sustained by the 
openness of Galenic medicine to the consideration of many types of causality. This is perhaps 
surprising; what is commonly remembered of this antique system was its insistence upon humoral 
imbalance or dyskrasia as the cause of all disease. To the extent that this is true, it nevertheless 
underestimates the complexity of humoral causality. Galenic physiology developed an elaborate 
system predicated on the quantities and qualities of the four bodily humors, to wit, blood, black 
bile, yellow bile, and phlegm. Each was associated with certain ratios of moisture and heat; while 
blood was wet and hot, black bile was cold and damp; phlegm was hot and dry while yellow bile 
was cold and wet. This same combinatorial arrangement was applied to the four elements so that 
each humor was felt to participate more in that element: blood with air, black bile with earth, 
phlegm with water, yellow bile with fire. Health was understood as the peculiar kind of balance of 
the humors to which each individual was naturally inclined; Galen recognized “nine possible 
mixtures” of humors that were called temperaments by “later Latinate interpreters.”61 The first 
was “an exact balance of the four Aristotelian primary qualities—hot, cold, wet and dry,” while 
the others showed “a predominance of one or two qualities, which indicated a predisposition to 
certain types of illness rather than being in themselves unhealthy.”62 A person who naturally had 
more black bile in their bodies, and so was inclined to dry and cold, had a melancholic 
temperament. But the features of pathology and temperament were often indistinct in the medieval 
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and early modern accounts, as “complexionate melancholy shared the core qualities of the disease 
of melancholy.”63  
The pathological form of black bile could be produced in the body in two distinct ways: 
either through an excess of “natural” black bile, thought to be produced from the “dregs” of blood, 
or through a second pathological process of “adustion” in which a humor ignites and its smoky 
vapor darkened the animal spirits, responsible for coordinated mental activity with bodily action.64 
Melancholia became the name of that disease in which an excess or vapor of black bile caused 
prolonged “fear and sadness.”65 Galen distinguished three versions of the disease in his  De locis 
affectis: the first, located only in the brain, the second, throughout the blood so over the whole 
body, and a third with its origin in the gut [ortum a ventriculo], though later commentators would 
often hypothesize a splenetic origin for this, the “windy” [flatuosa] kind of melancholia. Various 
hypotheses developed about how black bile could produce passionate and imaginative 
disturbances. For instance, the dark fumes of adust mile could create an “inner darkness” that the 
melancholic feared just as children fear the dark around them. Another argued that the rarified 
animal spirits required for many functions, including sensation and voluntary action, became 
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infected with the sooty residue of atrabilis, slowing them and distorting the function of the organs. 
Yet another thought that the cool, dry qualities of the humor distempered the brain and especially 
its imaginative power.  However, beyond the humoral causes, melancholy could be recognized in 
its symptoms. All melancholics exhibit fear and sadness, a judgment in which Galen agrees with 
Hippocrates. However, beneath this common symptom of passion is a gallery of chimeras, 
figments of the melancholic's diseased imagination; one melancholic fears that Atlas will tire and 
shrug off the world, another, thinking himself a snail, runs from company because he does not 
want his shell crushed, and another imitates the song of the cocks whenever he hears it.66 It was in 
part that the melancholic was a subject for exploring such a gallery that they provided some 
fascination for early modern Europeans, giving an excuse for a “curieuse recherche” of their 
diverse imaginations.67  
The humoral theory did not serve as an explanation of the “causeless passions,” but instead 
brought a unity to a field of possibilities. The arabesques by which all of the passions were woven 
together into the facets of this humor were not outcomes of the humoral theory save in that the 
notion of a humor directed all the various resources of explanation back again ultimately to the 
body’s mystery. While humoral changes and interactions were the theoretical foundation of 
pathological causality, practical treatment required a recognition of what external factors brought 
about those changes. Because the humors were integrated into the system of natural elements, their 
composition was not different in kind from any other natural object. The Renaissance Galenic 
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body could not be removed from the world; causes of disease were of a piece with changes in the 
weather, the relative moisture and heat in one's diet, even the movements of the stars. Cause was 
not only explanatory, but also a specification of what was responsible for disease. Therefore, the 
“investigation of causes was essential to Galenic diagnosis, and emphasis on the necessity of their 
knowledge (even on a conjectural basis) to successful   treatment   was   the   hallmark   of   neo-
Galenic rationalism.”68 Physicians had to consider the six “non-naturals” of regimen, namely, diet, 
sleeping and waking, exercise, bodily retentions and excretions, air and all climatic effects, and 
the passion themselves. There were also potential supernatural causes of disease, as when God 
punished someone for their sins or the devil tempted someone into theirs. Luther had famously 
said that a melancholy head was the devil's bath or balneum diaboli. But beyond all this there were 
still a potentially infinite list of “adventitious” causes, in which Burton included nurses, education, 
terrors, jests at one's expense, imprisonment, poverty, other diseases of the whole body or organs, 
the death of loved ones, and many others. Therefore, to investigate the “false cry” of the 
melancholic by looking at all its potential causes was to rediscover the whole world, but now as 
something uncertain, tinged with the mood of the passion to which any of its parts may be the 
cause. However, as medical theory increasingly reduced the kinds of causality it recognized in 
pathology in the early eighteenth century this problematic was eclipsed. The cultural meaning of 
melancholy shifted from a question about the relation between passion and action to a continuum 
of nervous states, encompassing romantic moods and the mental alienation of the madhouse 
patient.  
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To see the meaning of Burton's melancholy we must account for his allegory. What can we 
make of Burton’s four figures? What holds together this group that appeared to him and his 
contemporaries as melancholy? We can begin to explore this by looking at each in turn as they 
were discussed or treated by others at this time. Imagine we are in London in the 1630s. A 
gentleman is confined to his quarters, complaining of wind in his side. We can be sure he is a 
member of the upper class, as Michael MacDonald has showed that diagnoses of melancholia were 
almost entirely reserved for upper classes while similar symptomologies in commoners were 
dubbed “mopishness.”69 He is a melancholic of the “hypochondriack” variety, so named for that 
area of the body just below the rib cage—what Burton Englishes as the “hypochondries”—where 
a vapor of black bile was thought to originate, and which gave rise to a range of unspecified and 
constant complaints. This form of the disease was given special attention, since “early modern 
writers claimed to detect a prevalence of the hypochondriacal melancholy in particular,”70 
including Burton himself who called it the “most grievous and frequent” form of melancholy.71 
Daniel Oxenbridge, a physician practicing in London, gives this account of one such patient he 
treated:  
Mr. Kyder, aged 55, in the Autumn, 1637, hypochondriacally Melancholy, troubled 
with Fumes, Frights, Fears, Perplexities, Sadness, Heaviness, discontented without 
a manifest Occasion; he feared more than ever the Plague, was troubled to hear the 
Bells toll, had unquiet Sleeps, durst not lye alone in his Chamber, he started and 
had Frights in his Sleep and in the Day, Apprehension of Death and Infamy 
causelessly; he was very hot in his Hands and Mouth; upon drinking but a little 
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Wine He had a Pain, Weight, and Heaviness at his Heart and Palpitation thereof 
and small Occasions would raise these Fits.72  
 
Attending closely to this typical case and its method of recording will tell us much about 
how a typical seventeenth-century physician approached the melancholic. First, there is the matter 
of the work itself, entitled General Observations and prescriptions in the practice of physic on 
several persons of quality. That these were “observations” signaled the work’s inclusion within 
the medical genre of observationes, “a distinctly late-Renaissance genre, a specific product of 
humanistic medicine.”73 Unlike its medieval cousin, consilia, in which case histories were 
organized as illustrations of theoretical descriptions of disease, the observatio privileged personal 
and historical details of patients, detailed specific treatments provided, and often, if not always, 
gave a narrative of the course of the disease in the individual patient. This “intellectual novelty of 
the sixteenth century”74 became increasingly common as a humanistic practice of medical note-
taking developed throughout the seventeenth century. This meant that there was increasingly some 
daylight between the still-dominant Galenic medical theory as well as its attendant physiology and 
the attention paid to individual cases. Oxenbridge is intent upon writing down the relevant 
complaints of his patient even if he cannot bring them under a physiological explanation.   
Second, throughout we hear a certain refrainhis symptoms are “without a manifest 
Occasion,” he fears “causelessly,” he responds fitfully to “small Occasions.” Sure enough, this 
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was the traditional mark of the melancholic whose fear and sadness was often described in medical 
works as sine causa, sine occasione manifesta, or the like. But the nature of the “occasion” is 
clearly open to dispute. Kyder's fear is judged as pathological, whether caused by an imagination 
of succumbing to plague or an apprehension that his name is in the wrong mouth. But some 
melancholics developed rhetorical and affective practices that transformed these “small 
Occasions” into a new discourse. Indeed, John Donne's famous reflection on “for whom the bell 
tolls,” in his Devotions upon Emergent Occasions takes as one of its “occasions” the one we find 
in Kyder: a sick man listening to the funeral bells toll. Yet we see in Donne's meditation that this 
does not remain a private and pathological passion, but precisely an “occasion” which dilates into 
a recognition of his profound connectedness to humankind. If the bell tolls for a baptism or a burial, 
“that action concerns me,” for “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the 
continent, a part of the main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if 
a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own were; any man's death 
diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for whom 
the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”75 Donne develops the “small Occasion” into a new form of 
experience, one premised upon discovering the similitudes in all things. 
If hypochondria is, despite its strange symptoms, clearly a problem for medicine, it is less 
clear why our figure of the inammorato has been recruited into this pathological company. It is the 
difference between an expression of passion and the social scene, the paradoxical appearance of 
an absence of an occasion, that allows us to see the connection between the hypochondriac and the 
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lovestruck youth. He is overcome by love melancholy, “a kind of rage proceeding from an Irregular 
desire of enjoying a lovely object; and is attended by Feare and sadness.”76 It is not “natural and 
chaste love” itself that is melancholic, but the irregularity of desire for the beloved, an excess of 
passion with reference to its cause. “Heroicall passion,” that is, a passion emerging from hereos, 
was one of the medical terms for lovesickness.77  Arnoldus of Villanova defined it as “an alienation 
[of the mind] accompanied by a deep and irrational lust.”78 Here the problem of motive is not the 
inability to act, but the difficulty of articulating the reasons for the passionate acts undertaken by 
the lover on behalf of wooing the beloved. Lovers are “apt to mistake, amplifie, too credulous 
sometimes, too full of hope and confidence, and then againe very jealous, unapt to beleeve or 
entertaine any good newes.”79 Though the stars, climate, diet, temperaments of the lovers, 
accoutrements and dress, and sight itself, are all indicated by Burton as causes of love-melancholy, 
he gives a special consideration to mere opportunity, for “opportunity of time and place, with their 
circumstances, are so forcible motives, that it is unpossible almost for two young folkes equal in 
yeares to live together, and not be in love, especially in great houses, Princes Courts, where they 
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are idle in summo gradu, fare well, live at ease, and cannot tell otherwise how to spend their 
time.”80 We must be careful not to see love-melancholy as a specific emotional state deemed 
pathological, but rather a social judgment that the love was excessive given the circumstances.  
Claims of melancholy in the sphere of love were not limited only to the young and lusty; 
they were also extended to the unhappy couples who had fallen out of it. Milton's defense of 
divorce strove to prove that in the case of an “indisposition, unfitnes, or contrariety of mind, arising 
from a cause in nature unchangeable,” the dissolution of the marriage bond was Biblically lawful.81 
Essential to his argument was the notion that the first reason God gave when instituting marriage 
in the Garden of Eden was for the “the apt and cheerfull conversation of man with woman, to 
comfort and refresh him against the evil of solitary life.” In the case that this was impossible, then 
“neither can it be of force to ingage a blameles creature to his own perpetuall sorrow, mistak'n for 
his expected solace, without suffering charity to step in and doe a confest good work of parting 
those whom nothing holds together.”82 A diminishment of pleasure in the body of one's partner 
can be better carried than “when the minde hangs off in an unclosing disproportion, though the 
body be as it ought.”83 Milton's felicitous phrase, an unclosing disproportion, captures the sense 
of the problem melancholy introduced into the social world, here in its most intimate example of 
the married couple. The divinely appointed motive for marriage is the enjoyment of the cheerful 
society of another; its impossibility justifies divorce. If one is bound to an “an image of earth and 
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fleam” (that is, a partner whose temperament is composed principally of black bile and phlegm), 
loneliness is only embittered by the proximity of an inept partnership. When marriage fails, it 
becomes a “drooping and disconsolate houshold captivity, without refuge or redemption.”84  If at 
first the moony-eyed lover and the immiserated spouse appear to be opposites, they are linked by 
a problem felt to be common to the melancholic: there is a disproportion in passions; for Milton, 
it was between the temperaments of spouses that made their situation, marriage, itself 
inappropriate; for the Inammorato, it is a disproportion between his excessive lust and the social 
determination of appropriate displays of affection.   
The “unclosing disproportion” that one found between he unhappy couple could also be 
discovered in the soul. The religiously melancholy were those whose spiritual affect was either an 
excessive fixation upon scrupulous concerns or excessive exuberance through the opinion of 
spiritual inspiration. The superstitious or religious melancholic was a frequent figure in sermons 
and pamphlets on questions of conscience. The religious melancholic was overcome by scruple, 
that is, “a great trouble of minde proceeding from a little motive, and a great indisposition, by 
which the conscience though sufficiently determined by proper arguments, dares not proceed to 
action, or if it doe, it cannot rest.”85 The sermon on religious melancholy became a subgenre in 
English homiletics, “from Edmund Gregory’s Historical Anatomy of Christian Melancholy (1646) 
through to Richard Baxter’s Signs and Causes of Melancholy (1706).”86 Samuel Clarke's 
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systematic work sets forth the question “What difference is there between Melancholly, and 
trouble of Conscience?” He marks four distinctions: melancholy affects only the imagination 
rather than the “whole man,” it can be cured by “physic,” it completely, rather than partially, 
eliminates courage, and most importantly, while the “sight of sin” is the cause of cases of 
conscience, in melancholy, “the imagination conceiveth a thing to be so which is not, making a 
man fear, and dispaire upon supposed, and feigned causes.”87 In one we read that the “principal 
sign, by which we may judge when the indisposition is chiefly or wholly in the body, is this: that 
the person accuses himself highly in general, without being able to give any instance in particular; 
that he is very apprehensive, of he does not know well what; and fearful, yet can give no reason 
why.”88 The ability to give an account of one's conscience distinguished genuine cases of 
conscience from melancholy. If the cause was unclear, the problem could be removed from the 
spiritual realm and returned to the remedies of “physick.”  
This attempt to remove individuals' claims to spiritual passions also worked to discredit 
would-be prophets. In the confessional struggles of the mid-seventeenth century, this figure was 
dubbed an “enthusiast.” The criticisms of Meric Casaubon, Henry More, and Joseph Glanvill of 
religious “enthusiasts” was premised on an ascription of melancholia.89 Enthusiasm was “a 
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misconceit of being inspired.”90 The authority of those who claimed prophecy or divine insight 
was challenged by those who called their preachings the result of a wounded imagination, a sign 
of melancholy. While the diagnosis of melancholia as a confessional slander was already underway 
in Lutheran Wittenberg, where Lutherans described Calvinists and Zwinglians as melancholics, 
this took on a new register in the confessional divides emerging in the beginning of seventeenth 
century English religious life. While “Papists” were melancholy in their superstitions, the “Non-
Conformists on the other side are possessed by the same evil spirit,” as the Papists, which was 
evident because “they are frighted from our Communion, by such things as themselves 
acknowledge Indifferent.”91 The intense and passionate response of the Puritans to matters of rite 
and ritual was a fear without a justified cause. This religious and political division could be read 
in the symptoms of their manners, bodies, and habits, as “[t]heir whole constitution is sowred by 
the melancholy humor; uneasy both to Themselvs and others, especially their Governors.”92 The 
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joining of conventicles or secret religious meetings, associated with Presbyterians, were labeled as 
symptoms of the solitariness of the melancholic by those who opposed them. 
As noted above, the maniac, though chosen as the representative figure of nineteenth-
century melancholy, has a wholly different valence of meaning in Burton and Baroque medicine 
at large. Rather than a figure whose inner imaginative life cuts him off from social activity, 
Burton's examples of maniacs are all figures who interpret the world through a fearful imagination. 
Burton's claim that the maniac is the “angry portraiture” of the reader is not only the wagging 
finger of a moralist, but a consequence of the theory of action held commonly in both the arts and 
medical faculties of European universities. All action is premised upon imaginative interpretation 
of the world—the maniac's error is different from ours in vehemence, not in kind. While the 
melancholic maniac represented an extreme of melancholy passion, his inclusion among the 
figures emphasizes the common relationship between his delusional ravings and the fanciful 
reverie of the lover and all other imaginative objects of the passions that fall between.  
 The figures of the lover, hypochondriac, enthusiast, and maniac that we encounter in 
various discourses of what I call the English Baroque, whether real or hypothetical, each specified 
a different domain in which the relation between passion and its causes—that is, motive—was a 
live problem. In each case, their passions are “without any apparant occasion.” Burton's use of 
“occasion” in his definition of melancholy preserves a sense of cause as the conjunction of 
circumstances, achieving a unity through their meaning for action. When Burton enumerates his 
catalogue of causes, it comes with the rider that they must be examined as possibilities, considered 
together with other concomitant causes that can inflect, amplify, mutate, or diminish any single 
cause. Astrology is the best representative of this form of causality; the stars always exert some 
influence upon us, but the nature and power of these astral and cosmic forces are variable, changing 
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both with their mutual interactions and because their motions through the “houses” of the zodiac 
endue them with new qualities. Yet even this whole complex of causality is not, in Burton's 
opinion, determinative: “they doe incline, but not compell.”93 
The astrological symbols floating above each of these figures as they appear in Burton's 
frontispiece suggest yet another inflection of the relation between Baroque conceptions of 
causality and melancholy. Each is represented by the symbol of a planet followed by signs of what 
astrologers called “aspect,” referring to the angle, in degrees, between two planets. Sextile marks 
sixty degrees, quadrate ninety, trine one hundred twenty, opposition one hundred eighty, and 
conjunction when two planets align. The lover's melancholy falls under Venus, but one that can 
be in sextile, trine, or opposition to some other, unspecified planet. The same is true of 
Hypochondriacus, whose Saturn is followed by conjunction, square, and opposition. The 
superstitious figure has three, generally salubrious planets—Jupiter, the Sun, and Mercury—above 
him, but these well-boding planets are qualified in some way by the crucifix that hovers uncertainly 
among planetary signs, as if Rome and its rite were another planet of baleful influence. The maniac 
has Mars and the moon in conjunction or Saturn and Mercury in opposition.  
This may seem like so much arcana; but whatever the astrological meanings they were 
supposed to convey to Burton's readers, it is more important to note that these planetary 
conjunctions and their declinations will glide through the genitures of every person, determined or 
inflected differently in each case but excepting no mortal from their influence. Each one of us is 
in part a lover, a hypochondriac, superstitious and manic; these are less individuals than typical 
moments of the problem of melancholy itself. They are less subjects than predicates—the 
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unfinished nature of the astrological determination suggests that each individual may at one point 
be inflected by some participation in superstition or mania, love or hypochondria.94 
We might read these figures neither as anonymous individuals nor as wholly generalized 
types but as “Characters” in the sense that they appeared in a popular genre of the seventeenth 
century, Character-writing. We find, for instance, the superstitious man in one of the more famous 
examples of the genre, Joseph Hall's Characters, an early modern updating of the ancient 
Theophrastean genre of rhetorical descriptions of various ethical types. He is “strangely 
credulous...Some ways he will not go, and some he dares not; either there are bugs, or he feigneth 
them; every lantern is a ghost, and every noise is of chains.”95 He has habits he himself does not 
understand, as when he goes “a little about, and to leave the cross still on the right hand.”96 Within 
the detailed catalogue of quirks and peculiarities, we find a disordered maxim of inference: “One 
event is enough to make a rule: out of these rules he concludes fashions, proper to himself; and 
nothing can turn him out of his own course.”97 The melancholic reads the situation through his 
own fear.  
Just as with Hall's Characters, the figures of the frontispiece are midpoints between 
notional types and individuals. They are bundles of potentially consistent predications of a figure 
who can thus be recognized as a kind. What is true of the frontispiece is true of the work itself, for 
“although the Anatomy is steeped in humoral theory, Burton does not use it to treat individuals as 
part of a limited number of pre-set groups, but instead registers the fluidity between different types 
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of human experience and encourages his readers to recognise this in their self-examination.”98 This 
fluidity is not merely literary but was instituted within the medical treatments of melancholy at the 
time. Astrological physicians were extremely popular: “Forman, Napier, Lilly, and John 
Booker....each recorded more than a thousand consultations a year.”99 One reason for their 
popularity was their relatively low cost compared to the Royal College of Physicians practitioners 
and the ability for them to offer treatment at a distance: if a sick person was bed-ridden, another 
could go to seek a remedy from these physicians, sometimes bringing the sick person’s urine, but 
sometimes only a verbal account. For “astrology added a cosmological and social dimension to 
the egocentric experiences of disease and healing.”100 The astrological doctors knew “how to pick 
out from the thousands of intersecting geometrical relationships among the planets in any given 
geniture those that will affect the body, character and fate of a given client.”101  Indeed, it has been 
speculated that Burton himself was a patient of Simon Forman, the famous, or infamous, 
astrological doctor.102  
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Pursuing the occluded humors through the body, seventeenth-century physicians did 
attribute local manifestations of pathology to some quality of a humor in want or excess, but this 
only constituted the most proximate cause; what was responsible for bringing about that excess or 
defect was much more difficult, and more important, to ascertain, for both treatment and prognosis 
depended on it. If a respected physician could argue that the “attributes of melancholy arise through 
a certain quality of the humor, which is nothing other than its color,”103 this did not mean he was 
only concerned with descrying hues. The qualities of the elements were combinatorial. This was 
imagined not as a movement along a single continuum but as a qualitative passage between 
elements, from the hot, dry phlegm to the colder, wet black bile, or some other variation. The 
serious physician had to be knowledgeable and alert to all the causes and conditions that might 
attend these transformations. This presented another problem. The immediate causes of 
melancholy—excess of black bile or vapors rising to the head—failed to account for the great 
variety of melancholic symptomology. The variety of melancholic presentation was linked to the 
distempered imaginations of the melancholics. Melancholia was a disease of the imagination and 
“the kinds of melancholic ailments are many because of those hidden and deceitful imaginations 
which befall each individually.”104 These hidden images that lay behind the strange behavior of 
the patient were pathologies of motive; in what we might anachronistically refer to as Renaissance 
“psychology,” the imagination was active in even the simplest acts of voluntary locomotion.  
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We have mapped out a hypothesis for the variety of Burton's figures. But how should we 
understand the later image? In the course of the eighteenth century, the figure of the melancholic 
ceased to appear as a problem concerning the relation of passion and action. Towards the end of 
the eighteenth century, it was transformed into a special problem within the emergent science of 
psychiatry. The melancholic did not disappear; physicians continued to treat hypochondriacs or 
cases of “the vapours.” Nor, of course, did fear and sadness dissipate.  Yet the absence of a manifest 
occasion no longer irritated the imagination to an inquiry into the passions. The riddle of pathology 
was to be read out from the body of the subject, not from his relation to the world. Attention was 
redirected, again and again, to the body, mannerisms and speech of the patient.  
What can account for the dissipation of a cultural preoccupation with melancholy as a 
problem of motives? The seventeenth-century problem—that a passion could arise without its 
cause being known—was eclipsed from within the various projects for constructing a scientific 
medicine that emerged in the eighteenth century. Notably, the leading medical mechanist of the 
time replaced the “sine causa manifesta” with a distinctive symptom of the melancholic, now seen 
as a figure “always intent upon one and the same thought.”105  A new physiology allowed the 
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physician to see the melancholic in abstraction from the world in which she moved; this world was 
dissolved into a piecemeal and regenerated as the “animal economy,” preserving only what was 
already legible as a possible explanation of physiological order and disorder and, eventually, of 
norm and pathology. Whereas Burton's melancholic was everywhere a figure whose mystery could 
not be ranged within any sphere smaller than the complete range of causality, the eighteenth-
century melancholic was contained by an 'economical' theory. 
 For eighteenth-century physicians, the older medical catalogues with their multiplicity of 
causes were little more than a tangle of quackish and disordered observation, badly in need of 
systemization. This was already evident in the century's first decades when Bernard Mandeville, 
later famous for his defense of laissez-faire government in The Fable of the Bees, wrote his treatise 
on the “Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases.” He was determined to “deviate from the usual 
method” and forego “the tedious enumeration of signs and causes upon the neck of one another, 
as well as the frightful heaps of different medicines found in those that have treated of the 
hypochondriack and hysterick passions.”106 His answer was far simpler: hypochondria arose from 
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a weakening of “animal spirits” arising from a distempered stomach.107 This desire to reduce 
causes was thought of as a reform to medical confusion and even a remedy to abuses. Alexander 
Stuart, a prominent Scottish physician who studied under Boerhaave, gave a description of an ideal 
physician in his notes, claiming that “the Quack’s Catalogue of specifique simples [that is, 
remedies of a single ingredient, like cinchona bark for malaria] & the physician’s catalogue of 
original simple causes which with Gods great & invalueable Gift the Light of Reason joined with 
diligent & careful observation & seconded by Gods favour & blesseing is a sufficient stock to sett 
up a good physician.”108 The idea here was to organize the much-contemned prescriptions of so-
called “empirics”—physicians who worked primarily through trial-and-error—under a scheme of 
natural philosophical inquiry into causes, thereby creating something like a schedule of drugs 
attached to a slender list of pathological causes. We might contrast this attitude with Shakespeare’s 
Jaques who claims that his melancholy is his own, “compounded of many simples, extracted from 
many objects, and indeed the sundry contemplation of my travels, in which my often rumination 
wraps me in a most humorous sadness.”109 Though Jaques' use of the term “simples” here is 
metaphorical, this only serves to heighten the contrast: where Stuart saw at the beginning of the 
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eighteenth century a need for reform, Jaques, the “Traveller” found a creative archive of 
experience.  
2.3 The Eclipse of the Melancholy Problem in Eighteenth-Century Medicine 
The eighteenth-century transformation in melancholy was an eclipse of melancholy's social 
problematic. This bucks against the historiographical trend that wishes to read this development 
out of the deepening of medical knowledge. Stanley Jackson, one of the twentieth century’s 
leading scholars on this history, saw in melancholia’s narrowing signification the “waning” 
influence of medical humoralism. He argued that as humoral explanations of melancholia 
compelled less assent, “chemical explanations” took their place.110  Yet this ignores that 
“chymistry” had been a competitor to Galenic physiology since the sixteenth-century in the 
medical theories of Paracelsus and Van Helmont. Indeed, already by 1650 the majority of licensed 
English physicians had rejected the Galenic view of the elemental composition of the humors in 
favor of some version of a chemical composition.111 With William Harvey’s discovery of the 
circulation of the blood, first published in his 1628 De Motu Cordis, humoral physiology indeed 
faced a unique challenge. However, the traditional humoral theory faced challenges long before 
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this. The theories of Paracelsus had been taken up in the medical faculties of Salerno and Leiden 
and gradually gained adherents in England from those returning with degrees abroad. Because of 
the exceedingly long course of medical study in England, many aspiring physicians chose to pursue 
their medical studies abroad and sometimes encountered the influence of Paracelsus on the 
continent.  Even more influential were the iatrochemical theories of Johann Baptista van Helmont 
that were vociferously anti-Galenic; one chapter of his Ortus Medicinae is titled “The Ignorant 
Physics of Aristotle and Galen.”112 Disease was an “ens, non accidens” that opposed life. Its causes 
were invisible, seminal powers distinct from the living body. The body itself, insofar as it was 
living, was not a cause of disease. His explanations of physiological function through fermentation 
gained supporters in medical faculties across the continent, originating the movement that has 
come to be called “iatrochemistry.” While Helmontianism made a major showing in the 
Restoration when, in 1665, they applied for a medical college, this was the groundswell of a 
process that had been at least decades in the making.113 In 1618, the Royal College of physicians 
accepted “a great variety of chemical medicines…in its Pharmacopoeia of 1618…at the expense 
of the more traditional “Galenic” therapy of regimen, bleeding, and purging.”114  If melancholia's 
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meaning were dependent on a rigid adherence to humoralism, we would expect to see its 
“narrowing” happen almost a century earlier.  
If humoralism waned, the humors themselves did not disappear in the eighteenth century. 
Jackson admits that “the black bile lingered on for a while in some version or other of the above 
spleen related theories as a source of pathogenic 'vapors.'“115 Jackson admits that both of his 
exemplars of the changing nature of melancholia, Friedrich Hoffman and Archibald Pitcairn, 
described it “in familiar terms” borrowed from the humoralist treatments. As Jean Starobinski 
notes in his history of the treatment of melancholy, Hoffman only transferred to the blood “the 
qualities of slowness, thickness, and malaise that the ancients had attributed to black bile [les 
qualités de lenteur, d’épaisseur, de paresse que les anciens attribuaient à l’atrabile].”116 Moreover, 
it is hard to say something is “lingering” if it remains for nearly the whole century. Walter 
Charleton, a physician often marked as a transitional figure from humoralism to a corpuscularian 
worldview, nevertheless preserved a view of the reality of the humors, save for black bile, which 
he alone judged a “Fictitious Humor.” 117 In Nicholas Robinson’s 1729 A new system of the spleen, 
we find a self-consciously modern physician, buttressed in his knowledge by “the Improvements 
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of Natural Philosophy and Discovery of the Circulation of the Blood.”118 Yet when he discusses 
the theory of humors, he preserves it under a modification. The four temperaments were reductions 
of an observed variety of movements in the body, “for by increasing the Beating of the Heart, you 
evidently alter the prevailing Quality, and consequently the Humour depending on that Quality; so 
that the Difference of Constitutions is much more clearly grounded on the different Elasticity of 
Fibres, whereon those different Motions depend, that give those different Qualities.”119 The move 
was a typical one in the eighteenth-century medical discourse. Difference was not discrete; 
variation could be placed upon a continuum, all accounted for by a single principle. This principle, 
then, would be the true cause, insofar as a cause was sought as explanation. 
What we must see is that the transformation in melancholy's meaning was not simply a 
result of a weakened Galenism but a result of a concerted program to reduce causality in medicine. 
Medicine was fraught with controversy both before and after 1700, but the latter controversies 
often pivoted upon a common point. Baroque medicine, whether informed most closely by Galen, 
Hippocrates, Avicenna, Paracelsus, van Helmont, or Telesio, assumed a world with plural 
causality. Post-Newtonian medicine, with all of its competing theoretical frameworks, maintained 
a consensus that cause should be simplified. Indeed, one of the first and most influential figures of 
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this movement, the Dutch physician Herman Boerhaave, took as his motto Simplex Sigillum Veri—
the simple is the sign of the true.  
The transition from the first frontispiece to the second is, in some ways, to be understood 
in terms of a transformation in the discussion of causation in the medical sciences in the course of 
the eighteenth century.  Whereas in the early seventeenth century there had been a variety of kinds 
of cause at work in the conceptualizations of medicine, several eighteenth-century programs 
worked to narrow the range of causation.  In the case of melancholia, we find that a change in the 
theorization of pathological causality can be seen to eclipse the problematic of the passion “without 
apparent occasion.” One of the common disputes was over whether medicine was an art or a 
science. Daniel Sennert, an esteemed professor of medicine at the University of Wittenberg in the 
early seventeenth century, addressed this question at the beginning of his major work on medicine, 
coming down on the side of it as an art, “for medicine departs from the sciences not only, as is 
said, because of its goal, which is to produce health, nor simply because of its method of inquiry 
[cognitio], but for these and also other reasons, because it neither rises to first causes, nor does it 
observe those other conditions which are required in a science.”120 Medicine required a knowledge 
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that would incorporate many distinct kinds of causality, some of which it inherited from other 
sciences and some of which were unique to its own cognitio.121  
The change in orientation towards causality in medicine began not with Harvey’s discovery 
of the circulation of the blood but with the desire of a new generation to bring the success of Isaac 
Newton’s natural philosophical principles into medical research. Theodore M. Brown described a 
group of eighteenth-century physicians as “Newton-struck,”122 many of whom can be traced to the 
intellectual circles surrounding Archibald Pitcairne and his students “at Edinburgh, Leiden and 
Oxford” who together “envisaged a medical theory on the same level of certainty as Newton's 
theory of the world, which they referred to as a 'principia medicinae theoreticae mathematicae.'”123 
Newton explicitly formulated a normative principle on causality in his Principia. In the revised 
edition of 1713, Newton formulated a rule: The effects of nature ought to be assigned to the same 
type of cause, however far it is possible.124 Pitcairne had advocated for a thoroughly mechanical 
view of the body, inspiring a generation of research in Scotland. (This was in large part due to the 
influence of Hermann Boerhaave, who had attended Pitcairne's lectures at Leiden.) His inaugural 
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lecture at Leiden in 1692 was titled “Enquiries after Physical Causes as are generally proposed by 
Philosophers, are entirely useless and unnecessary to Physicians.”125 This seems at first glance to 
be not so distant from Sennert's argument that medicine is an art because it does not rise to first 
causes. But Pitcairne's problem is different; his task is to rid medicine of vain disputation over 
occult causes and other categories that arose from an attempt to ascertain the natura rerum. 
Newton gave a different model to the physician. Cause would be the designation for a certain 
regularity of effect, a unity ordered by mathematical regularity. One needed only the “observation 
of the actions and reactions of the corporeal bodies” in order to “discover the forces and establish 
the laws that direct their movement.” Once these were known, it did not matter what the “cause” 
was.  
The elimination of a search into causes moved the inquiry into melancholic passions from 
one of the motives of passion to one concerning the motions of passions. Just as Newton had 
exactly described the laws of planetary motion but dared not to “feign any hypotheses” as to why 
this was the case, the Pitcairnean physician was to understand corporeal phenomena as a 
mechanism, so that “all Diseases may be comprehended under a Change of Velocity.”126 If it seems 
difficult to conceive of how this definition would account for melancholy, a disease of the 
imagination, we must recall that even in the Galenic system variations in thought and imagination 
were partially explained by the relative swiftness of the “animal spirits,” the ultra-fine fluid 
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responsible for coordinating thought and bodily action. The emphasis had distinctively shifted, 
however, from the quality of the humors to their motion by the end of the seventeenth century. We 
find in Locke's Essay an explanation of mental habits through custom, which “seems to be but 
Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a going continue on in the same steps they 
have been used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the Motion in it 
becomes easy and as it were Natural.”127 In the same way, a disruption of the mechanism used by 
thought could lead to a repeated, morbid motion that could become an inveterate habit. Since “all 
sensation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits, 
variously agitated by external objects,” then “the abatement of any former motion must as 
necessarily produce a new sensation, as the variation or increase of it; and so introduce a new idea, 
which depends only on a different motion of the animal spirits in that organ.”128 With this 
argument, we can imagine how an organic, mechanical lesion might initiate the imaginative errors 
still associated with the melancholic.   
The emergence of the concept of the “animal oeconomy” allowed eighteenth-century 
physicians to isolate melancholic causality within the patient's body. The Galenic crasis was a 
ratio of qualities. Its effects could only be understood by seeing the body as part of the world and 
its many causes; the animal economy is a corporal account-book, ignoring any exchanges that did 
not first pass through the bureau de change of the body. Under the aegis of this phrase, medical 
reformers carried out a reorganization of the theory of the body. This excited and organized 
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physiological and medical research in Scotland and France and grew to have enormous importance 
throughout European medical faculties in the eighteenth century. This program embraced a great 
deal of controversy and variation, being championed by camps that could identify as mechanists 
or vitalists, iatrochemists and iatromathematicians. Indeed, by the end of the century, “animal 
economy” could be understood as a synonym for “physiology” itself, as when we read that the 
“history of the fluid parts comes into a system of anatomy only occasionally; because it properly 
belongs to what is called physiology, or the animal economy.”129 A desideratum of this new 
scheme was the reduction of the received catalogues of pathological causes to variations in general 
principles of the animal economy, subsuming the heterogeneous class of contingencies and 
occasions that affect the body under a general concept. This became a maxim of natural 
philosophy: “Nature is frugal in Causes, but various and manifold in Effects.”130 We see this 
echoed in Ménuret's Encyclopédie article on animal economy: “In this philosophic inquiry of all 
our functions, one sees more clearly than anywhere else the greatest simplicity of means joined 
with the greatest variety of effects, the least expense of force followed by the most substantial 
movements.”131 The variety of effects no longer required a plural causality to explain it.  
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 The animal economy was less a concept than a regulative image that organized medical 
inquiry in pathology and physiology throughout the eighteenth century, part of what philosopher 
of science Wilfrid Sellars once called the “scientific image.”132 Whereas in the humoral system, 
the fluids served in the transferal of qualities in the animal economy they become a conserved unit 
of exchange. Diarrhea leads to a lessening of urination; the increase of a symptom in a fever in one 
part of the body “is generally attended with a Diminution of the Symptoms in other Parts.”133 This 
can be contrasted with the understanding of medical cause in the Galenic curriculum: “A cause is 
that which generates something in the body although it itself is not part of the body.”134 The animal 
economy reversed this principle, sealing medical causation within the body’s frame. This was 
wholly in line with the attempt to set medicine on a mechanical basis, as in Archibald Pitcairn’s 
attempt to derive fundamental medical phenomena from a single cause “answerable to all 
medicinal Uses, [that] ought to be derived from a Body dispersed through the extreme minutest 
Arteries of the Brain.”135 The Baroque problematic of melancholy passion as not responding to its 
appropriate cause was no longer coherent within the newly established medical view. A socially 
inappropriate emotional response may be judged in the first instance as a disproportion between 
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the social situation and the subject but once the question was put to medicine the pathological 
understanding could only consider the body as a material and not a social fact.   
George Cheyne’s The English Malady, published in the 1730s, is particularly instructive 
in showing how the mechanist's vision of animal economy was adopted in the description of 
“nervous disorders.”136 He conceived of the body as “a Machin of an infinite Number and Variety 
of different Channels and Pipes, filled with various and different Liquors and Fluids, perpetually 
running, glideing, or creeping forward, or returning backward, in a constant Circle, and sending 
out little Branches and Outlets, to moisten, nourish, and repair the Expenses of Living.”137 The 
variety of cause and its concomitant diversity of effects has moved from a theater of life where 
those differences are registered as so many character types to the “animal economy”, where silent 
and constant movements within the body vary along a continuum. The sum of all these exchanges 
constitutes the activity of life. All the nervous disorders are placed upon a continuum: “All Nervous 
Disorders whatsoever from Yawning and Stretching, up to a mortal Fit of Apoplexy, seems to me 
but one continued Disorder, or the several steps and degrees of it, arising from a Relaxation or a 
Weakness, and the Want of a sufficient Force and Elasticity in the Solids in general, and the Nerves 
in particular, in Proportion to the Resistance of the Fluids, in order to carry on the Circulation, 
remove Obstructions, carry off the Recrements, and make the Secretions.”138 The classes of 
nervous disorders invented by Cheyne are moments in a continua of a loss of voluntary Motion. 
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Melancholy is in the first and mildest class, in which there is a “partial or total Loss of Sensation 
for some Time,” upon which there will “necessarily follow a Suspension of Voluntary Motion.”139 
From this vantage point, in which the melancholic is most acutely observed at those critical 
moments in which she loses voluntary control, where the passionate phenomena are secondary 
effects of disordered circulation of “animal juices” or the obstructions of glands by animal salts, 
the gaze turns away from the problem and meaning of melancholy that animates the variety in 
Burton’s frontispiece.  
In Cheyne's system, melancholic variety was no longer located within that obscure region 
of the melancholic’s own imaginative experiences nor in the transmutations of humors through 
their range of possible qualities. The mind is no longer connected to the Baroque fascination with 
ethical types and temperaments; instead, the ethical and moral meaning of the mind’s pathologies 
must be discovered within its own economy. The variety of mental phenomena is infinite, but its 
causality is treated as homogenous. The Baroque cornucopia of character types and the variety of 
causes that give rise to them is liquified in an ideal of infinite and continuous gradations. Cheyne 
dealt with the Protean variety of nervous symptoms by arguing that “the true Reason of the 
Multiplicity, Variety, and Inconstancy of these Symptoms, is the vast Multitude of the 
Combinations possible, of these Natural functions, every one of which makes a new Symptom.”140 
It is important to hear his use of “function” as a term to describe physiological processes, 
something clearer in his descriptions of “Perfect Health” as “the easy, pleasant, and uniform 
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Performance of the Animal Functions, in a full Circulation, free Perspiration, and regular 
Secretions.”141  
In a striking passage in his introduction, Cheyne imagines the mind as a bell surrounded 
with an infinitude of hammers, each of which being pulled “conveys a measur’d and proportion’d 
Impulse of Stroke to the Bell.”142 This nervous mind is a smooth surface, its pathologies and 
normal affections all moments of discrete variation along its exterior. Each hammer-strike is a 
stimulus whose material qualities can now be ignored; instead what is important is the intensity of 
its force and its equivalent effect. This can be traced to a larger movement in the development of 
a mechanical psychology, one in which the medium for the transmission of effects to the motor 
organs changed from the fluid animal spirits to vibrating solids. But this transition placed all of 
the explanatory burden on motion, eliminating the qualities of the spirits that had once participated 
in temperament and character. This meant that there was “[n]o essential difference...between the 
transmission of effects to the inert bodies that constituted the animal 'frame' and the inert bodies 
of the inanimate world.”143 The Newtonian ideal of assigning similar effects to the same type of 
cause had achieved prominence, if not dominance, in the medical literature on melancholia. 
The reduction of medical causality was as much a moral as a physiological program. Where 
Cheyne is concerned in detail with diet, exercise, and the other questions of regimen, it is in the 
mode of moral prescription: the disturbances in regimen that lead to nervous disorders are always 
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the effects of “Luxury and Intemperance.”144 This defect in morals is at once a sufficient 
explanation and not worthy of a physician’s inquiry. Moral language even finds its way into the 
description of physiological function, as when the liver is called “a Receptacle (for some time) for 
the destructive Effects of Luxury and Intemperance.”145  People are liable to “ascribe their 
Distempers, acute or chronical, to a wet Room, damp sheets, catching Cold, ill or under-dress’d 
Food, or eating too plentifully of this or the other Dish at a certain Time,” which are  “trivial 
Circumstances,” the “true Cause” is their own “continu’d Luxury and Laziness, because they 
would gladly continue this Course and yet be well if possible.”146 Even if “Seasons, Climates, 
astral and aerial Influences, and many other Circumstances, had any Effect or Influence in 
begetting or propagating these Distempers,”  they are nevertheless “slight, partial, and occasional 
Causes only, in respect of those others mention’d.”147 Idleness and luxury are the “Efficient 
Causes” of these diseases.   
The understanding of melancholy was more deeply entrenched as a phenomenon arising 
from the body with the mid-century association of mental disorders with the nervous tissues. 
Robert Whytt (pronounced 'White') claimed in 1765 that “all diseases may, in some sense, be 
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called affections of the nervous system, because, in almost every disease, the nerves are more or 
less hurt,”148 though he later recognized that “a diagnosis of nervous disease was increasingly 
being given ‘to many symptoms seemingly different, and very obscure in their nature, [which] has 
often made it be said that Physicians have bestowed the character of nervous on all those disorders 
whose nature and causes they were ignorant of.'“149 The range of causality has become identified 
with the animal economy; the events are part of the natural history of a case but are not properly 
considered as causes.  
Indeed, it was in large part the reduction of the “hypochondriacal” disorders to the 
predisposing causes of “nervous delicacy” that transformed the melancholic symptomology from 
one primarily identified with men to a feminized disorder: “Women, in whom the nervous system 
is generally more moveable than in men, are more subject to nervous complaints, and have them 
in a higher degree.”150 This opinion had already been voiced by David Kinneir at the opening of 
his landmark work A new essay on the nerves and the doctrine of the animal spirits: “As the Brain, 
and consequently the Spinal Marrow arising from thence, enter so much into the composition of 
all the solid parts of the body (which is manifest from repeated experiments) it is reasonable to 
conclude, that all distempers whatsoever must affect the Nerves in some degree.”151 This meant 
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that the most important and immediate cause of the disease was anatomical. The treatment of 
melancholia would be dependent upon a field of scientific research into the nerves.   
There is a close relation between the simplification of causality and the increased emphasis 
on morality in the treatment of melancholia and related disorders. Cause is both a means for 
explaining phenomenon and for assigning responsibility. As the causes of medical disorders were 
enclosed within the explanatory scheme of the animal economy, responsibility could only be 
assigned to the animal.  
So far we have traced the eclipse of the Protean variety in Burton's frontispiece in the first 
half of the eighteenth century, but it is in the latter part of that century in which we find the slow 
emergence of psychiatric medicine and asylum governance that would inform the other 
frontispiece. Indeed, this story is of a piece with the one we have been tracing, in that it followed 
from the desire to simplify medical research into etiology—the next step was to eliminate it. It 
would be replaced with a program of clinical description and ordered classes of disease, a new 
methodical arrangement of medical observation that was birthed under the name of “nosology.” 
The 1760s saw two major works of general nosology, François Bossier de Sauvages' Nosologia 
methodica published in 1763 and closely followed by Cullen's Synopsis Nosologiae Methodicae, 
first published in 1769. Although the nosological program surged in the eighteenth century's latter 
half, the seeds from which it was drawn were planted in the seventeenth, almost entirely by Thomas 
Sydenham; the full title of Sauvages' work can be translated as The Method of Nosology, Setting 
the Classes, Genera and Species of Diseases According to the Thought of Sydenham and the 
System of the Botanists. Sydenham was a close companion of John Locke and in his own time had 
a reputation throughout the medical faculties of Europe. His ambition was to establish a science of 
medicine based upon a Baconian method of induction and natural history: “The improvement of 
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physic, in my opinion, depends (1.) upon collecting a genuine and natural description or history of 
all diseases as can be procured; and (2.) laying down a fixed and complete method of cure.”152  
The search for causes drops out completely from his program, for he felt that “the causes of most 
diseases should seem absolutely undiscoverable” and the “curious inquirers into these causes lose 
their labor.”153  Psychiatry emerged by turning to nosology. This granted new room for specialized 
treatments to be developed for each pathological order. In the case of the “neuroses,” this opened 
a path to interventions of the psychiatrist upon the behavior and ideation of the mad or melancholic 
subject. Since the melancholic's symptoms manifest as errors, moral correction, or auxilia moralia, 
in Sauvages' idiom, could not be neglected: “Thus [the melancholy and mad], imbued in false 
principles of some moral philosophy, can be called back to the use of reason through reasoning, 
should they want to reckon with us what truly is the good, what must be placed before other things 
and whose secure possession we should be content with when lacking all other things.”154 This 
practical note of the nosologist would become a plan for the emergence of the alienist, the specialist 
in mental maladies. He (for they were all men) would become a corrector of ideas, equipped with 
experience and technique, rather than a researcher of the etiology of madness.  
In the final decades of the eighteenth century, a passion was deemed pathological by 
accounting for the “cost” it exacted within a vitalist picture of the animal economy. Instructive is 
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John Brown's 1780 Elementa medicinae. His program uniquely combined all of the various 
reorganizations of medical causality we have so far reviewed: he created a nosological tabulation 
of disease classes (Fig. 4), a continuum of cause onto which they can be plotted, and the 
redescription of their causes from its various objects to a general principle, the relative excess of 
defect of “stimulation.” In Brown's system, as it came to be called, the organizing principle of all 
health as well as the cause of disease was a ratio between excitement and excitability. Excitability 
was a property of the organism and was localized in the medullary portion of the nerves and the 
solid muscle. As seen in the diagram below, the inverse ratio between excitement and excitability 
was conceived as a continuum onto which a tabulation of diseases could be precisely rendered. All 
diseases are occasioned by too great or too little excitement. When this model was applied to 
nervous disorders like hypochondria, the melancholic's body was said to be “exhausted by a 
passion or perturbation, in the same manner as by excessive excitement in other cases.”155 When 
the eighteenth-century physician encountered a disorder of the passions, they were not 
encountering a social phenomenon. The passions became simply another class of stimuli.  
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Figure 4 — Brown's “Table of Excitement and Excitability” 
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This returns us to where we began: the image of a man in a straitjacket (Fig. 2). The 
psychiatric asylum was not troubled by removing the melancholic from the social scene—their 
pathology was within, even if the cure could be rendered through a new environment. The problem 
of the melancholic's motive no longer appears as a symptom of melancholy, but as a question of 
administering treatment to those who may resist it. William Tuke’s York Retreat, famous for its 
“moral treatment” of the insane, made use of this regime as well. He consider fear of “great 
importance in the management of patients” although it should not be “excited beyond that degree 
which naturally arises from the necessary regulations of the family.”156 While Tuke argued 
passionately against the indiscriminate terrorizing of mental patients practised in county and 
private asylums, he saw fear as an essential tool for motivating patients when all other recourse 
failed, for when “it becomes the chief motive of action, it certainly tends to contract the 
understanding, to weaken the benevolent affections, and to debase the mind.”157 If Tuke 
represented the mildest voice in asylum management, we can very well expect that all houses for 
the insane employed fear as a technique for both governing and treating the insane. In the 
seventeenth century, the melancholic was marked by a fear without an occasion; in the nineteenth 
century asylum, the occasion for fear was supplied.  
We may now see how the nineteenth-century frontispiece exemplifies the conceptual 
reorganization of melancholy as it took shape even in the first half of the eighteenth century. 
Psychiatric observation refers the concept to the behavior and appearance of the patient, and the 
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observations are referred back again to the nosological construct in diagnosis. The stark difference 
between the subject of the psychiatric diagnosis and the melodramatic affect of his loved ones is 
indeed the content of the drama. Intuitively, the clinical gaze and the melodrama seem to be 
opposites. Where the former records, catalogues, abstracts its perceptions from the affairs of the 
heart and refers it to an ideal of knowledge, the latter casts away all parts of reality that do not 
service the intensity of some expression of the interior life and its subjection to fate and fortune. 
But the melodrama reworks precisely that field of meaning that the clinic casts off without 
intruding upon the domain of its researchers. We should see them as complementary, a neat 
transfer of psychiatric discourse into an artistic display for salacious public curiosity.  
I have included this at once long-winded and yet much-abbreviated history to indicate a 
field of inquiry; its exploration and mapping will occupy the chapters of this study. What I hope 
to make intelligible in this restitution of the early modern discourse on melancholy is not a morbid 
attention lavished on one particular ailment, nor a chapter in the pre-history of depression, nor 
even an intriguing re-conceptualization of fear and sadness. Rather, I wish to show how 
melancholy constituted a problem of the relation between the passions and their meaning.  
It may seem surprising to move from this medical narrative into the thickets of sixteenth-
century rhetorical and dialectical texts as I do in the next chapter. My rationale is this: now that 
the reasons for the problem of melancholy’s eclipse have been outlined, we must rediscover the 
conditions that made it possible to appear in the first place. Having witnessed it disappear, we will 
now be able to better sense the subtle movements that accompany its emergence. In the standard 
if much controverted curricula of the humanist university we see a high valuation placed upon 
being able to speak copiously. The practices that supported this capacity were born from a 
reimagined vision of the classical rhetorical ars topica, the rhetorical practice of invention that 
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allowed one to discover arguments on any subject. Yet this value in copiousness, as it was carried 
into all the branches of the university including the medical faculty, is what we have just witnessed 
undergo a winnowing. It was copia that let melancholy speak and its exile silenced the melancholy 
problem. 
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3.0 Chapter 2: A Thousand Similes: Melancholy as Topics 
In the previous chapter I argued that the problem of melancholy was one of motives—the 
inference from the phenomenon of a passion to its socially mediated object. In failing to discover 
an appropriate object, medical discourse intervened to assert probable causes of the passion. Robert 
Burton’s collation of these in a massive index recovered all of these various causes as topics, that 
is, sites of probable arguments for the causes of melancholy passions and habits. Yet there was 
another and far more unique way in which rhetorical-topical methods were used to articulate a 
passion without grounding it in explication of its causes.  I call these the melancholy topics. 
However, the use of topical invention for the articulation of melancholy passions was of course 
never explicitly detailed in handbooks. Rather, these practices comprised the intellectual backdrop 
of humanistic education and training to such a great degree that the various inflections and 
appropriations of its resources are found across an enormous range of discourse. My purpose is 
not the pedestrian one of pointing to yet another instance of a rhetorical culture applying its habits 
of perception and expression to another phenomenon. Instead, I wish to show that the problem of 
Baroque melancholy contributed to a unique transformation of the resources of topical invention 
that privileged similitude and metaphor over the more typical method of topical argumentation 
that privileged essence and distinction.  
We discover one of the most telling pieces of evidence of the self-consciously rhetorical 
elaboration of poorly-motivated passions from what Shakespeare places in the mouth of Jaques, 
one of his most famous melancholics. In As You Like It, he first appears not in person but through 
report.  In the scene in question, we find an exiled Duke attempting to convince his displaced court, 
now living in the Forest of Arden, that their situation is less grave than it appears. Though the 
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court's new life in forest exile is “exempt from public haunt,” the duke now “[f]inds tongues in 
trees, books in the running brooks,/Sermons in stones, and good in everything.” The cold blasts of 
“winter's wind” are his “counsellors/That feelingly persuade me what I am.”158 The Duke’s 
rhetoric here is the more traditional vision of rhetoric’s ability to move the passions—he attempts 
to move from a position of dissatisfaction with his exile to a cheerful if stoic optimism on its 
salutary effects. To discover the “good in everything” he must nevertheless bend his ear to the 
“sermons in stones.”  
When a companion suggests that they prepare for a hunt, the Duke remarks that he is 
saddened that the deer, as the “native burghers of this desert city,” should have to be killed for his 
entertainment, though this does not dissuade him from his sport. Another exiled lord then reports 
that the melancholy Monsieur Jaques holds a similar sentiment. The lord came upon him earlier in 
the day, lying beneath an oak where a wounded stag came “to languish” and its tears “augmented” 
the brook. The Duke then asks whether he heard Jaques “moralize this spectacle.” Indeed, the lord 
says, he turned it “into a thousand similes.” He gives a sample of these similes. For example, 
Jaques addresses the stag, saying, “Poor deer....thou mak'st a testament/As worldlings do, giving 
thy sum of more/To that which had too much.” The dying stag weeping into the stream is a 
metaphor for those who vainly bequeath their wealth to the already-wealthy: the stream does not 
need the stag's tears. The Duke moves to meet the melancholy gentleman, expressing that he loves 
to rendezvous with Jaques when he is “in these sullen fits,/For then he's full of matter.”159 Here, 
the actors exit.  
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The scene is strange. Why is the Duke so eager to hear Jaques' moralizing, when it seems 
as if he was able to do as much himself? What's more, when Jaques is criticizing the Duke and his 
court, calling them “mere usurpers, tyrants and what's worse,/To fright the animals and to kill them 
up/In their assigned and native dwelling-place”? Moreover, why is Jaques more “full of matter” 
when he is in a “sullen fit”? This cannot be explained away as one of the typical characteristics of 
the melancholic. In Galenic medicine, we see errors in speech attributed to an excess of black bile 
and in the moral diatribes against acedia in medieval writings. We find them as either taciturn or, 
occasionally, garrulous, but never eloquent. This was also true in the iconology of melancholia in 
the Renaissance. Yet the Duke attributes Jaques' apparently superior ability to “moralize the scene” 
to his melancholy.  
The Duke says that he loves “to cope him” when he is in “these sullen fits/For then he's 
full of matter.” The verb “to cope” can mean to simply encounter or contest with.160 It appears 
commonly with this sense in Shakespeare's works. Yet because of the lines that follow it, we might 
take it as a glancing pun—also common in Shakespeare. Both the speeches of the exiled Duke and 
Jaques the Traveller are examples of one of Renaissance rhetoric's cardinal virtues: copiousness.  
Copiousness of speech was so prominent a feature of Renaissance that one can take the “phrase 
copia dicendi, or even copia alone” as “a ubiquitous synonym for eloquence.”161 To possess an 
abundance of words and things became a slogan of Renaissance humanists, borrowed from 
Quintilian's Institutio oratoriae. Copia was the key-term in the title of what was likely the most 
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successful humanist publication of the sixteenth century, Erasmus' De duplici copia verborum ac 
rerum, a manual for achieving copiousness primarily through methods of linguistic variation. But 
the abundance designated by copia was more than a simple loquaciousness. It was rather a term 
for speech-in-potential, a facility of discovering what to say on any given occasion. Even brevitas, 
or the condensed style in speech, was felt to emerge from a careful selection of the plentiful 
storehouse of the mind, tastefully pared down. Erasmus wrote that “[i]f indeed it is true, as in Plato, 
Socrates acutely reasons, that the ability to lie and to tell the truth cleverly are talents of the same 
man, no artist will better compress speech to conciseness than he who has skill to enrich the same 
with as varied an ornamentation as possible.”162 Copia, then, was at once a style of profuse 
discourse and (more importantly) a power of producing such a discourse. 
We have seen in the introduction that the problem of melancholy presented itself, 
especially in the medical literature, as a passion with an excess of possible causes. As Jaques shows 
us, it appeared quite differently to those who inhabited the position of the melancholic. “Sullen 
fits” can always be justified, so long as one was not limited to the causes that were “apparent.” 
Jaques allows himself to metaphorize the immediate objects of his experience to discover 
occasions for his sadness. The sources of such justifications of the passion are the melancholy 
topics.  These topics gave rise to a melancholic rhetoric that sought occasions for feeling rather 
than deriving its feelings out of the occasion. Jaques again shows us another example. While 
listening to a song of Amiens, Amiens cuts off. Jaques pleads for more. Amiens warns him: “It 
will make you melancholy, Monsieur Jaques.” Jaques is not moved. “I thank it. More, I prithee, 
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more. I can suck melancholy out of a song as a weasel sucks eggs.”163 Jaques' ability to “suck 
melancholy” out of songs (and, as we see throughout the play, all things) is an example of his 
ingenious use of melancholy topics. The ars topica, a technique of classical rhetoric for 
discovering arguments, becomes a means for uncovering the world as a passion.  
The discourse elaborated from the use of melancholy topics is no longer confined to 
argument but unfolds new qualities from experience. This restitution of topics as a means for 
constituting a melancholic persona and discovering modes of feeling was a radical development 
of the rhetorical tradition. If the topics of classical rhetoric were geared to deal with exigency, the 
tensely situated problems of public deliberation and legal disputes, the melancholy topics direct 
our attention away from these exigencies to the transience and fruitlessness of all endeavor. Rather 
than using the topics to analyze a situation, the melancholic orientation of passionate invention 
acts as a solution—or rather a dissolution—of the very notion of situation. Its goal is not 
negotiation but articulating a position that stands at a remove from the world and its “worldlings,” 
that is, it elaborates melancholic passion into a rhetoric that critiques conventional motives. At the 
same time, the techniques of melancholy topics are constitutive of a form of experience that 
metaphorizes sense-experience into the meaning of the insensible. Rhetorical invention does not 
look to justify an action but articulates a passion by seeking predicates in its immediate 
environment that find resonance with the objectless melancholic mood. That is, it discovers not 
sermons but passions “in stones.”  
Melancholy itself is a topical selection of experience, adjusting which features are most 
salient in accordance with the melancholic's passion. Melancholy is also a mood discovered in the 
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same way that one discovers arguments: not out of whole cloth but through the method of the 
topics. It is sustained artfully, not accidentally. Though the passion of the melancholic is without 
apparent occasion, through the melancholy topics every occasion appears to speak for the 
melancholic's passion. Jaques runs through a set of conventional melancholics and rejects each as 
a characterization; he has “neither the scholar's melancholy, which is  emulation; nor the 
musician's, which is fantastical; nor the courtier's, which is proud; nor the soldier's, which is 
ambitious; nor the lawyer's, which is politic; nor the lady's, which is nice; nor the lover's, which is 
all these; but it is a melancholy of mine own, compounded of many simples, extracted  from many 
objects, and, indeed, the sundry contemplation of my travels; in which my often rumination wraps 
me in a most humorous sadness.”164 The variety of melancholic figures we saw arrayed around 
Burton's frontispiece in the first chapter may suggest that Jaques' cannot be a synecdoche for the 
whole class of melancholics. And of course, Jaques is also a fiction. Yet Shakespeare's 
characterization of this melancholic shows how the formation of a melancholic persona could at 
once be derivative and creative, a motley of postures and sentiments that draw from the whole 
range of melancholic appearances. Although the Duke looks to find Jaques, so he might “cope” 
with him, that is, engage in disputation for entertainment, Jaques flees into solitude. He tells 
Amiens that he has been “all this day to avoid” the Duke, for “he is too disputable...for 
company.”165 Jaques puts his use of copia not into dispute but as a resource of experience. While 
he “think[s] of as many matters” as the Duke, he does not “boast of them” but instead gives 
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“heaven thanks.”166 The melancholic turns copia, originally a preparation for rhetorical wrangling, 
into a store of meaning that can be brought to bear upon every experience.   
We might read the scene as a paragone between two rhetorical attitudes emerging from 
Renaissance practices of rhetorical invention. On the one hand, the Duke gives us the situational 
attitude. On the other hand, Jaques represents the melancholizing attitude. The Duke's social 
predicament, being in exile, is clearly poor. There are no clear courses of action. Although he, like 
Jaques, appeals to nature for his arguments, they all nevertheless turn back upon the specific 
condition of himself and his court. Moreover, the situation demands a rousing of morale, so his 
“sermons in stones” of course find the “good in everything.” It is moralizing in the modern sense; 
making a virtue of necessity as the old saw says. Jaques' reading out from the Book of Nature is 
copious; it finds moral significance in all things, but his ability to “moralize” the spectacle is not 
tethered to any specific situation. It is a capacity of his own perception.  
It is then no surprise that we see this dispute organized around the topic of the hunt. 
Scholars have frequently (and correctly) recognized that Jaques' reproach of hunting “as a cruel, 
inhuman occupation, leading to barbarism and not befitting a free man” was a “stereotyped topos” 
of humanistic literature.167 However, we might also take the attitudes of the Duke and Jaques to 
the hunt as an image of two attitudes to rhetorical invention.  The ubiquitous metaphor for the ars 
topica, formed in antiquity and elaborated in the Renaissance, was the hunt. Just as the hunter must 
know the likely places where game may be, so too the trained orator must know the loci where 
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arguments are likely to dwell. As Quintilian says, “You will not succeed in finding a bird or beast 
if you do not know where it is born or accustomed to be...so not every kind of argument can be 
sought everywhere.”168 In the Renaissance, this metaphor was interiorized, so that the orator's 
mind is a hunting ground. Books that collected commonplaces on such themes were often titled 
silvae, forest, or viridaria, hunting preserves. While there is a clear difference in the Stoic cheer 
of the Duke and the dramatic allegories of Jaques, the difference is not only in the contrast between 
the optimist and pessimist. The more profound point of departure is what they find relevant: the 
Duke’s self-assuring case about the moral health of his exile is still pointed to the political conflict 
that hems in his condition. Jaques’ moralizing of the wounded stag is a deflection of the situation 
entirely: his rebukes are hurled not at the usurper, but at the motives of hunters in general who are 
viewed as usurpers in nature. Therefore, there are those who know these places so they may hunt, 
kill, and use the prey there. However, as we see with Jaques, there is another, melancholic 
possibility; one may know the place not as a hunter, but as a fellow traveler in the forest of rhetoric.   
We will study Jaques' matter to understand his sullen fits. This chapter argues that the 
humanist revival of the ars topica in the early sixteenth century and its adoption in the European 
curriculum laid the foundation for Jaques' melancholy topics. My purpose is not to describe the 
typical or representative use and meaning of the humanist ars topica, but to act as a cicerone or 
guide through those parts of its tradition that could be cannibalized for the purposes of 
melancholizing.  I argue that the conceptualization of dialectical invention that occurred in this 
                                                 
168 “Nam, ut in terra non generantur omnia, nec avem aut feram reperias, ubi quaeque nasci aut morari soleat 
ignarus...ita non omne argumentum undique venit ideoque non passim quaerendum est.” Quintilian, Institutio 
oratoriae, 5.10.20-22. See also Cicero, De oratore, 2.3.147.  
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restitution of the classical ars topica seeded the grounds for the development of a distinctly 
melancholy topics in the English Baroque.  
3.1 Humanism and Topical Invention 
We have already seen that Jaques' “fullness in fits” requires us to grapple with the 
Renaissance theory of copia and its attendant art of topics. In the sixteenth century, humanists 
reconstituted the topics, also known as loci, or places, as the inventive part of dialectic. As the 
humanists gained dominance in the curricula of Northern Europe, logic itself began to become 
identified with topical technique. Logic embraced that what came to be called the trivium, the 
allied arts of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric. Thomas Wilson, one of the first to write an English 
vernacular rhetoric and dialectic textbook, defined logic as “an arte to reason probably, on bothe 
partes, of all matters that bee put forth, so farre as the nature of every thyng can beare.”169 Peter 
Mack, a historian of Renaissance rhetoric, has argued that humanism demanded “the object 
language of dialectic ought to be not a semi-formalized subdialect, but real language with all its 
resources.”170 That is, dialectic was a preparation for all occasions of speech, not just university 
disputations. The topics were defined in an English glossary of the time as “that part of Logick, 
                                                 
169 Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason: Conteinyng the Arte of Logique (London: Printed by Richard 
Grafton,1552), 2.  
170 Peter Mack, Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic 
(Leiden: Brill, 2006), 255. 
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which treats of the invention of arguments.”171 Richard Sherry, once headmaster of Magdalen 
College for boys, gives us a contemporary's sense of the breadth of the meanings assigned to the 
topics. The topics, or “places” as he calls them, can be “taken foure maner of wayes.” First, there 
are those called common places because they are “entreated of, of [viz. by] bothe partes [viz. 
parties], althoughe not in all one cause.” That is, both parties in a case or controversy dispute the 
same issue to different purposes, such as the reliability or unreliability of witnesses. Second, there 
are the sententiae, “whyche wee exaggerate as it were wythoute the cause, but so that they serue 
to the cause whiche wee haue in hande: as bee the amplificacions of vertues, and the exaggeracions 
of vices.” Third, there are the “seates of argumentes,” that vary across the different genres of 
rhetoric. In deliberative, we are concerned with what is “honest, profitable, pleasaunt easye, 
necessarie. &c.” In demonstrative or epideictic, we look to the “kynde, kynred, contrey, goodes of 
the bodye and of the mynde,” of the person being praised. Finally, there are the “general” topics, 
“whych declare what belongeth to euerye thynge, and howe oute of eche of them there be taken 
argumentes, partly necessary, and partlye probable.” They are shared by the “Oratours with the 
Logicians.” Sherry notes Aristotle's Topics as the primary source and recommends that this be 
read, but “the varietie of authors hath made the handlynge of them sumwhat darke, because 
amonge them selues they can not wel agre, neyther of the names, neyther of the number, neyther 
                                                 
171 Thomas Blount, Glossographia, or, A dictionary interpreting the hard words of whatsoever language now 
used in our refined English tongue : with etymologies, definitions and historical observations on the same : also the 
terms of divinity, law, physick, mathematicks, war, music and other arts and sciences explicated : very useful for all 
such as desire to understand what they read (London: Printed by Thomas Newcomb, 1670), s.v. “Topica.”  
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of the order.”172 The conflation of these four—commonplaces, sententiae, loci argumenti, 
dialectical topics—was typical, for though theorists made many distinctions between and within 
them, practitioners saw them all as so many sources of discourse, the founts of rhetoric.  
Yet invention itself would undergo a significant, if subtle, reimagining throughout the 
sixteenth century.  Despite classical rhetoric's claim on invention as its first canon, the humanist 
reforms of university curricula would assign it to dialectic. This entailed a reform of the medieval 
curriculum on logic, organized around the reception of Aristotelian texts but interpreted through 
Peter of Spain's Summulae, written in 1246. The incipit of that work stated that “dialectic is the art 
of all arts and the science of all sciences, holding the way to the principles of all methods” and that 
therefore “it ought to have priority in the acquisition of knowledge.”173 Dialectic was largely 
concerned with the technical needs of students engaged in dialectical disputations at the university. 
The desire for a dialectic that was more responsive to the discursive and literary needs of a 
burgeoning Tudor humanism began to push against Peter's term logic, as when “Johannes Eckius, 
in his commented edition of the Summulae of 1516, stresses that argumentatio ranks above 
analysis of terms, and is the 'primary subject' of logic.”174 Both universities—Oxford and 
                                                 
172 Richard Sherry, A Treatise of the Figures of Grammer and Rhetorike (London: n.p., 1555), 43v-45v. [No 
pagination in original.] 
173 “Dialetica est ars artium et scientia scientiarum ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. Sola enim 
dialetica probabiliter disputat de principiis omnium aliarum artium. Et ideo in acquisitione scientiarum dialetica debet 
esse prior.” Peter of Spain, Tractatus Called Afterwards Summule logicales (Assen: Van Gorcum & Co., 1972), 1. On 
the possibility of this famous passage containng early interpolations, see Lambertus Marie De Rijk, “On the Genuine 
Text of Peter of Spain’s Summule Logicales,” Vivarium 8, no. 1 (1970), 10-55. 
174 Ibid., 38. 
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Cambridge—saw a strong humanist revision of the curriculum. By the mid-sixteenth century, the 
humanist revision of topics was established, and invention became an early and fundamental part 
of early modern schooling in England.175  
The specific subset of topics known as dialectical were familiar to Renaissance readers of 
Cicero’s Topica, an adaptation of the Aristotelian system for a Roman audience. Cicero describes 
topics as “a system developed by Aristotle for inventing arguments so that we might come upon 
them by a rational system without wandering about.”176 The work purports to be a translation of 
Aristotle’s Topics but in fact offers a distinct view of the nature of topics if not an entirely new 
approach.177 The Ciceronian topic is merely the single word “key” that urges the mind into a 
direction of thought. The first are those loci which are inherent to the subject. These are from the 
whole [ex toto], from its parts [ex partibus eius], from its signs or properties [ex nota], and from 
things closely affected [ex eis rebus quae quodam modo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur]. The 
first three are all topics providing the speaker with different materials to use when considering the 
question quid sit? of What is it?, and can be thought of as arguments from definition, from the 
enumeration of parts, and from etymology, respectively. The last heading contains under it thirteen 
                                                 
175 See T. W. Baldwin, William Shakespeare’s Small Latine & Lesse Greeke (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1944), 1.80-2, 101, 289-90 and 2.108-137. 
176 “Disciplinam inveniendorum argumentorum, ut sine ullo errore ad ea ratione et via perveniremus, ab 
Aristotele inventam.” Cicero, Topica, 1.  
177 For an account of the relationship between Cicero's work and Aristotle's, see Sara Rubinelli, Ars Topica: 
The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2009), 
111-41. Her conclusion, in short, is that Cicero's primary source is not the Topics but the section on topics in Aristotle's 
Rhetoric. However, much more is gained from her discussion than the last word in a Quellenforschung.  
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other topics. The second class are those topics which are extrinsecus, separated from the subject 
under discussion. These depend “principally on authority [ex auctoritate].”178 This refers to those 
proofs Aristotle called atechnoi, proofs that do not rely upon the art of rhetoric or dialectic. They 
are types of forensic evidence, including witnesses.  
Scholastic dialectic relied upon an Aristotelian view of topics, where the humanist adopted 
a more Ciceronian view. They serve as practical reminders to aid an orator, jurisconsult, or 
philosopher for bringing to mind the possibilities of argument in any case. In De Oratore, Cicero 
explains how he imagines such an art to work just as if one “wished to reveal to somebody gold 
that was hidden here and there in the earth.” Then “it should be enough for me to point out to him 
some marks and indications of its positions, with which knowledge he could do his own digging, 
and find what he wanted, with very little trouble and no chance of mistake.” These topics, now 
reduced to a short list—down to 19 from roughly 300 in Aristotle—of “keywords,” become the 
basis, or at least the model, for the many sixteenth-century works on dialectical invention. In 
various combinations, reductions, and variations, the Ciceronian reading of the topics would come 
to be identified closely with dialectic, preserved in the middle ages by Boethius and developed by 
Abelard, Peter of Spain, and others.   
It is easy to miss the humanist innovations in dialectic as the most radical innovations were 
often couched in language that made them appear to be simple derivations of tradition. Though the 
humanists were enacting a major revision of the subject of dialectic, it was possible to represent it 
more mildly as a restitution of the full classical tradition, one that preserved, or was even 
authorized by, Aristotle. Cicero's Topica was announced itself as a paraphrase of Aristotle's Topics. 
                                                 
178 Cicero, Topica, 4.24. 
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Essential to Cicero's revision, however, was a loss of an attempt to represent topics as a systematic 
art. This meant dramatically simplifying  Aristotle's theory of predicables around which his system 
of dialectic was organized. A predicable is the object of a predication. A typical topos tells us to 
take one of the predicables in a statement and examine it for a certain argumentative possibility. 
The bulk of Aristotle's Topics consists of rules of this kind, 337 by one count.179 Let us examine a 
typical entry. In Book V, Aristotle takes up the problem of investigating whether something is a 
proprium, or non-essential quality, of the subject under consideration. He sets out a few general 
principles of the proprium: it is either always or only sometimes present. God is always an 
“immortal life” but man is only sometimes “walking in the theater.”180 When your opponent makes 
a claim about the proprium of a subject under dispute, you should examine to see whether it is 
always or only sometimes true.  
Though Cicero comes between Aristotle and Boethius in the chronology, the humanist 
privileging of his simplified view of topics reorganized the meaning of the purported continuity 
between these three authors. The predicables dropped out of Cicero's Topica but were present in 
the medieval curriculum in mediated form through a number of commentaries on Aristotle, most 
importantly those of Boethius and Porphyry. Boethius' translation of Aristotle’s Topics was the 
only surviving version of it in the Latin West. His commentaries on Cicero’s works were even 
more important. His commentaries show his attempt to combine two distinct teachings on topics, 
the first coming through Cicero and Aristotle. In the Boethian interpretation of topics, the topic is 
neither a keyword nor a heuristic for discovering possibilities of argument. It is the equivalent of 
                                                 
179 Louis Marie Régis, L’Opinion Selon Aristote.(Paris: Vrin, 1935).  
180 Aristotle, Topics, 5.1. 
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a maxim or rule which Boethius calls the propositio maxima. We see that this was interpreted by 
Peter of Spain, the most widely read logical text in European universities, as a kind of general 
inferential proposition, such as The whole is always greater than the part and Whatever is 
predicated of the species, also the genus.181  When a maximal proposition is not included in the 
argument explicitly, it nevertheless gives it force. This allows him to define topics as propositions 
that are both universal and maximal. He gives an example with the argument that the Moors are 
weaponless because they do not have iron. What warrants this inference is the maximal proposition 
“where the matter is lacking, what is made from the matter is also lacking.” The topic is “from 
matter.”182 The Aristotelian topic is reinterpreted as a maxim of inference, describing a kind of 
inferential validity ex rerum natura. According to Peter Abelard, “a topic is an inference rule that 
helps one find what is missing in enthymemes.”183 This discovery of what was “missing”—the 
maxim that warranted an imperfect or rhetorical syllogism—that made up the bulk of what was 
called dialectic. It was this that Agricola wished to say was only one part of dialectic, its critical 
or juridical side.  
The scholastic Aristotelian view of topics was organized around late antique commentaries 
on Aristotle rather than Aristotle's original text. While the predicables received their fullest 
treatment in Aristotle's Topics, this was not available in Latin until the twelfth century. The 
introduction of this text to Latin Europe, along with his Prior and Posterior Analytics and 
Sophistical Refutations, formed what came to be known as the logica nova or “new logic” in the 
                                                 
181 Peter of Spain, Tractatus, 12va-12vb, 59.  
182 Boethius, De topicis, 53, 1189B21-8. 
183 Ibid., 25.  
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medieval university. Earlier Masters of Arts had relied upon Porphyry's comments on the 
predicables in his Isagoge, also known as his Praedicabilia, an introduction to Aristotelian logic. 
This late antique text, in Boethius' Latin translation, was among the most commonly used logic in 
the medieval university. If modern scholars have seen in Porphyry a confused thinker, attempting 
to bring his neo-Platonic views into Aristotelian logic, the medievals held him in so high a regard 
as an Aristotelian that his little work became incorporated into Aristotle's Organon. Porphyry's 
analysis listed five predicables: accident, genus, species, property, and difference. Each of these 
terms is essential or non-essential, convertible or non-convertible. Definition requires both 
convertibility and essential predication. For instance, every human is a rational animal, and so too 
is every rational animal a human. Property or proprium is convertible but not essential. Every 
human laugh, and every being that laughs is a human. But laughter is not considered to be the 
essence of the human. Accidents were inessential properties that might be shared with other kinds, 
such as the color of a person's hair. These are all things that if changed or destroyed would not 
change the essence of the subject.  
Because every genus is a species of a higher genus, the Porphyrian model of nature 
resembled a Great Chain of Being.184 If one could ask “What is Plato?” and hear the reply, “A 
man,” nothing prevented you from asking, “What is a man?” Peter of Spain's use of the term arbor 
to describe Porphyry's arrangement of predicates inspired graphic illustrations of his logic as a 
tree. Indeed, in the “four hundred surviving manuscript copies” of Porphyry's Isagoge, “at least 40 
                                                 
184 Remarkably, the classic study of this notion by Arthur O. Lovejoy in The Great Chain of Being: A Study 
of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971) takes almost no cognizance of its logical 
underpinnings, mentioning the Porphyrian Tree only in passing and through quotation on p. 87. Neither Peter of Spain 
nor Porphyry are included in the index.  
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percent contain a drawing of the Tree of Porphyry.”185 The model of the tree allows for moments 
of branching, but always emerging from the “trunk,” a rectilinear line of relation that always refers 
one to the highest metaphysical genus, substance. While the Tree of Porphyry's influence waned 
throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it nevertheless continued to appear in 
traditional discussions of dialectic, as attested by the graphic representation included, taken from 
the arch-Aristotelian John Case's 1589 Summa veterum interpretum in universam dialecticam 
Aristotelis (Fig. 5).186 
The humanist reforms of dialectic transformed the vertical, topical model of logic and its 
ontological assumptions into a model that privileged similitude rather than belonging, a key feature 
of the melancholy topics. The arch-humanist Lorenzo Valla carried out a broad critique of 
Aristotelian ontology in his humanistic restitution of dialectic, as did later his compatriot Mario 
Nizoli. However, far more influential, especially in Northern Europe, was Rudolph Agricola's De 
inventione dialectica.187 Lisa Jardine tells us that the work  appears in university booklists “three 
times as often as any other dialectic manual apart from Melanchthon (twice as often as that).”188  
                                                 
185 Annemieke R. Verboon, “The Medieval Tree of Porphyry: an Organic Structure of Logic,” in The Tree: 
Symbol, Allegory, and Mnemonic Device in Medieval Art and Thought, ed. Pippa Salonius (Turnhour: Brepols, 2014), 
97. 
186 Luce Giard places Case's work on an “autre niveau” from the widely disseminated humanist dialectical 
texts in England. He is grouped with Richard Staynhurst's Harmonia seu catena dialectica of 1570 and Griffin Powel's 
works on Aristotle published in the 1590s. The English-produced Ramist texts constitute a “troisième groupe.” See 
Giard, “La production logique de l’Angleterre au 16e siècle,” Les Études Philosophiques 3 (1985), 317-9. 
187 The relationship between these two works is set out at length in Mack's Renaissance Argument, 244-250.  
188 Lisa Jardine, “Place of Dialectic Teaching in Sixteenth-Century Cambridge,” Studies in the Renaissance 
21 (1974), 55. 
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According to Walter Ong, “[j]ust as in the Middle Ages Peter of Spain’s logic was logic (even 
more than Aristotle’s was), so Agricola’s reoriented logic became for generations after him, in the 
absolute sense, logic unqualified.”189  It was presented to generations as a non-controversial text 
that would rightly order inference and speech. Those movements of thought that travel under the 
name of a school remain conspicuous in the histories of a period, but what often directs the 
practices rather than the products of thought is like a rip tide that’s force does not appear in the 
crests and crashes of waves of thought. It is here that we should locate Agricola's De inventione 
dialectica, for however original its thought may have been, it was also read as a textbook in the 
basic logic course and served as a (sometimes unacknowledged) source for other texts used in the 
classroom.  
Both Valla and Agricola's revivals of the topics left room for a critical dialectic focused on 
valid judgment and was principally concerned with the logical forms of the syllogism. This was 
largely what dialectic represented in the medieval university curriculum. Although both men had 
notions of how it could be reformed, they were far more concerned to revive and reform the “lost” 
part of dialectic: invention. They argued invention had been neglected by the scholastics and 
required a reappraisal of the meaning and use of the topics. Inventio, the first of the classical canons 
of rhetoric, concerned the “finding” of appropriate sentiments for discourse and argument. Though 
the techniques for this varied slightly depending on the author, all were grounded in the classical 
ars topica. According to Agricola, “all facility with argument and all copia is drawn from the 
                                                 
189 Walter Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 93. 
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topics.”190 Agricola was consciously making a gesture to revitalizing an ancient art, counting 
foremost among his predecessors Aristotle and Cicero, though he criticizes the former for being 
too obscure in his treatment of the subject and the latter for using only legal examples. Both looked 
to the scholastic tradition of dialectic with some disdain; Boethius was the “last of the learned” 
[eruditorum vltimus] for Valla, and he refers dismissively to the scholastic tradition of dialectic as 
those who “wrote after Boethius.”191   
In order for a melancholic rhetoric to be able to elaborate on even chance experience, it 
required a practice that could assimilate any material. It found this in humanist dialectic. Agricola 
defined dialectic as the art of knowing how to speak convincingly (probabiliter) on any subject 
whatsoever. This art relies upon deep familiarity with the topics, those “seats of argument” that 
lead one to consideration of a matter from many facets and so generation of potential arguments. 
The use of the places requires more than just holding the places in memory; they must be held as 
if they were in one's sight, in one's hands, through continuous exercise.192 This was imagined as 
becoming a habit of perceiving similitudes between apparently unlike things that “is always at 
hand to us, as whenever we seek similitudes between things through the topics, similitudes come 
                                                 
190 “Ut ergo dicamus id, quod praesentis est negotii tractatumque locorum aperiamus, id est, doceamus, quo 
pacto sit omnis argumentorum facultas & copia e locis eruenda.” Rudolph Agricola, Rodolphi Agricolae Phrisii De 
inventione dialectica (Coloniae: Alopecium, 1523), 374. Hereafter DID.  
191 Lorenzo Valla, Vallae Opera (Basileae: 1543), 644.  
192 “Nec vero memoria tenuisse locos satis esse credidero: sed paratos exercitos, & velut in conspectu, & ad 
manum positos teneat velim.” DID, 374-5.  
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forth for us in arguments.”193 Insofar as dialectic was a training in recognizing similitudes, it made 
it possible not to speak convincingly about all things, but to use all things in speaking. Copia is 
always “at hand” to the trained dialectician who is able to draw a simile—or a thousand—from 
what appears before her.  
                                                 
193 “Sed quod hoc usu & tractatuque rerum, cum ratio accesserit eis, copia quaedam & thesaurus paratur, qui 
semper nobis in promptu sit, ut quoties ex locis quaeremus similibus in rebus, similes nobis argumentationes 
occurant.” Ibid. 
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Figure 5 — A printed Porphyrian tree from John Case’s Summa veterum interpretum 
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Figure 6 — Synoptic diagram of Agricola's topics 
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By contrast with the Porphyrian tree, Agricola's topicalized view of nature begins from the 
thing and moves ever further out from its essence. Agricola saw the ontological grounding of the 
topics in the natural similarities between things. As Lodi Nauta has argued, this view grew in part 
out of Agricola's idiosyncratic view of logical universals as similitudes. Topical relation was 
thickest not in the singular proprium, but in the plurality of accidents of each object and its 
similarities to others.194 The tracing out of these “similitudes” was closely linked to a certain view 
of nature that subtends the Agricolan revision of dialectic. The support for dialectic is not simply 
its convenience for orators and pleaders at the bar; instead, it reflects the order of the societas 
rerum, the society of things. To justify its general application, Agricola sets forth a remarkably 
original theory of the origin of the topics:  
All things which are said either for or against something fit together and are, so to 
speak, joined with it by a certain community of nature [quadam naturae societate]. 
Now the number of things is immense and consequently the number of their 
properties [proprietas] and differences [diversitas] is also immense. This is the 
reason why no discourse and no power of the human mind can comprehend 
individually all the relations in which individuals agree and differ. However, a 
certain common condition [communis quaedam habitudo] is present in all things 
(even though they are different in their appearances), and they all tend to a 
similarity of their nature [naturae similitudinem]. So, for example, everything has 
a certain substance of its own, certain causes from which it arises, certain effects it 
produces. And so the cleverest men have picked out [excerpsere], out of that vast 
variety of things, these common headings [communia capita] such as substance, 
cause, effect and the others.195 
 
There are several things to be noted in this passage. First, the societas naturae is itself 
topical, that is, topical practice is authorized by the order of nature. Agricola imagines topics' 
                                                 
194 For an explanation of Agricola's view, see Lodi Nauta, “Universals to Topics: : The Realism of Rudolph 
Agricola, with an Edition of his Reply to a Critic,” Vivarium 50, no. 2 (2012), 190-224.  
195 DID, 9-10. 
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mythic origin in which ancient wise men “pluck out” the common features of the world through 
the comparison of individual things. Although things are individuated through their characteristics, 
“all things possess a certain common condition [habitudo] and tend towards a similarity of nature, 
because substance is common to all things, and all things arise from certain causes, and all things 
effect something.” The topics are simply these characteristics, namely definition, genus, species, 
proprium, whole, parts, conjugates, adjacents, acts, subjects, efficient and final causes, effects and 
aims, its place, time, connections, its accidents, and its incompatibles.  These common 
characteristics or notae are nothing other than the topics or loci. The mind runs through these 
common characteristics and draws out of them what can be said, making the comparison of any 
two things possible.  
Second, the common habitudo of all things is at once a misprision of the medieval 
dialectical tradition and a strikingly unique movements towards a dialectical view of nature. In 
medieval terminist logic, habitudines referred to relations between terms in a proposition or 
between propositions in a syllogism. Peter of Spain read the topics as habitudines. For instance, 
the locus from definition was the habitudo between the definition and the defined; the topic of 
description, the habitudo between description and described.196 Agricola is instead imagining a 
relation not between discourse and referent but between the natures of things. Speech is to be 
invented out of these common relations. The topics themselves are identified with the features of 
the world.  
                                                 
196 “Locus a diffinito est habitudo diffiniti ad diffinitionem....Locus a descriptione est habitudo descriptionis 
ad descriptum.” Peter of Spain, Tractatus, 61, 62.  
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Third, dialectic attunes the practitioner to the tendency of nature towards similarity. In this, 
it is foundational for the emergence of a melancholy topics that did not wish to speak with 
knowledge on all matters like the ancient sophists but to discover matter for dilating upon their 
passion in all things. The movement from a discourse of knowledge to rhetoric of passion does not 
take place within the works of humanist dialectic, but its reorganization of the societas rerum made 
this possible.  Humanist dialectic transferred the illumination of things from their essential 
qualities to their aptitude for appearing similar. Agricola describes the simile in this way: “Of all 
the places from which arguments are drawn, perhaps none is of less power against a resisting 
listener than the similitude; to him who follows it freely, and proffers himself for instruction, 
nothing is more fitting. For, if rightly applied, it opens the matter, and places some image of it in 
the mind, so that although it may not produce a necessary assent, it brings about a silent shame for 
dissenting.”197 It is used less for proving than for explaining and illustrating, and so while it is 
often used by orators, we find it more often in poets. It is a more difficult topic for invention 
because its material is wholly outside of the subject's own substance [tota extra rem].   
Where Cicero's notion of the locus extrinsecus was the sort of argument that is “outside” 
of the art of invention properly speaking, as in the case of bringing in witnesses or authorities, 
Agricola took the Ciceronian topics that went past definition and saw them as extrinsic to the 
nature of the thing considered. Agricola places similia among the “extrinsic” topics, building upon 
a distinction in Cicero. But his use of this distinction involves a striking transformation. The 
                                                 
197 “Omnium locorum e quibus ducuntur argumenta, nulli fere minus est virium contra renitentem auditorem, 
quam simillitudini: ad eum vero qui sponte sequitur, docendum se praebet, accommodatior nullus est. Aperit enim 
rem, si recte adhibeatur, & quandam eius imaginem subiicit animo: ut cum assentiendi necessitatem non afferat 
tacitum dissentiendi pudorem.” DID, 119. 
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extrinsic topics in Cicero were the equivalents of Aristotle's atechnoi, proofs that came from 
outside of the art, such as material evidence, witness testimony, and authority.198 With Agricola, 
the distinction becomes literal. The topic, as a “nota” of the “res,” is outside of the substance of 
the thing under consideration. In trying to prove that Cicero (Agricola's example of an individual) 
will die, to argue that he is a man, and therefore composed from corruptible elements and subject 
to disease, is to argue from topics within “Cicero.” In contrast, to argue that Cicero has a mortal 
father and mother and that all mortal-born die is to argue from topics outside of “Cicero.” Those 
topics that are in substantia get classed as part of its definitio. But, as we see in his discussion of 
simile, it is by placing the thing within the societas rerum that it becomes illuminated.199 In topical 
method, we discover the thing most fully not in its substance, but in what is extrinsic to it.  
Attention to similarity is developed in dialectic by a close classification of the various types 
of extrinsic relation. Agricola breaks the external topics into four classes: what is related either as 
a cause of effect of the thing [cognata], what is attached to it [applicita], its accidents [accidentia], 
and its opposites [repugnantia]. These classes proceed through a widening scope of distance from 
the thing. This mode of organization contrasts with the scholastic arrangement, premised upon the 
Porphyrian Tree, described above. It is in Agricolan dialectic where we see an alternative order. A 
graphical representation of topics as branching out from the subject under consideration (res 
proposita) was set forth in early printings of the work. The topics, the termini of these branching 
brackets, are arrayed on the right side. The divisions that come before them show that we are 
                                                 
198 Cicero, Topica, 8.  
199 Cf. this with Leonardo Bruni's early Renaissance view of ornamenta as illuminating ethical matters 
precisely by setting them in “a particular context.” See Clare Lapraik Guest, The Understanding of Ornament in the 
Italian Renaissance (Boston: Brill, 2006), 237.  
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moving ever further away from the essential nature of the subject.  The first seven (definitio, genus, 
species, proprium, totum, partes, coniugata) are those “internal topics” that are “within the nature 
of the matter” under consideration. Then we move to those that are “around its substance” (circa 
substantiam rei). Then we turn to the external topics. First, the cognates, comprising its causes and 
effects. Second, the applicitia, which include topics like the place and time. Finally, we arrive at 
the two related categories of accidentia and repugnantia where we find, among other topics, the 
similitude.  
The melancholic's topicalized imagination is prefigured in humanist dialectic itself. 
Dialectic became seen as a mental power of imaginative perception as well as a facility in 
discovering metaphorical possibility. Just as the similitude creates an image in one's mind, so 
topical description becomes a model of mental vision tout court.200 If Agricola's purpose here was 
                                                 
200 This was reinforced through the conflation of the topics of invention and the techniques of artificial or 
trained memory, most notably, in Vives De anima 3.354-5, 361 and Giulio Camillo's La Topica o vero della 
elocuzione.  The key classical sources for thinking of artificial memory in terms of “places” comes from the pseudo-
Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium. It described a technique of that worked ex locis et imaginibus, from places and 
images. Here the imagined places were to be taken literally; aedes, intercolumnium, angulum, fornicem, et alia quae 
his similia sunt. The images were to be set into these places as if hanging pictures or setting up statues in a mental 
house. It was essential to ex ordine hos locos habere, to hold these places in a set order, and to select places that were 
deserted as “solitudo conservat integras simulacrorum figuras.” The most developed version of the adoption of topics 
in mental vision is undoubtedly in the masters of Renaissance ars memoriae, Giulio Camillo, Girodano Bruno, and, 
to a lesser extent, Tommaso Campanella. To delve into the complexity and abstruseness of these thinkers, however, 
would take us too far afield. Moreover, although Bruno in particular remained alive in the memories of certain English 
neo-Platonists and esoterics, his contributions were sui generis and risked running afoul of religious orthodoxy, even 
in the theologically disputatious England of the seventeenth century.  
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to offer a pedagogical model of habits that build eloquence, he nevertheless also articulated the 
formation of a new discursive position, one that would develop into the melancholy topics. As 
opposed to a procedure adopted adventitiously on the basis of a case, the art of invention began to 
be seen as a mental faculty. Melanchthon called dialectic a “certain natural power, by which we 
may give the order of things in their relations.”201 Visorius, in his 1534 commentary on Agricola, 
writes: “Some call dialectic an art, other say it is a faculty.”202 Nearly all of the other important 
humanist writers on dialectic followed suit. Sturm wrote that it was not a form of knowledge, but 
a dunamis, a certain “power of the mind like an instrument” for “perceiving things.”203 Ramus 
distinguishes a dialectica naturalis in his Partitiones and claimed that “[d]ialectical art ought to 
                                                 
201 “Est ars ipsa (dialecticae) domi nobis et in animis nostris nata, sicut numerandi scientia, plana et facilis 
est. Est enim propemodum naturalis quaedam vis, qua per ut demus rerum inter se ordinem.” Phillip Melancthon, De 
Dialectica Libri Quattor (Lipsiae: Fabrus, 531), 3. [1b. 1. 1.] 
202 “Alii dialecticen artem vocant, alii facultatem esse dicunt.” Johannes Visorius, Compendiosa librorum 
Rodolphi Agricolæ de inuentione dialectica epitome. Per Iohannem Visorium Cœnomanum (Paris: Apud S. 
Colinaeum, 1534), 101. 
203 “At Aristoteles in Rhetoricis scribit disserendi dicendique vias dunameis, non epistemas esse. Animi vim 
quasi instrumentum quoddam ad aliquam rem perspiciendam, dunamis vocat: doctrinam vero aliquarum rerum scientia 
comprehensam, episteme nominat, vi et facultate cuiusdam artis tanquam instrumento perceptam. Itaque ad 
comparandas trahendasque caeteras artes ac disciplinas, inventa dialectica est, quae in discendo utilis sit.” Johannes 
Sturm, Ioannis Stvrmii Dialectices Liber Tertivs de Demonstratione: & quartus de Arte Sophistarum & de collocatione 
Dialectica (Argentorati: Wendelin Rihel, 1548), 6-7. 
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begin from an imitation and observation of natural dialectic.”204 One of the strongest statements 
of this kind is found in a 1568 work called On the Study of Dialectic Rightly Undertaken [De studio 
dialectices recte suscipiendo], written by Melanchthon's pupil David Chytraeus. He argues that 
God placed dialectic into the minds as “a light, by which we see, just as if they were things placed 
before our eyes, and determine the differences of colors,” but dialectic allows us to see “God and 
those other things not placed before our eyes, and as we discern the one from the many, and the 
order, difference [distinctionem], consequence.”205 Dialectic was a means of seeing what was not 
apparent. In this, humanist dialectic laid the foundation of the melancholic position, which “saw” 
the world through the passion without apparent occasion.  
When dialectic was identified with the inventive mental faculty, the topics were the organ 
of experience. We see this most remarkably expressed in an Italian Baroque theorist, Pietro Sforza 
Pallavicino, who argued in his 1644 Del Bene that wit, or ingegno, was “that gift of nature 
which…consists precisely in joining, through cunning attention, objects which seemed to be 
disconnected, and tracing in them the hidden traces of friendship within that very contrariety, the 
unseen unity of a peculiar similitude amidst total dissimilarity, some bond, some kinship, some 
                                                 
204 “Ars enim dialectica debet ab imitatione et observatione naturalis dialecticae proficisci.” Johannes 
Piscator and Petrus Ramus, Animadversiones Joannis Piscatoris In Dialecticam Petri Rami (London: Middleton, 
1583), 3v. 
205 Jodochus Willichus and David Chrytaeus, Iodoci Willichi Reselliani Erotematum Dialectices III, quibus 
accessit Davidis Chytraei de Studio Dialectices recte instituendo Libellus (Basileae: Guarinum, 1568), 255-6.  
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confederation where others would never suspect it.”206 Its rules, he tells us, are fully laid out in 
Aristotle's Topics.  Agricola himself presents one of the original reasons for the invention of topics 
as the human confrontation with diversity and therefore, the need to distill the “common 
characteristics.” There is “no discourse or power of the human mind able to grasp how all things 
taken singly either agree or disagree with every other individual thing.”207 Agreements are 
similitudes of properties or accidents; where we don't find similitude, we have a “disagreement” 
between things.  
The melancholy topics were predicated upon an interiorization of dialectic as a faculty and 
the objectification of predicates. These both mark a movement towards a topicalized imagination. 
Agricola’s suggestion for practicing the topics is an adaptation of the rhetorical practice of 
ekphrasis, or in Latin descriptio, which he calls a preliminary exercise (praeexercitamenta) for 
boys. But unlike the rhetorical practice, purpose is not to achieve an elegance of expression. 
Topical ekphrasis is not a schoolroom oration, but the imaginative discovery of arguments in which 
“[i]t suffices....to have marked down a thing through single words, as if headings, of each of the 
                                                 
206 “L'arte di ben ravvisarle contiensi principalmente negli otto libri meravigliosi della Topica di Aristotile, 
in cui si mostra la maniera di indagar le ragioni per disputar probabilmente in ogni maniera ed a favor di ciascuna 
parte.” Sforza Pallavicino, Opere edite ed inedite del cardinale Sforza Pallavicino (Roma: Salviucci, 1844), 324. 
207 “Quo fit, ut omnia quae singulis conveniant aut discrepent, sigillatim nulla oratio, nulla vis mentis 
humanae possit complecti.” DID, 9. 
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topics.”208 While rhetoricians seek to amplify, accuse, etc., the dialectical task is to first set out an 
exact vision of the thing, its nature and characteristics.209  
This description is the topical account that brings the thing into a single view. Agricola 
emphasizes several times that the use of the topics is to have everything in one glance. He imagines 
this as an imaginative exercise in which the soul is encircled by these common characteristics of 
things and, moving through each in turn as if through certain stations, it is laden with a great 
number of “probable” things.  
 
We will achieve this, if first we should have all the topics and their precepts 
firmly affixed in our memories so that whenever we like we and without hesitation 
we are able to perceive everything as if in one view. Secondly, if through much 
practice we should accustom the mind to always have its eyes attentive and open, 
so to speak, so that it is immediately able to pluck out the concordances and 
discordances from the things described through the order of the topics.210 
 
Rather than preparing us for some already-existing situation, we run through the topics to 
create a mental habit. This habit was the grounds for the transformation of rhetorical and dialectic 
topics into a mode of melancholic experience. This practice was quite different from the classical 
use of the topics. In Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, however the topical techniques may have 
                                                 
208 “Satis enim nobis erit, es singulorum locorum, singulis verbis velut capitibus quibusdam annotasse.” DID, 
386. 
209 “Necesse est autem quisquis volet rem aliquam describere, ut omnem eius naturam, proprietatemque 
exacte perspectam habeat.” DID, 386-7. 
210 “Id assequemur, si primum locos omnes et omnia praecepta firmiter affixa memoriae habeamus, ut 
quotiescunque libuerit, cuncta velut uno intuitu sine cunctatione perspicere possimus. Deinde, si multo usu 
assuefecerimus animum, intentos semper et apertos (ut sic dixerim) habere oculos, ut statim possit ex rebus per 
locorum ordinem descriptis consentiana discrepantiaque eruere.” DID, 403. 
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differed, they were aligned in attempting to discover an argument for a real situation calling for 
speech. That is to say, topical invention was limited by the motive of the speaker to prove a case 
or defend some point. In Agricola's ekphrastic use of topics, we find a new function for the 
classical technique. In the exercise, there is no set end for discovering the right predicates. One 
simply contemplates the object under each of the topical headings.  Indeed, though it has been said 
that the humanist dialectic's “description of the topoi” is tantamount to “attempt[ing] to make an 
art out of the natural capacity to establish some state of affairs through observation and a 
methodical order,”211 it is equally true that they began to envision a natural faculty of observation 
that was made in the image of dialectical art.   
The possibility of a melancholy topics depended upon the realignment of the topics with 
dialectic rather than within rhetoric. Although Agricola argued (prior to Ramus) that invention 
belonged to dialectic rather than rhetoric, most treatments of the ars topica treated the distinction 
as principally one of scope; the matter of rhetoric was “principally in politics,” whereas dialectic 
examined all questions (materia rhetoris est in politicis principaliter, materia dialecti est in 
omnibus).212 It is precisely in its openness to all considerations, its ability to invent matter on any 
question, that dialectic allows for the rhetorization of nature, expanding it beyond its sphere of res 
humanae. The distinction between dialectic and rhetoric, made by Agricola and championed by 
Ramus, has been viewed as a devalorization of rhetoric's claim since Ong's work. This is in one 
                                                 
211 “Der Kern der humanistischen Reform der Dialektik ist die Beschreibung der Topoi, d.h. der Versuch, aus 
der natürlichen Fähigkeit, einen Sachverhalt begründen zu können, durch Beobachtung und methodische Ordnung 
eine Kunst zu machen.” Volkhard Wels, Triviale Künste: die humanistische Reform der grammatischen, dialektischen 
und rhetorischen Ausbildung an der Wende zum 16. Jahrhundert.(Berlin: Weidler, 2000), 112. 
212 Agostino Nifo, Commentaria, 1v.  
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sense true, but it is actually quite misleading; humanist dialectic was as much an intense 
valorization of rhetorical invention, giving it its own status as a branch of a classical art of probable 
reasoning. While Cicero had introduced the notion of the topics as sedes argumentorum, Agricola 
initiated its transformation into a logic of nature, in which things can be analyzed and compared.  
3.2 The Question Infinite 
In seeing Jaques as a practitioner of topics, we can see the difference of melancholy topics 
from the classical image of topical practice, which was used to train orators for participation in 
public life. Jaques uses the topics to disdain and criticize the “public haunt” and its motives. Jaques 
is ridiculed by other characters for being studied in his melancholic set-pieces. Orlando accuses 
him of having “studied [his] questions” from “painted cloths,”213 referring to a genre of popular, 
cheap, and conventional paintings on textile; Jaques' famous speech on the seven ages was one 
popular theme for these cloths.214 Jaques has formed his topical habits not by responding to the 
“public haunt” but through discovering those commonplaces that articulate his melancholic mood.  
The shift in the nature of a topics was also paralleled by a melancholic reconceptualization 
of the “question,” or controversy around which arguments are built. The humanists emphasize the 
generality and universality of dialectical, topical, method.215 This opposes the situational focus of 
                                                 
213 As You Like It, 3.3.275. 
214 See Mander, “Painted Cloths: History, Craftsmen, and Techniques,” Textile History 28, no. 2 (1997), 126-
7.  
215 See Cicero, De Oratore 2.145-6. 
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Cicero, where the “dominant sense of locus...is of a system of situational analysis comprising 
taxonomies of rhetorical forms that can be used to create arguments for a specific case (quaestio 
finita).”216 That is, the classical rhetorical res of circumstance, situation, case, occasion was 
replaced by the dialectical res, the general subject of discourse. The dialectical sense of res was 
best explored in  the quaestio infinita, the “question infinite.” This distinction, probably first made 
by Hermagoras, was in Greek one between thesis (infinite) and hypothesis (definite). A youthful 
Cicero said that such questions were distant from the office of an orator [procul ab oratoris officio 
remotas]. But, as Quintilian noted, elsewhere he recognized that the particular question contains 
within it the general one:  “For in their division of the different kinds of speeches they set up two 
sorts of cases: one they describe as raising general questions, not related to individuals or 
occasions; and the other as depending upon specific individuals and occasions; not knowing that 
any debate whatsoever can be brought under [referri] the notion and quality [vim et naturam] of 
the general kind.”217 Yet the Ciceronian rapprochement with the infinite question had a clear 
motive: the general questions were fewer in number and therefore made it easier for the orator to 
come to terms with the variations in particular cases. This same distinction was taken up in English 
vernacular treatises. Speeches either respond to a question that is “infinite...and without ende” or 
one that is “definite, and comprehended within some ende.” The person who speaks upon the 
“question infinite” talks “of thynges universally, without respect of persone, time, or place.”218 
                                                 
216 Mortensen, “The Loci of Cicero,” Rhetorica 26, no. 1 (2008), 36. 
217 “Constituunt enim in partiendis orationum modis duo genera causarum : unum appellant, in quo sine 
personis atque temporibus de universo genere quaeratur ; alterum, quod personis certis et temporibus definiatur; ignari 
omnes controversias ad universi generis vim et naturam referri.” De oratore, 2.133.  
218 Wilson, Rhetorique, 1r-v.  
 126 
Commonly, the examples given of infinite questions are comparative, as in Wilson, who asks 
whether the courtier or the scholar leads a better life. It is in this sense that Jaques 
“studied...questions” from painted cloths—he has prepared set speeches on commonly disputed 
“questions infinite.” 
The quaestio infinita was the statement of a general dispute within a specific case. 
However, Agricola notes that this often fails—in many cases the “whole question hangs upon a 
circumstance” [totam quaestionem ex conditione pendere].219 He gives the example of a common 
controversia subject—should Cato divorce Marcia? Agricola's departure seems at first to place all 
of rhetoric within the consideration of circumstance. Rather, it shows how political, deliberative 
rhetoric cannot be reduced to a general question or thesis.220 Circumstances are not merely the 
garb over the true thesis to be debated. Each circumstance within the controversy of a case is a res 
with its own arguments. Only by recognizing in Cato the various predicates of Stoic, politician, 
orator, etc. as well as those in Marcia are we able to adequately address the question. Whether 
Cato should divorce his wife depends upon the circumstance—is he poor? is he devoted to study? 
is his wife not virtuous?—rather than the general question of Should a philosopher divorce his 
wife, which simply moves Cato up the Porphyrian tree and replaces the individual with his 
genus.221 
Yet when Agricola turns to demonstrate how to use his topical practice, he gives the 
example of a thesis, that is, the question “Should a philosopher take a wife?” We see here that the 
                                                 
219 DID, 248. 
220 See Mack, Renaissance Argument, 188. 
221 DID, 377. 
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topics, even if they may be used to answer the questions of specific circumstances, find their 
clearest use in application to the quaestio infinita. Before addressing the question directly, he first 
runs “philosopher” and then “wife” through all of the places. Then from this material, he takes the 
definition of philosopher and “visits” it to all the now-filled places of “wife.” Since a philosopher 
is a man seeking virtue, and the proprium of a wife is seeking to bear children, Agricola “finds” 
here an agreement, since one may plausibly say that part of virtue is seeking to reproduce. While 
this may seem to be a simple combinatorial exercise, the order given to the process belies this. 
What is moved through the topics is a res, not a proposition. This pre-propositional collection of 
predicates shows how the dialectical topics have transformed to resemble a kind of imaginative 
play or predicates rather than a procedure for debate. Indeed, were we to consider all of the places, 
we would never come to a reason to terminate the topical collection of predicates.  
The thesis, distinct from the hypothesis because it is not attached to specific circumstances 
[circumscriptum circumstantiis], is a seed of copia. Melanchthon argued that the general question 
“not only has a special place in the speech, but also gives forth words and sententiae to every part 
of the oration.”222 The thesis, the question without occasion, was in this sense identical with the 
loci communes: the answers to such a question could be moved between different occasions for 
speaking. The mobility of speech directed towards a quaestio infinita complemented the unsituated 
passion of the melancholic. Just as there is a distinction between the question anchored to time, 
place, and persons and one that is not, so too we might take this analogy into the realm of passions. 
If feeling is directed to particular conditions, it is definite. But where it roams freely, as in Jaques' 
                                                 
222 “Ac thesis illa, cum habet peculiarem interdum in oratione locum, tum verba et sententias gignit in 
omnibus partibus orationis.” Melanchthon, Elementa rhetorices, E8r19-20.  
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“sullen fit,” we have the commonplace mood of the melancholic. Jaques shows us that what we 
have identified in the first chapter as a problem—the passion without apparent occasion—was also 
a capacity, an expectation that the melancholic may move more easily into a register of moral truth, 
forming a dark apotheosis out of a mundane scene. His melancholy is a rhetorical prism. He is 
expected to turn any scene into allegory.  
When the topical ekphrastic method was absorbed by melancholy topics into a habit of 
experience, there was no case, but instead a passion. The discovery of predicates, then, was not 
limited to answering a controversy but could continue on indefinitely. What allowed melancholy 
passions to become sutured into this rhetorical structure was the indeterminate nature of its cause. 
In this way, melancholy passions become “questions infinite” in a new sense—the answer to How 
am I feeling? can be extended without bounds to any object in which a similitude to a potential 
reason for the feeling can be discovered. The melancholy topics transform the mood of melancholy 
itself, taking any object that could be said to be a cause of the passion as its occasion for 
elaboration.  
Jaques makes a point that his form of speech does not address specific individuals. When 
the Duke accuses Jaques of being a hypocrite—“chiding sin” when he himself lives as a 
“libertine”—Jaques defends himself with recourse to the “question infinite.” He asks the Duke, 
“What woman in the city do I name,/When that I say the city-woman bears/The cost of princes on 
unworthy shoulders? Who can come in and say that I mean her,/When such a one as she such is 
her neighbour?” The similitude between the characters of those the melancholic criticizes trumps 
the speech about any specific circumstance. It is precisely in showing the typicality of their motives 
that the melancholic critique takes his sting. When he attacks, in general terms, a man “of basest 
function/That says his bravery is not of my cost,” this only shows the poignancy of the criticism. 
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It is the angered listener, who in  “[t]hinking that I mean him...therein suits/His folly to the mettle 
of my speech.”223 The commonplace character of the melancholic rhetoric takes its wide 
applicability precisely by foregoing arguments from circumstance, letting the circumstance 
confess itself as an example of the typical.  
We can follow the problematic introduced by the infinite question into the melancholy 
topics in seeing how it is used by Shakespeare's melancholic characters. Quentin Skinner's 
Forensic Shakespeare traces out in exacting detail how various scenes within Shakespeare's oeuvre 
are illuminated by mapping them out against the formulas of the quaestio iudicii as it appeared in 
vernacular rhetorics of the time. This even appears in the dialogue of certain characters, as when 
the Duke says to Portia in the trial scene of The Merchant of Venice saying she, disguised as a 
“he,” is “acquainted with the difference/ That holds this present question in the Court.”224 Despite 
his careful tracing of the Hamlet plot against the description of question analysis, Skinner's analysis 
does not take into account the most famous line in all of Shakespeare and its clear invocation of 
the quaestio; I speak, of course, of Hamlet's “To be or not to be; that is the question.”225 Here, the 
quaestio does not conform to the forensic model that Skinner is at pains to shows organizes the 
action of Hamlet. Cicero further divided the quaestio infinita in his Topica, making a distinction 
between the quaestio cognitionis “whose aim is the acquisition of knowledge,” and the quaestio 
actionis that concerns deliberation about an action. He contrasts a discourse that seeks to ascertain 
the nature of legal right from its origin, about which it may be disputed whether it comes from 
                                                 
223 As You Like It, 2.7.75-83. 
224 See Quentin Skinner, Forensic Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 210. 
225 Italics mine.  
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nature or civic compact, with the question whether it is “the duty of the wise man to get involved 
with politics?”226 It is, rather, better modelled as a meditation that begins upon what Cicero called 
a “question of action” but, in the melancholic dilation upon similitudes, is upended by a quaestio 
cognitionis, a question of thought.  
Indeed, the soliloquy dramatizes a contest between these quaestio cognitionis and the 
quaestio actionis. We see the topical movements of Hamlet's inferences. “To die—to sleep.” This 
similitude allows him to claim that death, like sleep, brings rest, and to “end/The heart-ache and 
the thousand natural shocks/That flesh is heir to.” But this similitude can be extended. In the topical 
dilation of “sleep” we find one of its accidents; when we sleep, we are “perchance to dream.” 
Dreams have a more ambiguous status. The possibilities must “give us pause.” The question of 
what is in a dream is not a matter of action, but only of a kind of knowledge, perhaps one 
inaccessible to humans. But this uncertainty affects the deliberation about action, in that it breeds 
the “dread of something after death.” Hamlet argues that it is only this fear that is the real motive, 
not to flee life, but to persevere amidst its pangs and spurns.  
                                                 
226 “Quaestionum autem 'quacumque de re' sunt duo genera: unum cognitionis alterum actionis. Cognitionis 
sunt eae quarum est finis scientia, ut si quaeratur a naturane ius profectum sit an ab aliqua quasi condicione hominum 
et pactione. Actionis autem huius modi exempla sunt: Sitne sapientis ad rem publicam accedere. Cognitionis 
quaestiones tripertitae sunt; aut sitne aut quid sit aut quale sit quaeritur. Horum primum coniectura, secundum 
definitione, tertium iuris et iniuriae distinctione explicatur. Coniecturae ratio in quattuor partes distributa est, quarum 
una est cum quaeritur sitne aliquid; altera unde ortum sit; tertia quae id causa effecerit; quarta in qua de commutatione 
rei quaeritur. Sitne sic: ecquidnam sit honestum, ecquid aequum re vera; an haec tantum in opinione sint. Unde autem 
sit ortum: ut cum quaeritur, natura an doctrina possit effici virtus. Causa autem efficiens sic quaeritur, quibus rebus 
eloquentia efficiatur. De commutatione sic: possitne eloquentia commutatione aliqua converti in infantiam.” Cicero, 
Topica, 82. 
 131 
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all, 
And thus the native hue of resolution 
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought, 
And enterprises of great pitch and moment 
With this regard their currents turn awry 
And lose the name of action.227 
 
The question loses its name of “action” to “thought,” that is, the quaestio actionis becomes 
the quaestio cognitionis. This is imagined by Hamlet as changing the quality of bodily 
temperament. The ruddy attitude required for deeds is “sicklied o'er” with the ever more abstract 
forms of reasoning. The sanguine question of action becomes a melancholic question of thought 
through its topical dilation into similitudes and possibilities. This has the effect not of helping us 
to retrieve arguments but leaving us in a state unsuited for action altogether. The melancholic habit 
of topical generalization leads to a state in which deliberation always leads us to the point of 
uncertainty rather than to decision. Rhetorical and dialectical capacity become melancholic 
indecisiveness. But within this indecision is a topical flowering of an articulation of passion. 
                                                 
227 Hamlet, 3.1.57-91. 
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3.3 The Melancholy Commonplace 
 Hamlet’s soliloquy deploys a number of distinctly melancholy commonplaces. 228   
Commonplaces are discursive elaborations of topics that maintain the mobility across situated 
discourse that topical perception retained.  Before we are able to see how melancholy rhetoric 
emerged from the topical tradition, we must first understand the relationship between 
commonplaces and the ars topica proper. The loci argumentorum were defined by Cicero and 
Quintilian as the sedes argumentorum, those that are detailed in descriptions of dialectic. We have 
so far discussed the rhetorization of these dialectical topics. However, the commonplace or locus 
communis is often thought to have had a different history, one more or less independent from the 
logical comprehensiveness of dialectic. Scholarship on the topic has often distinguished between 
“analytic” and “concrete” topics.229 Commonplaces are aligned with the “concrete” topics, that is, 
those that concern specific subject matters and are most familiarly deployed in the distinctive early 
modern practice of note-taking that came to be known as “commonplacing.” This practice is 
frequently traced to the influence of Erasmus' pedagogical works, most importantly De copia and 
De ratione studii.    
This use of topics was a way of mapping out a potential semantic space. Whereas in the 
classical works this potential space was the forensic speech, a defense or accusation in a courtroom 
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setting or one of the schoolroom exercises modelled upon this, the Renaissance reimagined this 
space as the very power of discourse. The commonplace was fertile for the discursive elaboration 
of melancholic passions: it was precisely in the ability to discourse on the common conditions of 
human life that the melancholic is able to justify a passion not bounded by situational concerns. A 
key part of the skill of commonplacing was knowing how to embed one of the sententiae culled 
from reading into a new discourse. Erasmus explained this practice through a metaphor: “[j]ust as 
a gem must be set in a ring to realize its full splendor, so the literary commonplace needs a proper 
discursive setting in order to display its true value.”230 Then, “whenever the occasion demands, 
the stuff of speech will be ready at hand as if safe nests had been built, whence you can take what 
you wish.”231 If the Erasmian commonplaces were geared towards amplification, this was 
nevertheless an amplification of the general proposition. Agricola argued that “what the 
rhetoricians call loci communes are nothing but the major propositions of arguments.”232 For 
example, we want to prove that some man named Coelius should be convicted and so therefore we 
need to show that he is a sorcerer. The commonplace, then, is that all sorcerers should be 
condemned. It is the generality of the proposition that allows it to serve us on any occasion where 
a specific individual is before us. The commonplace is precisely that part of the argument that 
exceeds its occasion, allowing it to appear in others. If Erasmus focused on the re-embedding, he 
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nevertheless fostered practices that trained the ear of the reader to find those expressions that 
echoed beyond their setting.     
The strong distinction made by scholars between Agricolan dialectical topics and Erasmian 
commonplaces is overstated. The Erasmian “copy of things” or copia rerum was said to “take their 
rise from the places of Topics in dialectic.”233 At the same time, the notion that the Agricolan 
dialectic was purely logical has underemphasized his own description of the uses of topics as part 
of the practice of reading many of the same classical authors Erasmus had placed at the core of the 
reformed humanist curriculum. Melanchthon, in his De rhetorica libri tres of 1519 argued that the 
loci communes were both dialectical and rhetorical in nature.234 In his De copia, the first examples 
Erasmus gives of loci communes are dialectical topics, from definition (genus, species, proprium, 
differentiae, and two additional topics, partitio and divisio) and a loose set of others, including 
many found in Agricola, like contraries, similitudes, and opposites. That is, the commonplace was 
not unlike Jaques “studied question”—it moved the topic from a moment of perception into a patch 
of discourse that could be set within a variety of speeches. The transition from topic to 
commonplace is one from invention to elaboration. Attendant upon this transition is a movement 
from the quasi-logical categories of Agricolan dialectic to common themes of discourse. While we 
are unlikely to give a moving speech about genus or proprium, there are many occasions on which 
we may be called to speak about Justice, Love, or Mercy. However, unique to the melancholy 
commonplaces was a retention of universal applicability even within these themes. Because the 
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melancholic mood had no discrete object, it discovered the subjects of its discourse from the 
common qualities of all things.   
Erasmus claims that even more powerful for its probative power are exempla, which are 
“employed either as similes, or dissimilia, or contraries.” Here we see that Erasmus gives a 
different shade and wider scope to the topic of comparison than did Agricola. It encompasses the 
“fabula, the apologue, the proverb, judgments, the parable, or collatio, the imago and anthology, 
and other similar ones.”235 These were to be gathered through reading. Erasmus advised the pupil 
to create headings in a blank book, “partly from classes of vices and virtues, partly from those 
things that are especially important in human affairs.”236 But the exact listing and order of these 
headings was up to the individual, for “anyone may make an orderly list of the virtues and vices 
for himself, following his own judgment,” though he can also borrow a listing he finds in a classical 
author or authority. The exempla, as headings, are simply superlatives of other topics, as we see 
from Erasmus' listing: “senile youth, unusual happiness, remarkable memory, sudden changes in 
fortune, sudden death, voluntary death, unnatural death, extraordinary eloquence, unusual riches, 
famous men of humble birth, subtlety of intellect, extraordinary physical strength, extraordinary 
appearance, distinguished character in a deformed body.”237 However, when he comes to examples 
of commonplace headings, we find them in the form of proverbs or sententiae, like “To each their 
own beauty” (Suum cuique pulchrum), “It is safest to believe no one” (Tutissimum est nulli 
credere), and “He who gives quickly gives twice” (Bis dat qui cito dat). Moreover, even with the 
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headings of the virtues, there was room for specification. Under the heading of Piety and Impiety, 
the commonplacer is to include the “several particular kinds,” such as “piety toward God...toward 
the fatherland...toward parents of children, or even toward those whom we ought to honor in place 
of parents as teachers and those by whose kindness we have been taken care of.”238 This method 
of introducing “heads” in the form of important terms or maxims can be brought into the 
organization of any aspect of one's reading, for “no learning is so far removed from rhetoric that 
you may not enrich your classifications with it.”239 The possibility of excerpting sententiae, 
similitudes, parables, and exempla from one's reading is linked to the habits of mind that held the 
commonplaces at the ready. To arrange a pithy sentence under “love” is not a different act from 
contemplating its causes, repugnantia, cognata, etc. What holds across all these various uses of 
the term “topics” and its analogues is a metaphor: a place where one might find arguments. 
Typically, this meant a mental habit that gave one greater acuity to know what to consider in a 
given discourse. Sometimes the metaphor was realized literally. The topics would become indexes 
for books, part of the burgeoning system of finding aids in the print era.   
The topic and commonplace are respectively as the seed and the flower of rhetorical 
discourse. The tension between the logical structure of a discourse and its content was not a 
coincidence of two unrelated meanings but part of the incitement to a reconciliation between res 
et verba, that made Northern European humanism distinctive. The relationship between the two 
was good humanist practice, following the dictum of Quintilian: concern for words comes through 
solicitude after things, because “the best words are essentially suggested by the subject matter and 
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are discovered by their own intrinsic light.”240 The dialectical art, then, was imagined as a way of 
seeing the source of a discourse through its verbal realization.  If in practice, writers on topics 
leaned to one side or another of argumentative formalism or the collection of material, they 
nevertheless often imagined their enterprises under the same banner.  
If, as in the case of Erasmus, the recommendations to excerpt and excise sentences, 
apothegms, and examples was a way of storing them for later re-contextualization, it nevertheless 
made possible a speaker who refused to weave the mobile sentence back into the scene. This 
speaker, one I identify as the melancholic, found meaning only once it was placed in this 
storehouse, or in Burton's phrase, kept all their treasure “in Minerva's tower.” Erasmus' claimed 
that by understanding the matters in “the literary monuments of ancient Greece,” one also reads 
“the whole of attainable knowledge.”241 The most dialectically inclined were often concerned with 
topical method as a compendium of the rules of an art and in this way were not far from the 
Erasmian collections of sentences and apothegms, as attested by Melanchthon's Loci communes, a 
work that with its arrangements of the “special topics” of theology set the model of Lutheran 
theological discourse for generations to come.242 We also see that those who set out headings under 
which “flowers” could be collected derived the headings and sometimes also the order from some 
dialectical process. The most extreme version of this is John Foxe's printed commonplace book 
which is mostly blank pages with headings. Yet the headings are a complete survey of dialectical 
possibilities broken down through the predicates of substantia, giving  “twenty-five subdivisions, 
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which take us from God the Creator, through spirits, the soul, the heavenly bodies, and the 
elements, by way of inanimate and liquid substances, human inventions in clothing, arms, printing, 
gunpowder, bells, and clocks, and on to monsters, plants, and animals, and, finally, man and 
woman.”243 Here we see the nature reflected in the commonplace book according to its Porphyrian 
division into genera. However, the melancholy commonplace book, if such a thing existed, would 
not organize its headings according to their essential differences, but through the similitudes of all 
things in the societas rerum. We would find headings of Transience, Decay, Mutability, and 
Vanity. Here lies a paradox: the apparent profundity of the melancholic passion finds its initial 
matter in the generic qualities of existence. It becomes vivid through its topical exploration of the 
similarities across the rhetorical genres surveyed above.  
The habit of melancholy topics has a history, but it did not live its life mostly on the page. 
Therefore, the history I have told here is irreducibly speculative. Yet this is only to acknowledge 
what is common to many other intellectual histories. Insofar as “influence” still remains an 
explanans in many histories of ideas, we are stuck with stories of androgenesis, of men 
illuminating the minds of other men, each thought a development of inflection of another extant 
thought. Instead, I attempted to follow out suggestions within a largely pedagogical literature to 
illuminate certain features of melancholic rhetoric. If we only look to the many instances of 
rhetoric that have melancholic themes, we can only catalogue their themes. In the next chapter, I 
wish to show that these consistent themes across melancholic rhetoric were topical, commonplace 
resources that helped to organize and justify the melancholic passion as a mood, that is, a passion 
that does respond to a situation but to a quality of phenomena that is not apparent before 
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articulation. This mood was the starting point for a rhetorical elaboration of melancholic 
experience, one that would turn upon a distinctive form of perception: the emblematic. 
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4.0 Chapter 3: Melancholy Rhetoric: Commonplace and Emblem as Mood and Experience 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the habits of humanist topics disassociated rhetorical 
practice from response to oratorical exigency. The melancholy topics became a mode of perceiving 
through similitude rather than essence. This developed into genres of a melancholy 
rhetoric,capable of discovering matter to justify melancholic passion without having to take its 
object as the cause of its passion. I focus on three genres that each build upon the next. First is the 
melancholy set-piece built out of melancholy commonplaces. As dicussed in the previous chapter, 
the commonplaces were prepared passages used to amplify a speech, or, in the Renaissance, a 
written work. They are likened to “arms that must always be readied for some certain use, so that 
through them, whenever the situation [res] calls for it, they are put to use.”244 However, the 
melancholic's “use” of the commonplaces was not to respond to the call of a situation but rather to 
identify a scene with their passion. This was a rhetorical elaboration: mood was articulated through 
the commonplace. The second genre looks to how melancholy rhetoric developed around a dual 
movement of dilating passion into mood and articulating mood through sense experienced as an 
emblem. The emblem book assisted in developing what I call the melancholic’s emblematic 
perception.  This consisted in taking the sights of one’s environment and treating them as emblems. 
This meant to “place” them in one’s mind beneath the verbal articulation of one’s mood in a 
commonplace. This is a habit trained upon the immensely popular genre of the emblem book. The 
emblem was a motto or inscription associated with a picture printed beneath it. The significance 
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of their relation was made explicit or riddled at by a prose or poetic passage that followed. This 
same structure describes the subjective orientation of the melancholic rhetor. Finally, I look to a 
third genre, the occasional meditation, in which the emblematic perception was developed into 
both a prose genre and a form of melancholic activity, or “melancholizing.” In the meditation, the 
emblematic mode of perception. is translated directly into the melancholic’s lived experience.  In 
each of these genres, the relation between mood and meaning is elaborated through the topical 
techniques described in the previous chapter and so developed into a melancholy rhetoric. This 
rhetoric constituted melancholy no longer as a problem of motive but as a mode of experience.  
4.1 Melancholy as Mood 
Before embarking on a description of the history of this rhetoric, I must first clarify my use 
of the difference between “passion” and “mood.” According to Jonathan Flatley, a scholar of 
melancholy in modernity, mood is itself objectless, but it creates an “affective atmosphere” in 
which “intentions are formed, projects pursued, and particular affects attach to particular 
objects.”245 In glossing Heidegger's term “thrownness” (Befindlichkeit), Flatley argues that the 
“sense of a situation” always takes the form of a mood or Stimmung.246 I do not disagree that in 
phenomenological inquiry mood is the appearance to the subject of the situation. But this makes it 
all the more striking that we can speak of a melancholic mood. I have argued in Chapter 1 that 
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melancholy is precisely a problem of judging the relationship between affect, emotion, passion, 
and situation. If we take melancholy in this problematic sense, rather than as a shade of sadness, 
the articulation of a melancholic mood also appears as a problem. Melancholic passion, then, is 
not mood as attunement or Stimmung, but Verstimmung, an underdetermined ill-feeling or 
detunement. It is only through the mediation of a discourse that discovered a way to justify and 
articulate melancholic passion as capable of rediscovering its occasion everywhere that it became 
a mood.  
Mood typically orients us towards objects as potentials for action. I will treat my friend, 
coming to the door unexpectedly, differently depending on whether I am calm or troubled. In this 
way, mood is a generalized and underdetermined motive that is specified when it approaches a 
situation. The melancholic mood differs in that it resists the situatedness of objects as real 
determinants of action. The objectless mood of melancholy discovers in the world not the objects 
of its passions, but objects for its passions. It must be equipped with a practice that can transform 
the objects of experience into an object of passion without asserting that they are the causes of the 
passion. In doing this, melancholic mood remains unique in its ability to stand aside from the 
typical function of mood in organizing and orienting motives and projects. Unlike the 
Heideggerian interpretation of Stimmung as the phenomenological orientation under which things 
are given to us, melancholic mood cannot be easily divided between what is given to the 
melancholic through feeling and what is made by the melancholic for feeling.  
Where mood is extended through some period of time, affecting our perception of all that 
appears in the mood. The “aboutness” of discourse makes it incapable of simply transmitting mood 
even if it can communicate it obliquely. We infer someone’s mood as a pattern: when someone 
puckers their face at the suggestion of a dish, we may first think that it is not suited to their palette. 
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However, as every suggestion is rebuffed, we begin to infer that the person responds from a peevish 
mood. They are disinclined to any suggestion. Melancholic mood artificially, in the sense of 
artfully, recreates the general extension of mood. Its content is not limited to a specific set of 
objects but is a reflection upon the similitude of all things. The melancholic commonplaces were 
developed by the comparison of all things, not only two things.  
The melancholy topics allow melancholic mood to come into consciousness even without 
an object, for it discovers in each object not its essence but a similitude.  
In the second part of this chapter, I show how the development of the emblem genre 
inaugurated a form of perception that took the objects of sense as images of something insensible. 
I examine the topical practices supported the development of the emblem book proper and show 
how these were taken up in a new way through their instantiation within the melancholic 
commonplaces. This generated a distinctive seventeenth-century practice, the occasional 
meditation. I argue that this is the melancholic rhetoric par excellence in which motive is replaced 
by the elaboration of experience.  
4.2 Melancholy Commonplace as Articulation of Mood 
Having seen the way melancholy commonplaces were born out of topical habits in Chapter 
2, we are now prepared to see them in use. Here, we turn again to Jaques and his famous speech 
on the seven ages of man. This speech weaves together many of the principal melancholy 
commonplaces. This speech is one of the “purple passages” of Shakespeare, precisely those that 
are often recited because they are able to be detached from the scene in which they were spoken. 
By exploding the speech from its purple passage eloquence and returning it to its commonplace 
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sources, we will see the function these commonplaces play on articulating and justifying 
melancholic passions. In doing so, we will be able to recognize how the melancholic’s inflection 
of topical habits become recognizable discursive patterns that constitute a rhetorical melancholic 
subjectivity.  
Jaques’ soliloquy on the commonplace “All the world's a stage” is a melancholic adaptation 
of the theatrum mundi topos. Jaques walk through each of the “seven ages” is a meditation upon 
mutability; each age is as if it were a different part. This changes the familiar topos that we all play 
a part by emphasizing how even the individual moves through distinct roles. Each of the ages takes 
upon a new motive and goal of action, showing in this mutability of human life the vanity of all 
things. This plays upon the omnia vanitas topos. The final age is “second childishness and mere 
oblivion,” a clear reflection upon the decay that is our common fate. The “strange eventful history” 
that is a life ends “Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans every thing.” This is a memento mori, the 
call to remember death. I will move through each of the commonplaces of this speech, as if they 
were stations, contextualizing it in its commonplace character. Jaques' speech takes its central 
commonplace—All the world's a stage—from a long tradition but mints it into a new, melancholic 
mood through its elaboration. This commonplace, known by its Latin name theatrum mundi, has 
dominated interpretations of Jaques' speech and is in its own right one of the most studied literary 
commonplaces. Ernst Robert Curtius' seminal work on this topic catalogues the most salient 
examples of its employment.247 Yet it is not immediately obvious why the theatrum mundi 
commonplace would be a melancholy topic. In its re-emergence in the medieval era, we find it in 
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John of Salisbury's Politicratus, where he suggests that human life “resembles a tragedy more than 
a comedy since the exit from it is usually sad.”248 But Salisbury's point in the passage was that this 
was the tragic fate of tyrants who deserve their fall, an episode repeated time and again in the 
political history he was charting. We see the Baroque melancholy interpretation of this 
commonplace most fully in Pierre Boaistuau's Theatrum Mundi of 1558.  Boaistuau describes the 
“theater” of his work as a “rapsodie, collation or a gathering togither of divers authorities.”249 In 
this, we see that the theater is an imaginative redescription of the commonplace book itself. It is in 
this theatrical commonplace book that we are taken through the stages of worldly misery. We first 
see “thy selfe what thou art, and what miseries al humaine creatures are subject to: thou maist also 
see the miserie of the Cleargie, of governors, and magistrates, of Judges, Lawyers, and Marchants, 
of fathers and mothers, from mans first conception to his last departure out of this miserable and 
transitory world.”250 Indeed, what we find in Boiastau's second book is a collection of examples 
that show the “corruption of all estates.”251 This is loosely organized around the ages of life, 
showing the “vayne toyes and trifles children are subject unto,” through the “miseries of 
souldiers,” and those who “minister justice.” So we find Jaques' dilating upon the “whining school-
boy,” the “soldier,/Full of strange oaths and bearded like the pard,” and “the justice,/In fair round 
belly with good capon lined.” Jaques is reproducing for us the commonplace book of misery and 
vanity, as if reading aloud the index of Boiaustau's commonplace book.   
                                                 
248 Qtd. in Lynda G. Christian, Theatrum Mundi: The History of an Idea (New York; London: Garland, 1987), 
65. 
249 Pierre Boaistuau, Theatrum Mundi (London: Printed by Thomas East, 1581), A.vii.r. 
250 Ibid., iii.v. 
251 Ibid., epistle 2 [unpaginated in original]. 
 146 
The “exits and entrances” of the actors of the world opens the view of the melancholic onto 
the mutability of all humane things. The world is not a stage only when the play is on, but remains 
an empty stage before and after the actors play their part. This commonplace combines both a 
meditation on the mutability of life with an image of the empty world. Mutability or 
changeableness assigns to a thing a property of potential divergence from its own essence. The 
specific conditions of change under which we observe nature are not the concern, except as 
exempla to embellish the central theme of instability itself. What is crucial is the ability of this 
commonplace to serve as a filter of any experience: wherever one goes, the objects of experience 
can be considered under the heading of Mutability, and the commonplace can in turn be elaborated 
by discovering the distinct way in which this object suffers its changes. The commonplace serves 
to justify a melancholic passion and transform it into mood: the sadness of things passing changes 
its emotional tone when the specific object of loss is no longer declared to be its cause. A rotten 
apple is a practical inconvenience; under the melancholic gaze, it is transformed into an emblem 
for the contemplation of our common condition as perishable, changeable natures. So too, the 
entrances and exits of the characters in As You Like It take on a ghostly meaning after we hear 
Jaques' speech: their exit from the stage echoes our common exit from the world.  
Whether meditative or admonitory, melancholic rhetoric emerged from the discovery of 
arguments against conventional motives. The objects of invectives against vanity were 
traditionally of a misogynistic bent. It is aligned with the mutability topic in its focus upon fashion. 
The melancholic turn to the vanity topos brought together the religious lamentations of 
Ecclesiastes with the disdain of the search for the novel, the luxurious, and, above all, the 
speciously permanent. It was in the elevation of the omnia vanitas that we can see the working of 
a melancholic commonplace, a mode for exercising the emblematic gaze through the capacity to 
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reduce anything to an object not worthy of pursuit. Ubiquitous to the theme was a verse from the 
Book of Ecclesiastes: “vanity of vanities, and all things are vanity” (Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia 
vanitas.) The authority of this line's presence in Scripture afforded those who wished to dilate upon 
it the safe haven of religious sanction, as when Robert Granger's 1621 commentary on Ecclesiastes 
promises that in its pages “the worlds vanity, and the true felicitie are plainely deciphered.” We 
find it again in Donne's “satyr” on the theme, adorned with the sententious epigram: “Vanitas 
vanitatum, & omnia vanitas./Vanity of vanity, and all is vanity.” The verse reads:  
When Solomon had tried all variety  
Of mundane pleasures, ev'n to full satiety;  
And after throughly weigh'd the worlds condition,  
And therein mans: concludes with this Position,  
All that man can in this wide World inherit,  
Is vain, and but vexation of the spirit.252  
 
Solomon was the purported author of Ecclesiastes, but here he is also the exemplary 
melancholic figure of the vanitas topos. He is at once known for a divinely opulence and wisdom. 
The omnia vanitas is then read as the utterance of a sated and wise king rather than the cynical 
motto of a marginalized prophet. This is followed by a couplet on the same theme—indeed, its 
title is “Of the same”: “The World's a Book, all Creatures are the Story,/Wherein God reads dumb 
lectures of his glory.”253  Just as the theatrum mundi is like a melancholy commonplace book, the 
Book of Nature too shows us the silent meaning of the world, but here, the “dumb lecture” speaks 
of divine glory. At first this seems at odds with the notion of the world as “meer vacuity.”254 How 
is it that God's Creation is both a canticle of his glory and absolutely empty? But these are two 
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moments of the same melancholic attitude, developed out of the topical reorganization of 
significance from essence to similitude. The true significance of Creation is extrinsic to it. Its 
nature is fallen, postlapsarian, and points only to its own mortality. The “meer vacuity” of the 
world is the stage that remains once the players have played their parts. It is in the contemplation 
of that in which we see the full stage, or the creature, in the character of its eventual “exit.”   
Life is vanity is, of course, can be a religious lamentation or jeremiad against sinful action, 
but it is also a redescription of communal action as a form of patience, an action-in-waiting whose 
end is not its immediate effect but rather the development of a supramundane habit of feeling. If 
all action is vanity, one must learn to act while at the same time distancing oneself from the 
outcomes of action. The melancholic activity of recognizing, glossing, and criticizing motives 
becomes a rhetorical activity that takes the place of conventional pursuits. This transforms the 
motive of action from a pursuit of some outcome to a passionate exercise. The world is no longer 
the site of action, but action is an apotropaic ritual against the growth of worldly passions. Pierre 
Du Moulin, a Huguenot refugee in England, argues in his Heraclitus that “the surest for a man to 
separate himselfe from the world, [is] not with his feete, but with his affection.”255 He compares 
this to being “within a Court or Palace, spectator of vanity and troubles, without participating of 
them; and in the middest of a babbling multitude, to talke only with himselfe, & to entertaine his 
thoughts with God.”256 This recommendation seems at first to be for a haughty disdain, but Du 
Moulin immediately qualifies it. In the “meane time”—that is, while alive—one should “imploy 
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his indevors to the edification of the Church, stretching out his hand to the erroneous...rather then 
[sic] to hide his Talent in the earth, and to cut himselfe cleane off from the body, and all civill 
societie, as an unprofitable member.”257 What allows for one to continue to be engaged in civic 
and ecclesiastical life while holding one's passion at a remove hinges upon the subtle redescription 
of time as “meane time.” The very activity of elaborating one's sense-experience into emblematic 
significance became a kind of activity that both kept one's mind free from melancholic idleness 
and at the same time did not place its significance into an effect in the world. True or real 
satisfaction is impossible in life. Earthly, temporal events do not hold enough significance to 
remain distinct. Rather, significance falls within the practice of elaborating experience itself.  
In his conclusion, Jaques becomes grave, for after the course of life has run, the “strange 
pageant” ends in “mere oblivion/Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.” We see in this 
rhetorical climax the melancholy commonplace of decay. This commonplace discovered a 
similitude in all mortal things. Any process, natural or historical, could then be apprehended 
through the commonplace of decay. The moving power of this commonplace was bolstered by a 
common belief that history was an active process of decay evident throughout the entire sublunary 
realm. The twentieth-century scholar Victor Harris noted that though this belief in the decay of the 
world had been inherited from the middle ages, in the 1570s and 1580s, “there grew up a more 
explicit concern over the progressive or cumulative corruption, over the decay that did not stop 
with the original supernatural curse.”258 Godfrey Goodman's 1616 treatise, The Fall of Man, or 
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the Corruption of Nature, “gave the doctrine its most consecutive and extensive philosophical 
form.”259 To Goodman, the “decay of the world and the miseries of man are not merely 
punishments; they are reminders, intended in the end to save men.”260 We discover in decaying 
matter a reflection of the topical societas rerum.  Decay can be rediscovered as a topic in its myriad 
instances. The contemplation of dying plants, for instance, has an analogical structure, the familiar 
dialectical inference of whole from part: the “decay in the whole is derived from decay of the part, 
and death of the species from death of the individual.”261 In this meditation, we see Goodman 
reinserting decay throughout the dialectical topics branching off from the individual plant he 
contemplates. This is important because corruption is often insensible; “corruption, discernible by 
reason, is difficult to prove from observation.”262 Topical dilation allows us to understand decay 
sensibly and passionately while at the same time generalizing it. The inferential discovery of decay 
in all things depends upon elaborating moments of salience—decaying plants, fruit, one’s aging 
face—and thereby making decay a feature of all melancholy experience. In the melancholic's 
topicalized imagination nature itself is a memento mori.  
Melancholy became the most intimate stamp of nature's ability to frustrate action, and 
thereby frustrate the conventional rhetorical strategy to place a decision in a particular narrative, 
complete with motive and effect. Melancholy shows us that we are not always the authors of our 
actions, as “sometimes the soule proues the mint of our actions, and brands them with her own 
stampe; and somtimes the bodie ouerrules the freedom of our wils, and beares the whole sway; 
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mores sequuntur humores.”263 If the soul was not divided between its rational and sensitive 
faculties, then “should there be no greater difficultie to cleanse the vncleane blood, to purge the 
grosse melancholie, then now we finde in taking away some spot or blemish from the outward 
skinne.”264 Unlike the rest of creation, we are not only corruptible in our matter but divided in our 
spirits. Even our joy is attended by the traces of natural corruption. We must make our music on 
“the guts of dead creatures, a token of his crueltie, and the remainder of his riot.” The decay of 
nature gives us those instruments with which we can please ourselves in “melancholie fits,” and 
to “take...recreation, temper...passions, and vse them as a meanes to kindle...deuotion.”265 
Goodman does appeal to the Aristotelian conceit that the best wits should bee most subiect to these 
fits; and in the most noble and deepest vnderstandings, you shall most easily discerne some tokens 
and signes of melancholie.” Yet this is not a distinct form of melancholy, but rather a reflection on 
the nature of melancholy passions. Since “it is not the flesh, but the mind which is capable of griefe 
and of sorrow,” the greater the capacity of one's mind the greater is the intensity of one's sadness. 
Whatever the mind conceives of as true “shee is alike affected therewith, as if they were true 
indeed.”266 The perspicaciousness of thought is also a liability.  
I have just elaborated how the rhetorical practice of commonplacing was taken up by the 
melancholic as a mode of articulating melancholic passion into mood. Jaques' weaving together of 
a cento-poem of the melancholic commonplaces makes his speech into a condensed vision of the 
imaginative perspective that result from the melancholy topics. But this condensed vision is 
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threatened with the charge of being vapid: if it only grasps the general and common characteristics 
of things it is not inventive but reductive. Jaques’ speech is so often cited because, as mentioned 
above, it is able to be spoken on any occasion. This shows only the commonplace character of 
melancholy rhetoric that create a mood. But melancholic rhetoric did not cease with the 
commonplaces. The commonplace mood of the melancholic could then be further articulated into 
the sensible and richly passionate language by elaborating and articulating itself through the 
particular and detailed objects of personal experience. The most inventive and powerful of the 
methods of joining mood to matter was developed out of the genre of the emblem that taught the 
melancholic how to relate a commonplace with an image.  
4.3 Emblematic Perception 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that the fully elaborated melancholic rhetoric 
was characterized by what I call emblematic perception. Emblems are complex objects, combining 
image, thought, and significance into a single work. Though, as we shall see, the emblem genre 
emerged in its principal form through the medium of print, it was also a practice that could be 
brought into one's real experience. We see such a practice in Jaques' musings upon the wounded 
stag that opened the previous chapter.  As described at length in an article by Michael Bath, this 
was an image that would have been familiar to the audience as a common entry in an emblem 
book.267 Jaques, by taking what he sees before him as an emblem, is able to turn it into a “thousand 
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similes.” In his emblematic perception, the topical similitude and the melancholic commonplaces 
are united, as each similitude becomes a gloss upon the common sadness of all things. The societas 
rerum becomes the passionate commonplace book of the theatrum mundi, in which all of its entries 
are emblems.  
I take the development of emblematic perception in the strong sense—it is the habit of 
perception that developed from the reading of emblem books. The first emblem book was Alciatus’ 
Emblematum liber and it was soon followed by many imitations. Emblems were often drawn out 
of material of commonplace books,268 and in some cases, printed commonplace books borrowed 
material directly out of emblem books.269  The Emblematum liber's status as a kind of 
commonplace book was reinforced in its 1551 edition, where the emblems were arranged under 
topical headings. The reader could take “from the book of emblems, as from the best stocked 
storehouse, whatever he needs to inscribe and decorate the walls of his house, the glass of his 
windows, his wall-hangings, curtains and panels, his tableware, his seals, signet-rings, clothing, 
tables, bed-posts and weapons, his sword and all his house.”270 In the preface, Alciatus wrote that 
“just as one can fasten trimmings on to clothing and badges on to hats, so must each of us be able 
to write on dumb signs.”271 The ability to see emblematically relied upon the topical habit of 
picking out common characteristics of things. Like the habits of commonplacing, the emblematic 
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perspective was an attempt to extract the “honey” of lettered experience and to preserve it in some 
form. Alciatus, the founder of the genre, wrote that he wished his emblems to depict “that fine 
something which is expressed from history or nature [quod ex historia, vel ex rebus naturalibus 
aliquid elegans significet].”272 The undetermined nature of the aliquid that emblem could express 
made it ideal for the elaboration of the melancholic passion, unmoored to the determination of a 
discrete object.  
Where Agricola, Erasmus, and other humanists had described practices of copia as 
storehouses or reservoirs of potential meaning that were preparation for reembedding into 
situations, the emblem made these reservoirs of meaning their content. The emblem's removal 
from situated purposes made it perfectly suited for the elaboration of a melancholic passion whose 
occasion was not apparent. Jaques' “moralizing” must be recognized in this way: he looks at what 
is before him as itself an emblem. Emblem books were a prolific genre, with “well over six hundred 
authors” having produced “in excess of two thousand titles, which in turn represents tens of 
thousands of individual emblems.”273 Of course, there was some variation in the form of the 
emblem across this vast literature, but it was for this remarkably consistent. In almost all examples, 
the emblem had three parts: an inscription, a heading, often a sententia, the pictura, an image, 
often printed in a cartouche, and the subscriptio, an illumination of the significance of the emblem, 
often in the form of a quatrain. According to Bohuslav Balbin in his Verisimilia humaniorum 
Disciplinarum, the emblem was a “sententia, expressed through a picture, pertaining to the morals 
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and life of men.” Balbin goes through several subgenres of emblems but excludes what others call 
“Ethical Emblems” because an ethical direction is present in all emblems. The inscriptiones of the 
emblems were often culled from those same sententiae that peppered the commonplace books. 
Sometimes this was done in a way that resembled those florilegia that collected lines from a single 
author, as in Otto van Haen's Moralia Horatiana. Sometimes they were organized topically. But 
the sententia is imagined here differently than in Erasmus. Rather than re-embedding the phrase 
into a context of use, the sentence becomes the germ for its own setting, an allegory for 
contemplation, in the emblem book. This is not to say that emblems themselves did not have uses; 
they were very important in jurisprudence, for instance. Nevertheless, the residue of the allegorical 
image now hangs upon the sentence in a way that refers us back to a scene that is not the scene of 
life.  
Rather than drawing a sententia from one's commonplace book as a learned old saw to 
quote, the emblem inscribes the sententia into an image. This is a pivot between the proverb as a 
wisdom of an earlier and revered age and the sententia as the pith of meaning within a phenomenon 
whose essence is recruited into a similitude. The “first consideration” for preserving a sententia is 
that it comes to us from the “age of Saturn.”274 It is not difficult to imagine a taste developing for 
the excerpted, suggestive sententiae in these collections. Erasmus described the collections of 
adagia, parables, and sententiae he himself recommended as being “frozen when disjoined.”275 
Erasmus meant this clearly in a negative sense. However, the “frozen” quality of these collections 
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of sententiae allowed for a kind of ageless contemplation of their meanings, a method for exploring 
the suggestibility of particular phrases that came, per Erasmus' suggestions, as if from the “age of 
Saturn.” In this respect, the commonplace book was almost, if not quite, a work of literature itself. 
It would find its literary expression, almost by accident, in the emblem book. The emblem books 
offered a distinctive “setting” of the stony sayings, apotheosizing their frozen character into the 
status of a hieroglyph.  
The Renaissance, and especially the Baroque, emblem, by contrast, was “without apparent 
occasion.” Here, we must put the emphasis on apparent, since the emblem pointed to a significance 
that extended beyond what it depicted.  A line from Alciatus’ 1530 work, De verborum 
significatione, provides a key to the inversion of the theory of meaning that melancholic rhetoric 
would adopt from the emblem. According to Quintilian, the res is “what is signified” [quae 
significantur] and verba “what signifies” [quae significant]. He writes: “Words signify, things are 
signified. Nevertheless even things sometimes signify, like the hieroglyphics in Horus and 
Chaeremon, on which we composed a little book of verse with the title Emblemata.”276 Things, as 
we discover in the topical literature, cannot refer to themselves. Insofar as a res becomes a res 
significans,277 its reference cannot be found in its definition, but rather in that broader orbit of its 
applicitia—it achieves a claim to truth not from its existence but from its appearance. As 
appearance, nature can take on the character of a similitude, an index that points from the 
appearance of beings to an invisible significance. Quintilian imagined the “emblematic” use of 
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loci communes as carefully prepared speeches that were at once ornamental and to be employed 
by an orator upon an occasion. He remarks that some orators had “certain writings, that is loci, 
committed most diligently to memory,” so that “they had “spontaneous” speeches ready, as the 
occasion might arise, as if they adorned it with emblems (emblematibus).”278 This passage comes 
shortly after Quintilian introduces the idea of loci communes. However, the emblems were enjoyed 
as collections, that is, before they were “inserted” into some other discourse or embossed on a 
shield.  
The disarticulation of emblem from situation is supported by its etymology—from the 
Greek through Latin—as a removable piece of inlaid ornamentation. In Cicero's In Verrem, we 
hear a description of Verres' tearing emblema from a silver goblet at a feast and then establishing 
a shop where they were reset into gold goblets for sale, giving us the sense of a figural ornament 
that can be detached from its setting. Alciatus imagined his work as having some literal application 
to the creation of ornaments, giving “in each separate epigram a description of something, such 
that it signifies something pleasant taken from history or from nature, after which painters, 
goldsmiths and founders can fashion objects which we call badges and which we fasten on our 
hats, or else bear as trade-marks, such as the anchor of Aldus, the dove of Froben and the elephant 
of Calvo, which carries its young for so long without giving birth.”279 This sense of the emblem 
was widely repeated by its Renaissance and Baroque theorists. One writer defines it as a “Picture 
worke of wood, stone, or metall, finelie set or painted in divers colours, as in chess-bourdes and 
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tables: small images, flowers, or like ornamentes set on plate, or other thing by a vice, to take off, 
and put on when we will.” These aspects of the etymological meaning of emblem—pictural, 
ornamental, and detachable—were fundamental to the view of the uses of the emblem proper.   
The emblem consisted of three parts: inscription, picture, and subscriptio, a verse or prose 
elaboration of the meaning of the emblem. Ideally, all three parts of the emblem participate in a 
“mutual elucidation.”280 The “res picta of the emblem is endowed with the power to refer beyond 
itself” as a “res significans.”281 It is precisely this “beyond” that we must uncover. It is a semantic 
realm: the emblem's significance is able to be rediscovered in other contexts, and in that way, it is 
what lies beyond the appearances of a moral embedded in circumstances. The “beyond” of the 
emblem identifies a moral and semantic realm. The potential relevance of an emblem as a gloss 
upon an indefinite number of situations is also the guarantor of its moral stature. The repeated 
figures of the emblem—its floating hands, robed women, lyres, pelicans, lions—are only one part 
of an allegory. That is, as individual elements they represent generic characteristics of truth that 
are recombined time and again into new emblematic configurations. Images give a specification 
to the emblem's meaning wholly distinct from that of exempla, those moral histories in which 
individuals give instances of past embodiments of virtue or vice, of fortune or failure.  As one 
Baroque theorist put it, “the course and nature of the contemporary world is depicted in a veiled 
manner by special figures,/and explained in accompanying rhymes.”282 What is veiled here is of 
course not the image—this is made manifest. Rather, the image is the res significans of another 
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thing, one which is not apparent and cannot be made to appear. For this reason, it must be intuited 
from seeing the emblem image under the inscription of a sententia that turns its salient meaning 
away from what it is to what it is like.  
In order to see how the emblem became a genre uniquely suited to the melancholic critique 
of motives, it is instructive to compare it with its close cousin, the impresa, that was used to 
communicate a personal motive. Indeed, much of the Renaissance theory of the emblem was drawn 
initially from writings on the impresa. It differed from the emblem in two important ways. First, 
the impresa was similar to the emblem in form, with a motto and picture, though typically without 
an explicative subscriptio.283 Its first and most notable theorist, Paolo Giovo, wrote a dialogue on 
the subject. He set forth rules for the impresa, the first of which was that there should be a “just 
proportion of body and soule,” that is, between picture and motto respectively.284 This analogy 
became a commonplace within theories of the impresa and emblem, though often slightly modified 
to account for the emblem's addition of a subscriptio. The Italian epic poet Tasso argued that the 
emblem had two souls, “an organic soul (which is provided by the painter) and a rational soul 
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(bestowed by the poet).”285  Where the impresa offered a suggestion of significance around which 
a private sense might evolve, the emblem took its materials in order to show the significance of 
something otherwise unable to be communicated. The impresa's enigma was coy where the 
emblem's was sacred. Second, the impresa or “devise” was a means for communicating the 
passions and motives of its bearer. It had the etymological significance of “an undertaking, 
enterprise, or intention,”286 and its use in heraldic imagery and on weaponry lent it a courtly or 
martial significance. It was explicitly linked to the human ability to “communicate and understand 
each others [sic] will.” The “devise” was held above all other “externall wayes of expressing our 
conceptions, be it by word, sentence, or gesture;” in its ability to show “all the motions of their 
soule; their hopes, feares, doubts, disdaines, affrights, anger, pleasure and joyes, anguishes and 
sorrowes, hatred and love, desires and other heart-possessing passions.”287 Indeed, the device's 
purpose was to “declare the humour or inclination of him that bears it.”288 If the emblem is distinct 
from the impresa in that it does not express a personal humor but rather points to a sententia, an 
impersonal statement that is represented as a natural or hieroglyphic revelation, the passion it 
communicates should also seem impersonal, as if it is the passion of nature itself. Where the 
impresa communicates an intention for action, the emblem invites the reader-viewer to participate 
in a passion.  
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While certain emblems were also appropriated for these uses, the emblem book lent itself 
more to the contemplative purposes of the melancholic. Samuel Daniell, one of Giovio's English 
translators, added his own set of five rules, the third being that the “mot [viz. motto] be taken out 
of some famous author,” linking the impresa to the humanist facility with excerpting sententiae.289 
Another writer on imprese, Henri Estienne, defined the Enigma as “an obscure sentence, expressed 
by an occult similitude of things.” The Emblem, in turn, has an “affinity with the Aenigma,” and 
differs from it in that “drawing (as it were) the Curtaine from before the Aenigma, it declares the 
matter more plainly.” What does it mean that an emblem is a plainly-stated enigma? What can we 
make of this oxymoronic definition?  
The enigma of the emblem depended upon its “hieroglyphic” character. The hieroglyph 
was something that at once both communicated and concealed. Horapollo's Hieroglyphica was the 
primary humanist source for knowledge of and speculation on hieroglyphics. Its 1517 appearance 
in a Latin translation by Ficino made it even more widely accessible. But the historical and 
philological work was less significant to the development of the emblem genre than, for instance, 
Ficino's sense of their occult meaning. In his commentary on Plotinus, we find a notion of them as 
the form of knowledge held by God, “not of a manifold working-out of the thing but as its simple 
                                                 
289 Giovio, Worthy Tract, A.vii.r. However, it has been noted by Katherine Duncan-Jones that the prefatory 
epistles are far from original to Daniel, but are rather respectively “a mosaic of quotations from Ruscelli's Discorso, 
appended to Giovio's work as early as 1555; and...a translation of about two thirds of the Ragionamento by Domenichi 
first appended to Giovio in a separate edition in the same year, and of three devices by Symeoni, whose devices 
together with those of Domenichi were combined with Giovio's.” See her “Two Elizabethan versions of a treatise on 
imprese,” English Studies 52 (1-6), 122.  
 162 
and lasting appearance.”290 Symbols are knowledge of this place, or locus, and Hieroglyphics a 
sacred and chiseled form of this knowledge. The hieroglyphic was often a shorthand for pointing 
to a particular character of meaning, namely, “an old conception of language as participating in 
the reality which it expresses or refers to,” (une conception vieille du langage comme participant 
à la réalité qu’il exprime ou indique).291 Klibansky, Saxl, and Panofsky claim the early modern 
melancholic suffered primarily “from the contradiction between time and infinity, while at the 
same time giving a positive value to his own sorrow “sub specie aeternitatis” since he feels that 
through his very melancholy he has a share in eternity.”292 The emblematic res significans, poised 
between its natural morality and its eternal significance, was peculiarly apt for use in elaborating 
melancholic passions.  
The humanist topics and the conceit of the emblem as hieroglyph held in common the 
theory of natural similitude. It was thought that in every emblem there is a comparison or a 
similitude. When combined with the motto or inscriptio of the emblem, we see the unity between 
the Erasmian excerpting of sententiae and the topical argument from natural similitude. Balbin 
argued that the emblem had the structure of a complex sentence, comparing the inscriptio and 
picture to the protasis and its explication in the subscriptio to the apodosis. He gives the example 
of an emblem with the inscriptio Flight is our victory (fuga est nostra victoria) and a picture of a 
Parthian, in flight, wounding an enemy. Parthians were famous for firing archer's volleys during 
horse-mounted retreats. Balbin glosses the emblem through a surprising similitude: “Just as a 
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Parthian, when he flees, wounds and overcomes his enemy (this is the Protasis), thus I, by fleeing, 
will triumph over my desire (voluptatem) (this is the Apodosis).” This is precisely an inversion of 
the traditional view of passions as motives, where we fear what we flee and pursue what we desire. 
In Balbin's example, we see an instance of how the emblematic subscriptio realigns the 
conventional system of motives to a passionate and contemplative register by an allegorical 
reorientation of the direction of the passion. Here, desire is not the passion but instead is made into 
an image. As an image, it can become the object of an emblematic reflection around which a 
passion can grow. Insofar as desire is made an emblem, one is able to be moved against it. 
If the essence of things was articulated through their difference, their moral character was 
discovered through similitude. In emblematic perception, one does not seek the meaning of the 
object of experience, but instead this object becomes an illumination of the significance of 
something that is unable to enter into experience. Where knowledge looks to know the proprium 
of its object, the emblematic perspective takes the accidents of the object of experience as copia 
for the elaboration of a significance of something else. The topicalization of the societas rerum as 
a weave of res significantes was particularly rich for the making of emblems. Benjamin held as an 
essential characteristic of the German Trauerspiel, which he called the “the antinomies of the 
allegorical” (die Antinomien des Allegorischen), namely, that “any person, any object, any 
relationship can mean absolutely anything else.”293 If this makes allegory appear arbitrary, we 
must recall that the meaning of things is not here to be taken in the sense of their definition, but 
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rather of their significance. Because similitude allows us to illuminate anything by the light of any 
other thing, the melancholic's allegorical weave of experience is truly infinite in its matter.  
The vatic or prophetic character of the emblem emerges from the impersonality of the 
supposed speaker of the utterance that comes, artificially of course, from nowhere and from 
everywhere. It is this character that made it a vehicle for melancholic passions. By making the 
motto an inscription for a natural scene, “the appeal which humanist writers continually make to 
proverbs, maxims, and received authorities has to be seen as a process of naturalisation, and for 
this reason they frequently claim for their emblems the authority of hieroglyphs as a natural 
language.”294 The inscriptio points to its pictura, charging it with the significance not of a merely 
witty rebus that must be deciphered but instead as a sacred character whose significance cannot be 
fully exhausted. The inexhaustibility of the emblem's significance comes, once again, from the 
topical flit of similitudes sensed by the acute reader-viewer. This then appeared as a discovery of 
a condensed mystery that the mind was attempting to decipher, just as the hieroglyph appeared as 
a communication of ancient wisdom, handed down across time. As Estienne had it, “Symboles 
and Aenigmas... serve as a Rind or Bark to conserve all the mysteries of our Ancestors 
wisdome.”295 These contained the “grave and serious mysteries as well of the faculty of Theologie 
as of Phisiologie and Policy.”296 The divine mysteries of nature are only available in sparks 
because of the fallen nature of the intellect. The hieroglyphs themselves are imperfect attempts to 
preserve a meaning that was originally part of the divine Word, as when these were first set before 
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the eyes of Adam and Eve in Eden in the form of “living creatures... whence men might perceive, 
as through the traverse of a Cloud, the insupportable rayes of his Divine Majesty.”297 The supposed 
difference between the natural and hieroglyphic emblem is belied by this analogy between sacred 
writing and the creature as a form of God's writing. The Hebrew people, the special guardians of 
divine revelation, reflected their understanding by writing in “Characters” that shone like the 
objects which the Patriarchs saw illuminated by divine splendor. For this reason, they preferred to 
communicate in “Parables and Similitudes.”298 The divine power that is contained in the emblem 
is then comparable to the science of hieroglyphics that “illuminated the understandings of those 
who studyed it, by expelling those shades of darknesse occurring in the Meanders and ambiguities 
of so great diversity of things, to conduct them to: perfect and true knowledge of their 
Characters.”299 Here the cool, windy plain of mental contemplation of nature is given a moral 
significance that emerges, on its occasion, with a different, more intense passion. By setting the 
reader of the emblem book into a contemplative, hieroglyphic mood, its moral maxims were 
transformed from clichés to oracles.  
Here we might examine a few emblems that exemplify the problematizing of motives. The 
first comes from a 1624 collection by the Dutch writer Otto van Veen. Its inscriptio is Humana 
cuncta vanitas.   
                                                 
297 Ibid., 2.  
298 Ibid., 3.  
299 Ibid.  
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All exterior things, like realms, victories, honors, loves, money, are sheer vanity, 
meaning nothing more to us than bubbles, depicted between the crown with its scepter, the 
laurel and palm, the bow of cupid, and moneybags.300 
 
                                                 
300 Externa quaeque id est regna, victorias, honores, amores, pecunias, meram esse vanitatem, nobis 
significant bullae, inter coronam cum sceptro, lauream, palmam, arcum cupidinis, & loculos depictae. Otto van Veen, 
Emblemata, siue symbola a principibus, viris ecclesiasticis, ac militaribus, alijsque vsurpanda (Bruxellæ: ex officina 
Huberti Antonii, 1624), 5. 
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Figure 7 — “Humana cuncta vanitas” from the Emblemata of Otto van Deen, 1624 
Courtesy of the Emblematica Online Digital Collection and The Rare Book & Manuscript Library 
of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
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This emblem plays upon a proverb in Erasmus' Adagia, homo bulla, man is but a bubble. 
The accompanying essay on this theme collects the variations on the sentiment in various authors 
as it typical of the work, but it concludes with an encomium disguised as lamentation on the late 
Archduke of Austria, Phillip, son of Emperor Maximilian. After praising him in through all the 
encomiastic topics, we learn that “no one mortal, though he be a neighbor to the very stars, is 
anything but a bubble.”301 The emblem's rhetoric shifts the meaning. Whereas Erasmus' encomium 
of Philip lamented the death of a great man, the emblem looks askance at any valorization of 
worldly pursuits. With the convention against the direct representation of the human, we instead 
gaze upon the “effects” of unrepresented persons—a crown, purses, laurels. These are the objects 
of all earthly passions, floating next to the bubbles with which they share an essential brevity. The 
vanity is not exemplified by some historical individual's loss, but rather the floating detritus of all 
historical action. Here we see the bubble topos, a commonplace of melancholic mood, absorbed 
within emblematic works as an element of the pictura. The interspersing of bubbles among the 
conventional objects of motives makes this emblem a highly condensed visual representation of 
the relation between melancholic mood and the critique of motives. While each of the objects of 
desire appear distinct, the melancholic interpolation of the “bubble” between each of these 
highlights their similitude of transience rather than their distinct essences.  
Like in the image of the bubble across, melancholy commonplaces took on new dimensions 
of meaning as they were articulated in visual form. We see the omnia vanitas and theatrum mundi 
commonplaces brought together in a unique was by Francis Quarles, a preeminent English emblem 
                                                 
301 “[N]eminem esse mortalem usque adeo coelistibus vicinum, quin bulla est.” Erasmus, Opera omnia, 
2.502f-503a. 
 169 
writer. His sixth emblem's inscriptio is In cruce tuta quies—In the cross there is quiet repose. The 
picture shows a haloed cupid running towards the world, commonly represented in the emblem 
literature as a banded golden ball topped by a cross, that has fallen upon the table. The arms of the 
cross have prevented it from falling off, acting as a stop. On the facing page are stanzas of English 
verse, prefaced by a line of Scripture, Ecclesiastes 2:17, “All is vanity and vexation of the spirit.” 
The stanzas criticize those “befool'd...in desire,” the “studied plots of wit,” the possession of 
pleasure, honor, and wealth, all of which fail to “bring rest,” as the coda of each stanza tells us in 
turn. The final stanza returns us to the conceit in the image: “That fond breast/That is possess'd/Of 
Earth without a cross, has Earth without a rest.” An epigram also makes use of the image's logic. 
Whoever embraces the world sees it from behind, not knowing “the best end of what ye hugg's a 
cross.” Cupid is all desire, running to grasp the things of the world but failing to see what supports 
them.  
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Figure 8 — “In cruce tuta quies” from Quarles’ Emblems, divine and moral 
Courtesy of the Emblematica Online Digital Collection and The Rare Book & Manuscript Library 
of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
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In religious and devotional emblem books, the emblems become like stations, not of 
Christ's passion, but the reader's own. I do not draw this allusion to Catholic practice capriciously: 
many produced by English and continental Jesuits introduced an image of the heart into 
emblematic pictura as a leitmotif that connected the emblems into a sequence. The heart is the seat 
of the passions. Here, it also symbolizes the passion of the reader that moves between each 
emblem, finding itself under a new modulation in each image. An English vernacular example, 
Christopher Harvey's Schola Cordis [School of the Heart], is derivative of van Haeften's work of 
the same name, borrowing its plates and much of its order.  The book is an ordered series of 
allegorical scenes in which we witness the heart's descent into the world, its tribulations, and, at 
last, its return to God. We begin with the “infection” of the heart in Eden, and proceed through its 
removal, its darkness, its flight, vanity, and so on. In the fourth emblem on the Vanity of the Heart, 
we see a demon pumping bellows into a heart. Escaping from its valve at the top are vapors filled 
with images of vain desires—a battle standard for martial glory, a crown for power, a fiddle for 
pleasure, and the world itself. We see too bubbles, the icon of vanity in the light of human life's 
brevity. This echoes a sentiment we find elsewhere, as in Jaques Abbadie's treatise discussed 
above, where he says that the virtuous man “sees not by his Heart, which sends into the uppermost 
parts of our Soul continual Clouds, which darken the Understanding.”302 Here, the Galenic theory 
of adustion is employed only partly as metaphor. The material subtilty of the dark clouds is a 
necessary component for the metaphor to work within the argument, for the means through which 
                                                 
302 Jacques Abbadie, The Art of Knowing Oneself, or An Enquiry Into the Sources of Morality, in Two Parts 
(Oxford : Printed by L. Lichfield, 1698), 7.  
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the obscurities of a lower faculty, the Heart, may affect the reigning part, the Understanding, 
requires a way of imagining a diffuse effect.  
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Figure 9 — "Doctor Panurgus" curing the folly of his patients by purgative medicines and chemical cures, 
attributed to Michael Droeshout 
Courtesy of the Wellcome Collection under a  Creative Commons BY license.  
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Figure 10 — Engraving by Peter Rollos from Le Centre de L’Amour, c. 1630/1687 
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Figure 11 — “Stultorum medicus” (Doctor of fools) from Proscenium vitae humanae, 1627 
Courtesy of the Emblematica Online Digital Collection and The Rare Book & Manuscript Library 
of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
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Figure 12 — Detail from the frontispiece of Microcosmus Hypochondriacus, 1651 
Courtesy of the Wellcome Collection under a  Creative Commons BY license.  
 
 
 
 
 177 
Significantly, this iconographic topos of the images in vapors is an inversion of a common 
way of depicting melancholic fears and their potentially demonic sources. Michael Droueshot's 
satirical print, “Doctor Panurgus” curing the folly of his patients, shows the purging of a 
“gallant's” brain by placing him in the furnace. The smoke rising from it shows the phantasms that 
were the source of his illness. The witty verse on the print tells us that he was made mad “by 
crotchetts” and we see crochet and other past-time activities floating in the cloud of smoke. This 
print and others like it show the iconographic conceit of the “cure of phantasms.” In the medical 
theory of the time, the imagination produced the objects of the passion, whether they be things 
desired or things feared. The matter out of which the images were formed came from the 
refinement of the blood into animal spirits. In melancholy, black bile corrupted these spirits, 
making them dark and producing fearful images. It was in this way, too, that demonic melancholy 
might be produced, as demons were believed to have the power to act upon the humors and spirits 
of the body. The demon would introduce a darkened spirit of vapor into the body of the 
melancholic in order to produce imaginative errors, resulting in excessive fear. We see this 
illustrated on the frontispiece to a medical text on hypochondriacal melancholy: the demon blows 
a corrupted vapor into the ear of the afflicted while the doctor prepares a remedy. At the same 
time, Harvey's vision of the heart's spiritual purification inverts the significance of melancholic 
passions. The remedy to the vain heart's flight from God begins with the reversio cordis, the heart's 
turn back to its source. The beginning of this process is dramatized as a dialogue between the Soul 
and Christ. The Soul senses its sinful condition and describes its response: “My trembling heart 
shakes with continuall feare/My frantick passions fill my mind with madness/My windy thoughts 
with pride are tympaniz'd.” The heart's error and indulgence into vanity is again described in terms 
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of melancholic symptomology. The “windy thoughts” are those image-filled vapors we observed 
in the Vanitas Cordis (Fig. 13).  
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Figure 13 — “Cordis Vanitas” from Harvey’s Schola Cordis 
Courtesy of the Emblematica Online Digital Collection and Bibliothek der Herzog August 
Bibliothek. 
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The emblematic picture of the heart's vanity, then, merges two iconographical conceits to 
form a new argument concerning the status of the passions. The “gallant's wit” is infected with 
vanities, but we see this infection happening through a demonic channel of poisoned pneumatic 
winds. However, unlike the melancholic symptomology which produces images to be feared, here 
we see the demon producing the images of desire. It is not the melancholic who is infected but 
rather the man of the world whose desires maintain him in worldly pursuits.  
Insofar as all motives were understood to be turn upon aversion from or attachment to a 
mental image, the emblematic shift of the image's significance allowed for it to become a practice 
in the reorientation of motive. If every motive is organized around a mental phantasm which I 
either fear or desire, I am able to change my own motive by relating to this phantasm not as the 
thing-itself, but as an emblem. One takes the mental image and assigns it a motto, attaching to it 
not the passion of movement towards it as an object of desire, but letting it become a res significans 
whose properties become a similitude for a spiritual motive, an ascent towards the supramundane.  
Emblematic contemplation was a topical immersion to discover matter for a passion 
without an object. At the end of his work, Harvey returns us to the notion of the emblem book as 
a “school of the heart.” It is through the passions that God himself instructs us in a spiritual trivium: 
“My Hearts my Prayer-book, in which he writes/Systems of all the Arts and Faculties/First reads 
to me, then makes me exercise,/But all in paradoxes, such high strains,/As flow from none but love 
Inspired Brains.”303 He concludes the book with three poems, one for each branch of the trivium: 
the grammar, rhetoric, and logic of the heart. The “Logick of the Heart” is left for last.  The 
methods of dialectical invention have become resources for a spiritual, passionate inventio in 
                                                 
303 Harvey, School of the Heart, 191. 
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which we are “to find what terms/My Lord and I stand in.” This is no longer a discovery of 
arguments, but an inquiry into and discipline of motive, for “[w]hen to dispute and argue's out of 
Season/Then to believe and to obey is Reason.” Let us recall that Luther had said that the 
melancholic hears and sees nothing while others are “speaking, drinking, coming or going,” that 
is, engaged in the affairs of the world. Instead, what Luther had described as the pathological cause 
of this distance, where the “thoughts of the heart [cordis cogitationes] have been drawn away from 
the senses,”304 is reconfigured as the desideratum of a spiritual practice.   
Emblematic perception extended past the emblem book into other forms of pictorial 
representation. The still life in general and the vanitas in particular was “a variation on those 
emblematic images which convey a message as if they were a text within reality.”305 The still life 
resembles the emblem in its “symbolic allusions, hidden symbolicity, frozenness in time, absence 
of narrativity and vaguely enigmatic character that calls for or even demands an explication and, 
therefore, a text,” while it differs from the emblem in its “realism and through its inscription onto 
the lived reality of the everyday world.”306 Yet this very difference serves to heighten the effect of 
                                                 
304 “Sicut videre est in Melancholicis. Illi aliis loquentibus, bibentibus, ingredientibus aut egredientibus nihil 
audiunt, nec vident: quia cordis cogitationes sunt abstractæ a sensibus.” Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke : 
kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar: Böhlau, 1964), 34.520. 
305 “[U]ne forme variante de ces images [viz. emblems] qui véhiculaient un message comme si elles étaient 
en réalité un texte.” Russell, “Vanitas,” 49. 
306 “D’une part, la nature morte ressemble à l’emblème par ses allusions symboliques, par sa « symbolique 
cachée » comme on dit parfois, par son immobilité dans le temps, par son absence de narrativité et par son côté 
vaguement énigmatique qui appelle, ou même exige une explication et par conséquent un texte. Mais elle diffère de 
l’emblème par son réalisme et par sa pleine inscription dans la réalité vécue du monde quotidien, alors que la pictura 
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emblematic perception, not only by attesting to its ability to move across the things of the world 
in experience, uncovering them as emblems, but also intensifying the emotional effect of 
emblematic meditation. The greater vividness that the painting offers pulls upon the tension 
between the res significans and the details of the real object. These details call to be placed within 
the metaphorical weave of the meditation, giving the suggestion of meditation's infinite quality of 
potential extrapolation. This gave rise to a feeling of reading out the hieroglyphs of God.  The 
infinite extension of significance in hieroglyphic deciphering was both represented and felt in the 
contrast between explicit, verbal meditation and the grained texture of perception that was not—
yet—brought into the full significance of the meditation.  
Evert Collier's Still Life with a Volume of Wither's 'Emblemes' (Fig. 14) shows the relation 
between the emblem-genre and the reflection upon melancholy commonplaces. Collier lived in 
England from 1693 until his death in 1708. He made his name through trompe l'oeil and vanitas 
paintings. In his painting, the composition invites us to emblematic reflection. The objects, a 
composite of the topics of English Baroque melancholy, are set within a real space. It is an interior, 
perhaps with a window—its light does not reach the deep background—off to the viewer's left 
side. The “real” relations between these objects as physical, their points of contact and overlap, 
are haunted by a another set of relations, their meanings. The presence of Wither's emblem book 
gives an unsubtle hint, one that other painters of the genre would leave unstated: we are to read 
these objects as emblems. (Perhaps the later date of the painting, 1696, called for reminding 
                                                 
de l’emblème se détache nettement de la réalité ambiante par sa différence d’échelle et de plan par rapport à ce qui 
l’entoure.” Ibid. 
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viewers of this convention that had been tacitly present since the 1620s.) As we have seen, though 
its practices emerged from humanist dialectic and rhetoric, now its concern with verbal 
copiousness is all but implicit, having been absorbed into the habits of perception and experience, 
captured in a still life.  
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Figure 14 — Still Life With a Volume of Wither’s ‘Emblemes’, 1696 
Courtesy of Tate Galleries under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND (3.0 Unported) 
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4.4 The Occasional Meditation 
The topicalization of reflective experience changed the nature of the 'occasion' itself, 
turning it away from the public event to the private observation. Whereas Harvey's School of the 
Heart sets out the allegory of the rightful exercise of the passions against worldly motives, we 
discover a fuller sense of its practical application in the popular seventeenth-century genre of the 
“occasional meditation.”  The occasional meditation turned the dialectical ability to speak upon 
any topic into a habit of being able to meditate upon any experience. It was “inspired by 'outward 
occurrences, accidents or random ideas.” Peter Daly has called the occasional meditation 
“emblematic poetry.” However, they “dispense with the printed picture,” and take their visual 
element from perception itself. 307 The melancholic passion is at once not bound to the occasion in 
that it perdures beyond the specificity of emotional response required in the complexities of social 
life, but also in that it can take form around almost any fragment of experience.308 Michael Bath 
distinguishes two varieties, “the unfolded aphorism and the meditation on the creatures,” with clear 
echoes of the humanist practice of writing upon collected sententiae or adagia and the 
topicalization of nature in the emblem form, respectively.309 The meditation beginning from a 
sententia is a development of a literary culture that had developed in the wake of the Erasmian 
commonplacing techniques. The material collected under the loci communes could be woven 
together into a discourse of its own. The second form, the “meditation on the creature,” was 
                                                 
307 Peter Daly, “Emblematic Poetry of Occasional Meditation,” German Life and Letters 25, no. 2 (1972), 
127. 
308 Bath, Speaking Pictures, 163.  
309 Ibid.  
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distinctly developed by Joseph Hall but received its most explicit theoretical elaboration from none 
other than Robert Boyle. Where the emblem began with the picture and so appealed to the sensible 
directly, “meditation addressed itself not to the material but to the spiritual eye, the eye of the mind 
which corresponds to the second faculty of the rational soul, namely understanding.”310 The 
meditation on the creature took the sense-object of a natural scene and elaborated it in the 
occasional meditation through a similitude.  
It is in the occasional meditation that we most clearly see how Jaques' topicalization of 
experience became a common and even popular practice. Just as the Erasmian commonplacer was 
to choose a sententia from one's reading so the meditator should choose an object of experience. 
The Senecan metaphor of the bee, commonly employed in discussing the use of commonplace 
books, re-emerged in the discourse on occasional meditations as a mode of experience, as in James 
Harrington's Horae consecratae, where after a meditation on his early fall from horseback, he 
writes a hymn beginning: “O Gracious God, and Father; let my sense,/Be spiritualiz'd, and from 
each Providence,/As Bees from Flowers, suck sweetness.”311 In the movement to selections from 
the Book of Nature, the sententia is replaced with sense itself. The position of the Reflector is 
solitary, ruminative, and save for the activity of meditation itself, idle. Occasional mediations are, 
to take the title of one such work, an attempt to form a “Solitarinesse improved” in which the “the 
beames of the heauenly Spirit are contracted into a point vpon the soule, as the beames of the 
Sunne by a Cristall, whereby the light and heate of grace are increased.”312 The notion here was 
                                                 
310 Bath, Speaking Pictures, 161.  
311 Sir James Harrington, Horae Consecratae, or, Spiritual Pastime (London: Printed for the Author, 1682), 
352. 
312 Francis Rous, The Arte of Happines (London: Printed by W. Stansby, 1631), 348. 
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of a nature that announced God's presence. Praesentemque refert quaelibet herba Deum, as the 
oft-cited verse had it. Therefore, “Every creature is a severall page, in which we may reade some 
instruction to further us in heavenly wisedome,” and “[t]he Occasional Meditations of such as are 
piously devoted, give us sensible demonstration of this.” This from a popular work on “strange 
prodigies” seen in Germany between 1618 and 1638.313  
In the occasional meditation, the perceptible becomes an illumination of the imperceptible 
through the elaboration of a similitude. The topicalized predicates of sensed objects are a kind of 
gauzy texture that give constitute the medium of meditation. The first expositor of the practice of 
occasional meditations was Joseph Hall, a bishop in the Church of England. His instructions for 
meditation entailed “looking through” any “bodily obiectes, at [the] spirituall and heavenly.”314  
The meditator will always be climbing in her thoughts “from Earth to Heaven; and suffer no object 
to crosse us in our way without some Spiritual use.”315 This ascent into the heavenly is mirrored 
by the meditation's force turning inwards: “It begins in the understanding, endeth in the affection; 
It begins in the braine, descends to the heart; Begins on earth, ascends to Heaven; not suddenly, 
but by certaine staires and degrees, till we come to the highest.” Here the celestial ambition of the 
meditation is assured by the vehemence of religious passion and precisely by its power to transcend 
“Earth” and the secular, opaque meanings of its objects. Yet in Hall's meditations, it is not Nature 
itself but the presence of divinity throughout nature that affords the stuff of meditation. This 
                                                 
313 L. Brinckmair, The Warnings of Germany: By wonderfull signes, and strange prodigies seene in divers 
parts of that countrey of Germany, betweene the yeare 1618 and 1638. (London: Printed by John Norton and John 
Okes, 1638), 3. 
314 Joseph Hall, Occasionall Meditations (London : Printed by M[iles] F[lesher], 1633), A4r-v. 
315 Ibid., A5v. 
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difference between created essence and the trace of its creation is approximated by the topical 
distinction between a thing's definition (what it has in substantia) and that which it bears in its 
properties, accidents, and similitudes (what is circa substantiam and extra substantiam). These 
extra-essential predicates are used to the end of “looking through” objects. The play upon 
similitude is the most consistent trope in Hall's meditations. Each begins with its title, a description 
of its “occasion.” For instance, flies gathering around the chafing wounds of a horse are like 
“malicious detractors of the tongue” who “gather unto; and dwell upon” any point of infirmity in 
the object of their calumnies.316 The owl's “strange Melancholike life” is discovered to have rightly 
been accounted wise, for when “other domesticall and ayrie creatures are blind, she onely hath the 
inward light to discerne the least objects for her owne advantage.” From this Hall draws several 
lessons: “hee is the wisest man, that would have least to do with the multitude; that no life is so 
safe as the obscure; that retirednesse, if it have lesse comfort, yet lesse danger and vexation; Lastly, 
that hee is truly wise who sees by a light of his owne, when the rest of the world sit in an ignorant 
and confused darknesse, unable to apprehend any truth, save by the helpes of an outward 
illumination.”317 To apprehend things in their outward, daylit illumination is folly; the owlish inner 
light of the meditation is precisely this ability to bring one's own illumination to experience, and 
so to respond to it passionately not in the way that it appears to others but through the significance 
that one invents in “looking through” it.   
The topicalization of nature allowed one to practice the melancholic movement of the 
passions at any time. They are emblems formed out of the material of experience itself. Hall 
                                                 
316 Ibid., 78-9. 
317 Ibid., 157-9.  
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explicitly connects his meditations to the emblem genre. In considering a spider, he notes that 
“[t]here is no vice in Man, whereof there is not some analogie in the brute Creatures.”318 The spider 
is “an Embleme of those Spirituall free-booters, that lye in wayt for our soules.”319  In another 
meditation upon the magnetic properties of lodestone he muses that there is nothing “more heavy 
and less apt for motion then [sic] Iron, or steele,” and yet “these doe run to their beloved loadstone, 
as if they had the sence of a desire and delight; and doe so cling to the point of it, as if they had 
forgotten their weight for this adherence.” This serves as an “Embleme of the harts of men,” in 
which God's grace is the lodestone that “draws up the yron hart of man to it.”320 Yet what is 
remarkable for the literary production of the time is how few are the allusions and sententiae in 
Hall's work. Aside from the occasional paraphrase of a verse of Scripture, his composition upon 
the “occasions” of his meditation give the impression of being worked out within his own 
experience.  
The plasticity of the occasional meditation made it a particularly useful antidote to the 
increasing spiritual concern with the ills of idleness, chief among the symptoms and causes of 
melancholy. Boyle argued that the meditation keeps the “Soul from Idleness” as it is “busi'd about 
the present subjects of his Reflections.” This in turn discourages “our Ghostly Adversary” from 
trying it with temptation, seeing that it is already occupied “with something that is at least innocent 
if not good.”321 This itself is a “sufficient motive” for taking up the practice of occasional 
                                                 
318 Ibid., 35. 
319 Ibid., 37. 
320 Ibid., 109-10.  
321 Robert Boyle, Occasional Reflections (London: Herringman, 1665), 3. 
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meditation.322 The emphasis on the importance of solitude for the soul ran up against the increasing 
concern with the temptation of idleness. The solution to this was to create within solitude a kind 
of activity. This was not to be a simple piety of devotional prayer, but a mental exercise of 
discovering the divine presence in all things. As the Puritan pastor George Swincock put it, “[i]f 
thou wouldst exercise thy self to godliness in solitude, labour to spiritualize earthly things.”323 He 
compared the use of occasional meditations to the Gospel story of Mary and Martha. While Martha 
is busied with preparing a meal for her guest (Christ), Martha sits in earnest conversation with him. 
When Martha rebukes her, Christ says that Mary has chosen the “better part.” Swincock conflates 
these two positions so that while one is “to spend the day in thy Shop, or fields, and about many 
businesses” you should also “think on that of Christ” and “by such occasional meditations, which 
are obvious to ordinary understandings” to improve “thy time in solitude.”324 If on the one hand, 
the meditation, like the religious emblem, is posed against the motives of worldliness, it is also 
able to supply its own set of motives to any activity whatsoever. The meditation is a practice of 
distancing the heart, one's concerns and passions, from the world. This distance is 
counterintuitively discovered in the ability to reflect upon any object or experience of the world 
itself. As I have already discussed in the section on the emblem, this is in part an effect of locating 
the significatio of things in their capacity for similitude. It is at the same time a negative image of 
worldliness. To be in the world is not simply to attend to whatever one may encounter but to 
discern from among all the possible predicates of things those salient for action.  
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The metaphorizing of all experience transformed idle time into exercise, transforming 
melancholic affect into an activity—what Burton called “melancholizing.” According to Boyle, 
the practice gives one a “Faculty, whereby an Inquisitive Soul may expatiate itself through the 
whole  Immensity of the Universe, and be her own Teacher in a thousand cases.”325 It allowed for 
a notion of interiorized activity. Though the Occasional Reflections “fill our heads, they need not 
employ our hands, as having perform'd all the service that need be expected from them within the 
mind already.”326 In this, the occasional meditation completes a dialectic of topical sense of time, 
wherein “the same Exercise inures a Man to draw his Conceptions from the very Nature of the 
thing he speaks of, which, among those that can judge of Wit, is held a far greater sign of it, than 
the saying things more specious, and elaborate, that appear to be Antienter [viz. more ancient] than 
the Occasion, as is usual in Epigrams, and other solemn premeditated pieces of Wit, where 
oftentimes the Thoughts were not made for the Themes, but before them.”327 Here the conception 
is “rather suggested by the Occasion, than barely applied to it.”328 His style will become so “pliant” 
that “scarce any Thought will puzzle him to fit words to it” and “cut out Expressions” that closely 
fit the subjects of his speech. If the outcome of the practice is very similar to the Erasmian ratio 
studiorum, in that habitual reflection gives one a “store and variety of good Comparisons,”329 and 
its goal is now explicitly to suit one for rhetorical virtuosity, the material now is taken directly out 
of experience rather than through one's reading.  
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In the occasional meditation, we see melancholic copia become a resource for discovering 
meaning in experience. The melancholic imagination, considered pathologically overproductive 
in medical works, was disciplined through attention to similitudes into a resource for spiritual 
exercise. Topical reflection upon accidental similitudes will “insensibly, and by unperceiv'd 
degrees, work the Soul to a certain frame, or temper, which may not improperly be called Heavenly 
Mindedness, whereby she acquires an aptitude and disposition to make pious Reflections upon 
almost every Occurrence, and oftentimes without particularly designing it.”330 It is a “Disposition 
and a Readiness to make Spiritual uses of Earthly things” in which the world is both “Library 
and...Oratory.”331 The practice of occasional meditation is linked to topical habits but transforms 
them from a habit of reasoning into a new habit of perception in that “it accustomes a man to an 
attentive Observation of the Objects wherewith he is conversant.” The meditator's gaze “ingages 
us to pry into the several attributes and relations of the things we consider, to obtain the greater 
plenty of particulars, for the making up of the more full and compleat Parallel betwixt the things 
whose resemblances we would set forth.” Here is a melancholic copia, seeking not matter for 
arguments but metaphors through which one might experience the world.   
If the explicit name of the “occasional reflection” did not yet emerge when Shakespeare 
wrote As You Like It, we nevertheless also find the movement from observation to moral 
significance in the figure of Jaques the melancholizer. It's most pointed instance, however, is one 
that he reports having been spoken by the fool, Touchstone. He admires the fool because of his 
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ability to “be so deep contemplative.” He draws a “a dial from his poke,” that is, a timepiece from 
his purse,  
 
And, looking on it with lack-lustre eye,   
Says very wisely, 'It is ten o'clock;  
Thus we may see,' quoth he, 'how the world wags;  
'Tis but an hour ago since it was nine;  
And after one hour more 'twill be eleven;  
And so, from hour to hour, we ripe and ripe,   
And then, from hour to hour, we rot and rot;  
And thereby hangs a tale.332 
 
Jaques recognizes this as a version of his own ability to “moralize a spectacle” as he says 
that the heard fool “moral on the time,” though this moves him to laughter rather than tears. Yet 
Touchstone's ability to piece together a melancholic reflection from his motley, zanni-like wit is a 
comic reflection of Jaques' own melancholic ingenium, something Jaques perhaps acknowledges 
when he exclaims “O noble fool!/A worthy fool! Motley's the only wear.” Motley, that is, the 
sewn-together patches taken from many experiences. Jaques' “motley” is his experience itself, 
mediated through the melancholy topics. 
Where the commonplacer extracts “flowers” from their reading, Jaques, the melancholic 
traveler par excellence, draws his sententiae from his own observation. The collection of 
commonplace arguments becomes for Jaques a collection of experience: his melancholy is 
“extracted from many objects” and “compounded of many simples.” Rosalind tells him that he has 
“great reason to be sad” for he has “rich eyes and poor hands.” Yes, Jaques says—”I have gained 
my experience.”333 Here Jaques makes the clearest statement of the result of melancholy topics: 
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he has exchanged a life of action, even motive itself, for experience. Experience is obtained 
through the topical extraction of significance from the objects of perception which are turned into 
emblems. The sense-experience is set within the commonplaces of the melancholic mood just as 
the emblem's pictura receives an inscription of a commonplace or sententia. Experience, then, is 
the emblematic subscriptio, the poetic working out of the relation between mood and sense.  
Jaques' melancholic “experience” is a counterpoint to the contemporary image of the 
traveller whose “experience” is gained as a form of political wisdom to be put in service of the 
state. One short treatise called the Profitable instructions provides a topics of observation, 
instructing the aspiring diplomat or legate what should be noted about the foreign land he enters.334 
It was written by William Davison, the secretary to Queen Elizabeth best remembered for his role 
in the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots. The treatise argues against those “sedentary traveller[s]”, 
for though he “may passe for a wise man, as long as hee converseth either with dead men by 
reading; or by writing, with men absent,” once he enters “the stage of publike imployment, and 
hee will soone find, if he can bee but sensible of contempt, that he is unfit for Action.”335 The 
ability to deal with “men of several humours, factions, and Countries; duly to comply with them, 
or stand off, as occasion shall require” cannot be gotten from books, but only from men. It is 
“Experience added to learning,” that “makes a perfect Man.”336 It consists mostly of topical lists 
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of what one is to “consider” when abroad. The main headings are the country's geographical 
features, the people, the “policy and government,” and the administration of justice. 
 The civil topics for observation are a dialectical outline of the very structure of situation. 
For instance, when we consider how the magistrate “doth carry himselfe in administration,” we 
should consider “1. His Court, 2. His Wisedome, 3. His inclination to 1. Peace 2. Warre, 4. How 
hee is beloved or feared of his 1. People 2. Neighbors, 5. His designments, enterprizes, &c., 6. His 
disposition, studies, and exercises of 1. Body 2. Mind, 7. His Favourites, 8. The confidence or 
distrust he hath in his people.”337 Experience here entails travel to foreign lands for political or 
diplomatic purposes. It is the traveller's responsibility to furnish himself  “with the knowledge of 
such things as may bee serviceable for your Country and & calling.”338 This too requires a topical 
training of perception, which the treatise offers for the “right informing of your minde with those 
things which are most notable in those places which you come unto.”339 The purpose is to 
methodically increase one's experience. This requires a clear motive and purpose for travelling, 
for “the only experience which I have gotten, is, to find how much I might have learned, & how 
much indeed I have missed, for want of directing my course to the right end, and by the right 
meanes.”340  
If the Italian courtier's ideal of sprezzatura was a kind of elegant ease, we should see in 
English melancholy a related performance: not a pretension to genius, but instead a distance from 
the world and all of its eagerness, studium, ambition, and business. So-called “fashionable 
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melancholy” was an attractive removal from worldly pursuits.341 But this was not the end of it. 
Just as the humanist was trained to have commonplaces readied for any discourse, melancholic 
sophistication allowed one to bring a passion before one, transforming social engagements from 
contests of wills to rival displays. The tension was not simply one between a disavowal of the 
world and a commitment to it. These two positions are not static but mark out a continuum. The 
refusal of the world, as we see with Shakespeare's Timon, is the extremity of melancholy. It is 
contrasted with the greed and venality of his friends and parasites upon his magnanimity. But 
distance does not foreclose participation. Jaques is an attractive avatar for melancholy, for he is 
not so set against worldly motives that he rails against them. Rather, he stands apart from them as 
one to whom they are not proper. Jaques finds a distance that allows him to relish the theatrum 
mundi. We need not object to the notion of “fashionable melancholy” if we attend to the 
seriousness of the self-fashioning that was frequently attendant upon it. To use Christa Olson's 
notion of an “embodiable topos,” we should rather read the embodiment of such a posture as a 
transformation of it. It is not so much an inhabiting of a pose so as to lay claim to a “fashion of 
passion,” a decadent performance of malady akin to those French aristocrats who had rectal 
surgery on non-existent fistulae to show their allegiance to the King. Instead, to take up a position 
of explicit inaction is not only a claim to one's own genius but also a repudiation of a worldview 
and its sense of action.  
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We can now narrate the sequence of the previous three chapters. In the first chapter, we 
discussed the plurality of probable causes of melancholy as a topical habit within Baroque 
medicine that allowed various kinds of causalities to be entertained simultaneously. Nowhere was 
this more elaborated than in Burton’s catalogue of melancholy’s causes, occupying most of his 
work’s first book. While Burton, the author of the Anatomy of Melancholy, was a self-professed 
melancholic, he also took up in his book the medical, philosophical, and historical tradition that 
saw melancholy as a problem. As a compiler and cento-maker of the medical tradition he inherited, 
Burton excelled in topicalizing the possible causes of melancholia. We see in his synopses how 
the chapter headings all originate from a dialectical division of melancholy.342 Each heading, in 
turns, becomes a reservoir for all discourse on the subject.  
In the second chapter, I argued that humanist dialectic allowed for a new orientation 
towards topical method that emphasized copiousness and so privileged similarity over essence. 
This background of topics shows the common intellectual backdrop both of the medical humanism 
discussed in the first chapter and the rhetorical practices of melancholics described in this chapter. 
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Because of the underdetermination of topical practice, they could be appropriated both for the 
habits of organizing traditional knowledge as well as the invention of individual emotive 
expression. I have argued that the logical source of this difference is contained in the dialectical 
tradition itself. It was both an organon highly refined for making distinctions and discovering ever 
finer differentiae as well as an attunement to the metaphorical similitudes between all things. 
Where the scientific and medical discourse privileged topical classification, the melancholy topics 
looked to figure, transform, and articulate the objectless passion of melancholy.  
In this chapter, I have showed the outcome of the melancholizing tendency of topical habits 
in various rhetorical genres. Jaques is an avatar for melancholic habits of thought in discourse. 
Jaques' speeches and “studied questions” are preoccupied with melancholic commonplaces like 
vanity and the theatrum mundi; indeed, his formulation of the latter (“All the world's a stage”) is 
the form most familiar to us. All of these practices, commonplaces, and topical inventions were 
conventional. Yet because the theater dramatizes his rhetoric as that of a melancholic we are able 
to ascertain the link between his commonplace discourse and his moody persona. This persona, 
however, was not confined to the theater, but was even more elaborated in genres of 
“melancholizing,” that built from the commonplace to the emblem and finally to the occasional 
meditation. These nested practices of melancholic rhetoric mark a transformation from topical 
capacity as argumentative to expressive and from a rhetoric of the public to that of intimate 
experience. This history not only shows the extension of rhetorical habits into new domains but 
gives a skeptical reading of the apparently spontaneous and immediate nature of private 
experience. Recognizing that melancholy developed itself as a rhetoric restores the “persona” to 
the personal without implying that its passionate and discursive movements are disingenuous or 
deceitful.  
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The tension between the desire to discover the causes of melancholy passions and a will to 
elaborate and extend them is held most closely in The Anatomy of Melancholy. Burton, self-
identified as a melancholic, not only sets out treatments for melancholy but goes to considerable 
rhetorical lengths to justify melancholic passions. It is possible to “give some satisfaction to 
melancholy men,” by showing them “the causes whence they proceed.” This “satisfaction” is at 
once one part of the attempt to cure their ailment; their fears may be alleviated when they learn 
that their ailment does not proceed from “Divels, as they suppose,” nor that they are “bewitched 
or forsaken of God,” but that all can be accounted for by “naturall and inward causes.” Burton then 
turns to one of his favorite examples: if someone should walk “upon a plank, if it lie on the ground, 
he can safely do it: but if the same plank be laid over some deep water, instead of a bridge, he is 
vehemently moved, and 'tis nothing but his imagination, forma cadendi impressa, to which his 
other members and faculties obey.”343 This shows that even if the cause of melancholic passion is 
imagined, an imagined cause is not necessarily unreasonable and it is common to all. But if we 
insist that those who prepare to walk over a river “have a just cause to fear, a true object of fear; 
so have melancholy men an inward cause, a perpetual fume and darkness, causing fear, grief, 
suspicion, which they carry with them, an object which cannot be removed; but sticks as close, 
and is as inseparable as a shadow to a body.”344 The melancholic has a real and just cause of fear; 
it differs only from others in that it is not apparent. The opaqueness of the melancholic's passion 
makes it no less justified. If Burton shows how the topics of melancholy's causes can encompass 
both their removal and their justification, he is a unique case.  
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The two topics of melancholy—its many causes and its resources for passionate 
elaboration—can be set off as two potentially antagonistic positions: the onlooker and the 
melancholic. If the cause of the passion simply must be made clear, melancholy is an object of 
potential knowledge. If the causeless passion is a license for passionate elaboration, melancholy is 
an inventional topic for a new rhetoric. This conflict around the meaning of melancholic passions 
was indeed dramatized many times in the Elizabethan and Jacobean theater. It is this that I take up 
in the following chapter. 
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5.0 Chapter 4: The Motive and Cue: Melancholy in the Baroque Theater 
In the previous two chapters, Shakespeare's Jaques was taken as an avatar for the practices 
of a melancholy topics. It is no accident that we find this emergence of a new rhetorical orientation 
in the theater. While it has long been observed that the poet-playwrights of the English stage were 
deeply influenced by their rhetorical education, it is also true that the stage was itself a form of 
public rhetoric. Were we to assume, in a seemingly flat-footed way, that rhetoric is oratory before 
a popular audience, where would we find it in Elizabethan England? There were three institutions 
of public declamation: the pulpit, the gallows, and the theater. On these raised platforms, the 
complex and turbulent ideologies of the age were woven and unspooled. Nearly every Elizabethan 
and Jacobean Londoner would have taken in sermons, plays, and executions every year. While it 
was imperative that one went to hear a sermon on a Sunday, on other days free from labor or 
religious obligations, one would see the city's residents flood forth in two directions, some heading 
north to Tyburn and the gallows, and others to Southwark or Shoreditch to spend a day at the 
theater. 
The theater was singular in its ability to represent problems of motive. In the sermons, the 
problems of motive were always addressed as a problem of sin. In the gallows-speech, a criminal 
motive was the sinful cause of a tragic result. Only the theater could represent the complex 
intertwining of multiple motives within a “plot” allowed for speeches to be organized around 
different interpretations of a social situation. That today we so closely identify the theater with the 
presentation of character motivation is not a foregone assumption of theatrical form. That we 
understand theater as a representation of character's motives is in large part a legacy of the 
innovations of the Baroque theater.  
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5.1 The Baroque Theater and the Development of Motive 
A primary factor in the development of character-motive was the absence of a chorus in 
tragedy. The classical chorus watched the issue of fate unfold and sang their passions into a 
wisdom that could not be contained, but only represented, by the civil institution of the drama. By 
contrast, the Baroque theater represented an action that was carried across the interwoven and 
conflicting motives of multiple characters. The plots were rightly often described within the plays 
as “confusion.” Theatrical motive does not emerge as a single-minded bent toward one 
overweening desire but rather as the constantly revisable orientation of a character towards a kind 
of action or object whose nature is disputable and capable of transformation through the character’s 
experience. Unlike the Greek hero of tragedy or even the comic slaves of Terence and Plautus’ 
Latin dramas, Baroque character was not determinative of action. Rather, the sense of who a 
character was had to be revealed through the development of their motives as each scene unfolded. 
Although scholarship has frequently emphasized the influence of classical drama, and 
particularly Senecan tragedy, on early Elizabethan tragedies, it has neglected a significant study 
of the disappearance of the chorus in the translation of ancient tragic models into a new vernacular, 
popular theater. A nearly forgotten article, published by Robert Turner in 1963, perhaps comes 
closest to being such a study. Turner traces the brief development and disappearance of the “causal 
induction,” that is, a prologue to the play introduced by a character who represents the cause of 
the action. It was introduced in the 1580s as a technique through which playwrights could 
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“introduce the motives or external causes of the main action of the drama.”345 This convention 
developed out of a transformation of the medieval morality plays in which the figures of Virtue 
and Vice were the principal characters, and the “causes of action were set forth clearly by an 
abstract figure.”346  One such example is the 1564 drama Appius and Virgina: “Appius is given 
the plot to trap Virginia by the Vice Haphazard while Justice and Conscience lament Appius's 
rejection of them as guides for his action.”347 Turner argues that as dramatic matter shifted to non-
allegorical subjects, the causal induction “banish[ed] the abstract figures from the story itself to a 
framework in which they occupy a position similar to the classical chorus or the medieval dream-
vision.”348 In Kyd's The Spanish Tragedy, the first of the many “revenge tragedies” of the period, 
both Revenge and the Ghost of Andrea, murdered by the prince of Portugal, are identified as the 
Chorus in the dramatis personae. Revenge himself says in the prologue that they will together 
“serue for Chorus in this tragedie.” They speak only during the prologue and the end of each act. 
Kyd's choral use of these motive-figures is a case of pseudomorphosis that shows the 
distinctiveness of the Elizabethan drama rather than its indebtedness to the classical tradition.  
Although they were “adapting the function of the Vices and Virtues,” the playwrights using 
causal inductions, “wished to dissociate themselves as sharply as possible from their old-fashioned 
mode.”349 This was first done by replacing them with mythological characters, as when we see 
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Cupid taking the place of Vice in the 1580s.350 The argument that the causal induction was a 
transitory technique is strengthened when we recall that “the morality plays did not themselves 
employ this convention and that the causal induction gradually died out after the early 1590's when 
a literal presentation of action became customary.”351 The presentation of an allegorical figure 
before, rather than within, a plot “trained the audiences to accept the literal story without the 
assistance of abstract causes and prepared for the eventual exclusion of all allegorical 
representations of motive.”352 This gradual reduction of allegorical figures coincided with the 
emergence of the history play that “did not come into its own until about 1590 when the causal 
induction was beginning to fade.”353 We may even venture to say that the emergence of history as 
a representation that could stand without any external comment required a training of the public in 
the rhetoric of motives that developed in the 1590s and through the end of the Jacobean period.  
The sequence shows a development, from the abstracted Virtues and Vices of the morality 
plays, to the allegorical induction-figures, and finally to a character with a fully developed motive. 
In the early allegorical plays, the action “illustrates the motive force” that rules the scene, as in 
Histriomastix when England is ruled successively by “Peace, followed by Plenty, then Pride, Envy, 
War, and finally Poverty before Peace reasserts her rule.”354 The transition from the simple 
allegory to the mixed character of the play introduced by its cause is more complex. We find one 
such transitional moment, lingering between the motive-figure of the causal induction and the 
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historical character in Middleton's The Revenger's Tragedy. The revenger, Vindice, stands between 
those allegorical, abstracted motives of the earlier plays and the character whose motive is enacted 
through the development of the plot. His abstract, allegorical quality can be seen from his name, 
Italian for “avenger.” In the opening scene, Vindice, his bile adust in vengeful mourning, walks 
onto the stage holding a skull, while “a train [of characters] pass over the stage with torchlight.”355 
We learn that the skull is his late betrothed's. He waxes upon the decadence of the court and prays 
for revenge. Vindice's skull is a constant, imaginative reminder of his motive: revenge for his wife 
whose skull he carries with him. In the end, the skull is the weapon with which he kills the Duke 
who poisoned his dead wife. The abstraction of Revenge has here shifted into the most concrete 
imaginable allegory of revenge, identifying its cause with its means. The allegory of the Baroque 
theater was not abstract but concrete. It apprehended action not in its concept but through an 
attempt to grasp the entirety of an action in each of its parts.  
Shakespeare created the most memorable of all melancholic revengers in Hamlet. Between 
1592, when Kyd's The Spanish Tragedy was first performed, and 1600 when Hamlet took the 
stage, the nature of the melancholic's motive in the revenge play, and, therefore, in all of theater, 
had changed. Where Hieronimo along with the legion of theatrical revengers he inspired “depict 
themselves as afflicted figures who have been driven by violence into a melancholic madness,”356 
with the character of Hamlet, we see a third and final moment of transformation of motive. 
Hamlet's melancholy appears as an obstacle to the vengeance he has been tasked with: he is 
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“pigeon-liver'd and lack[s] gall/To make oppression bitter.”357 This is precisely what humoral 
melancholy provided to the revengers before him. Indeed, this passage is from one of his most 
famous soliloquies, in which he reflects upon the nature of motive—as a spectator of theater.  
A band of players comes to Elsinore. Hamlet, greeting them, asks one of the principals to 
perform a speech he once heard, performed by this actor, though it was “never acted” because the 
play “pleased not the million; 'twas/caviare to the general.” The speech is Aeneas' recital to Dido 
of the Trojan War, recalling an episode from the second book of the Iliad. Hamlet prompts the 
player with the beginning of the speech which he has apparently memorized, and the player picks 
up the speech where he leaves it. After a poetic description of Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles, and his 
murder of King Priam and his sons, the player comes to a description of Hecuba, the now widowed 
and childless Queen of Troy, at the moment she witnesses her husband's death:  
But if the gods themselves did see her then 
When she saw Pyrrhus make malicious sport 
In mincing with his sword her husband's limbs, 
The instant burst of clamour that she made, 
Unless things mortal move them not at all, 
Would have made milch the burning eyes of heaven, 
And passion in the gods.358 
 
In speaking these lines, the player himself is moved to tears. This is noted, seemingly with 
disdain, by Polonius, who asks him to stop. Hamlet moves to retain the troupe and warns Polonius 
to treat them well as the players are “the abstract and brief chronicles of the/time.” As Polonius 
departs with the actors, Hamlet and the player remain back. Hamlet asks him if he can put on a 
play called the Murder of Gonzago and insert a short speech into the play. The player agrees, and 
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departs. It is then, alone, that Hamlet reflects upon the significance of the player's speech and his 
passion: 
Is it not monstrous that this player here, 
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, 
Could force his soul so to his own conceit 
That from her working all his visage wann'd, 
Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect, 
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting 
With forms to his conceit? and all for nothing! 
For Hecuba!359 
 
Hamlet interprets his own passionate inability as a failure to be moved by his own situation 
as powerfully as the player was by his imagination. Indeed, Hamlet's readiness with a play, one he 
knows as Gonzago's Murder, suggests that he knows the “appropriate” motive of revenge only as 
an audience member of revenge tragedy. As the actor is moved by his “own conceit,” he becomes 
like a moved member of the audience. The reciprocal role of the passions both as motivated by the 
actions of others and motives to act is reflected in the theatrical relation of actor both as mover of 
passions in the audience and moved by the passions of his role. The melancholic is then the ideal 
character for the theater’s reflection on itself, for it is when this relationship between actor as 
moving and moved breaks down from its conventional operations and begins to question itself.  
It is no accident that Hamlet's speech concludes, then, on a consideration of the theater. 
Hamlet recalls that “guilty creatures sitting at a play/Have by the very cunning of the scene/Been 
struck so to the soul that presently/They have proclaim'd their malefactions.”360 Hamlet's abrupt 
movement in his soliloquy from self-reproach to a discussion of the theater is justified by the 
problem of motive.  The nature of motive is made complex by the possibility that appearances are 
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deceptive. This applies even to his supernatural “cue for passion”: drawing upon the notion of 
melancholy as a balneum diaboli, the “bath of the devil,” he worries that perhaps the ghost he has 
seen is not his father but the devil, who is “very potent with such spirits” that are, like Hamlet, 
subject to “weaknesse and...mellancholy.”361 In the theater, this deception is open. When we are 
moved by the theater we are not moved by the opinion that is real, but because of its verisimilitude. 
It is for this reason that he thinks “the play's the thing/Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the 
king.” Claudius will never openly admit to having murdered his brother, but if he has he could not 
help but be moved by the sight, unless “things mortal” move him not at all. Hamlet's own course 
of action is his mise en scène, creating the conditions that will create a telling passion in Claudius.  
The object of the passion is always a phantasm—even if it is true. Hecuba is “nothing” 
because she is a figure of the imagination.  Berating himself, Hamlet asks, “What would he do,/Had 
he the motive and the cue for passion/That I have?” Here we should read the motive and cue for 
passion as a pleonasm, a rhetorical repetition of the same sense. This is supported by other editions 
of the text, as in the 1625 quarto, where the line reads “what woulde he doe/Had he the motive, 
and that for passion/That I have?”362 By “motive” Hamlet means the ability to be moved into 
passion: his own inability to discover the passion appropriate to his situation is at odds with the 
ability of the actor who in a “fiction” can bring himself to tears. Hamlet's corresponding “motive 
and cue for passion” is the discovery of his father's murder through visitation by his ghost. The 
ghost, like the actor's imagination of Hecuba, is an image, though one was witnessed directly with 
the eye's (and also the audience of Hamlet's eyes), while the other is in the imagination. The 
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ambivalence between these is played out early in the play, when Horatio meets Hamlet, and Hamlet 
exclaims, “methinks I see my father.” Horatio, having just seen the ghost but not yet having 
informed Hamlet of this, responds “Where, my lord?” expecting that Hamlet has too seen the spirit. 
Hamlet responds, “in my mind's eye,” that is, in the imagination.363 The theater is the intermediary 
between passion and object par excellence because it captures all of the dimensions implied by the 
early modern meaning of “imagination.” 
Hamlet's play-within-the-play shows how the meaning of a situation or a scene depends 
upon the passions of those who witness it. Shakespeare's other melancholics, though they do not 
stage actual plays as Hamlet does, each trouble the meaning of action by responding differently to 
the scene than those around them. Unlike the Virtues and Vices of the Morality play or the 
allegorical figure of Revenge in the causal induction, Shakespearean melancholy does not stand 
over the Baroque theater to clarify the motives of the actors. Instead, as I shall show in this chapter, 
we see across Shakespeare's works a repeated pattern in which melancholy becomes the origin of 
a problem of motive. The pattern can be described as follows: the cause of the melancholic's 
passion is not clear, either to themselves or others. The melancholic's behavior is then not deemed 
an appropriate or conventional response to the situation at hand. This sets up an initial conflict, in 
which the cause of melancholic's passion becomes a site of dispute and hypothesis. In each case, 
this dispute cannot be solved through argumentation. Ultimately, the causes of all passions are 
attributed to various imaginations, like the player's “conceit” or the real apparition of a ghost 
demanding vengeance. In the conflict that emerges around the interpretation of melancholic 
passion in the theater, Shakespeare articulated distinct and conflicting attitudes towards the 
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imagination. These two attitudes, which I will call respectively the “civil” and the “melancholic” 
imagination, issue forth wholly different forms of action. The conflict of these actors, the confusion 
of their motives, and the rhetoric of their imagined motives is what is played out in the dramas of 
Shakespeare organized around the figure of the melancholic.   
The remainder of this chapter has three moments. I will first articulate the Baroque theory 
of the role of imagination and passion in motives. Here I seek to show how two distinct modes of 
imagination—the civil and the melancholic—served as competing hermeneutics of common life. 
Second, I will show how three examples of Shakespeare's melancholics pose distinct problems of 
motive that can be read as a conflict between the civil and the melancholic imagination. I look to 
Queen Isabel in Richard II, Romeo in Romeo and Juliet, and Antonio in The Merchant of Venice, 
discovering in the common pattern described above but, in each case, throwing a distinctive light 
upon the relation of passion, motive, and imagination through the confrontation of the civil and 
melancholic imaginations. Finally, I return to a consideration of Hamlet as it has been received in 
several important twentieth-century and contemporary interpretations, including those of T.S. 
Eliot and Carl Schmitt. I argue that the Baroque theater was a form of collective imagination and 
that the figure of the melancholic played a pivotal role in training her audience how to imagine 
differently.  
5.2 Imagination and Passion  
 
The early modern theory of passions is inextricable from a theory of motives. Passions 
were not “simple actions; but...compleat qualities and actions which are accompanied by many 
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others, and yet which all tend to one principal end which the soul proposeth.”364 Because of the 
close conceptual connection between the ends of action and passion, we find the most elaborated 
theoretical treatment of motives in the “treatise on the passions,” a genre that flourished in the 
seventeenth century. These treatises set out a vision of passions and motives as part of a civil 
hermeneutic of situations. This was a departure from the discussion of passions in devotional 
manuals, in which the aim was to “mortify” the passions as part of an individual spiritual exercise. 
In the treatises, the modulation of passions is a form of civil prudence; one studies one’s own 
passions under the presumption that they are similar to others, and this institutes a general 
knowledge of motives. Hobbes would make this explicit in the introduction to his Leviathan, where 
he comments upon the commonly invoked maxim nosce teipsum, “Read Thy Self.” In Hobbes' 
interpretation, this meant a method for understanding the motives of others. Because of a common 
“similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another,” 
one can discover through introspection on one's own mental and passionate activity what the 
grounds are of your own motives, and therefore can “read and know, what are the thoughts, and 
Passions of all other men, upon the like occasions.”365 However, Hobbes made a crucial 
distinction: the similitude was in the motions accompanying the passions, and not their imagined 
objects.  
Civil prudence proposed rules for passions that established a hierarchy of appropriate 
response. One's social station determined which passions were appropriate under various 
                                                 
364 Marin Cureau de la Chambre, The Characters of the Passions (London: Printed by T. Newcomb, 1650), 
5. 
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conditions. The preacher and divine Thomas Cooper's The Mysterie of the Holy Government of 
Our Affections laid stress on the differences in passionate expression appropriate to different 
stations. Ministers can censure, but private men cannot. Magistrates can punish wrongdoing, 
whereas private men can only grieve it. The result is that the possible objects of passion reflect the 
social order of importance that marks the appropriate form of expression. When “our private case 
be safe, and yeeld [sic] us sound matter of rejoycing; yet we must withall be sorrowfull for the 
publike: yea, our particular joy must give way thereto.”366 The public face of sorrow is mandated 
by the trump that common objects of passions have over the private. This is supported by Biblical 
precedent, for “[t]hough Nehemiah for his owne private be in good case; yet because the house of 
his God lyes waste: therefore, though he stand before such a Monarch, as would not endure any 
such melancholy passion; yet his sad countenance must needes bewray his Affection to his God, 
and compassion with his distressed and desolate Church.”367 In the case of public celebration, the 
reverse is also true; even though “in private it go ill with us; yet wee must rejoyce in the publike 
good, and be comforted in our particular distresse, by the consideration of the publike welfare of 
the Church of God.”368 The adjustment of passionate expression to a public situation is not 
dissimulation, but rather a directive for “mortifying” one's wayward passions by maintaining a 
public affect. However, even in this religious context, the mortification of passions is not imagined 
in this case, as it was in the devotional books and works of contemplation, as a private exercise. 
Rather, it is precisely as the work of adjusting one's private passion to focus on the public good or 
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evil. Indeed, the “sinceritie of our Affections,” is judged by whether they are “proportionable to 
the Object, and measure thereof: as, If the sinnes of the Times be grievous, and extraordinarie, so 
our griefe be su[i]table; If the mercies of God, and his deliverance, be wonderfull, so our Joy and 
Thankfulnesse be answerable.”369 Sincerity is a judgment of fitness to a proper object rather than 
the candidness of an individual.  
The Passions of the Minde in Generall, first appearing in 1601 and written by an otherwise 
little-known writer Thomas Wright, includes a section on “Pollicie in Passion” in which Wright 
outlines the civic proprieties of passionate expression. For instance, in order to please someone 
who is your superior or peer, “thou must apparell thy selfe with his affections, and love where he 
loveth, and hate where he hateth.”370 Wright maintains that there is a difference between the right 
and wrong use of this strategy, as if “this meane fostereth flatterie, if it be abused, so it nourisheth 
charitie, if it be well used.”371 The range of possible reasons for passions allows Wright to offer a 
lengthy topicalization of civil motives. In keeping with the passion-theory of motives, all of these 
can ultimately be reduced to love and hate, but within these we find a topical efflorescence of 
variations that attempts to capture the variety of possible situations. In Wright's “Discourse to the 
Motives to Love,” he lists seventeen such “motives,” printed with a synopsis in Ramus brackets, 
the standard print form of visualizing topics, based upon the system of the dialectician Peter 
Ramus. His discussion of them takes up over a hundred pages of his works as he offers a brief 
essay on each motive that he discovers through a further topical division of their varieties. In each 
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of these essays, Wright argues that “much more is insinuated then [sic] is set down.”372 It was the 
task of the “good Scholler” to apply these “generalities to particular matters,” since “a slender 
insinuation will content a ripe apprehension.”373 In this, the motives show themselves as topics.  
 Let us look to one of Wright's brief essays. One motive of love, paradoxically, is hate. 
Many “politike Potentates and Princes” form alliances with each other because they are “in 
dissension and warres with their professed enemies.”374 As examples, he lists Herod and Pilate, 
but also the “hatred of subjects against superiors” which unites them “in all uproars and 
commotions, riots and rebellions,...and causeth revolt against the State.”375 He connects this 
motive to other motives to love, discussed in an earlier essays, namely resemblance, profit, and 
advantage. Wright's reflections on the “pollicie” of passions are the more remarkable when it is 
remembered that the term was closely associated in the idiom of the day with ragion di stato or 
“reason of state.” “Reason of state” refers to the art associated with Machiavelli, that is, “the use 
of any and all available means, however immoral, to preserve the state and to increase the power 
of the ruler.”376 This can be seen from the title of a Spanish work translated into English in 1632: 
Policie unveiled: wherein may be learned, the order of true policie in kingdomes, and common-
wealths: the matters of justice, and government; the addresses, maxims, and reasons of state. It 
was only with the Machiavellian turn and his famous reflections on being feared and loved that 
the political discourse on action and the passionate theory of motives were united. Works of 
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“pollicie” such as this one and similar genres like the “mirror of princes” that offered advice to 
rulers typically offered admonitions against being ruled by passion. The unique developments of 
English Machiavellianism, closely studied by Victoria Kahn, used the “emphasis on the religious 
ends of politics” as justification for the “assimilation of Machiavellian reason of state by 
Christianity.”377 This in part explains how Wright ends each of these essays, as in the motive to 
love from hate. It closes with a long prayer to God, whose central sentiment is that we must fight 
the enemies of God, “for that victory is more glorious, and that glory more illustrious where 
adversaries are strongest.”378 
Knowing the appropriate passionate response depended upon correctly apprehending the 
situation one was in. One element of this was recognizing the affective dispositions of others. 
Wright locates a civil topics of places for the “discoverie of passions.” These can be ascertained 
by learning how to read and interpret, variously, others' “externall Actions,” “play,” “feasting,” 
“drinking,” “gesture,” “voice,” the “managing of the hands and bodie,” “praising,” “Apparell,” 
“Conversation,” and “Writing.”379 These various topics give way to collections of heuristics and 
maxims. He who “talkes too muche before his betters” is full of “arrogancy, contempt, and lacke 
of prudence.”380 Too much “varietie...of garments proveth the ficklenesse of their heads.”381 
Someone who is easily pleased by the praise of others has “selfe-love and vanitie” within the “best 
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tenement of his heart.”382 The superficiality of these maxims belies the import of what they 
represented. While the commonsensical collection of observations that Wright makes do not seem 
to have much claim to psychological acumen, more important is his illustration of how one may 
come to a form of civil wisdom through topical observation. The topics for discovering passions 
were training forms of perception, attention, and observation onto various aspects of other's 
appearance, behavior, comportment, and speech.  
This civil topics of motive developed into a practical hermeneutics that disproportionately 
addressed one side of motive: the corporeal rather than the imaginative. This kind of inference, 
drawn from emotional comportment and physiognomy, was an essential part of “politick” 
knowledge. The topical tradition was sometimes invoked directly, as when Wright turns from 
motives of love to those of hate. Rather than writing short essays on the various motives, he 
imagines that there is some “occasion...offered to moove the passion of hatred against some 
particular person, as to inveigh against a Traitor, or publike enemie of the State or our selves.” 
Wright enumerates the topics for which to discover arguments that will “perswade our auditors or 
friends to hate them” with “divers meanes” for different evils. Here he turns to the familiar 
rhetorical topics of vituperation found in Quintilian. In both praise and vituperation, one was to 
first consider the person's parents, country, and stock.383 Wright calls these topics of the persons 
“ingresse” into the world, under which we should consider first, if “his Parents were base, wicked, 
or infected with any notorious vice.” Second, “the manner of his begetting was unlawful.” Third, 
whether “he was born at such a time as the influence of the heavens as the influence of the heavens 
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had some extraordinary action in the tempering of his body.” Fourth, if he was “born in a bad 
place.” Fifth, if his parents died or were tormented in his upbringing. Sixth, if he showed vice in 
his childhood years.384 Similar topics are given for the course of his life and the manner of his 
death if he is already deceased.  
In Wright and especially in other treatises of the passions, the bulk of interest in discovering 
the passions is shown in physiognomic and characterological judgments. In a section on the 
“Discovery of Passions in Gesture,” Wright claims that the “subject is very ample, and would 
almost require a whole book.” The topics of gesture are “reduced unto these heads; motions of the 
eies, pronuntiation, managing of the hands and body, manner of going.”385  Within these various 
bodily topics Wright shows us the kind of inferences we may make from observation. If someone 
has a “rowling eye, quicke in moving, this way, and that way,” it shows that he has “a quicke, but 
a light wit, a hote cholerick complexion, with an unconstant and impatient mind.” The 
“quicknesse” comes from an “abundance of hote spirits.” Much winking comes from “weakness 
of spirits,” and so on in this manner. A popular physiognomy gave some scope reading motives 
from the face, the complexion, or the gestures. In the face, “superiours may learn to conjecture the 
affections of their subjects mindes, by a silent speech pronounced in their very countenances.”386 
The art of physiognomy uses these “characters” written on the face to discover the intentions of 
others, based upon the premise that these are the results of motions of the spirits that correspond 
to the kinds of acts that occur under a similar passion. The motions of the spirit, then, are visible 
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in the face through a mysterious influence. This physiognomic, “politick” hermeneutic of passions 
resembles in many ways the semiotics of medicine, attempting to read from a bodily sign an 
underlying cause.   
However, when reading the body, the civil imagination was only able to infer one side of 
the motive, the internal motion that showed in the face or gesture gave the quality of the feeling. 
It could not discover the object in the imagination. Beyond the rough and ready attempt to read 
motive directly from the body, motives could only be inferred from the situation, according to 
what appeared most “fitted” to it. It was in the opinion of what was “fitting” to a situation that the 
theory of motives relied upon a theory of imagination. As mentioned above, passions were 
understood as motives as they provided both the efficient power to move the body and a direction 
of action. The direction was the imaginative component of the passion which held as its object 
something desirable or hateful. This view of the passions was traditional. Its locus classicus was 
in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations. There the pertubationes animi or upheavals of the mind are 
linked with four kinds of “opinion” associated with four primary passions: aegritudo or grief is an 
opinion of present evil, laetitia or joy of present good, metus or fear of an impending evil, and 
libido or desire, of a future good.387 The basic motives were imagined as the beginnings of bodily 
locomotion were, then, fear and desire, as fear makes us flee our opinion of a coming evil and 
desire leads us towards a future good. In this way, all of human motives can be mapped onto bodily 
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locomotions precipitated by the four passions, which, according to Burton, “Bernard compares to 
the wheeles of a chariot, by which we are carried in this world.”388 This allusion to Bernard is a 
clear example of an intentional misprision: in the original sermon, the four “wheels” of his chariot 
were not the four motive passions, but four vices that comprise malice: Cruelty, Impatience, 
Audacity, and Shamelessness.389 Clearly, what appealed to Burton here was but the image of 
passions as the basis of motion. This judgment of the values of objects was called the vis estimativa 
or estimative power. In this way, motive is a dual function of the imagination's estimative powers 
and the passionate response to what it presents to the soul.  
In the treatises, this Ciceronian theory appeared alongside the famous Thomistic 
description of eleven passions, set out systemically in the Church Doctor's Summa Theologiae. 
The passions were organized into two portions of the “sensitive appetite,” the concupiscible and 
irascible. This was distinguished from the will, or the “intellective appetite.”390 The concupiscible 
passions encompassed the four basic motives in Cicero and included two more, bringing the total 
to six: joy and grief, desire and aversion, love and hatred. Whereas the concupiscible passions were 
concerned with the simple judgments of what was good or bad, the irascible are those passions 
that see the good and evil as difficult, that is, they imagine the good or evil as difficult to avoid or 
obtain. Aquinas makes clear that the “irascibilis objectum” must, nevertheless, remain a sensible 
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or imaginative difficulty [arduum sensibile], not a difficulty as judged by the intellect. The 
irascible passions then indicate a more complex imagination of the good or evil imagined within a 
situation or context that contains obstacles and complications. 
 In Aristotle's De anima, the division between the imaginative and the corporeal parts of a 
passion were viewed not as two distinct factors of action but as two possible descriptions emerging 
from distinct sciences. Aristotle defines the passions or ta pathē as “reasons expressed in matter” 
[logoi enhuloi].391 This allows for them to receive two distinct treatments, first from the physikos 
or natural philosopher who describes fear as a “surging around the heart of blood,” and alternately 
by the dialektikos, who defines it as a “craving for retaliation.”392 In Aristotle, the distinction is 
not between the interior feeling and exterior cause but rather between two genres of description, 
drawn from distinct inquiries. Both described the same phenomenon of passion.  
By contrast, “the thinkers of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance thought about the De 
anima in the light of their own experience of the duality of minds and things.”393 This duality was 
described with “various older terms such as species and intention,” but early modern writers 
redefined these terms “in such a way that they now applied to the dichotomy between what was in 
the soul as against what is outside the soul.”394 According to Edward Reynolds, Bishop of Norwich 
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and author of A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man, the passions, by  
“stirring up the spirits, and quickning the Fancy,” have a “direct influence upon the Habits and 
Manners of the Minde; which being in this estate constrained to fetch all her Motions from the 
Imagination, produceth them with the same clearness and vigour as they are being represented.”395 
The mind takes “all her Motions” from the imagination, indicating its role as the locus of motives 
and passions. Yet the medical literature went even further, claiming that not only all motions of 
the mind, including the passions, but all voluntary motion of the body as well depended on the 
imagination.  
We may begin by looking at one such medical account of motive, from a seventeenth-
century doctor, Daniel Sennert, in his explanation of “spontaneous motion”:   
Spontaneous motion thus occurs in this fashion and order: first, an external object is 
presented; which, moving the immobile, is communicated through the external senses and 
the common receptacle of the imagination, and out of this, what it is is known. There, it is 
understood more carefully and accurately, seeing whether it is pleasing and convenient or 
harmful and unpleasant. Love or hate follows from this understanding, that is, the desire of 
having the pleasing and delightful thing or fleeing from the harmful. Indeed, the animal is 
not moved arbitrarily [frustra], but its appetite is incited by an object insofar as it is a goal 
or a good. Motion follows directly on the appetite in beasts...in men, however, before 
motion occurs, something intercedes. The appetite and the motions of the internal senses 
are presented to the mind in order that they may be approved or disapproved by it. If 
approved, and the mind reckons the sensitive appetite to be right, motion soon follows; 
however, if it is rejected as false, contention and struggle arise between the sensitive and 
rational appetites, until one conquers the other; and whichever wins is the principle of 
motion and orders its motion to the moving faculty. This faculty, imbued through the whole 
of the bodily muscle, draws together those muscles which are needed; the contracted 
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muscles draw forth the tendons, the tendons the bones, and, by movements of the bones, 
the limbs or the whole body is moved from one place to another.396 
 
When the sensible impression first comes through the sense-organs into the mind, the 
answer to the question Quid sit? or What is it? is assigned to the sensus communis. Yet the 
imagination is what determined the question Quale sit? Here we recognize the rhetorical questions 
posed in “stasis” theory, the Hellenistic rhetorical method for determining the question at issue in 
a legal case. In the common sense, the various senses are gathered together in the mind to 
determine the nature of the thing in terms of its definition. The questions of whether it is good or 
bad is deferred to another faculty, the imagination. Burton defines imagination, similarly to 
Sennert, as “an inner sense which doth more fully examine the species perceived by common 
sense, of things present or absent, and keeps them longer, recalling them to mind again, or making 
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new of his own.” The “common sense” is that faculty through which “we discern all differences 
of objects.” That is to say, we do not individuate sense phenomena in the sense organs, “for by 
mine eye I do not know that I see, or by mine ear that I hear, but by my common sense, who 
judgeth of sounds and colours.” The common sense gives a preliminary answer to the question 
What is it? by grouping an array of predicates reported from the various sense organs under a 
single term or description.  
Motive, then, was understood both in the sense that passions were thought to be the 
efficient causes of action and in the literal sense that they are part of the motive faculty, or vis 
motrix, the capacity for bodily movement. The completist and synthetic tendency of the treatises 
on the passions led them to integrate the Ciceronian theory of the passions, the Galenic theory of 
spirits, and the Thomistic-Aristotelian view of a tripartite soul divided into various faculties. In 
this synthetic view, the spirits were the efficient cause of action while imagination provided its 
final cause. The passions were formed from a composite of an imaginative judgment and the spirits 
and humors that moved the members of the body. In this way, passion mediated between the 
physical and psychic causes of action. The introduction of the imagination within an individual's 
motive opens onto a field of interpretation within Baroque theories of action that has no analogue 
in modern sociological, historiographical, or philosophical accounts of motive. The accounts of 
humoral theory as an account of passion has been misprized in contemporary scholarship where 
the humors are thought to imply “a materialistic determinism which predisposes the constrained 
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individual to be ruled by a dominating passion.”397 Instead, we must understand the question of 
early modern motive as requiring a fuller account of its object, an object formed in the imagination. 
The early modern theory of imagination is the archive for the period’s understanding of this 
process.  
The imagination combined at least three distinct capacities: an estimative capacity that 
judged whether its object was a good or an evil, a compositional power that was able to recombine 
forms into a new one, as in the chimera, and the interpretive, as when one can see a form in a 
cloud. This is part of its “double prerogative” over other faculties of the soul in having a great 
“multiplicity of Operations” and in its “framing of objects” in which it is at once creator, composer, 
and translator, making, mixing, and replacing objects.398 The civil topics of motive, elaborated in 
the treatises on the passions, interpreted the imaginative object as deictic, that is, a particular, 
concrete thing that could be moved towards or fled. We might say that civil understanding dealt 
with that part of things that was assigned in the ars topica to the internal topics. Its primary concern 
was with a hermeneutics that could apprehend what a motive was through a series of inferential 
topics.  
As mentioned above, both Burton and Sennert's accounts of motive, linked back to motion, 
are ultimately derived from Aristotle's discussion of imagination or phantasia in the De anima. 
We owe it to Martha Nussbaum for illuminating the close connection between imagination, 
motion, and interpretation for us. She notes that in Aristotle’s works “phantasia and desire are 
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jointly necessary conditions for animal motion...and phantasia is a necessary condition for 
desire...which must prepare desire before desire can lead to action.”399 Just as important is her 
argument that phantasmata are not to be understood in every case as an internal mental image, as 
“representing has always been a matter of interpreting rather than reproducing.”400 Indeed, this is 
the function that is given to the imagination in its evaluation of its object as grata vel noxia, 
agreeable or harmful. This is an activity of imagination either when it is confronted directly with 
an object of sense or a composite phantasm formed within the imagination itself. Aristotle's 
discussion of the power of the imagination or phantasia in De anima turns upon the example of 
seeing forms in clouds. This is also his explanation for dream images: the blood that passes before 
the eyes of the sleeper seem to take on forms of old friends, gods, the dead, in just the same way 
that a cloud may appear as a dragon. However, as Nussbaum notes, “Shadow-pictures and dream-
images are distinguished from the phantasia that follows from them” as when “[w]e take a shadow-
picture for an animal, a dream picture for a real one.”401 The only difference is that when we see a 
dragon in the clouds, we do not believe it is a dragon, though we do in dreams.  
The role that melancholy played in the theater's rhetoric of motive depends upon the fraught 
relation between passion and imagination unique to the melancholic. Discovering a motive from a 
situation posed a significant problem in the case of the melancholic, whose passion was without 
“apparent occasion.” While a great deal of scholarship has been devoted to understanding 
                                                 
399 Martha Nussbaum, “The Role of Phantasia in Aristotle’s Explanations of Action” in Aristotle's De motu 
animalium: text with translation, commentary, and interpretive essays (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1978), 221-2. 
400 Ibid., 225-6. 
401 Ibid., 1.247. 
 226 
melancholy’s grounding in the humoral theory, far less attention has been paid to melancholy as a 
disorder of the imagination. In medical works, the immediate cause of melancholia was described 
in two ways: first, as an excess or corruption of black bile, and second, as a distempering of the 
imagination, or even as a laesa imaginatio, a wounded or infected imagination. Burton transforms 
imaginative distemper into the primary cause of melancholy, writing that “great is the force of 
imagination, and much more ought the cause of melancholy be ascribed to this alone, than to the 
distemperature of the body.” When the imagination affects the soul with some conceit, the body 
responds to this as real. Burton constantly appeals to the example of the ease with which we might 
walk across a board on the ground, but the terror of doing the same when it is placed over water: 
“'tis nothing but his imagination, forma cadendi impressa, to which his other members and 
faculties obey.”402 But if the imagination works on all of us, his imaginary scoffer says, sane people 
have a “just cause” for fear. Burton replies that melancholics do as well, but it is an “inward cause, 
a perpetual fume and darkness, causing fear, grief, suspicion, which they carry with them, an object 
which cannot be removed, but sticks as close, and is as inseparable, as shadow to a body, and who 
can expel or overrun his shadow?”403 The melancholic responds to an imaginative understanding 
that is not legible to others; she carries the cause of her passion with her, as an “inward cause,” 
one that is within the imagination itself.  
How did melancholy disturb the function of the imagination? Nussbaum’s essay on 
imagination’s role in perception is instructive: the imagination is “the agent’s selective interpreting 
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of his environment.”404 The perception of even an object present to sense requires imagination, as 
when we perceive a rose “it is not the rose qua rose, but the rose qua white that acts upon our 
sight.” The motive function of the imagination comes from its unique ability to present “forms of 
the pleasant and the fearful, hence necessarily of the thing as a unitary object under some 
description, not just as an assortment of various perceptible characteristics.”405  It is precisely the 
question of how the unity of the object is formed from imagination’s privileging a certain predicate 
that is at issue in the melancholic. While the melancholic’s imagination is not simply an assortment 
of “various perceptible characteristics,” its topicalizing character allows it to evaluate more than 
one characteristic as pleasant or fearful. Various potential attitudes towards the imagined object 
are made possible by privileging now one characteristic or another. Melancholic copiousness of 
imagination leaves it prone to “those strange and yet strong delusions, whereby the Minds of 
melancholly men (in whom this Facultie hath the most deep and piercing operation) hath been 
peremptorily possessed.”406 It would be wrong to think that “delusion” here corresponds with 
fictions. When we find George Puttenham in The Arte of English Poesie say that the “the 
phantasticall part of man (if it be not disordered) [is] a representer of the best, most comely and 
bewtifull images or apparences of things to the soule and according to their very truth,”407 “truth” 
here implies verisimilitude, a quality that can be attributed to a fiction. The imaginative “delusion” 
is not mere imaginative fiction but the melancholic's departure from the “appropriate” passion as 
deemed by a civil hermeneutics.  
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According to the medical literature, the melancholic imagination was dramatically different 
from the normal imagination. Hercules de Saxonia, one of Burton’s foremost authorities on 
melancholia, describes the difference in this way: “The imagination turns around the species 
sensibilis from an absent object, but the passions of the melancholic turn even about a species 
insensibilis.”408 The species sensibilis is a technical phrase within scholastic philosophy with roots 
in the late antique psychology of Augustine and Arabic medicine. But a species insensibilis is an 
oxymoron—an insensible appearance. The species insensibilis of melancholic imagination is 
opposed to the interpreted sense-object. The example given by Saxonia is a commonplace: the 
sheep sees a wolf and knows it as an enemy through the wolf’s nature [ex propria natura lupi]. It 
is the phenomenological salience of a proprium that allows sheep to avoid wolves even without 
having the human power of reasoning. This is thought to be within the power of their imagination.  
In contrast, the melancholic’s imagination, often described as too strong, is topicalized; but 
rather than beginning with a specific object of the imagination, the melancholic passion itself 
becomes the source of invention. In Saxonia's words, the melancholic brings an opinion of what is 
good or evil to that which is neither. As discussed in the previous chapter, the melancholy topics 
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were organized both to recognize the common features that every object has as well as to turn any 
image into an emblem. Just as the sheep reads the imaginative judgment of the wolf out of its 
nature, so too does the civil topics of motive read a conventional judgment of what is good or bad 
as if it is a natural one. The melancholic, in contrast, discovers in every object of the imagination 
a reason for her passion. The reason, however, is not the cause of the melancholic's passion, which 
remains elusive if not inarticulable. Rather, the imagined object becomes fuel for sustaining the 
passion. In this way the melancholic’s imagination turns its object into allegory, and its motives 
become metaphors. That is, passion is both motivated by metaphor and there is motive to the 
discovery of apt metaphors for melancholy passions. In the melancholic imagination, the passion 
is the movement, disarticulated from the world of objects and ends. Every figure of the 
imagination, whether present to sense or an absence recalled from memory and composed in some 
new manner, becomes an image of passion. 
The two distinct forms of imagination, civil and melancholic, emerged to confront one 
another as distinct character-types in the Baroque theater. In the dramatic figure of the melancholic, 
passion remains a motive. Rather than being seen as a response to an imaginative judgment of a 
situation, the melancholic passion interprets everything through itself. The discovery of a means 
for sustaining its own passion is premised upon the melancholy topics described in the previous 
chapter. But in the theater, we see also that the melancholic topics place the individual at an 
interpretive remove from others.  It is no accident, then, that Theseus' speech on the subject in A 
Midsummer's Night Dream, amounting to a Shakespearean theory of the melancholic imagination, 
is placed in the mouth of a character who disdains this position. Theseus views the melancholic 
imagination from the point of view of the civil hermeneutics. As he sees it, both “lovers and 
madmen” have “such seething brains,/Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend/More than cool 
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reason ever comprehends.”409 The distinction between apprehension and comprehension is the 
difference between judging what something is and understanding it intellectually. In another 
passage in A Midsummer’s Night Dream, we learn that “Darke night, that from the eye, his function 
takes,/The eare more quicke of apprehension makes.”410 Theseus then makes an addition: not only 
the “lunatic” and the “lover” but also “the poet/Are of imagination all compact,” that is, in a league, 
one that we recognize as a compact of melancholics.411 But each is defined by a variation on 
imaginative activity. The “madman” sees “more devils than vast hell can hold.”412 The mad 
produce terrifying phantasms and are also beholden to them. Imagination and perception cannot 
be discriminated for the melancholic as they can in the civic hermeneutic, as the melancholic 
responds passionately to their phantasms as if they were present. The lover, who Theseus says is 
“as frantic,” sees “Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt.”413 The racist connotation here, that Egyptian 
beauty could not rival Hellenic, is clearly the point of Theseus’ negative evaluation.  
The play provides an extreme example. The Queen of the Fairies, Titania, is given a potion 
that induces her to love the first person she sees. She awakes to see Bottom, a comic character who 
has been himself transformed into an ass and falls in love. Titania’s potion-induced love for Bottom 
is a kind of an extreme form of this same translation of beauty to a figure that is conventionally 
seen as grotesque. She does not see Bottom as other than he is—an ass—but finds this ass to be 
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beautiful, with his “sleek smooth head” and “fair large ears.”414 But we should pause over the 
metonymic “brow.” Though “brow” is often taken in Shakespeare as a synecdoche for face, we 
might still ask whether the synecdoche is Theseus’ or the lover’s. I hold to the latter: the lover’s 
imagination is not only active in its ability to transpose similitudes but also to discover the ideal in 
the part.  
The poetic imagination edifies the common objects of mundane experience with an  “eye, 
in fine frenzy rolling,” that “[d]oth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven.”415 The 
imagination “bodies forth/The forms of things unknown,” but the complementary activity of “the 
poet's pen/Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing/A local habitation and a name.” Poetic 
imagination supplies the “occasions” for the “airy nothing” that is, turns them into the characters 
and places of poetry. We do well to remember that the author of this speech, Theseus, is himself 
such an “airy nothing,” and therefore his disdain must be taken with the ironic distance we hear in 
an imaginary character speaking against the vanity of imagination.  
Theseus' description of the melancholic’s imaginative disorder can be tracked to the three 
abovementioned functions assigned to the imagination—estimation, interpretation, and 
composition. First, there is the question of an interpretation of what is good or bad to the sensitive 
appetitve, part of the vis estimativa.416 As observed in the Hercules de Saxonia's description of the 
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melancholic's species insensibilis, the melancholic does not evaluate its imaginative objects 
according to their nature, but according to the sense given to them by their passion. The 
melancholic joining of image and sense in the imagination can be likened, therefore, to the 
emblem. Insofar as the object imagined was not taken as a real, worldly object, but rather as a 
symbol or res significans, the movement of the melancholic was itself unworldly. She no longer 
could be seen to be moving towards a desired object or fleeing from a fearful one, even one 
complexly mediated by civil imagination. It is in this sense we should take Hamlet's “there is 
nothing either good or bad/but thinking makes it so.” This is often heard either as a moral 
skepticism or Stoical position. Rather, we should hear in it the ambiguity that is inherent in the 
image awaiting inscription.  
Second, melancholic imagination derives the situation from their passion rather than 
adjusting their passion to the situation. Theseus’ speech ends by calling these the “tricks” of a 
“strong imagination.” He gives two examples. In both cases, the imagination reverses the standard 
order of operations, supplying a reason for a passion that has no apparent reason. First, “if it would 
but apprehend some joy,/It comprehends some bringer of that joy.” According to the work of 
American philosopher and semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce, this is an abductive inference, a 
judgment concerned not only what the object is, but what the situation is. Abductive inferences 
are essential in attributions of motive. Alfred Gell, the late British anthropologist, connects this 
form of hypothesis to inferences of social agency, typically following some logic that “for any 
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agent, there is a patient, and conversely, for any patient, there is an agent.”417 Gell's famous 
example was the richly ornamented war-canoes of the Trobrianders. He argued that the purpose of 
this ornamentation was to inspire fear, for the inhabitants of the invaded islands who saw the 
canoes coming ashore would make the abductive inference that whoever was able to make such 
an elaborate design would surely be more powerful than themselves. In the same way, the passion 
of “joy” leads to the imaginative inference of a “bringer of joy.” Theseus’ second example is 
similar, showing a kind of inferential humor leading to an interpretation that justifies a passion, as 
if it is night, and “imagining some fear,/How easy is a bush supposed a bear!” Fear looks to 
interpret a situation by making hypotheses that would justify this fear.  
Third, the melancholic's imaginative capacity for composition was precisely the topical 
ability to isolate and rearrange predicates. The civil hermeneutic sees the melancholic's 
compositional power of “strong imagination” as disordered because it produces new, non-existent 
objects, created through the joining together of predicates. Burton says that melancholics' strong 
imagination leads them to construct “many chimeras, antics, golden mountains and castles in the 
air.” This poetic, inventive power of the melancholic imagination is registered as a symptom only 
when the composed phantasm becomes an object of a passion, fearing or loving what is non-
existent, formed from a topical imagination. The imagination operates upon the same model that 
Agricola posed for the topics: it is through comparison that it composes. Its primary method of 
discovery is the similitude. We find this in the typical discussion of imaginations of impossible 
things, such as a “golden mountain.” The metonymic composition of the fictive beings depends 
upon the composition of diverse sense experiences, since “unless we have seen gold and a 
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mountain, we cannot imagine a golden mountain...[and] unless we had seen a lion, a goat, and a 
serpent, it would be impossible to imagine a chimera.”418 This returns us to the “brow” of the 
Egyptian. Just as Sennert argued that in making the chimera, the imagination fashioned together 
the parts of other sense-impressions, so too does the lover's imagination compose the face of the 
beloved from a variety of sources.  
Whereas in the civil hermeneutic, the passion is the motive as a cause of the action whose 
image is its end, for the melancholic, the passion is the final cause of a topical elaboration of the 
imagination itself. That is, the melancholic's motive is not towards a discrete action. Instead, she 
adopts the melancholy topics, described in the previous chapter, to extend her passion into an 
imaginative interpretation of any situation. The melancholic's failure to conform to a civil strategy 
of passion and the occlusion of its causes are two moments of the same phenomenon. The strategic 
motive has a clear and distinct image of its end; strategic reasoning, often appearing as “reason of 
state” in the theater, subordinates the instrumentality of action towards this goal. However, the 
imagistic component of the melancholic's motive is the seed of questions. Burton says that the 
“moving faculty” can be divided into two causes: the “end is the object, which is desired or 
eschewed; as in a dog to catch a hare, &c,” while the “efficient cause in man is Reason, or his 
subordinate Phantasie, which apprehends good or bad objects.”419 Here Burton points out a 
potential division between the object of desire and the “subordinate phantasy” of the subject. The 
                                                 
418 “Et quamvis aureum montem & Chimæram imaginemur quae nunquam tota vidimus, tamen secundum 
partem ea percepimus. Et nisi aurum & montem conspexissemus, aureum montem imaginari non possemus. Sic nisi 
leonem, capram, draconem vidissemus, Chimæram imaginari impossibile esset.” Sennert, Institutiones, 111. 
419 AM, 1.154 [1.1.2.8]. 
 235 
melancholic, rather than seeking to apprehend the good or bad of an object of action as part of 
deliberation, instead subordinates the fantasy to her passion. 
Many of the most confounding passages in Shakespeare's works resolve back to the 
question of imagination that—to the modern—seems to erupt in the middle of a discourse without 
reason. Recall Mark Antony's speech that comes just before his suicide attempt.  Speaking to his 
manservant Eros, Antony begins a wistful meditation upon cloud-gazing. The cloud may take on 
different forms, sometimes “dragonish;/A vapour sometime like a bear or lion,/A tower'd citadel, 
a pendent rock,/A forked mountain, or blue promontory/With trees upon't, that nod unto the 
world.”420 However, these clouds “mock our eyes with air”; their “signs” are only “black vesper's 
pageants.”421 This seems to be the rational distinction between appearance and reality. Yet 
Antony's reverie precipitates his drastic act: he assigns his own form to the phantasmic one: “here 
I am Antony/Yet cannot hold this visible shape.”422 In this, he finds support for his passion of 
despair, but the “subordinate phantasy” of the cloud is by no means the object of his action. Rather, 
the extreme passion that motivates suicide must discover the self as an imaginative object. The 
tragic action of self-slaughter cannot be accessed by the vision that only sees in the clouds the 
signs of rain. So too, the theater must train its audience to take its “pageants” as imaginative objects 
of their own passions and so be moved by the passions of actors.  
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5.3 Shakespeare's Melancholics 
At this point we turn to an examination of melancholic characters in the works of 
Shakespeare precisely at the point where they resist the civil hermeneutic of their passions. Here 
the Shakespearean theater dramatizes a conflict between the civil topics of motive and the 
melancholic imagination. This appears in Shakespeare's works as a scene in which a melancholic 
and her companion argue about the cause of her passion. The topics of the causes of melancholy 
passion collide with a melancholic rhetoric. These debates not only index an attitudinal difference 
between the characters of the scene but are an oblique commentary on the way we should view 
theater itself. Which form of imagination—civil or melancholic—should lead us in our 
understanding of this human drama?  
One of the earliest instances of the scenic formula of the “melancholic’s defense” is found 
in Richard II. Richard, still king, has left the palace to quell an Irish rebellion. Queen Isabel, 
entering with her attendants, comports herself mournfully. Bushy, a loyal servant, reminds her that 
she has promised the king she would “lay aside all life-harming heaviness/And entertain a cheerful 
disposition.”423 She responds that though she made this vow to please the king, but “to please 
myself I cannot do it: yet I know no cause.”424 She cannot think of any reason for her sadness other 
than Richard’s departure, but she feels that this cannot be the cause: her sorrow is “unborn” and 
her “inward soul/with nothing trembles: at some thing it grieves/More than with parting from my 
lord the king.”425 The stage is set for an emotional tribunal.  
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Bushy prosecutes the case for the public cause: Richard’s absence has made the Queen 
sorrowful. Bushy’s case opens with a maxim: “Each substance of a grief hath twenty shadows.”426 
The maxim, if taken on its own, would appear like a gesture of dismissal. Bushy develops it 
thematically, working out the opposition between “substance” and “shadow” as a division between 
the true and imagined cause. The shadow “shows like grief itself, but is not so.”427 The “shadow” 
is a standard metaphor for the imaginative cause of the passion. “Shadow” as a visual metaphor, 
allows Bushy to move to the image of the eye, which “expresses” sorrow in weeping, and it is in 
this expression that its proper function is distorted. Sorrow affects the imagination's ability to 
interpret perception, as “sorrow's eye, glazed with blinding tears,/Divides one thing entire to many 
objects.”428 He subtly connects the opposition of singular–plural (“Each substance” – “twenty 
shadows”) with the act of crying: many tears come from one sad occasion. This offers a metaphor 
for the distortion of perception: each tear acts something like a prism. While it does not obstruct 
vision, it multiplies the perceived object into a confusion of partial images.  
Bushy wishes to convert the pageant of melancholic images that support the Queen's 
sorrowful passion into a single cause, and in so doing bring her within the civil hermeneutic 
appropriate to the court of the absent king. According to Bushy, the Queen, in imagining something 
in these shapes, moves until she finds a standpoint that enables her to ‘distinguish form.’ Bushy 
compares this to “perspectives, which rightly gazed upon/Show nothing but confusion, eyed 
awry/Distinguish form.”429 This describes the painterly technique of anamorphosis. This 
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technique, most famous to us from Hans Holbein’s The Ambassadors, was popular in 
Shakespeare's time. Holbein's painting can serve as an example of the type. The famous 
anamorphic skull in the painting’s lower region appears, from the frontal standpoint of true 
perspective, like an odd stain. Its form can only be seen by standing “awry.” The Queen, who is 
“Looking awry” on the King's departure, finds “shapes of grief, more than himself, to wail;/Which, 
look'd on as it is, is nought but shadows/Of what it is not.”430 The situation, “as it is,” can only be 
seen from the perspective that Bushy suggests, in which her passion is clearly motivated by “what 
is not,” that is, the King's absence.  
After the conceit has reached its full elaboration, Bushy turns the sentence back into the 
particular circumstances of the Queen’s sorrow. Here we find another curiosity. The “substance” 
of grief is, in this case, absence. Bushy wishes to see this as the real absence of the King’s person. 
To look directly at an absence is to see nothing, or perhaps only the traces of a former presence, 
the “shadows of what is not.” To look “awry” upon the departure is to allow one’s eyes to travel 
in the projected direction of the departed. Curiously, it is precisely this performance of attachment 
which would cause the Queen to think her woe has an object other than the King, since this 
produces the anamorphic illusion. Bushy is thus quite artfully able to maintain a complex set of 
commitments: he must, by the bidding of the king, ensure the Queen is not sad; at the same time, 
he must confirm the propriety of her sorrow when he addresses the claim that her sadness does not 
refer to the king, which is its only proper object. So he must find a way to show the Queen that her 
sadness is unreasonable and also should be put aside.  
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The Queen's response is an articulation of another image of absence with which she 
identifies her passion. Her sorrow is not caused by the absence of a king, but is established through 
an imagination of “what is not.” Isabel concedes the plausibility of Bushy's account, but maintains 
her claim: “my inward soul/Persuades me it is otherwise.”431 Whatever the cause, she cannot end 
her sadness, since “thinking on no thought I think” she “with heavy nothing faint[s] and 
shrink[s].”432 Here she turns Bushy's dismissal of her sorrow as “nothing,” showing that thinking 
on “nothing” has effects; she is deprived of something vital, becomes fearful, and “heavy,” 
beginning a play on the idiom of pregnancy she will play on through the rest of her speech. This 
is, of course, a speech written by a man and used to suit the problems of the play: Richard is 
heirless. However, it also points up a certain kind of melancholic knowledge. Just as in pregnancy 
before the modern era, one knows one is “heavy” without knowing anything about the child-to-be. 
Bushy, almost comically given the overtly conceit-laden style of his own speech, calls this 
“nothing but conceit.”433  
This prompts the Queen to state her own case:   
 
'Tis nothing less: conceit is still derived 
From some forefather grief; mine is not so, 
For nothing had begot my something grief; 
Or something hath the nothing that I grieve: 
'Tis in reversion that I do possess; 
But what it is, that is not yet known; what 
I cannot name; 'tis nameless woe, I wot.434  
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This sentence, a heaping up of anacolutha, develops an opposition borrowed from Bushy, 
but stripped of its courtly images. Shadow becomes simply nothing, and substance becomes 
something. The movement between this pair rests upon an implicit image of pregnancy, already 
introduced in her prior speeches. This image imbues each clause with a double meaning which is 
never fully unfolded.  First, we must hear “conceit” both in its sense of a rhetorical device and as 
sexual conception, a sense still present to the early modern ear. We can understand the Queen’s 
response (‘Tis nothing less) in light of this double entendre: to admit that it is conceit is not to say 
that it is nothing but that it is the beginning of something. It is not less than what might be born. 
The next use of it foregrounds the rhetorical sense: “conceit is still derived from some forefather 
grief.” We should hear the possibility of a hyphen between “still” and “derived”: that is, the 
poetical conceit is stillborn, the abortion of a sad occasion that is its father. Her own grief is 
unique—it is parthenogenic. Here we can hear a faint allusion to Luke 2:35, Nicodemus’ prophecy 
to the Virgin Mary: “Yea, a sword shall pierce this soul also, that the thoughts of many hearts may 
be revealed.” This is a figuration of a mystical sympathetic union between the King and Queen of 
England, as between Christ and Mary, the Queen of Heaven. She plays upon the image of virginal 
pregnancy further: “nothing had begot my something grief.” The next clause completes a chiasmus 
but shifts the image. Now, the something—her conception—holds the nothingness she feels. To 
“possess in reversion” means to be written into a will. The property reverts to the willed party upon 
the death of the holder. Recalling again Nicodemus’ prophecy, the sadness will become the 
possession of the virgin mother upon the death of her child. What she carries is yet unknown, and 
precisely because of this, cannot be named: like children, grief can only be named upon its birth. 
Yet this very namelessness is proper to the feeling, and so becomes its name: “’tis nameless woe, 
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I wot.” The Queen's elaborate metaphorizing of her passion is at once a rejection of Bushy's 
understanding of the civil situation and a far more astute rendering of it. Her woe is “nameless” in 
that it cannot be born: what is crucial to the situation is not what is happening, but what has failed 
to happen.  
The Queen's sorrow inverts the Ciceronian understanding of sorrow as an opinion of a 
“present evil.” Her sorrow, as she articulates it, is rather like an absent good. Bushy's civil 
hermeneutic attempts to render absence as a motive of passion that is no different from the discrete 
objects of conventional fear and desire. This has the comforting corollary that it may be corrected 
in time, as the absence of the king is removed once he is made present again. But the Queen's 
“nameless woe” arises from absence itself. Its image is the imaginative support for a passion that 
has no corresponding object in the situation. Yet the concealed presence of an unborn child is also 
marked by the quickening of something—or here, nothing—to come. The Queen eloquently 
speaks to her strange feeling of a premonition that includes a feeling for the future without 
imagining any specific outcome. Whereas the civil hermeneutic prides itself on its ability to 
calculate possible futures from present indications, the Queen’s melancholy hermeneutic defends 
feeling as a sign that exceeds and is not bound by knowledge of the present.  
Where the mournful melancholy of the Queen requires her to invent an image to justify it 
against the civil hermeneutic, the melancholy lover's imagination invents a beloved to support his 
passion. Here, however, the beloved is not simply a metaphor, for Romeo’s two loves, Rosalind 
and Juliet, are both real. But Romeo’s love-melancholic rhetoric shows that the imaginative object 
of his love adventitiously makes use of the qualities of these two girls for the support of his all-
consuming passion. Though Rosalind never appears on stage, her presence in the play is decisive 
for orienting us to the melancholy nature of Romeo’s love. His profound, mad, and unrequited 
 242 
love for her is quickly followed by his brusque dismissal of his previous devotion upon meeting 
Juliet. Romeo is in love less with Juliet than the passion of love itself.  
In the opening act of Romeo and Juliet, Romeo’s cousin, Benvolio, discusses Romeo’s 
strange behavior with his mother. Romeo has been found weeping in the morning, and “[a]dding 
to clouds more clouds with his deep sighs.”435 As the sun rises he “in his chamber pens 
himself,/Shuts up his windows, locks far daylight out/And makes himself an artificial night.” Lady 
Montague fears for her son, “Black and portentous must this humour prove,/Unless good counsel 
may the cause remove.”436 The plan, then, is to discover the cause of Romeo’s melancholy and to 
seek to remove it. Soon enough it is found that Romeo is in love with one Rosalind who does not 
return his affection.  
Romeo’s cousins have misapprehended the cause of Romeo’s melancholy by presuming 
he suffers from love of Rosalind. This leads to their plan to take him to a party, no less one thrown 
by their enemies, the Capulets, hoping that meeting other girls will dispel his gloominess. Rather, 
Romeo is moved by the imagination of love, one that may move from one individual to another. 
Though at the start of the play he loves Rosalind beyond all, he tells us after meeting Juliet that he 
has “forgot that name, and that name's woe.”437  Indeed, he is a typical, almost parodic vision of 
the youthful melancholy lover. Mercutio mocks him for this: “Romeo! humours! madman! 
passion! lover!/Appear thou in the likeness of a sigh.”438 His love is bound up in metaphor: “Now 
will he sit under a medlar tree,/And wish his mistress were that kind of fruit/As maids call medlars, 
                                                 
435 Romeo and Juliet, 1.1.123. 
436 Ibid., 1.1.130-132. 
437 Ibid., 2.3.36. 
438 Ibid., 2.1.7. 
 243 
when they laugh alone.”439 Though Romeo overhears this, he goes on to soliloquize in just this 
manner: “O, that I were a glove upon that hand,/That I might touch that cheek!”440 When Romeo 
walks “underneath the grove of sycamore/That westward rooteth from this city side,” Klaus 
Bartenschlager has argued we must hear the “sycamore” as a pun on “sick amour.”441 
The misapprehension of imagination’s power is the tragic significance in Mercutio’s Queen 
Mab speech. Romeo and Mercutio argue over the truth of dreams. The fairy Queen Mab “gallops 
night by night/Through lovers' brains” so that they “dream of love,” on “courtiers’ knees” who 
dream of “curtsies straight,” the fingers of lawyers who “dream on fees” over “ladies’ lips” who 
“on kisses dream,” and so on.442 Queen Mab, then, is precisely the conjunction of spirits that move 
an organ and the image-object they are moved towards. She is motive in an allegorical form. 
Mercutio’s position is that the fantasies of dreams are false insofar as they are non-existent, 
reflecting the desires of the dreamers. But it is precisely the devaluation of these desires that leads 
him to miscalculate. When Romeo begs him to end his litany because he “talks of nothing,” he 
retorts that he does, because he talks of “dreams…nothing but vain fantasy.”443 Romeo is a 
melancholic lover, whose object revolves around the particular beauty and virtues of the beloved. 
In the treatises on the passions, motion was always imagined as locomotion. Yet, as the 
melancholic's imaginative object was not deictic, it could not project its motive into the locomotion 
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that would follow in the simple case of the concupiscible animal passions. Instead, the motion of 
the spirits provoked by the passionate response to the imagination itself serves as the motive. 
Juliet, by contrast, is also in love, but preserves the sense of civil appearance as distinct 
from passion. Juliet remains torn between love and reason: She tells Romeo that though “joy[s]” 
in him, she has “no joy of this contract to-night.”444 The formation of the compact has come 
directly on the heels of their meeting, and so “is too rash, too unadvised, too sudden;/Too like the 
lightning, which doth cease to be/Ere one can say 'It lightens.'“445 Juliet maintains the awareness 
that Romeo’s passion may simply be hot-bloodedness; time must test whether it perdures. She tells 
him that if his “bent of love be honourable,” he should send her word tomorrow. It is not entirely 
surprising that it is Romeo rather than Juliet that is marked this way. In fact, we see that Juliet is 
quite right to question the ardor of Romeo’s passion, as his attachment to her immediately ends 
his devotion to Rosalind.  
The melancholy of the Queen is dominated by sorrow, and Romeo's by love. In this is 
recognizable still the less complex shading of the humor character or even the allegorical motive-
figures of the earlier theatrical era.  But Shakespeare's most complex melancholics, Hamlet and 
Antonio, we find that their passions are complexly mixed. To grasp this complexity requires a 
deeper reading of Antonio's melancholy as functioning as a motive within the play. The opening 
lines of The Merchant of Venice set forth Antonio as a melancholic whose sadness is “without 
apparent occasion.” He confides to his companions that he is confused about the cause of his 
sorrow:  
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In sooth, I know not why I am so sad: 
It wearies me; you say it wearies you; 
But how I caught it, found it, or came by it, 
What stuff 'tis made of, whereof it is born, 
I am to learn; 
And such a want-wit sadness makes of me, 
That I have much ado to know myself.446 
 
His companions, the similarly-named Salarino and Salanio, puns on the Italian salario or 
wages, offer competing hypotheses on the cause of Antonio’s sadness. They first suggest that his 
occupation as a merchant is the source of his sadness. His mind is “tossing on the ocean” with his 
investment abroad. The fear of shipwreck or other misfortune could “out of doubt” make one 
sad.447 Salarino suggests that Antonio is dogged by all the similitudes of this possibility, as when 
one blows upon one’s soup to cool it makes one think of “[w]hat harm a wind too great at sea 
might do,” or in going to church and looking upon its stony façade one might “bethink…straight 
of dangerous rocks” that would “touching but my gentle vessel's side,/....scatter all her spices on 
the stream.”448 In every case, Antonio’s sadness ultimately turns upon “his merchandise.” Antonio 
rebuffs these suggestions, saying that his “ventures are not in one bottom trusted,/Nor to one 
place.” He has limited his risk through diversification, and he has not risked his “whole 
estate/Upon the fortune of this present year.”449 He is clearly a prudent merchant.  
Salarino then moves on to another possibility: Antonio must be in love. This suggestion is 
immediately, and perhaps angrily, dismissed by Antonio. Salarino then jests, if in some frustration, 
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that Antonio is sad because he is “not merry.”450 There is to be no cause other than Nature having 
“framed strange fellows” who either “laugh like parrots at a bag-piper” or have “such a vinegar 
aspect/That they’ll not show their teeth in way of a smile,/Though Nestor swear the jest be 
laughable.”451 That is, there is no other cause but a melancholy temperament. Antonio is sad...just 
because. Salarino’s solution is clearly inadequate. The humor in the theater is, as we have seen in 
the treatises, only a partial motive, giving a tendency and manner to a character’s actions. 
Scholarship has been keenly pointed on the most evident instances of “humors” in the theater, 
given an undue emphasis to the Jonsonian theory, in which humor “may by metaphor, apply 
itself/Unto the general disposition:/As when some one particular quality/Doth so possess a man, 
that it doth draw/All his affects, his spirits, and his powers, /In their confluctions, all to run one 
way,/This may truly be said to be a humour.”452 The Jonsonian humors comedy is closely tied to 
the tradition of commedia dell’arte, where the zanni of traveling troupes played in the masks of 
stock characters. However, it is within the works of Shakespeare that imagination becomes a 
central feature of character motives. After Salarino and Salanio have offered the most conventional 
of imaginative motives for sadness—money worries or love troubles—they have exhausted their 
possibilities. Salanio’s reliance upon humoral theory is here not insight but its dearth.   
We hear of the two guesses of Antonio's melancholy, his “merchandise” and love, both of 
which he rejects.  Commentators have missed the important pivot in the very next exchange of 
dialogue. Bassanio tells us that he owes the most to Antonio “in money and in love.” Gratiano had 
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guessed wrongly at the cause of Antonio's melancholy because he said or rather than and. It is not 
the desire of money or love, but the fact that he is owed both. This is an insoluble debt—one cannot 
lend money out of love. This, of course, is precisely why Antonio hates Shylock, who lends at a 
rate. For the same reason, Shylock hates him, for he lends “out money gratis and brings down/The 
rate of usance here with us in Venice.”453 But Antonio also violates the civil form of hate, for 
“[e]ven there where merchants do most congregate” he “rails” against the “sacred nation.” The 
two things “owed” to Antonio are at odds with one another. Bassanio claims that it is from 
Antonio's love that he has “a warranty/To unburden all my plots and purposes/How to get clear of 
all the debts I owe.”454 Antonio tells Bassanio that this explanation is unnecessary; he only 
“spend[s] but time/To wind about my love with circumstance.”455 Here we should recall that 
circumstance is a topical argument, a situating of an argument within the conditions of specific 
persons, place, and time. Antonio's “unconditional” love is a love that ignores, and is even 
offended, by any motive that would require these particularities. It does “more wrong” than if 
Bassanio had “made waste of all” Antonio's wealth. 
The imaginative problem in Antonio’s motive is the confusion that leads him to see a loan 
as an act of love. The question of Antonio’s love for Bassanio need not decide whether it was 
paternal, friendly, or erotic. Instead, what is crucial is to understand its place within a logic of 
exchange. From the emerging economic rationality, Antonio’s interest-free loans are non-sensical. 
Antonio misunderstands the nature of exchange, assuming a position in which he remains a non-
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party. “I neither lend nor borrow/By taking nor by giving of excess,” he says, but we see him doing 
this precisely at the moment of asking Shylock for a loan—for he is giving here far in excess of 
what he has.456 It is only the motives of others, in his mind, that he serves, or as he says, he borrows 
“to supply the ripe wants” of Bassanio. As Salanio says elsewhere, “he only loves the world for 
him.”457 (Bassanio himself says: “I have engaged myself to a dear friend,/Engaged my friend to 
his mere enemy,/To feed my means.”458) At the same time, he does not free himself from economic 
rationality. Antonio does freely give his money to his friend, but nevertheless it is not a free gift. 
It is understood that the money is to eventually be repaid. What is to be returned is the identical 
amount. Yet, he is beholden to Shylock for either the amount or a pound of flesh. Flesh is the 
“currency” of exchange in the erotic relationship, but here it emerges within the economic, 
subjected to its absurd logic of precise exchange, a logic that will ultimately undermine the 
contract.  
Antonio's motive is precisely this uncertainty of meaning: he wishes to maintain the 
metaphoric similarity between debt and erotic commitment as if it were really identical. This 
entails a radical generosity towards the beloved. For this, Antonio, moved by a passion 
ambiguously erotic or friendly, gives away the very means for his ability to act. Antonio tells 
Bassanio that “My purse, my person, my extremest means,/Lie all unlock'd to your occasions.”459 
There is a danger here for modern readings of taking passion as passivity. Daniel, despite having 
reproached other critics for reading out an answer to Antonio's motives, goes on to diagnose him 
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as a masochist. Yet something useful can come from taking Antonio’s plight as if it were told to 
us on the couch rather than from the stage. If we are to turn to Freud, we should not read Mourning 
and Melancholia once again, but rather a passage from his too-neglected work, “Inhibitions, 
Symptoms, and Anxiety,” where he describes the mechanism behind general inhibitions of the 
ego: “When the ego is involved in a particularly difficult psychical task, as occurs in mourning, or 
when there is some tremendous suppression of affect or when a continual flood of sexual 
phantasies has to be kept down, it loses so much of the energy at its disposal that it has to cut down 
the expenditure of it at many points at once.”460 Antonio at once suppresses and expresses his 
erotic passion by converting it into the metaphor of “means”—deferring sexual ends to Bassanio’s 
own erotic adventure to woo Portia. Freud’s metaphor is all too apt. In such a case, the ego is 
placed in “the position of a speculator whose money has become tied up in his various enterprises.” 
Such a “general inhibition” of action “characterizes states of depression, including the gravest form 
of them, melancholia.”461 In this sense, Antonio is both an early modern and a modern 
melancholic, for, as Shylock puts it, “his means are in supposition.”462 Just as Antonio's economic 
means are invested abroad, so too his passionate “means” of motive are invested in an absent 
object, one that neither he nor anyone else can articulate.  
Shylock is the motive foil to Antonio: where Antonio puts his “means in supposition,” 
Shylock makes means—in his case, money—his only image of an end. This has bizarre effects 
upon his imagined desires. Salanio and Salarino appear again in a parallel scene to question 
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Shylock about his motive in enforcing the Antonio’s payment in flesh. He is overcome by “a 
passion so confused,/So strange, outrageous, and so variable.”463 They show their immunity to 
metaphoric meaning when Shylock, mourning his daughter Jessica’s elopement with a Christian—
and many of his ducats—laments “My own flesh and blood to rebel!” Salanio replies, “Out upon 
it old carrion! Rebels it at these years?”464 He takes Shylock’s meaning of “flesh” rebelling in a 
literal sense; meaning that he feels lust. Shylock must gloss his metaphor: “my daughter is my 
flesh and blood.”465 Since he cannot have his daughter back, Shylock will at least take back his 
metaphorical due. Antonio’s flesh is also his flesh—in that he has contracted for it. At the same 
time, Shylock’s passion is “confused” because it refuses to recognize its own erotic element: his 
mourning for his late wife, Leah, and her memory. His two reminders of her—Jessica and his 
wife’s turquoise ring—have both been taken by a Christian man.  
When it comes time to exact his payment from Antonio, the Duke of Venice tells Shylock 
that he expects that his pressing of the payment of his bond in flesh is a “fashion of…malice,” that 
is, a show that he is playing until the final moment, when he will “show thy mercy and remorse 
more strange” than his “strange apparent cruelty.”466 Shylock persists. His motive is real, even if 
he cannot account for its reason: “You'll ask me, why I rather choose to have/A weight of carrion 
flesh than to receive/Three thousand ducats: I'll not answer that:/But, say, it is my humour: is it 
answer'd?”467 We might reply, no. The humor is not the answer. But in this case, we see that the 
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resort to humor is not an inability to account for his reason but a refusal to disclose it. We have 
already seen his reasons for hating Antonio—he has insulted Shylock and the other Jews of Venice 
publicly and regularly and his lending of money gratis has brought down the rate or usury. 
(Antonio is “wont to lend money for a Christian courtesy.” And “I hate him for he is a 
Christian,/But more for that in low simplicity/He lends.”468) We also know that he has been 
incensed by the loss of his daughter and part of his fortune. Indeed, in the scene where he calls her 
his own “flesh” we can now see that Shylock, too, has a metaphor as his motive: he wants 
Antonio’s flesh as a replacement for his loss of Jessica, his “flesh.” In this way, Shylock is the foil 
to Antonio in his subjugations of ends to means, as when we hear him say after his final judgment: 
“you take my life/When you do take the means whereby I live.”469 Whereas Antonio has confused 
the ends with his means, Shylock has substituted means for end. Whatever his passion is, he 
imagines its satisfaction as some form of payment. This means his motive-imagination takes on 
grotesque forms where the logic of payment is mixed with the cause of his passion; his grief at his 
daughter’s rebellion will be satisfied when she is returned to “dead at my foot, and the jewels in 
her ears.” The metaphor also emerges when his desire for revenge against Antonio is made out in 
the terms of a payment of a “pound of flesh.”   
When the courtroom scene begins, Antonio calls himself “a tainted wether of the flock,” 
recalling the Biblical mandate Shylock uses to authorize their deal. In a dispute between Laban 
and Jacob about the division of the forthcoming litter of lambs, they come to an agreement that the 
“eanlings,” or kids, “which were streak'd and pied” would all be of Jacob's. Jacob then takes “rods 
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of green poplar, and of hazel, and of the chestnut tree, and pilled white strakes in them, and made 
the white appear in the rods.” Because the sheep were “in heat before the rods,” they “brought 
forth young of parti-color, and with small and great spots.”470  
Antonio imagines that, like the sheep of the Biblical fable, he has been impressed with the 
mark of his own melancholic conceit.  It was believed in both the ancient and the early modern 
world that a pregnant woman might affect the appearance of her child based upon what she saw. 
This theory, known as maternal impression, was extended in Renaissance medicine of what was 
imagined, as we find in Burton. Pregnant women may produce  “moles, warts, scars, harelips, 
monsters,” caused by the “force of a depraved phantasy in them: Ipsam speciem quam animo 
effigiat, faetui inducit: She imprints that stamp upon her child which she conceives unto herself.”471 
Antonio's allusion here adds layers of complexity. A “wether” was a castrated ram; Antonio marks 
himself as one that cannot pursue love himself. Those who have interpreted this passage 
overliterally—arguing that Antonio fears the pound of flesh taken from him will itself be 
castration, a kind of anti-Semitic play upon circumcision—mistake here. Shylock is explicit about 
removing the pound of flesh from Antonio's chest: that is, his heart. The “tainted” quality is both 
an allusion to the spotted streaks of the newborn lambs and to the form in which it was generated: 
through the imagination. When the imagination is “very apprehensive, intent, and violent, it sends 
great store of spirits to, or from the heart, and makes a deeper impression, and greater tumult, as 
the humours in the Body be likewise prepared, and the temperature itselfe ill or well disposed, the 
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passions are longer and stronger.”472 Shylock's removal of Antonio's heart is the literal realization 
of the metaphoric motives of both men.  
By the play's conclusion, the two motive logics of economic and affectionate value are 
brought to a head. Portia gives Bassanio a token or her love with a ring before he returns to Venice 
to prevent Antonio’s death at the hands of Shylock. She gives him the ring, warning him that it 
will “presage the ruin of…love” if he gives it away. Bassanio replies “when this ring/Parts from 
this finger, then parts life from hence:/O, then be bold to say Bassanio's dead!”473 The ring is 
ambiguous in its value, as it is both a piece of material wealth and a symbol of the bond of love. 
This comes into play when, Portia, in disguise, resolves Antonio's problem by enforcing a literalist 
interpretation of the law; Shylock must take only a pound of flesh, no more and no less, or else 
forfeit his life. The impossibility of this forfends Antonio's doom. After this, she and Nerissa, her 
maidservant, decide to test their husbands, Bassanio and Gratiano respectively, by demanding in 
payment the rings they gave them as sworn tokens of ever-abiding affection. Antonio has said, 
after being saved, that both he and his friend “stand indebted, over and above,/In love and 
service…evermore,” to the judge.474 Being pressed to accept some reward, the disguised Portia 
asks for gloves from Antonio and Bassanio’s ring, which she asks to have “for his love.” After he 
explains that this was a gift from his wife, Portia retorts that “if your wife be not a mad-
woman,/And know how well I have deserved the ring,/She would not hold out enemy for ever,/For 
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giving it to me.”475 Antonio urges Bassanio to let the judge’s “deservings” and his own “love” to 
be “valued against” his wife’s commandment.  
Though sometimes accounted as the third of a triple plot, we should instead read the ring 
scene as the resolution of the motive confusion between gifts of love and of payments initiated by 
Antonio at the play’s beginning. The men rejoin Portia and Nerissa. No longer in disguise, the 
women demand explanations for why they are not wearing their rings. After hearing their 
explanations, Portia claims that she too will be as “liberal” as Bassanio with the doctor of the law, 
not denying him either “body nor...husband's bed.”476 Antonio inserts himself here, saying he is 
the “unhappy subject of these quarrels.”477 This is just: it is Antonio's position as both bond and 
bondsman that has led to the disruption of this other exchange of ring as res and res significans. 
The resolution is in the false nature of the exchange: Portia and her servant Nerissa were only in 
disguise: the rings were not given away, but given back. Although Bassanio's motive has been 
tested, the exchange has not occurred. Portia and Nerissa, to the astonishment of their husbands, 
give them back their rings. The women's ability to inhabit both the civil and private roles allows 
for the end of the cycle that began with Antonio's liberality.  
Yet the comic ending and the revelation of the disguises does not unravel the sadness of 
Antonio nor the grief of Shylock. Although Antonio's argosies return, making him a wealthy man, 
and Shylock, however diminished, remains alive, their passions remain a problem as we leave the 
theater. The civil logic of the gift is able to be resolved, but the emerging logic of the loan has no 
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termination. Indeed, it is precisely the ambiguous status of lending that upsets the civil passions. 
In Wright's treatise, he names gift-giving as a motive to love, but then pursues this through fourteen 
“circumstances.” Two are especially interesting for reading The Merchant of Venice: if the gift 
were “given by our Enemies” or if “the Person by giving was endangered or endamaged.”478 In 
the case of a gift given by an enemy, “the value of the gift...most effectually mooveth to love: for, 
bestowing benefits upon our enemies, we heape burning coales upon their heads, able to consume 
and drie to dust all the malignitie of malicious enmitie...for as benefits at enemies hands were not 
deserved, so being bestowed they deserve to be loved.”479 Love here is the payment one expects 
to receive from an enemy. Wright's image is telling: the gift is a kind of punishment able to be 
described as a “remedy”—the “hot coal” of a gift forces the enemy into a situation in which he 
cannot maintain civil hatred, even if his personal enmity remains. In the other case, where the 
“Giver, to doe us good, depriveth, not onely himselfe of the gift hee giveth, but thereby he incurreth 
some great peril, danger, or evill.”480 He compares this to the Biblical account of Ahimelech, who 
has put to death for showing hospitality to David while he was fleeing King Saul. The valuation 
of the gift is increased by whatever degree of “greater perill, or grievouser evill” its giving incurs. 
It is precisely these excess valuations that emerge from the civil logic of the gift disrupt exchange. 
It is Antonio's “surplus” value of his risking his life that ends up becoming a demand for Bassanio 
to give away his ring; how could one refuse any price for the salvation of someone's life when that 
life has been “lent” precisely to win you the ring? At the same time, the whole enterprise becomes 
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ridiculous; Antonio's risk was taken precisely to help Bassanio win his love, and now it is 
jeopardized by giving back the ring. In the same way, when Antonio tells Shylock not to lend him 
money as a friend, but rather to “lend it rather to thine enemy,/Who, if he break,...mayst with better 
face/Exact the penalty,” allows the “burning coals” to be returned and heaped upon his own 
head.481  
5.4 The Baroque Theater as Collective Imagination 
When we come in Hamlet to the play-within-the-play, Hamlet takes on the role of 
interpreter, whispering to Ophelia the meanings of the action of the puppet's “dumb shows,” before 
the main action begins. “You are as good as a chorus,” she tells him. “I could interpret between 
you and your love, if I/could see the puppets dallying,” he replies.482 To “interpret” was a term of 
art for the ventriloquism of the time, that is, the dialogue given to puppets by their master. The 
bawdiness of this line has long been noted, but its significance in Hamlet's vision of theater has 
not. If we accept that Ophelia's love is Hamlet, as all the previous exchanges between Ophelia and 
Hamlet have shown, the scene that Hamlet wishes to see is the very one he is engaged in: if only 
he could stand outside of it and watch himself and Ophelia as puppets.  
Here we see the divergence of the Baroque tragedy from the classical; around the figure of 
the melancholic, the Baroque theater introduced a new form of theatrical irony. The irony is no 
longer between the knowledge of the characters and that of the audience, but instead the various 
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meanings that can be “interpreted” into the theatrical scene only by the audience, taking the scene 
as an image, appearance, a dream. When one is involved in an action, motives cannot be interpreted 
as they can in the theater, for only in the theater is one able to receive an action as an image. Insofar 
as the audience is able to recognize the mutually divergent possible interpretations of a scene, they 
are participating in the topical perception that the figure of the melancholic represents.  
The reception of Hamlet has been of a piece with reflection on the nature of theater itself. 
My own reception has been no different in this. I have organized my understanding of the Baroque 
theater around the figure of the melancholic. In this, I offer a view that departs from significantly 
from some of its most influential receptions. Here I take up two, both of which treat the figure of 
Hamlet as an “enigma” that cannot be resolved within the play itself. The first is T.S. Eliot; the 
second Carl Schmitt.   
 In his famous essay, “Hamlet and His Problems,” Eliot’s characterizes Hamlet’s 
“problem”: he is “dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in excess of the 
facts as they appear.”483  Eliot thought this was an “artistic failure” on the part of Shakespeare. 
Hamlet’s passion he could not “drag to light, contemplate, or manipulate into art.”484  I strongly 
disagree: Shakespeare renders in Hamlet the quintessential melancholic, someone whose private 
drama does not match the scenes of social life. His passions are “without apparent occasion.” That 
the passion is in excess of the facts is not because, as Eliot claims, Shakespeare failed to grasp the 
need for an “objective correlative”; rather, the drama of melancholy is precisely that it poses a 
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problem concerning the motives of passions. In this, it is homologous to the problem, described in 
the first chapter, that we find in Burton's catalogue of medical causes. Hamlet's melancholy has so 
many possible causes so as to return us to Burton's catalogue: his love-sickness for Ophelia, his 
betrayal by former friends (“loss of friends”), his grief, religious melancholy, his education, 
excessive reading, ambition, anger, even the devil himself. Yet the drama of Hamlet's melancholy 
is not simply the list of possible causes, but the attempt to discover these by other actors. As I have 
sketched above, melancholy is essential to Hamlet's own problem of “being moved” within the 
situation, but, in a double movement, it also serves as the motivations of those others—Gertrude, 
Claudius, Polonius, Ophelia, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern—who variously try to determine the 
true cause of his melancholy and madness.  
 For Eliot, the “only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an ‘objective 
correlative.’”485 Eliot imagines this as “a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall 
be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate 
in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.”486 But the “immediacy” of 
feeling limits the capacity of response only to the absolutely conventional. Eliot admits so much 
by calling this a “formula.” The artistic “inevitability” of a tragic work arises from the “complete 
adequacy of the external to the emotion.” Eliot recognizes that “the intense feeling, ecstatic or 
terrible, without an object or exceeding its object, is something which every person of sensibility 
has known; it is doubtless a study to pathologists.”487 This is a feeling that is typical of the 
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adolescent, while “the ordinary person puts these feelings to sleep, or trims down his feeling to fit 
the business world.” But as I have argued in this chapter, it is precisely in this that the conflict 
between the civil imagination, ready for the “business” of civil action, opposes the melancholic 
passion that cannot be incorporated within its imaginative perception of action.  
Carl Schmitt, the erstwhile-Nazi jurist and political theorist, like Eliot, believed that the 
“incredible profusion of interpretations of Hamlet” could not be “solved by means of the contents 
of the play, nor by tracing the threads of an isolated process.”488 However, Schmitt did not think 
this was because the play was dramatically flawed but because it had to be explained through the 
common historical understanding of its audience. He interpreted the play as if it were a roman à 
clef of the political events of 1566 in which Gertrude was Mary Queen of Scots, and King Hamlet, 
her murdered husband, Henry Lord Darnley, and Claudius, the assassin and later husband of Mary, 
the Earl of Bothwell.489 But it is not only the many historical allusions in the play, nor the “true 
mirror reflections” of historical events like the abovementioned. There is a third thing, which 
Schmitt calls the “irruption” of history into the play. The first example of this is the argument that 
despite the play avoiding the topic, Schmitt argues that Gertrude must be seen as guilty in light of 
Mary Queen of Scots' guilt.490 Secondly, the fact that Hamlet refuses to play the role of avenger 
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reflects the fact that Mary's son, James Stuart, the future King of England and Scotland, failed to 
avenge his father. Schmitt supports this with the evidence that Hamlet's indecision is caused by 
“the paralysing question whether his father's ghost was a devil from hell or not.”491 This is an 
“irruption” of time into the play, because James wrote “a demonology in which he posed the 
question of apparitions in the same manner as Shakespeare in Hamlet.”492 (The explanation is 
hardly explanatory, since James' Daemonologie is quite forthright and not at all doubtful about the 
existence of demons.) The eruptions of time have a formative effect on Hamlet in two ways—“the 
taboo which occults the Queen's guilt, and the deflection of the avenger as type.”493 The audience, 
in recognizing these two as related to their shared historical reality, experienced the tragic that no 
play can adequately represent.  
Schmitt recognized the theater as a “public space,” but argued that this publicity is a strong 
limit on dramatic license, as “the audience no longer follows what is going on on the stage 
whenever the action departs too much from what the public knows and expects, and so becomes 
incomprehensible or absurd.”494 In a much more sophisticated form, András Kiséry's argues in 
Hamlet's Moment that beginning “around 1600, drama as a form of popular entertainment and as 
the most influential secular public medium was instrumental in familiarizing its audience with 
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politics as a profession.”495 In reflecting on the reception of Hamlet, Kiséry notes that much of the 
interpretation of the play “has concentrated on ‘that within which passes show’ and how this relates 
to ‘actions that a man might play’—preparing us to reading it as a play about the tortured, 
inscrutable yet insistently scrutinized psyche, conscience, and intentions of Hamlet and of 
Claudius, about the secret of old Hamlet’s murder, about a world of spying and hiding behind the 
arras—about the consequences of things that are out of sight, about the threats they pose and how 
they might come to light.” In this he identifies the primary function of the theater's training of 
audience with a curiosity about the political. The play's constant concern with “foreign politics, 
diplomacy, correspondence, and travel” are all attempts to “control, represent, and negotiate that 
without which passes show, another privileged space which threatens to define or dramatically 
alter the situation that is in plain view.” Interiority and the foreign lands discussed in ambassadorial 
conversations and letters are “analogous spaces...spaces of potentiality where life’s future course 
is determined and prepared.”496 In one respect, Kiséry's argument and the massive erudition he 
summons to support it must be correct: the theater undoubtedly did train audiences not only in a 
kind of political speech but in a form of political interpretation of action. However, through the 
figure of the melancholic, it at the same time showed the shortcomings of this view and what it 
was unable to assimilate to its hermeneutic. The imagination of the melancholic, whether or not 
we wish to describe it as “interior” is precisely a space in which a future course is not determined, 
but remains overdetermined in a topical sweat of possibilities.  
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Schmitt's argument turns upon a clear demarcation between action and acting, premised 
upon his reading of the scene from Hamlet that opens this chapter, his reflection upon the player 
weeping for Hecuba. In The Future of an Illusion, Victoria Kahn takes up Schmitt's interpretation 
of theatricality and its relation to the political through a critical reading of Hamlet or Hecuba. She 
notes that “what’s strange about Schmitt’s reading of Hamlet and Hecuba— and the distinction 
between politics and aesthetics on which it rests—is that it is undermined by the very speech from 
Hamlet to which Schmitt alludes in the title of his book.”497 Kahn mentions several times that 
Schmitt replies on the 1603 quarto, known to Shakespeare scholars as the “bad quarto,” as opposed 
to the more reliable editions of the second quarto and first folio. This has special relevance for us: 
the epigraph to Schmitt's book, drawn from this quarto, is precisely the line which includes 
Hamlet's question about the “motive and cue for passion” of the actor. In the 1603 quarto, this is 
flattened: “Why these Players here draw water from eyes:/For Hecuba, why what is Hecuba to 
him, or he to Hecuba?/What would he do an[d] if he had my losse?/His father murdered, and a 
Crowne bereft him.”498 In the “bad” quarto, the question of “motive” is flattened precisely into the 
conventional idiom of the civil imagination. Hamlet has lost his claim to power and a father. Such 
a loss calls, clearly, for revenge. Hamlet “imagines the player king with his own “'motive' and 'cue 
for passion'—rather than a simple cue for action, as Schmitt reads the scene.”499 Schmitt argues 
that “It is inconceivable that Shakespeare intended no more than to make his Hamlet into a Hecuba, 
that we are meant to weep for Hamlet as the actor wept for the Trojan queen.”  If we were to weep 
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with the player “it would prove that at the theatre we have other gods than in the marketplace or 
in church.”500 One might also say, at the gallows or on the pulpit.  
Yet this ignores that Hamlet's response of self-reproach does not lead him to decisive 
action, but instead to put on a play. It is not the play itself that can give him “grounds more relative” 
but the passionate reaction of the audience, in this case Claudius, that will serve as proof of the 
meaning of the situation. The theater is a collective imagination whose meaning is the passions it 
engenders as responses to itself. The compositional function of the theatrical imagination was 
assigned to the playwright and actors. It is to this that Theseus alludes when he puts the poets 
among those of “strong imagination,” the one who write the “occasions” for the “airy nothings” 
that are the characters and situations. It is under this description that Puck's famous closing speech, 
from the same play, takes on significance. Speaking directly to the audience, he says, “If we 
shadows have offended,/Think but this, and all is mended,/That you have but slumber'd here/While 
these visions did appear.”501 The “shadows” were the actors themselves, composed by the poet, 
but dreamt by the audience.  
The melancholic character is decisive for the theater in his indecision. Hamlet speaks the 
maxim of the estimative imagination when he claims that, as mentioned above, “[n]othing's good 
or bad but thinking makes it so.”502 This is just after he has declared to an incredulous Guildenstern 
that Denmark is a “prison.” Rosencrantz and Guildenstern cannot scan this except in terms of 
conventional motives. Rosencrantz, now in the pattern familiar from the scenes described above, 
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where the companion explains the conventional cause of a melancholic passion: “Why then, your 
ambition makes it one; 'tis too/narrow for your mind.” Rosencrantz engages in the appropriate 
courtly rhetoric to the prince, indulging in a concealed form of flattery by construing his complaint 
as a sign of his virtue. The topic of invention deployed here is to look for a conventional motive 
that could explain the prince’s passion—ambition is a virtue that eulogizes the prince’s dark 
sentiment.  
In the exchange that follows, we see more clearly perhaps than in any other passage in 
Shakespeare the conflict between the melancholic and the civil imagination. Hamlet rejects the 
courtier’s explanation, for even if he were “bounded in a nut shell” he could consider himself “a 
king of infinite space, were it not that I/have bad dreams.”503 The “infinite space” is the mind, 
which is, according to a resemblance between the walnut and the brain, bounded in a “nutshell”—
that is, a skull. But this space is not free, as the melancholic imagination shows the dark, bitter 
sides of things. Guildenstern glibly rolls over this enigmatic sentence, saying that his “dreams 
indeed are ambition, for the very/substance of the ambitious is merely the shadow of a dream.”504 
The courtly rhetoric by which Guildenstern attempts to remake the situation into a conventional 
one—the discontent of an heir—is resisted by Hamlet, as a “dream itself is but a shadow.” For 
Hamlet, the imaginative quality of the passions alludes to a melancholic contemplation on the 
common transience of all things. The courtiers misconstrue this insistence on the unrealized nature 
of an ambitious desire. Acknowledging the imaginative nature of ambitious desire by calling it in 
a courtly inversion a “shadow of a dream,” Rosencrantz nevertheless preserves the character of 
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ambition as an orientation towards a potential object. The final exchange shows the impasse of the 
two attitudes towards motive:  
Rosencrantz: Truly, and I hold ambition of so airy and light a 
quality that it is but a shadow's shadow. 
 
Hamlet: Then are our beggars bodies, and our monarchs and 
outstretched heroes the beggars' shadows. Shall we 
to the court? for, by my fay, I cannot reason.505 
 
Hamlet's ironic conclusion, that he cannot “reason,” is instead his refusal to reason within 
the limits of the commonplace motives ascribed to reasoning about passion and action within the 
civil imagination. Hamlet has placed at the climax of this exchange of a rhetorical metaphor the 
supreme object of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s own ambitions: the monarchy is only the 
phantasm or “shadow” that moves so many “beggars”—the sycophantic courtiers—into a vain 
form of “reason.” What is at stake here is not only an interpretation of the scene’s situation but a 
fundamental attitude towards the reliability of all “situatedness.” Where the courtier approaches 
the situation as something requiring calculation, the melancholic disdains the conventionalism that 
gives the courtier his goal. 
In exchanges such as this one, the melancholic character trained the audience in seeing 
passion not only as the precondition for the locomotive action, but as a movement in itself, one 
that opposed the conventional estimations of good and bad. The struggle to define the meaning of 
an action is not able to be resolved by action itself, but only by a recognition of the role of 
imagination within action. But this is not a division between the interiority of the mind and the 
hard external realities of politics. Rather, the conflict arises between the civil imagination that does 
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not account for its interpretive hermeneutics but takes them for granted and the melancholic 
imagination that recognizes that the “external” reality needs the support of the imagination in order 
to take on meaning.  
The interpretive function of the imagination is seen in its full topical capacity only in the 
melancholic, not only in the constant allusion to seeing various forms in clouds, but in seeing in 
the nebulous actions of others something whose determination can always bring in another 
circumstance, another predicate. When Hamlet, prepared to kill Claudius, finds him at prayer, he 
envisions his own action differently having included this circumstance within it. To kill a praying 
sinner “is hire and salary, not revenge.”506 The meaning of an action is changed by the 
circumstance that would affect its passion: Hamlet would not perform revenge if he did not feel 
avenged. When the conventional ends of action are suspended, passion becomes purpose. And this 
is precisely to be an audience for the theater is to perform the melancholic act. One learns an 
imaginative habit there that makes all the world a stage. 
The depths of Shakespeare's melancholic characters emerge in part because they performed 
the position of the audience member but brought it into the action. Alone among the critics, Walter 
Benjamin recognized that the “secret of [Hamlet's] person is contained within the playful 
[spielerischen], but for that very reason firmly circumscribed, passage through all the stages 
[Stationen] in this complex of intentions [intentionalen Raums], just as the secret of his fate is 
contained in an action [Geschehen] which, according to this, his way of looking at things, is 
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perfectly homogenous.”507 The stations of Hamlet's passion are those motive-spaces in which he 
encounters the possible causes others wish to attribute to his passion. There, in almost every scene 
where we find him, he performs his character in such a way that it is not Hamlet who is indecisive, 
but everyone else: we cannot be sure even to this day what the cause of his passion is. This is not 
a flaw in the play or the cause of a historical taboo, but the very problem that the melancholic 
poses, brought to its complete representation in the Baroque theater.  
The contest between the civil and melancholic imaginations was not confined to the stage, 
however. England would erupt in civil war and the theaters would close. Rather than seeing this 
as a purtiancial ordinance against an institution deemed too sinful we should also understand it as 
a desire to suppress a rival to the imposition of a new civil order. Nowhere was the role of 
imagination in the construction of such an order expressed more clearly than in Thomas Hobbes’ 
civil philosophy. His Leviathan looked to create an order out of the diversity of citizen’s passions. 
For Hobbes knew that the objects of the passions were not uniform—only their motions were the 
same. Therefore, a collective civic image was needed to install into the common imagination in 
order to organize a commonwealth. It was this image, the image of the Leviathan, that he hoped 
would do this, supplanting forever the equivocal imagination of the theater and its indecisive 
melancholics. 
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6.0 Chapter 5: Tyrannophobia: The Baroque Image of the Tyrant 
Thus far, I have discussed melancholy primarily as a problem of discerning the causes of 
passions that were “without any apparant occasion.” I drew this phrase from Burton's definition of 
melancholy in his Anatomy. But it is now important to recall that this portion of the definition 
specified “fear and sadness” as the two “constant companions” of melancholy. While the sadness 
of the melancholic has implicitly served as the primary example of melancholic passion, I now 
turn to the passion of fear. The most influential and sustained thinking of the nature of fear, both 
in its typical manifestation and as something whose cause was unclear, is found in the political 
philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. In this chapter, I argue that in Hobbes' vision of the state it is the 
collective cause of passion but not itself subject to passions. The essential problem, then, was to 
motivate the citizenry through fear without having them act from fear against the state. I argue that 
Hobbes' approached this problem through the iconology of the tyrant, the Baroque image of a ruler 
both feared and fearful. The suppression of the image of the tyrant is necessary to inaugurate a 
new civil imagination that includes in its chains of reasoning about motives fear of state-sanctioned 
punishment without conceiving of the state as a personal agent that might devolve into tyranny. 
Unlike Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Hobbes took the melancholic imagination’s power seriously 
and considered it a threat.  
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6.1 The Dynamics of Fear in Hobbes 
Sensitive readers have often noted that beneath its geometry of obligation and authority, 
Hobbes' political philosophy is animated by fear. Some have even ventured that the fearful mood 
of this account of civic life is in no small measure Hobbes' own temperament rarified into a vision 
of the state. In his poetic vita Hobbes wrote 
 
And when my mother conceived me, also fear, 
So that she bore twins: both fear and me together.508 
 
In saying that he was fear's “twin,” Hobbes alluded to the significance of his birth year. 
Hobbes was born in 1588, the year Spanish Armada attempted to invade England and overthrow 
the Queen. Hobbes was playing on the theory of maternal impression discussed in the last chapter, 
as if his mother's fear in her pregnancy has left him marked with fear in some way. However, Carlo 
Ginzburg argues that in this passage Hobbes confessed more than “a private weakness” but also 
“some pride at his decision to put fear at the center of his political philosophy.”509  It is in the 
movement of the individual passion to a common source of motive, the passage from fear to awe, 
that fear serves both as the original problem in founding a commonwealth and the ultimate means 
of its maintenance.  
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Reading the core sequence of Hobbes' political works running through De Cive, De 
Homine, and Leviathan, we find we can distinguish four different dimensions of fear. First, fear is 
flight. Hobbes' definition of fear in the De Homine as “aversion with the opinion of a coming evil” 
(aversio cum opinione damni secuturi) tracks closely to the Ciceronian notion of fear as an opinion 
of a future evil discussed in the previous chapter.510 We can understand fear's aversion in two 
ways: it is both the mental aversion from some possibility in mental deliberation and the real 
beginning of flight from some imagined harm. Hobbes' contribution was to identify these two 
moments, one imaginative and one embodied. His oft-quoted dictum that imagination is “first 
internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion” should be understood within his broader argument in 
Chapter 6 of the first book of Leviathan. Indeed, the chapter's first section is entitled “Of the 
Interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions, Commonly Called the Passions and the Speeches by 
Which They are Expressed.” Hobbes identifies both imagination and passion as the “beginnings” 
of voluntary motion. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this was a conventional view insofar 
as both imagination and passion were essential components of early modern understandings of the 
vis motrix. Hobbes also retains the notion that the imagination acts as an estimative power, 
providing “the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: 
And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable.”511 
Hobbes' innovation was to fully identify this imaginative judgment of “things’ good and evill” 
with the locomotive force of passion. This in effect identifies the motion of the imagination with 
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the motions of a passion. Whereas in Mercutio’s Queen Mab speech, we saw a disjunction between 
the parson’s dreamed desire of a “tithe-pig” and the “tickling” of his nose, Hobbes banishes all the 
fairy-work of this explanation, seeing in the image itself an insensible tickle that is felt in the organ 
through amplification.  In Hobbes, the two moments of motive—bodily motion and image—are 
collapsed into one. He makes this explicit in his De Homine, where he writes that “the image or 
colour is but an apparition unto us of the motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh 
in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance of the head.”512 The image of the passionate 
motive itself is the motion of the body. 
Hobbes' theory of motive was based upon his general ontology of motion. The passions are 
the “Interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions,” and so the seed of all motives.513 Passions could 
not be Stoically exorcised since “Life itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor 
without Feare, no more than without Sense.”514 Fear and desire are oppositely valued vectors in a 
counterfactual space. Animal motion reveals only the last “appetite in deliberation,” Hobbes 
deflationary definition of the will.515 Hobbes defined deliberation as when “in the mind of man, 
Appetites and Aversions, Hopes and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise 
alternately.”516 But they do not simply manifest in movement to and fro; rather, the minor motions 
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of the passions in their first instance, a tug of motions within the mind, vie for control in the internal 
deliberation of mental discourse. For Hobbes, the imagination is the locus of motive, for the “small 
beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, 
and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.”517 Desires cannot defeat one 
another except through force; without fear, humans are rapacious and are led about by their lusts. 
Fear, then, is a refinement, even an education, of desire. Fear introduces the conditional into mental 
discourse; I want x, but that could lead to y. This changes desire from merely the start of locomotion 
into a grammatical unit, from the condition of motion to the apodosis, or the dependent clause, of 
a conditional proposition.  
Fear transcends individual deliberations when we see it as the motivating condition for 
following the terms of an agreement. Fear then is a conditio sine qua non for the emergence of 
transferals of right in contracts and covenants. Here, Hobbes was scaffolding his theory of motive 
into a polemic against the prevailing jurisprudential view. An important jurisprudential question 
in the disputes leading to the English Civil War concerned the validity of contracts made in a 
condition of fear. In Roman jurisprudence, the “exception from a cause of fear” (exceptio quod 
metus causa) was considered a principle on which a contract might be voided. Hobbes addresses 
this doctrine directly. He holds that not only are contracts made from fear valid, but that the very 
institution of law proceeds from it. Since fear is the primary motive that leads citizens to fulfill 
their obligations, “a man sometimes pays his debt, only for feare of Imprisonment, which because 
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no body hindered him from detaining.”518 Voiding contracts made in fear would dissolve the 
possibility of a commonwealth.  
Fear and liberty are consistent, a point Hobbes wryly makes by imagining someone at sea 
in a storm who not only is free to “throweth his goods into the Sea for feare his ship should sink,” 
but does this “very willingly.”519 This is because for Hobbes liberty is precisely the liberty to move, 
that is, to have unhindered locomotion. Political freedom is no different, save that the obstacles to 
motion are the laws. This is Hobbes' meaning when he says that the “Greatest Liberty of Subjects” 
is dependent upon the “silence of the laws.”520 Obligation comes from the transferal of this liberty 
to another since it is “DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act” of one's transferal of right.521 
If fear is the negative value in a complex assessment of future possibilities, hope serves as the 
legitimation of what is done under fear. Indeed, it is a limitation on it. Self-defense is not a right 
one could transfer away because “there is no benefit consequent to such patience.”522 The motive 
and justification of all such transferals of right is “nothing else but the security of a mans person, 
in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it.”523 The foundations of 
a contract do not tremble merely because one of the parties does.   
If fear is the condition of obedience between individuals in a contract, it is also the 
condition for the foundation of a commonwealth, turning from the anxiety of individuals to the 
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collective motive for the construction of a common power. The mutual transfer of right is a 
contract, and the idea that Hobbes is famous for originating, the idea of a social contract, emerges 
from the ability of transferring this right not merely as an exchange but to a third party. In the 
constitution of a commonwealth, individuals contract to renounce their natural liberty and endow 
it in a sovereign representative. The contract made from fear is binding “in the condition of meer 
Nature,” but it is also in this condition that trust is weakest.524  A covenant made in the state of 
nature for which there is “any reasonable suspicion” of one party's delinquency is “Voyd” unless 
there is “a common Power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compell 
performance.”525 The institution of sovereign power not only frees the members of a 
commonwealth from the natural fear in a condition of war but also binds them in their trust of one 
another since the fear that one party will break its agreements falls below a threshold of 
reasonableness when there is redress to the civil power. That is, sovereign power is the 
centralization of fear. The sovereign is like the alchemical nigredo of fear, sublimating it from a 
force that disperses and atomizes individuals into one that binds them closely.   
While accounts of Hobbes’ theory of fear tend to focus on its power to organize the state, 
it is an equal (if not greater) concern for Hobbes that fear of the sovereign may lead to civil unrest 
or even civil war. The institution of a common power as a solution to our fear of other individuals 
carries a risk: should we not fear this common power? When the sovereign power itself becomes 
an image of fear, the fear of the subjects may be organized into a new form of power that can 
challenge the state. On the one hand, as I have just argued, it is imperative to Hobbes' view of the 
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commonwealth that the subjects fear the punishments of the sovereign power so that they do not 
disobey its laws. Yet another source of fear remained: the sovereign may be a tyrant. English 
political discourse's constant preoccupation with tyranny was deemed pathological by Hobbes; he 
dubbed it “Tyrannophobia.”526 The coinage is significant. Whereas Hobbes recognized that fear 
was an essential element in the construction and maintenance of a commonwealth, he felt that 
“tyrannophobia” would disturb the state. Among Hobbes' most memorable—and controversial—
arguments was that “because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the Actions, and 
Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury 
to any of his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice.”527 The impossibility 
of sovereign injustice follows from Hobbes’ definition of justice as action pursuant to or not 
interfering with contract or covenant. The sovereign, as the author of all law in a commonwealth 
may therefore take any action whatsoever to preserve the power to enforce contracts and the 
security of the commonwealth. Since the sovereign power can create or annul law, its 
representative is not subject to civil law but only bound by the law of nature. While the sovereign 
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527 Ibid., 3.163. 
 276 
may be judged to act with “iniquity,” this moral dimension of action never invalidates political 
authority.528 The impunity of sovereign power was, needless to say, not a commonly-held belief 
in Hobbes' England. Parliament had not only limited but beheaded its sovereign in 1649, two years 
prior to the publication of Leviathan. Even the moderate parliamentarian wing of the conflict often 
argued that while monarchs may have prerogatives, tyrannical rule made these forfeit. 
This fourth dimension of fear is the emergence of the problem of melancholy into the 
political philosophy of Hobbes. In a discussion of melancholy in Leviathan, Hobbes begins by 
linking the two typically melancholic passions of fear and sadness, saying that “Dejection, subjects 
a man to causelesse fears.”529 The “causeless” passions of melancholy, however, are of course not 
without cause, but caused by the individual's imagination. Yet, given that in Hobbes' theory 
passion always depends upon imagination, there is no hard line between passions and the madness 
of the melancholic. Madness, Hobbes argues, is simply a passion that is stronger or more violent 
than is normal. When vain-glory is continued one suffers from “Rage, and Fury.” In Hobbes' self-
translation of Leviathan into Latin, Hobbes translates both with the single furor.530 Love, jealousy, 
self-conceit—all taken to excess become furor. Any too-great imaginative capacity becomes a 
threat of madness without the check of a good judgment. Hobbes' associates the freedom of 
imagination with a kind of motiveless style of discourse, for “without Steddinesse and Direction 
to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse; such as they have, that entring into any 
discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by everything that comes in their thought, into so many, 
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and so long digressions, and Parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves.”531 Those who let the 
imagination freely play are threatened to become, like Actaeon, the hunter of Greek myth who, 
punished by the goddess, became the prey of his own hunt. 
If Hobbes disapproves of the melancholic individual's imaginative reverie, it nonetheless 
is clear that she poses a danger mostly to herself. However, in his section on melancholy, his 
concern with “causeless fears” immediately turns from individual to collective passions. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, the theater, along with the pulpit and gallows, was a key site for 
the fomenting of public habits of linking imagination to passions. It is no accident, then, that 
Hobbes glosses the category of common madness with a classical anecdote about the effects of 
tragedy. In Abdera, during the "acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extream hot day," 
many members of the audience fell into "Fevers," doing nothing but singing "Iambiques" until 
winter came.  Hobbes assigns two causes for this: their madness arose "from the heat, and from 
The Tragedy together." Andromeda, let us recall, was sacrificed to the “sea monster”—surely no 
coincidence, then, that it is opposed to the Leviathan, the great Biblical sea monster.  
The inspiration of collective fear may start from a single individual who communicates it 
to a collective. Hobbes give two telling instances of this process. One is that of the enthusiast, one 
who is “possessed of an opinion of being inspired.” When this passion is only “in one man,” it is 
“not visible...by any very extravagant action.”532 But when this passion takes hold of many who 
“conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is visible enough.”533 Just as the imagination, 
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as the “first internall beginnings of voluntary motions” are not visible until they are amplified 
through a passion, so too we see that the opinion of one individual may remain invisible until it is 
amplified in the passionate body of the multitude. In a second example, Hobbes imagines how a 
group comes to be seized with “Panique Terror.” He defines this as “Feare, without the 
apprehension of why, or what…called so from the fables that make Pan the author of them; 
whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though 
the rest run away by example; every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this 
Passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.”534 That is, one person’s fear of a 
phantasm is perceived by others who take it as evidence of a real reason to fear. This logic of 
collective fear is the same as that of “Tyrannophobia,” just as the movements stirred by the 
enthusiast are the same as those who lead a rebellion. The traditional image of the tyrant as plena 
metus or full of fear is the seed of a “panique terror” that grips the multitude and dissolves it into 
civil war.    
Collective imagination may become a threat to the integration of the commonwealth and 
shows the need to create a state that serves to give a common, overriding cause to all civic motives. 
The ability to the control fearful imagination is thus a fundamental concern of the governing power 
in a commonwealth. I read the final book of Leviathan, on the “Kingdome of Darknesse,” as a 
systematic attempt to deal with the problem of imagination in a fearful polity.  In this book, Hobbes 
describes fears arising from a condition of “darknesse,” that is, an error concerning the nature of 
images. Hobbes addresses this when he talks about the meaning of a “kingdome of darknesse” as 
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“another power” beside “these Soveraign Powers, Divine, and Humane.”535 Here he embarks on 
an adventurous piece of scriptural interpretation. If Beelzebub is the “prince of darknesse, this 
means only that he is 'Prince of Phantasmes,'“ and that “Inhabitants of his Dominion of Air and 
Darknesse, the Children of Darknesse, and these Daemons, Phantasmes, or Spirits of Illusion, 
signifie allegorically the same thing.”536 Darkness is the limitation and errors of the imagination. 
He lists four causes: misinterpretation of scripture, the belief in demons which are “but Idols, or 
Phantasmes of the braine, without any reall nature of their own, distinct from humane fancy,” the 
mixing of religion with philosophy, “especially that of Aristotle,” and finally mixing these with 
“uncertain Traditions...or History.”537  He believed that demonology originated because the 
“ancient pretenders to Naturall knowledge” did not discover the nature of sense, and so were 
unable “to conceive of those Images in the Fancy, and in the Sense, otherwise, than of things really 
without us,” that is, outside of our internal sensation.538 Spiritual darkness, then, is fear of 
phantasms. The melancholic is the figure of spiritual darkness.  
To understand the connection between collective fear and the popular imagination, we must 
articulate more fully Hobbes' theory of imagination. As in the previous chapter, Hobbes closely 
links his theory of passions to a theory of imagination. Yet Hobbes’ distinctive theory of 
imagination meant that he did not accept the conventional view of how imagination and passions 
become linked. Unlike those theorists who began by describing imagination as a power of the 
mind, Hobbes views sense and imagination as a continuum of sensation in time in which sense is 
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“originall fancy” and fancy, or imagination, is “decaying sense.”539 Imagination and memory “are 
but one thing” except that “Decaying Sense, when wee would express the thing it self, (I mean 
Fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I said before; But when we would express the Decay, and 
signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called Memory.”540 In the memorial 
imagination, the first degradation is the location and magnitude of the sensed object. The result is 
a patchiness of memory, the common experience in which “we lose (for example) of Cities we 
have seen, many particular Streets; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances.”541 Memory 
and phantasm float freely in their own space.  
Since imagination is “decaying sense,” it is often impossible to determine the difference 
between a dim perception, memory, and a wholly imagined object. Hobbes treats this problem 
when he discusses dreams. He concedes that “it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible 
to distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming.”542 In the dream, the senses are “benumbed” 
to outward impressions, and so dreams are images produced by “the agitation of the inward parts 
of mans body.” The distempers of the body, then, are productive of images that have the power to 
deceive us.  Because of this, the confusion of dream images and waking experience is most liable 
to happen to someone “full of fearful thoughts; and whose conscience is much troubled.”543 This 
can also happen to the waking “if they be timorous, and superstitious, possessed with fearful tales, 
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and alone in the dark.”544 Here Hobbes follows closely upon Burton's discussion of fear as a cause 
of melancholy. Fear caused melancholy in that it made the “imagination conceave what it list...and 
tyrannizeth over our Phantasie more then [sic] all other affections, especially in the darke.”545 As 
the imagination produces images, it inclines us towards belief in their existence: “Quae metuunt, 
fingunt; what they feare they conceive and faigne unto themselves, they thinke they see Goblins, 
Hags, Divells, and many times become melancholy thereby.”546 Perception and imagination have 
no clear criterion of difference for the fearful. For Hobbes, this indistinction between dream, 
phantasy, and sense gave rise to the “Religion of the Gentiles.”547 With this phrase, Hobbes means 
the pagan religion that does not come from divine revelation, but one may also take it as a wink at 
Christianity itself. Or, more pithily, we might say that collective imagination is common sense 
decaying. More pithily, we might say that collective imagination is common sense decaying. 
Fear without a discernible cause is tantamount to second sovereign, since it is only by an 
organization of fear through the single executor of law that life in a commonwealth avoids civil 
war. It is in this way that we see the problematic of melancholy passions traced throughout the 
previous chapters emerge as a principal concern at the institution of civic science. The well-
governed commonwealth should seek to eliminate as far as possible the imaginative play of 
melancholic topics that upsets the balance of civil imagination. Like we saw the various figures 
arrayed around Burton’s frontispiece, Hobbes brings together the superstitious, the enthusiasts, 
and the mad as common sources of threat to the state.  They are persons with an infinite motive 
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and therefore impossible to reliably integrate into the body of Leviathan. We may say with Hobbes 
that fear is the beginning of motion from, but if the object of fear is not specified, this can be any 
motion whatsoever. The fear of the merely imaginary undermined the motive powers necessary 
for the preservation of the commonwealth. The elimination of “superstitious fear of spirits” would 
make people “more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.”548 Yet the sovereign also depends 
upon religion as a means of enforcing civil obedience, and the only distinction between superstition 
and religion is the question of permission: “Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or 
imaged from tales publiquely allowed, Religion; not allowed, Superstition.” (His rider to this 
obviously less than pious definition is weak tea: “And when the power imagined, is truly as we 
imagine, True Religion.”549) Insofar as the ignorant “stand in awe of their own imaginations,” the 
law—as “a common Power to keep them all in awe”—is itself weakened.550 A melancholic man, 
and so too a fearful polity, is easily manipulated by apocalyptic rhetoric, for he can be made to 
believe that spirits “will hurt him, for doing, or omitting divers things, which neverthelesse, to do, 
or omit, is contrary to the Lawes,” like the prophet who turns the omens against the king.551 It is 
through the people's “superstitious fear of Spirits...Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, 
and many other things depending thereon,” that  “crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple 
people.”552 This is motion inclining away from the civil law, and Hobbes is clear that acts taken 
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out of supernatural fear are “not to be Excused.”553 The tyrannophobe and the superstitious 
melancholic are two variations on a common political problem. For Hobbes, fear without apparent 
occasion is the internal beginning of a seditious movement.  
The importance of an iconology of state that could overcome melancholic passions is a 
structuring feature of Hobbes' Leviathan. In the famous frontispiece of Leviathan, the inscribed 
line from the Book of Job that hangs over Leviathan's head—in fact a half-verse—may be said to 
be the work's first line. It begins “Non est super terram potestas quae conparetur ei,” but the 
remainder of the line is telling, “qui factus est ut nullum timeret”—Who was made so that he might 
fear nothing. The King James Bible renders it, “Upon earth there is not his like, who is made 
without fear.” We might read the elision of the Vulgate's full line as a suppression: the Leviathan 
needed to claim fear in order to make the motion to war. The question of the king's fear was integral 
to a constitutional crisis of the 1640s, a major contributing factor to the conditions that led to civil 
war. It was brought to a head by the case of ship-money, a long defunct medieval tax that enabled 
the king to ask a county who could not supply a warship in time of emergency to forfeit the 
equivalent in currency. The trial of John Hampden, a parliamentarian who refused to make this 
payment, became a theater for the testing of competing jurisprudential theories of sovereignty. 
(Hampden was “assessed at 20s.”554) As the pleaders continually noted, the controversy in the case 
was not de persona, that is, who had the power to levy a common tax for the purpose of naval 
defense; all parties stipulated that the King had this power. The dispute was de modo, as there must 
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be judged a necessary danger that would allow the King to use this extraordinary power. The 
defense of the imposition of a new tax to raise funds was made by the sovereign's ability to judge 
the nearness of danger: “That is the cloud be seen but afar off, the king, without the consent of the 
subjects, cannot tax them; but if the cloud be overhead, the king may call certain wise persons to 
him, and tax his subjects.”555 Within the king's providence “probabilities and conjectures” were 
admitted.556 Hampden's defense appealed to the possibility that this judgment could be 
counterfeited, and the rebuttal of this argument, however, weak, relied upon the persona of the 
king: “But what if the king will levy money, upon pretence of defence, in time of danger, and 
dispose of it otherwise, and the danger not so apparent? I say, so pious and just a king will never 
pretend a danger, if it were not re vera.”557 The assurance of the King's advocate did not satisfy 
the aggrieved parliamentarians.  
In turn, fear became the justification of the Parliament's right to sever military command 
from the King, as can be read in the Militia Ordinance or 1642. The ordinance reports a “design” 
upon the House of Commons, the result of “bloody counsels of Papists and other ill-affected 
persons, who have already raised a rebellion in the kingdom of Ireland.” The event of this report, 
attended by many other “discoveries,” resulted in a fear that was also a prophecy: “we cannot but 
fear they will proceed not only to stir up the like rebellion and insurrections in this kingdom of 
England, but also to back them with forces from abroad.” This precipitated the constitutional crisis 
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that initiated the English Civil War. In an irony that was surely savored by the Parliamentarians at 
the time, the very defense that Hampden had used in the Ship Money case now became the King's 
own plea.558 
Hobbes surely held these two cases in mind when discussing the integrity of sovereign 
power in Leviathan, recognizing the need for the sovereign both to instill an imaginative object of 
fear in the polity of the commonwealth without becoming so fearful himself that he causes civil 
uprising. He imagines the abdication of sovereignty as if he were an advocate on behalf of Charles 
I, saying “if he transferre the Militia, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want of execution of the 
Lawes: Or if he grant away the Power of raising Mony; the Militia is in vain.” But he adds another 
rider to these: “if he give away the government of doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion 
with the feare of Spirits.”559 As we have seen, superstition was linked closely in Hobbes' mind to 
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rebellion. Someone who fears spirits “either through his own superstition, or through too much 
credit given to other men, that tell him of strange Dreams and visions” can be persuaded that these 
imagined forces have powers. We might compare this sentiment to the speech of the bastard in 
King John:  
 
I find the people strangely fantasied; 
Possess'd with rumours, full of idle dreams, 
Not knowing what they fear, but full of fear: 
And here a prophet, that I brought with me 
From forth the streets of Pomfret, whom I found 
With many hundreds treading on his heels; 
To whom he sung, in rude harsh-sounding rhymes, 
That, ere the next Ascension-day at noon, 
Your highness should deliver up your crown.560 
 
The people “strangely fantasied” was a perpetual, internal danger of the state. One possible 
response to it was to project a greater fear—perhaps an invasion—that would organize the popular 
imagination back into popular support for the state.  
However, we might also read the omitted half of the Biblical line from the Leviathan's 
frontispiece as an opportunity to complete an enthymeme: the Leviathan was made “to fear 
nothing.” The solution to the double-edged fear of the ruler, that is, the fear necessary for the 
commonwealth and the fear that could threaten, is suggested through the image of the frontispiece. 
The image, so famous that it hardly needs description, is an image of the people composing the 
body of an “artificiall man.” They all hold in common the image of his face, but they are the 
material out of which his body is made. The state is in fact one person, an artificial person, of 
which the subjects are both matter and artificers. The multitude becomes one when “they are by 
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one man, or one Person, Represented.”561 Hobbes did not mean this metaphorically. The sovereign 
is “obliged by the Law of Nature” to ensure the safety of the people not because of a moral precept, 
but because in the state of nature one has the right to defend one's life by any means and the 
obligation to take the action agreed upon in covenant. The reflexive nature of the artificial person 
of the state means that its own health is the health of the people; its right to wage war with other 
states is perfectly analogous to the right of an individual in the state of nature to defend themselves. 
Hobbes makes clear that the safety of the commonwealth is not “bare Preservation, but also all 
other Contentments of life.”562 The sovereign representative has no obligation to his subjects 
enforceable by civil law and so therefore cannot be punished. Nevertheless, the old humanist 
question of good governance was reformulated as the preservation of the state's health, for although 
“Soveraignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not 
only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, 
it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.”563 
In Leviathan, Hobbes took the commonplace metaphor of the commonwealth as body and made it 
literal; if life is “but motion” then nothing prevents the artificial construction of life, and the 
commonwealth's order of motions comes ultimately from its artificial imposition upon the 
individual passions of its members. But like a natural body, the artificial body is also subject to 
breakdowns through disease, here imagined as “discords” that are ultimately internal motions that 
disrupt the vital motions of the body.  
                                                 
561 EW, 3.151. 
562 Ibid., 3.322. 
563 Ibid., 3.208. 
 288 
6.2 Abraham Bosse’s L’Homme Fourré de Malice 
Leviathan's frontispiece shows a new vision of a collective imagination, one that solved 
the problem of melancholic passions not through the individual's recourse to a rhetorical 
elaboration of experience, but through instituting a public image so powerful in its passionate 
effect that it could be taken as a common motive. We see this in the citizens' common gaze directed 
towards the face of Leviathan in the frontispiece. This detail was important and likely added on 
the basis of Hobbes' suggestion. We know that Hobbes discussed the composition at length with 
the engraver, Abraham Bosse.564 While the final version shows the subjects awed before the image 
of their own representative, the draft version of the frontispiece shows the faces turned towards 
the reader. Hobbes famously argues that without a “common Power to them all in awe,” men are 
in a state of war. In one passage, he specifies this as a “visible Power to keep them in awe.” It is 
the captivated vision of the polity looking upon its sovereign that will “tye them by feare of 
punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of these Lawes of Nature.”565 
Where the tragedy gave the Abderites a common madness, the Leviathan will create a common 
imagination of awe, a passion saved from madness by its binding and regulating force. The 
iconology of state is to replace the collective imagination of the theater. 
The captivated vision of an awed commonwealth in the frontispiece could not appear 
further from the Melancholy and Panique Terror that Hobbes warned of. Yet, in an obscure 
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companion to the frontispiece, we see the figure of the sovereign as a melancholic; Bosse's original 
vellum sketch, with the faces of Leviathan's body facing outwards, is strikingly similar to a visual 
conceit Bosse developed in another work, known as L’Homme Fourré de Malice, or The Man 
Wrapped in Evil. This text-image composite is a dense site of meaning with both “some enigmatic 
verses” (les vers peu obscurs) and a complex of emblematic or allegorical motifs in its design.566 
To unpack it we must resort to some speculation. The engraving was executed during Bosse's 1650 
collaboration with Hobbes. Indeed, according to Préaud, Bosse “seems to have loved these 
collaborative exercises of engraving à deux mains.”567 We might suppose that receiving an 
intellectual luminary into his atelier, one with whom he perhaps could discuss his beloved topic of 
projective geometry, he may also have relished a chance to treat Hobbes as the second hand in a 
collaboration.568 The engraving has to this point never been interpreted fully. Horst Bredekamp 
addresses it in his Der Leviathan. Bredekamp's concern with the engraving is primarily to establish 
Bosse as the author of the Leviathan image. However, in building this argument, he conjectures 
that L'Homme Fourré was not only produced within the same time as the frontispiece but served 
as “an answer to the 'Leviathan'“ (eine Antwort auf den Leviathan) that was “clearly ironic” (voller 
Ironie). The enigmatic engraving is a “kind of verso-image that completes the Janus-face of the 
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reign of an artificial God,” (eine Art Kehrseite, die das Janusgesicht der Herrschaft eines 
künstlichen Gottes ausmacht).569 
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Figure 15 — Abraham Bosse’s L’Homme fourré de malice, c. 1650 
Courtesy of The British Museum under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) license. 
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Why should a melancholic be the Janus-face of the modern state? I argue that it is a vision 
of the individual who has lent his face to the Leviathan. In this figure, two things are accomplished. 
First, we see that the figure is in fact ineffectual: his power does not come from him but only from 
his image. But second, this nevertheless shows the effectiveness of Hobbes' image of the state. For 
here the iconology of the tyrant, wrapped in melancholic lust, is made a figure of laughter rather 
than terror. Though Bredekamp has discussed this image as evidence of Bosse’s authorship of the 
frontispiece, he gives no further elaboration of its significance. I take this image of a melancholic 
figure as not only a visual riddle to be decoded for curiosity’s sake, but as a valuable key to a the 
thematic of Tyrannophobia in Hobbes. If in Hobbes’ own theory of the mind, names always refer 
to phantasms, here we have a rare glimpse into the strange phantasm of the tyrant whose 
melancholy haunts the Leviathan.  
In order to see the L’Homme Fourré as a wryly Hobbesian transformation of the iconology 
of tyranny, we must first look closely at Bosse's print. The man is shown in the attitude of a 
melancholic made famous by Dürer, discussed in Chapter 1: seated, his head holding his hand, his 
glance downwards. His mantle is covered in the faces of women. Beside him we see a monkey 
“aping” his master and so also resting his head in his hand. The short, misogynistic poem at the 
foot of the image helps to illuminate its intention:  
 
I think the engraver 
Considers more than his whim 
When he calls this dreamer 
The Man Dressed [fourré] in Malice,  
 
If he's freighted with faults 
whence else could they come  
save from those dangerous animals' heads 
who beguile the most delicate beasts? 
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Whatever's his vice, it 
Comes not from his nature 
Or if he is wicked [malicieux] 
It must be his mantle [fourrure]. 570   
 
On first take, this is a work squarely situated within a tradition of misogynistic satire; the 
man is made worse by his encounters with women and they cling to him like a robe. But the poem's 
final line is pointedly equivocal. The fourrure indicates both his mantle but also his fur insofar as 
he is one of those tricked animals, les plus fines bestes. An historical French dictionary tells us that 
“one calls crafty or instinctively malicious people fines bêtes.”571 That his fur is made of their furs 
is at once a saucy joke and a hint of a latent violence: where there are furs there once was a trapper, 
and he now wears these furs as if they were trophies. Moreover, there is likely a pun with the Latin 
furor, often used to describe the melancholic. Furor amoris was discussed by Cicero in his 
Tusculan Disputations as something that must be cured by bringing the afflicted “back to other 
                                                 
570 Je ne vois point que le Graveur 
Ait pour raison que son caprice, 
Quand il apelle ce Resueur [sc. rêveur] 
un homme fourré de la malice 
 
Car s'il est tout chargé de maux 
D'où procedent ils que de testes 
De ces dangereux Animaux, 
Qui trompent les plus fines bestes? 
 
Tout ce qu'il a de vicieux 
Ne vient donc pas de sa nature 
Ou bien s'il est malicieux 
Il s'en faut prendre à sa fourrure. 
571 « On apelle des personnes rusées ou malicieuses par instinct de fines bêtes, de mêchantes bêtes. » 
Glossaire Français, 1.468. s.v. bête. If we assume that Bosse was familiar with the basic tenets of Hobbes' theory of 
the Leviathan, which surely he must have been in order to design its densely rhetorical frontispiece, we might also 
read the reference to beast as a schoolboy pun. Hobbes made use of the Latin Homo homini lupus; if one asks what is 
femina homini, this sets up a pun, as the Latin lupa means both she-wolf and prostitute. 
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pursuits [studia],” including to love itself, for “some even think that by a new love a certain old 
one might be put out, as a nail dislodges a nail; however, this must greatly be advised against, if 
the love-furor is great.”572 Indeed, similar treatments appear in the handbooks of remedies for 
melancholy. Jaques Ferrand's discussion of this treatment in Erotomania is moralized but relies 
upon the Galenic medical aphorism, “contraries are remedied by their contraries.”573 Those who 
attempt to cure love melancholy by becoming profligate “will only find themselves more inclined 
to lust and wantoness: 'for the passages will become dilated thereby allowing for a freer flow of 
seminal fluids, and moreover, the remembrance of past pleasures creates a powerful longing to 
repeat them.'“574 The image seems to show that the man wrapped in malice precisely in a dark 
fantasia of erotic remembrance.   
The engraving's accompanying verse plays upon a strategy of attenuating agency, and 
therefore responsibility. All three of the abovementioned meanings of fourrure—mantle, furor, and 
fur—converge upon the ambiguity of something that can dissociated from one's person. Indeed, 
they show three degrees of that difference. The “nature” of the man is clearly distinct from his 
mantle, which can be taken on and off. Once we read the cloak as his own fur, we see this 
assemblage of faces as part of his bestial nature. Here we should recall the famous passage in Il 
                                                 
572 “Sic igitur adfecto haec adhibenda curatio est, ut et illud quod cupiat ostendatur quam leve, quam 
contemnendum, quam nihili, sit omnino, quam facile vel aliunde vel alio modo perfici vel omnino neglegi sit; 
abducendus etiam est non numquam ad alia studia sollicitudines curas negotia, loci denique mutatione tamquam 
aegroti non convalescentes saepe curandus est; etiam novo quidam amore veterem tamquam clavo clavum eiciendum 
putant; maxume autem admonendus est, quantus sit furor amoris.” Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 35.74-5.  
573 Ferrand, Erotomania, 334.  
574 Ibid., 334f. This medical evidence comes from Aristotle's Historia Animalium 7.6. 
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Principe where Machiavelli says that the education proper to the prince, modelled on Achilles' 
tutelage under the centaur Chiron, is to be taught by one who is “half-beast, half-man,” so that he 
knows how to use “both natures.”575 Yet here the nature of the beast is not the ferocity of the tyrant, 
but his luxurious fur robe. Knowing how to put on or take off the nature of the beast is not a 
description of the Machiavellian prince's ability to shuttle forth between self-composure and 
terrifying fury but the ability to assign responsibility for his faults to the “dangereux Animaux”—
his female seducers, both the motives and objects of his lustful passion. He discharges 
responsibility for his actions by attributing them to his fourrure, a mantle or mania that he can put 
                                                 
575 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harey Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
69. The image of a tyrant as a beast was one Hobbes was aware of and tried to suppress in his works. In the dedicatory 
epistle to Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, Hobbes argues that in the Roman Republic, 
the name “king had been rendered odious, as well by the tyranny of the Tarquins as by the genius and decretals of that 
city; it was the speech, I say, of the public, however pronounced from a private mouth, (if yet Cato the censor were 
no more than such), that all kings are to be reckoned amongst ravenous beasts.” But Hobbes inverts this ascription. 
Instead, it is the “Roman people” who were  “a beast of prey,” represented “with its conquering eagles it erected its 
proud trophies so far and wide over the world, bringing the Africans, the Asiatics, the Macedonians, and the Achaeans, 
with many other despoiled nations, into a specious bondage, with the pretense of preferring them to be denizens of 
Rome!” Hobbes here draws upon an anecdote in Plutarch, told upon the feted arrival of King Eumenes in Rome. The 
Senate gave him honors, but Cato looks upon him with suspicion and fear. When a friend reproaches him that he is a 
“friend to Rome” [philorommaios] Cato delivers his line, “Yes, but the animal, king, is by nature a flesh-eater.” 
Hobbes returns to this passage more than once. In De Cive we find it in a more refined form. Hobbes remarks that 
Cato, classical exemplar of wisdom, nevertheless is so partisan “that he censured in Kings what he thought reasonable 
in his own people.” Hobbes' is making a riposte to the Catonian defense of republican liberty; the true “beast of prey” 
is the populus on the march.  
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on and off, having learned Machiavelli's lesson of having both the nature of a man and a beast 
ready at hand.576 
The tyrant's passions were generated and sustained by sycophants. This is what is alluded 
to in the figure of the collared ape, also posed as a melancholic, who sits beside the man. Because 
it takes the same pose as the sitter, it clearly calls up the stereotyped figure of singerie: the ape as 
a human mirror, an imitator, who is one variation away from a flatterer who mirrors the ruler's 
desire back to him as counsel. The monkey had long held a place the medieval imagination of sins, 
especially acedia and vanitas. The theme of the “dreamer” is perhaps reinforced by the similarity 
of the French for monkey, singe, with dream, songe. The songe-creux, or idle-dreamer is likened 
to a singe-creux, idle monkey. But if we do not take it as an allegory, the monkey is a pet and so 
reflects upon the wealth and extravagance of the sitter. He is at least a noble, and perhaps even 
royalty. An ape counsellor is found in the English tradition: “an English popular poem of the 
fifteenth century tells of King Robert of Sicily, who was punished for his pride by being changed 
into a fool and set to caper in his own palace, with an ape for a counsellor.”577 The monkey is this 
foolish and blandishing advisor, consistent with the iconology of “fool's advice.”578 But his ability 
to modulate the tyrant's passion comes at the price of being subject to the tyrant's will. It was a 
common pictorial topos to show “fettered simians” attached to “the palaces or thrones of heathen 
tyrants.”579 Since several different lines of interpretation point to a reading of the sitter as a king, 
                                                 
576 For a related discussion, see Marshall, “Warburgian Maxims.” 
577 Horst W. Janson, Apes and Ape Lore in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (Nendeln/Liechtenstein : 
Kraus, 1976), 211.  
578 Ibid.  
579 Ibid., 150.  
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we may read the pet monkey's collar as a play on the fetter; it is at once vain, the sign of a courtier, 
and the mark of the fetter of pleasure, the grata compes, of a lover's sexual favors. The dreamer 
and his ape are locked together like Narcissus and Echo: the tyrant is unable to see in the world 
anything but the objects of his passion, and his sycophant can do nothing but imitate these back to 
him.  
The iconology of the tyrant's erotic melancholy created by Bosse undercuts the awe that is 
due to the sovereign person. Seeing him wrapped in his private passion, we see him as a figure 
removed from action. The cause of his melancholy is at the edges of agency: he both pursues the 
women he lusts after and claims that this pursuit is out of his control. The king both suffers from 
it but also wears it; we may hear the poem as not merely misogynistic doggerel (though it's surely 
that) but also as an example of indirect discourse: the fourrure of the king offers a defense for his 
own faults. This both reveals the distance of the private ruler's motives from the duties of state and 
mocks the fictions of agency that support the state. The same forms of “personation” that empower 
the sovereign representative to act on behalf of the people are inverted in his passion: here the 
causes of his passion are given their own personas. The visual echo between L'homme fourré and 
the Leviathan frontispiece suggest this: where the people are incorporated through a fiction into 
the sovereign by their common awe at his image, the sovereign representative is subject to his 
passions and makes melancholy his excuse for his indulgences, out of place with his supposedly 
elevated state.  
If, as Bredekamp suggests, we read Bosse's erotomaniac not only as a king but specifically 
Charles II, the joke becomes pointed towards his own ineffectual rule and the defenses made of it.  
Indeed, we find one such defense of Charles II in the diary of John Evelyn. In his famous diary of 
the times, Evelyn described the young princes as having both “many virtues, and many great 
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Imperfections.” Evelyn suggests that we would have been as “excellent prince” if he had been 
“lesse addicted to Women, which made him uneasy & allways in Want to supply their 
immeasurable profusion...those wicked creatures tooke him from all application becoming so 
greate a King.”580 Here Evelyn makes use of the same logic that is ironized in Bosse's engraving: 
the prince was, in his own nature, a great ruler, but was prevented from realizing this by his 
womanizing, even describing them in the misogynistic idiom of “wicked creatures” like the 
“dangereux animaux” of the engraving's verse. Bosse's engraving, then, is a joke about the 
sovereign person whose face dons the artificial person of the Leviathan: he is not the Machiavellian 
prince, but an ineffectual melancholic absorbed in the disappointments of his amor furoris.  
In ironizing the rhetoric that removes agency from the prince for his misdeeds, Bosse's 
engraving is not only as a visual counterpoint to the frontispiece of the Leviathan but also a 
counterargument to the book's theory of representation. While Hobbes concerned himself in great 
detail with the conditions for authorizing a representative, that is, to make another the author of 
one's actions, he neglects the question of how one might forfeit authority—and therefore 
responsibility—without appointing a representative. Inanimate objects can be personated, as a 
hospital may have an overseer, but it cannot, obviously, appoint its own representatives; it lacks 
authority. Nevertheless, “Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance, given them by 
those that are Owners, or Governours of those things.”581 The man wrapped in malice, by contrast, 
attributes his actions to a disease. Bosse's dreamer is involved in an elaborate prosopopoeia, the 
rhetorical figure in which one creates another persona and represents their speech. But in this 
                                                 
580Samuel Pepys, Diary, 6. Feb. 1685.  
581 EW, 3.150. 
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prosopopoeia, he inverts the iconology of the tyrant: no longer is he the dangerous beast. Instead, 
the women he chases pursue him in his imagination. He is the prey of his own desire. 
The duality of Bosse's image attests to Hobbes' overcoming of a long tradition that closely 
associated the erotic lust of the tyrant with his most terrifying violence. Hobbes’ elision of this 
commonplace theme is not accidental; his political philosophy is tantamount to the suppression of 
this image. The power of the Leviathan is not, like Machiavelli's prince, an outcome of his person's 
virtù and good fortune; rather, the power of the state is the common passion that its image arouses 
in the people. Yet it is in fact this break between the power of the person and the image of the state 
that remains one of Hobbes' lasting contributions to our own political imagination. The Leviathan, 
because it is not a natural person, can serve as the cause of passions without suffering them. The 
disguised image of Charles II in L'homme fourré de malice surely does not show the passion of 
the state but only of its private person. The subject of the tyrant and his distinction from the king 
is ubiquitous in the context of early modern English political philosophy. The image of the modern 
state is an ability to represent the sovereign power as distinct from the melancholy personage of 
the prince.  
6.3 The Humanist Image of the Melancholic Tyrant and Leviathan as Response 
 We must see the Leviathan against the backdrop of the humanist elaboration of the tyrant 
as a figure whose terrifying aspects resulted from his inability to rule his lustful passions. First, 
because this was the image of the tyrant that Hobbes wished to dissociate his new civil science 
from. Second, because the association between tyrannical passions and the humanist political 
arguments against sovereign injustice are opaque to us now. It remains difficult to see Leviathan 
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as a counter to the melancholic tyrant because its iconography has been so successful in 
suppressing the figure's Baroque iconology. By setting out the Baroque image of the tyrant as it 
was elaborated in the early modern period by humanists we can see Hobbes’ Leviathan not 
retrospectively as an early version of the all-too-familiar authoritarian nation-state but as a creative 
work upon the political imagination of his own time. Hobbes’ Leviathan was an insurgent 
phantasm in a war against Tyrannophobia—to recall the meaning of that struggle is to reawaken 
ourselves to one possible meaning of the state as an image.  
In the nascent political theory of Italian humanism, the erotic problems of the tyrant were 
emphasized because it was thought that in tyranny the ruler's libido replaced the law. Xenophon's 
Hiero is the locus classicus for the unhappy eroticism of the tyrant.582 The Hiero is a dialogue 
between two characters: the eponymous Syracusan tyrant and the poet Simonides. Simonides asks 
Hiero to compare the happiness of a private person with that of his current position, since he has 
experienced both. Hiero complains that no one is as unhappy as the tyrant. Simonides then leads 
him through all the pleasures and Hiero explains how the tyrant's fear corrupts his enjoyment of 
each one in turn. He is too fearful to travel and so sees less, his ears hear only false honors, and 
his palette is corrupted; food, through surfeit, becomes dull or cloying and he must be vigilant 
always for fear of poisoning. But above all other pleasures, the tyrant suffers from erotic problems. 
He cannot marry anyone except an inferior, which is degrading and unattractive. In his pederastic 
pursuits, he cannot be assured to the boy's passion. Hiero, the tyrant, complains that erotic love 
                                                 
582 It is evident that the Hiero was part of English humanist education. A manuscript English translation of 
the Hiero, apparently from the Latin, in Cambridge Library has been attributed to Queen Elizabeth. See Leicester 
Bradner, “The Xenophon Translation Attributed to Queen Elizabeth I,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes 27 (1964), 324-6. 
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“comes least to the tyrant, for it delights not in what is commanded, but in longing.”583 The tyrant 
suspects that all ostensible sexual affection for him is a shown born from fear.584 The dialogue 
proceeds with Simonides showing the tyrant how he might improve his pleasures through just rule. 
Essentially, the poet teaches the tyrant how to become just, but disguises this counsel as a way of 
returning to a state of sensual pleasures.  
The theme of the unhappy tyrant reappears in the Florentine humanist Poggio Bracciolini's 
De infelicitate principium, or On the Unhappiness of Princes.585 The greater part of the dialogue 
is the effort of Niccolo Niccoli's character to prove that the majority of rulers from history held up 
as examples were in fact bad. But this opens into a division between kings and tyrants, for where 
“life of tyrants is torture to them, but not of kings or emperors, since even Justin agrees that tyrants 
always abound in vices and therefore are necessarily unhappy.”586 Nicolaus attempts to extend this 
concession to contain all rulers, whether they go by “the name of emperors, kings, dukes, or any 
others,” since even if they are good, they are weighed down more than Atlas with “unlimited cares, 
troubles, anxieties, labors.”587 The record of praise left by the historians is a rhetorical effect. They 
                                                 
583 Xenophon, Hiero 1.30.  
584 Ibid.,1.38. 
585 See Davide Canfora, “La Topica del 'Principe' e l'uso umanistico delle fonti in Poggio Bracciolini,” 
Humanistica Lovaniensia: A Journal of Neo-latin Studies 45 (1996).  
586 “Tyrannorum...non regum aut imperatorum vita iis cruciabatur que dixisiti malis, quoniam et Iustinus 
affirmat tyrannos semper vitiis abundare.; ideoque et esse infelices necesse est.” Poggio Bracciolini, De infelicitate 
principium, ed. Davide Canfora (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1998), 34.15-18, 22.  
587 “[N]omine imperatores, reges, duces, ceterosque qui aliis dominantur comprehendi volo...Nam mali nullo 
modo felices erunt, a maius enim Athlante onus ferunt —propter infinitas curas, molestias, anxietates, labores quibus 
cruciantur, omnis felicitas abest.” Ibid., 19.7-8, 14. 
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take any “scintilla virtutis” and turn it into a blaze.588 Moreover, human nature is so fragile that 
“we slip easily into wantoness and vice” and so that “rule, evil through its license and very nature 
[re ipsa] is the maker and minister of evils.”589 Imperium is like fire; whoever holds it is either 
heated or burned, and either returns them evil or at least worse.590 Too great an abundance of 
pleasures makes them bitter.591 It has been speculated that Bracciolini's work was in some ways a 
response to his fellow humanist Leonardo Bruni's translation of Xenophon's Hiero. Brian Jeffrey 
Maxson has argued that Bruni used this translation as part of his argument with Salutati “about 
tyrannical rule and vernacular culture.”592 Bracciolini's dialogue is a truncated reprisal of 
Xenophon’s Hiero; the melancholy plaints of the tyrant become its whole substance and the poet's 
remedies are forgotten. Simonides advises Hiero to divide his actions into two classes: “a great 
ruler should delegate to others the task of punishing those who require to be coerced, and should 
reserve to himself the privilege of awarding prizes.”593 The remedy of the tyrant's unhappiness is 
an oblique use of power; through acts like greeting his subjects familiarly, instructing his 
bodyguards to also look after the city, and awarding prizes in contests, the tyrant produces a 
                                                 
588 Ibid., 27.18 
589“Nam tum natura fragiles sumus atque imbellices, qui facillime ad lasciviam et vitia labiamur, tum 
principatus re ipsa et licentia malus est malorumque opifex ac minister.” Ibid., 28.21-26, 18.  
590“Sicut enim ignis, quicquid illi heret, aut calefacit aut urit, ita et imperium, quos apprehendit, aut malos 
reddit aut certe deteriores.” Ibid., 28.2-4, 19.  
591“Nam voluptates, quo magis affluunt, eo ex copia et satiete fiunt insuaviores.”  Ibid., 32.19-20, 21.  
592 Brian Jeffrey Maxson, “Kings and Tyrants: Leonardo Bruni’s Translation of Xenophon’s Hiero,” 
Renaissance Studies 24, no. 2 (2010), 188ff.  
593 Xenophon, Hiero, 9.3.  
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popularity for his person that does not reduce envy and fear, allowing him to once again enjoy the 
pleasures of commercio hominum.    
King and tyrant could not be discerned through their office, which was identical, but only 
in the relation of their passions to the law. The analysis of tyranny in humanist political thought 
turned upon the division between the image of the happy, just king and the melancholic tyrant as 
a means for reflecting on the nature of tyranny. No one made greater use of it than George 
Buchanan, eminent Scottish humanist of the sixteenth century, in his De iure regni apud Scotos.594 
Here the humanist image of the tyrant had direct political relevance, as they sought to provide 
justification for the then-recent deposition of Mary Queen of Scots. Framed as a dialogue, 
Buchanan sets himself as a character in conversation with Thomas Maitland, a courier for the Earl 
of Suffolk. It is the deposal that Maitland’s character refers to obliquely when he speaks of his 
horror at the “atrocity of a recent crime” [recentis criminis atrocitas]—made more horrible because 
it involved violence against a woman, something even foreign enemies refrain from. Buchanan's 
persona asks Maitland if he “has an image of king and tyrant in his mind,” and the remainder of 
the dialogue is an exposition of this diptych and its consequences.595 Buchanan argues that 
recognizing the images of king and tyrant is the basis of civic education.596 The initial difficulty is 
                                                 
594 See Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 339-48 and also Oakley, “On the Road from Constance to 1688: The Political Thought of 
George Buchanan and John Major,” Journal of British Studies 2 (1962), 1-31, for a discussion of Buchanan and his 
influence. 
595 George Buchanan, De Iure Regni Apud Scotos (Edinburgh: Printed by T. Dawson, 1581), 9. 
596 “Et imagine utriusque proposita nonne vulgus etiam intellecturum putas quodnam sit suum erga utrunque 
officium.” Ibid., 55-6. 
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that both king and tyrant fall within the same genus, and therefore accidental similarities allow the 
worse to impersonate the better.597 It is critical, then, to elaborate in detail the respective images. 
Buchanan calls this an imago descripta. This signals that his method is drawn from the Ciceronian 
topic of descriptio, which answers questions like “what is a miser? what is a sycophant? and other 
subjects of the same type where one traces the portrait after nature and living reality.”598 The 
described character or image makes clear the differences contained within the type. These are so 
many roles in a mental theater.  
 Buchanan's description of the respective images of king and tyrant are not simply a 
rhetorical flourish upon his political theory but a central argument of this theory itself. As we 
learned in the previous chapter, the imagination gives an orientation to a passion that makes it a 
motive. The citizen's relation to power depends upon the image they have of good and evil rulers. 
But these images are not to be read out directly from the physical appearance of rulers; instead, 
the quality of their rule must be assessed in light of the respective ideal images of king and tyrant. 
For Buchanan, the truest image of the king is the law itself, an image formed by the conception of 
a ruler held in mind by the lawmakers. The law is an ideal image not of the king's body, but his 
cogitatio or thought. Moreover, it is deliberately set as an image for the natural king to gaze upon 
in order to check his “hate, fraud, love, anger, envy and all the other perturbations of his soul.”599 
The king must be bound to the law because of the weakness of human nature: “within man, the 
two cruellest monsters of greed and wrath forever wage war on reason,” [intra hominem duo 
                                                 
597 “[I]n rebus dissimmilis quae sub eodem genere continentur, similitudines quaedam inesse possunt, quae 
imprudentes facile queant in errorem inducere.” Ibid., 9. 
598 Cicero, Topica, 83. 
599 Buchanan, De Iure Regni, 20. 
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saevissima monstra—cupiditas & iracundia—perpetuum cum ratione bellum gerunt]. Here 
Buchanan develops the Italian argument: Because license can only worsen our natural weakness, 
it is necessary to “adjoyn to him a Law, which may either shew him the way, if he be ignorant, or 
bring him back again into the way, if he wander out of it.” This is even the origin of the law—a 
corrective to the lust of an ancient king.600 The image of the tyrant, by contrast, is one who does 
not use “the strength of their authority for the benefit of the people, but for fulfilling their own 
lusts.”601 They are “surrounded with arms, always fearing, always the cause of fear” (circumspecti 
armis, semper metuentis, aut metum facientis).602 He argues that the image of the fearful, 
melancholic tyrant is best painted in Seneca's Thyestes. Here, he identifies the tyrant with the Fury, 
a creature who, themselves tormented, rejoices in the torments of others.  
Why would the image of a tyrant not be the tragic figure of the tyrant himself? The Fury 
in Thyestes is the personated motive of the tyrant, not unlike the allegorical figures of the causal 
inductions discussed at the beginning of the previous chapter. When she first appears, she speaks 
in imperatives.  
 
And let no one at leisure to hate old fault, 
let a new one rise always, and not  
one in one, and while it is avenged let  
the foul deed grow.603   
 
                                                 
600 Ibid., 15.  
601 Ibid., 98. 
602 Ibid., 59. 
603 “Nec vacet cuiquam vetus/odisse crimen: semper oriatur nouum,/nec unum in uno, dumque punitur 
scelus,/crescat.” Seneca, Thyestes, 29-32.  
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This is spoken to the ghost of Tantalus, ancestor of the house of Thyestes who infamously 
served his son Pelops in a stew to the gods. Thyestes will unwittingly eat his own sons, one of 
whom is named Tantalus, in the same fashion, served to him by vengeful Atreus. Tantalus wishes 
to be fully passive; it is right for him to suffer punishment, but not to render it.604 But he will be 
sent as a “harsh vapor” [dirus vapor] to infect his descendants and in this way carry out the 
commands of Fury.605 Buchanan's image of the tyrant as Fury connects the exempla of tyrants 
through history. In his etymology of tyrant in De iure regni, Buchanan acknowledges that the 
Greek tyrannos had no negative connotation, but only accrued this over time through the example 
of the “wicked deeds” of those who adopted it.606 Fury crosses time; it transcends the rise and fall 
of any particular tyrant, but constantly engenders anew the story of a self-punishing lust.   
The humanist imagines the tyrant as a personification of furor. This bolsters my claim that 
Hobbes’ Leviathan had to overcome the collective imagination of the theater—Buchanan draws 
his image of Fury from tragedy. Indeed, he wrote the tyrant into it as well. Among his other literary 
accomplishments and ambitions, Buchanan sought to reform the theater and return it to its antique 
model. His other political work—or at least a work which took on political significance—was an 
academic Latin tyrant play named Baptistes, sive Calumnia, Tragoedia. Buchanan dedicated the 
work to James VI, his former student and future king. His words of dedication are unusually 
straightforward for the genre. Buchanan, however, wished for a humanist reformation of the 
theater, so that “young men might be moved to imitate the ancients through the common custom 
                                                 
604 Ibid., 86-7. 
605 Ibid., 87. 
606Buchanan, De Iure Regni, 65. 
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of theatrical stories.”607 His Herodes was his most concerted effort towards this goal. The “other 
neo-Latin plays (by Grimald, Schoepper, and much later, Schoenaeus) present only hypocritical 
priests” and so make Herod and Herodias more sympathetic by “suggesting that the matter is as 
much a matter of uncontrollable passion as of political strategy” and that Herod is “a drunken nit-
wit or a basically good but weak character.”608 Buchanan's stated intention is to present to the king 
an image of the tyrant as a tortured figure:  
 
Moreover that part of it may seem to concern you particularly which sets forth the 
torments of tyrants and their miseries when most they seem to flourish, a lesson 
which I deem not only advantageous for you to understand, but also necessary; so 
that you may early begin to hate that which you must always avoid.609 
 
Buchanan calls upon his “little book” as a witness to posterity; if bad counsel or his own 
license leads James into tyranny, “it should be imputed not as a failing to your teachers, but to you 
who did not obey their various warnings.”610 The play is the capstone to the education of the prince.  
                                                 
607 “Quod...adolescentes a vulgari fabularum scenicarum consuetudine ad imitationem antiquitatis provocet.” 
George Buchanan, Baptistes, sive Calumnia, Tragoedia (London: John Field, 1642), 350.  
608 Ibid., 163f.  
609 “Illud autem peculiaris ad te videri potest spectare, quod tyrannorum cruciatus, & cum florere maxime 
videntur miserias dilucide exponat. Quod te nunc intelligere non conducibilie modo, sed etiam necessarium existimo: 
ut mature odisse incipias, quod tibi semper est fugiendum.” Ibid. 
610 “Volo etiam hunc libellum apud posteros testem fore, si quid aliquando pravis consultoribus impulsus, 
vel regni licentia rectam educationem superante secus committas, non praeceptoribus, sed tibi, qui eis recte 
monentibus non sis obsecutus, id vitio vertendum esse.” Ibid., 350-1. 
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Buchanan's Baptistes dramatizes the two images of tyrant and king as competing motives 
of a ruler. In this, it is a profound reflection upon the Baroque understanding of tyranny, so much 
so that one of its English renditions was entitled Tyrannicall-government anatomized: or, A 
discourse concerning evil-councellors. Buchanan's subject was chosen from the long medieval 
institution of the Herod-play in which Herod is recognized as the epitome of a tyrant. The medieval 
Herod was a character formed from conflation.611 The dramatic figure of Herod first appeared in 
the passion plays common throughout Europe were incorporated within the liturgies of certain 
feast-days.  The action is, as a rule, extremely limited, but already in the mystery plays of the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, Herod appears as one enraged and is assigned the gestures of furor, 
as we see in the stage-direction:  
 
Then Herod, in a prophetic vision, inflamed by furor, throws his book; but his son, hearing 
the tumult, comes to pacify his father, and standing greets him.612 
 
 
It is to this that Hamlet refers when he complains that histrionic actors “out Herod Herod.” 
Herod, then, is the commonplace of a furious tyrant. But the English vernacular cycles of these 
mystery plays also show this fury as emerging from Herod's profound sorrow and fear, that is, his 
melancholy. He is shown in the character of fear when he learns of the prophecy of a new king 
                                                 
611 In the medieval genre, Herod the Great and Herod Antipas are confounded into a single character. 
Anachronism is seen in the Orientalizing of this figure, who, despite being a Jewish king, appears as a worshipper of 
“Mahound,” that is, Mohammed.  
612 “Tunc Herodes, visa prophetica, furore accensus, projiciat librum; at Filius eius, audito tumultu, procedat 
pacificaturus patrem, et stans salutet eum.” Ibid.  
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from the magi. He interprets this superstitiously, fearing it tells of a revolution.613 Even these 
relatively pale dramatizations of narrative began to develop this figure in reference to a court. A 
telling piece of dialogue comes down to us in the York cycle:  
Herod: Als for sorowe and sighte  
My woo no wighte may wryte; 
What deuell is best to do? 
 
Consolator 2: Lorde, amende youre chere  
And takis no nedles noy, 
We schall you lely lere 
That ladde for to distroye, 
Be counsaille if we cane.614 
 
Unlike in the Gospel narrative, the massacre of the innocents does not begin with Herod's 
command but rather through the sycophancy of a counselor—here, rightly termed Consolator—
who attempts to relieve the king from his woe. This marks an early transformation of the Herod-
character. When he is a histrionic raver, his actions are clearly of a piece with his wild 
intemperance. However, once his sadness and fear becomes the points of emphasis, this opens his 
motive to the influence of other factors.  
Yet when we come to Buchanan's humanist inflection of the Herod-play, we do not simply 
see him as a man in furor: the Baroque wishes to see Herod become a tyrant. This was best 
dramatized not by the bloodbath in the massacre of the innocents, but by shifting the drama to 
another story with the same figure: the events leading to the execution of John the Baptist. There 
                                                 
613 “Rex est natus fortior/Nobis et potentior./Vereor ne solio/Nos extrahet regio.” (A king is born 
stronger/Than we, and more powerful/I fear lest he shall drag us/From our royal throne.) In Joseph Quincy Adams, 
Chief Pre-Shakespearean Dramas: A Selection of Plays Illustrating the History of the English Drama from its Origin 
Down to Shakespeare (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 37. 
614 The York Cycle, Play 19, 136-143.  
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is no conclusive evidence that Buchanan's Baptistes was ever performed, but it is not unlikely that 
it was put on at the Collège de Guyenne.615 At the time of its publication, however, Buchanan 
seems to have consigned it to a closet drama to be read by a prince. The development of the Herod 
character into the “characteristic...idea of the tyrant,” encouraged a dramatization of the other 
narratives in which he featured.616 It was important for Buchanan's purposes of educating the 
prince that his Herod showed two possibilities: he could have been a good king had he not given 
way to his lusts.  
Herod’s pivot from king to tyrant dramatizes a moment in the Gospel account that gives an 
interpretation to his ambiguous sadness. Though the play follows the essential structure of the 
Gospel narrative, it is recast in Senecan dramatic form, allowing for a far greater development of 
the motives compounded in the decision to execute John the Baptist, a story that unfolds in eleven 
lines in Matthew's account and fifteen in Mark's. The two accounts left an ambiguity in Herod's 
decision to execute the prophet. Both remark that Herod was troubled and saddened by Salome's 
request. The “saddened king” (rex contristatus) of this passage developed a large Biblical 
commentary but also a moral-philosophical one. For instance, Nicholas Caussin's The Holy Court 
(La cour saincte) is a treatise on the passions, but its final book, a gloss on the example of Herod, 
becomes a novella. At each place in the story where moral interpretation of Herod's gestures, 
actions, or motives becomes available, Caussin treats it as a resource for making explicit the moral 
significance of his character. When he comes to the passage on Herod's sadness, Caussin treats 
this as an example of dissimulation and simply “affected all the marks of a true sadness with a 
                                                 
615 Ibid., 264f.  
616 Benjamin, Origin, 70. 
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hypocritical guise.”617 John Calvin, by contrast, in his Harmonia ex evangelistis tribus composita 
recognized a discrepancy between the two accounts; in Matthew, it is Herod's own desire to kill 
the Baptist, but initially refrains from doing so because he fears the reaction of the people; in Mark, 
it is Herodias' cruelty that motivates the execution.  When Calvin comes to interpret his sadness, 
then, we find not the Machiavel playing at piety while plotting a crime but a political struggle 
playing out in his breast. He does not dare to deny the “little dancer” for fear that he will gain a 
reputation for inconstancy; it is his own misplaced fear that constrains Herod's power to 
command.618 
Buchanan shows Herod’s sadness (in line with Calvin’s interpretation) as a moment of 
conflict between the competing images of the king and the tyrant. Here we see the image of the 
Law versus tyrannical Fury as a contest of maxims. He is counselled, on the one hand, to fear the 
Baptist as the leader of a popular revolt. This is the path of tyranny. At the same time, he fears that 
abdicating the rule of law and executing the prophet will lead to unrest. This is an image of the 
king whose passion is bound by the law. In one such exchange the Queen and her daughter tell 
Herod that if he allows popular assemblies (conventicula) he will not be feared.619 Herod dismisses 
                                                 
617 “Il fit paroistre au dehors avec une feinte hypocrisie toutes les marques d'une vraye tristesse. Il detestoit 
le jeu, il accusoit la fortune, il se plaignoit que le Ciel luy avoit envié sinistrement un object sur lequel il desirot faire 
paroistre tout l'amour & le respect qu'il portoit à la Maison Royale, dont il tenoit en partie son avancement. » Nicolas 
Caussin, La Cour Saincte, Ou Institution Chrestienne des Grands : Avec Les Exemples de ceux qui dans les Cours ont 
fleury en Saincteté (Lyons: Gay, 1646), 463.  
618 John Calvin, Harmonia ex tribus euangelistis composita, Matthaeo, Marco, et Lvca adivncto seorsum 
Iohanne, quòd pauca cum aliis communia habeat (Geneva: Nicolaus Barbirius & Thomas Courteau, 1563), 233. 
619 Buchanan, Baptistes, 354-5.  
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this as a good. They argue, in Senecan stichomythia (a sequence of alternating single lines) as in 
the following typical passage:  
Daughter. If the prince's pleasure is his right, then there is no law for kings, but 
kings make the law.  
Herod. Rumor will turn me from a king to a tyrant.  
Daughter. But it fears the scepter. 
Herod. It fears, and yet groans. 
Daughter. Curb it with the sword.  
Herod. Fear does not preserve kingdoms well.620 
 
Buchanan places in Salome's mouth a line from Ulpian, the Roman jurist: Quod principi 
placuit legis habet. This would have been familiar not only to the king, but to anyone paying 
attention to the political debates of the time. Particular sentences drawn from the Roman law and 
its commentary had become political shibboleths in the rule of Henry VIII.621 By placing this line 
in the mouth of Salome, Buchanan associates the Tudor and Stuart ideology of the relation between 
law and sovereign as an inversion of the truth that leads to tyranny. Hearing this, it becomes clear 
why this was the narrative of Herod's tyranny Buchanan chose to dramatize; the massacre of the 
innocents is diabolical, but one can see how the execution of a religiously eccentric prophet may 
be more easily presented as “politic,” a necessary aspect of absolute rule. Indeed, when the Queen 
reveals the plan behind her design, it is not as much directed towards revenging her own private 
                                                 
620 “Puella. Si principi quod placuit est ius, iam modum/Non regibus lex, legibus sed rex facit./Herodes. Pro 
rege fama me tyrannum perferet./Puella. At sceptra metuit./Herodes. Metuit: & garrit tamen./Puella. Compesce ferro. 
/Herodes. Regna male servat metus.” Ibid. 
621 Plucknett, “The Relations Between Roman Law and English Common Law Down to the Sixteenth 
Century: a General Survey,” University of Toronto Law Journal 3, no. 1 (1939), 46.  
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slight but is presented as a political act, an example by which to instruct the people.”622 Not only 
was the maxim of expediency the result of a corrupt philosophy but such a course of action would 
lead to the prince’s unhappiness.  
The Baroque saw the tyrant as the epitome of a body motivated, and so moved, by lust; he 
was an image of a body filled only with desire and without and impediments within it. What they 
saw, then, was motion without act—the tyrant was self-consuming, desiring what was impossible 
for him. It was this image or arbitrary lust that made Herod the perfect tyrant. The dramatization 
of Herod's rule of lust was transformed in the sixteenth century by the selection of yet another 
episode from his life, but one not found in scripture: his violent love for his wife, Mariamne. Once 
appearing on stage, it became a staple of dramatic writing.623 The popularity of this story is 
seemingly obvious when considered against the oft-struck stereotype of the Baroque taste for 
extremity. However, this story brought together each aspect of the tyrant-theme; his deviation from 
law, his unbridled libido, the inability to command the desires of others, his fall, the punishment 
through conscience. Herod's character must not merely display a paradox, but contain it. He must 
at once be both vengeful plotter and hapless abandonné of love. Benjamin's observation on 
Calderòn's Herod play also applies here: “Herod does not kill his wife out of jealousy; rather it is 
through jealousy that she loses her life.”624 It is passion that acts rather than Herod. He is so lost 
                                                 
622 Buchanan, Herodes, 1262-3.  
623 In his monograph on the subject, Maurice Valency wrote that a scholar in 1895 had “reckoned some thirty” 
distinct versions of the play, while he had found “without any difficulty, thirteen others” while “doubtless, many more, 
[are] growing dusty somewhere.” See his The Tragedies of Herod and Mariamne (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1940), vi.  
624 Benjamin, Origin, 133. 
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to jealousy that no other passion emerges and so no deliberation occurs. When we witness Herod 
having succumbed to a passion unqualified by another, he no longer has a motive but simply is 
possessed by the principle of jealousy. Josephus himself already notes that this problem in 
Antiquities in which he says that Herod seems to have a “double nature.”625  To the Renaissance 
ear, this can mean nothing other than Saturnine man, the melancholic oscillating between the 
extremes of his temperament. At the violent climax of his action, Herod no longer oscillates but 
devolves from his melancholic indecision into a manic furor.  
In the agitated movements of the sad, fearful tyrant, the Baroque theater presented a vision 
of command's impotence to fulfill desire. The anonymous tyrant of The Second Maiden's Tale 
hacking at the stone door of the tomb of the woman he has lusted after is an emblem. We can 
supply its inscriptio and subscriptio with two of his own lines: The monument woos me and My 
joys have all false hearts. The first irony is the feigned anteros, a love requited only in show, and 
so a separation of soul from body in dissimulation; the second is the absolute separation of soul 
and body in death. The disturbed tyrant seeks to preserve the corpse he lusted after, but just as he 
cannot command love or belief, he cannot command the body to live. Benjamin recognized that 
the “antithesis between the power of the ruler and his capacity to rule led to a feature peculiar to 
the Trauerspiel” or mourning-play. Its representation is “indecisiveness of the tyrant.”626 The 
tyrant, like in Xenophon's Hiero, is not able to enjoy erotic love because of his suspicion that all 
love him out of fear—they have false hearts. This suspicion then leads him to destroy his loves. 
But his desire does not cease at their death—even the grave, the monument, woos.  
                                                 
625 Josephus, Antiquities, 16.5.4.  
626 Benjamin, Origin, 70-1. 
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Bosse's man wrapped in malice is an homage to the iconology of the Baroque melancholic 
tyrant. Like Herod, we see him wrapped in the remembrance of loves he has, in some way, 
destroyed. He too is moved about by the counsel of a sycophant, his pet ape. In Buchanan's 
Herodes, the Second Maiden's Tale, and throughout the tradition of the Herod-play, we discover 
an image of the tyrant's fury which we see develop out of his erotic libido. His lust is a fearful 
image. It was such a fearful image that was used to argue for the just deposition of a tyrant, as a 
tyrant could only be recognized through their resemblance to an image of the past. In Bosse's 
engraving, the image of the ruler's lust is not fearful, but ridiculous. He uses the Machiavellian 
arcana of tyranny only in order to excuse his many dalliances. The unpredictability of the 
tyrannical passions arises from the melancholy problematic—the tyrant is not embedded within 
the normal social constraints that allow for the calculation of passions required by the civil 
imagination. Instead his passions burst forth and are justified after the fact through an appeal to 
the topical causes of love-melancholy and zelotypia, melancholic jealousy. Bosse’s poem plays 
upon these arguments that lessen the agency of the king from his actions. This is the perverse 
underside of Hobbes’ doctrine of representation and authorization. Just as the sovereign is able to 
deputize others to act in his person the same process can be reversed. By assigning the causes of 
his passion to others he distances himself from responsibility for them. Bad rule is not strong 
government but the deliquescing of sovereign power into the personal improprieties of the 
representative who, to avoid consequences, makes himself ineffectual by diminishing his own 
authority. The Man Wrapped in Malice is not an author of even his own actions—Leviathan seeks 
to be the cause of all the movements in the commonwealth.  
The frontispiece of Leviathan is not the vision of a personal cult of power but the 
dissolution of the fear of the personal passions of the ruler. Though this new monster retains its 
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monarch’s face, Hobbes’ Leviathan is perhaps the first instantiation of an image of the state as an 
impersonal power, divided into various civil powers that cannot be identified with any single 
individual though incorporated into a new one: the commonwealth. This is the “answer” Bosse's 
mantled man gives to the Leviathan. If in it we see the revelation of the sovereign person's true 
character, this only shows that the power of Leviathan is distinct from the character of the 
individual who occupies its sovereign position. The state does not operate because of the passions 
within the sovereign but is mobilized by the “visible Power” that keeps the multitude in awe. The 
state Leviathan imagines is an image of a ruler that can serve as the cause of fear without being 
subject to it. Indeed, as the elided line from the frontispiece's inscription reads, he was made to 
fear nothing. Bosse's image is a joke in that it gives the lie to Leviathan's face, for the real person 
who bears it can hardly command awe. At the same time, it shows the success of Leviathan: we 
do not fear the real person but the artificial man that is the state.  
Hobbes' theory of the state is not only an articulation of the conditions of legitimacy and 
the division of power among its administrative functions. It is also an attempt to replace the theater 
with a new culture of collective imagination. When Hobbes published Leviathan, the theatres were 
closed. The Puritan Interregnum government was opposed to plays, ungodly entertainments that 
attracted lewd behavior. But though the doors of the theaters proper were closed, Hobbes 
recognized that the state itself was a kind of theater, premised upon belief in the idea of a sovereign 
person. In Leviathan, he defined a “Person” as “the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and 
in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other.”627 The 
                                                 
627 EW, 3.148. 
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sovereign representative was the artificial person of the people.628 The people were the “authors” 
of his actions.  
But insofar as the Leviathan was to command awe and so transform melancholic fear into 
civil obedience, it was necessary that the imagined character of the state also be personated. And 
indeed, Hobbes tells us that even a “meer Figment of the brain, may be Personated.”629 Where 
Buchanan had instructed his King to imagine the tyrant as a figure in a play so that he may avoid 
it, Hobbes sought to turn the imagination of the King into a real power. The state Leviathan 
imagines is an image of a civil order that can serve as the cause of fear without being subject to it. 
We do not fear the motives of the real person (the sovereign representative) but the punishments 
of the artificial man that is the state. The image of the Leviathan is the will of the people, for it 
should be the last, or next to last, image in all deliberation of popular civic action. 
                                                 
628 David Runciman has argued that the Leviathan should not be understood as an artificial person but rather 
as a “person by fiction.” While I am convinced by his argumentation that the state is indeed a “person by fiction,” I 
remain skeptical as to why this would be incompatible with an “artificial person.” Runciman relies upon the 
philoigloical fact that Hobbes does not use this phrase in “later accounts,” a point that seems irrelevant to my lights. 
See Runciman, “What Kind of Person is Hobbes’ State?” Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2000), 268-78.  
629 Ibid., 3.150. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
In 1720, an enormous amount of speculation inflated the South Sea Company, a joint-stock 
company with a profitless monopoly over South American trade. Although Helen J. Paul's 
monograph on the topic seeks to correct the lingering conception that the Bubble was caused by a 
collective imaginative mania, this was nevertheless the dominant contemporary understanding of 
the event and the key to its moral significance.630  Because the political situation prevented any 
trade from happening, the returns the South Sea Company was able to provide depended upon 
investments in government debt. This scheme was unsustainable and led to the collapse of the 
stock price in 1720, ruining many would-be speculators. This event came to be known as the South 
Sea Bubble.  
The Bubble caused a major scandal as disappointed and ruined investors demanded an 
account of what had caused the crisis. The standard explanations of cause placed the responsibility 
on the imagined hopes of the investors themselves. Sir John Blunt, the founder and director of the 
South Sea Company, argued that a “Cause of the Misfortune” of the Bubble was the “Distemper 
of the Times.” The “Reason of Mankind in General” was captivated by the “fond Opinion of being 
rich at once.”631 This, of course, omitted his own role in promising dividends of up to fifty percent. 
Blunt, sanctimoniously, says that this truth “needs only an Appeal to every Man's own Conscience 
                                                 
630 Helen J. Paul, The South Sea Bubble: An Economic History of its Origins and Consequences (London; 
New York: Taylor & Francis, 2013).  
631 Sir John Blunt, A True State of the South-Sea Scheme: as it was first form'd, &c…and an examination of 
the conduct of the directors (London: Printed by J. Peele, 1722), 76. 
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and to desire him to reflect on the Operations of his own Mind at that Time and what he did and 
saw and knew to be done by others.”632 In the immediate aftermath, the House of Commons 
debated the appropriate course of action to take to uphold the “public credit.” At the bequest of 
King George III, an inquiry was begun that “to inquire into the Causes of these Misfortunes, and 
apply the proper Remedies for restoring and fixing Publick Credit upon such solid and lasting 
Foundations, as may effectually give Ease and Quiet to the Minds of his Majesty's Subjects.”633 
Sir Robert Walpole argued against a search into the causes of the distemper and instead proposed 
immediate remedy. One Lord Molesworth opposed this, saying that “before they consider'd of the 
proper Remedies, they ought to enquire into the Cause and Nature of the Distemper: That it is with 
the Body Politick, as with the Body Natural.”634 Walpole replied that “if the City of London were 
on Fire, they did not doubt but all wise Men would be for extinguishing the Flames, and preventing 
the spreading of the Conflagration, before they inquir'd into the Incendiaries.”635 When on 
December 19th, Sir Joseph Jekyll proposed creating a select committee to investigate the causes 
of the bubble, Walpole led the successful resistance of the motion by arguing that such an action 
“would take up a great deal of Time, and that the publick Credit being in a bleeding Condition, 
they ought to apply a speedy Remedy to it.”636 Walpole's suggested action was to engraft nine 
                                                 
632 Ibid.  
633 The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons of England. : With the speeches, debates, and 
conferences, between the Two Houses ; through every session from the year 1660. Faithfully collected from the best 
Authorities, and Compared with the Journals of Parliament (London: 1741), 222. 
634 Ibid., 220. 
635 Ibid., 221.  
636 Ibid., 225.  
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million pounds into both the South Sea Stock and the East India Company. He soon after became 
the first Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, largely due to his handling of the crisis. The 
modern party system, developed under Walpole's leadership, was partly an outcome of the disarray 
and confusion of the South Sea Bubble.  
Financial crises bring forth the peculiar dynamics of group affects that resist the simple 
situational accounts offered in the traditional theories of the passions. In the South Sea Bubble, the 
surge and plunge of the stock reflected a collective passion of enthusiasm followed by fear. No 
one can answer why the stock rose and fell at precisely those times. Indeed, it is the very 
unpredictability of the moment of the market’s surge or collapse that offers the incentive for 
investment. Everyone wishes to be ahead of the situation perceived by others. Yet the outcomes 
of these investments do lead to real and highly charged emotional situations of windfall and ruin, 
not to mention the effects of a large crash on all those others who though they did not invest their 
own wealth may be materially effected by its “negative externalities.”  
As the South Sea Bubble occurred before the crises of financial markets had become a 
normalized fact of capitalist economic life, the emotional dynamics resulting from it were not 
distinguished from those that caused it. It is no surprise, then, that satirists turned to melancholic 
distempers of the imagination as an explanatory hypothesis. As can be seen in both the 
Parliamentary debate and in Blunt's apologia, the Bubble episode was frequently represented in 
the literature that emerged around it as a “distemper” of the times, one in which a disordered public 
imagination led people into passionate confusion. Nor was this concept always taken 
metaphorically. Defoe's criticism of another “bubble,” the Mississippi scheme, was entitled The 
Chimera, recalling the typical example of a thing possible only in the imagination. He believed 
that the “Arbitrary Power” of the French sovereign  
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[r]ais'd an inconceivable Species of meer Air and Shadow, realizing Fancies and 
Imaginations, Visions and Apparitions, and making the meer speculations of Things, act 
all the Parts, and perform all the Offices of the Things themselves; and thus in a moment 
their Debts are all vanish'd, the Substance is answer'd by the Shadow; and the People of 
France are made the Instruments of putting the Cheat upon themselves, the Name of the 
thing is made an Equivalent to the Thing it self, transposing the Debts from the King to 
themselves, and being contented to Discharge the Publick, owe the Money to one 
another.637  
 
Defoe here identifies the central problem of financial speculation as the separation of the 
imagination of things with the “Offices of the Things themselves.” As we saw in Chapter 4, effects 
of the “strong imagination” associated with melancholics were criticized as errors of interpretation.  
This helps to explain why the “distemper” from the Bubbles was linked to the symptoms of 
hypochondriasis and the vapors, gendered diagnoses of melancholy.  
In the attempt to discover a cause for a collective passion “without apparent occasion,” the 
theorists of the Bubble took up the position of the Baroque medical doctor standing before the 
melancholic patient. Looking into the passion they seek to discover the passion’s imaginative 
object. Yet these objects were all commodities, things hoped for but not acquired. The risible 
character of these imaginations was put to great use in satire. Indeed, it was in satire that 
melancholy was explicitly invoked. Among the many “Bubble” satires written in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis, we find one appearing in the genre of medical “observations” by the 
pseudonymous physician Sir John Midriff, entitled Observations on the Spleen and Vapours: 
Containing Remarkable Cases of Persons of Both Sexes, and all Ranks, from the Aspiring Director 
to the humble Bubbler, who have been miserably affected with those melancholy disorders since 
                                                 
637 Daniel Defoe, The Chimera, or, The French way of paying national debts laid open: being an impartial 
account of the proceedings in France, for raising a paper credit and settling the Mississipi stock (London: T. Warner, 
1720), 6-7. 
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the Fall of the South-Sea, and other Publick Stocks. The doctor writes in his introduction that the 
observations are “calculated for the relief of those Persons who date their Splenetick and 
Vapourish disorders from the melancholy circumstances of the time.”638 The text stays remarkably 
close to its pretended genre of medical observations, giving great detail about many individual 
cases of “spleen.” In one case, the doctor arrives to find a “Mr. Pitfal” who fears that he is at the 
brink of death. Pitfal is already attended to by his neighbor and his cousin, a clergyman, though 
the doctor calls them “Job’s Comforters” for not talking him back from this delusion. Then he 
learns that Pitfal was doing “tolerably well” until the neighbor informed him that “the Stocks had 
fallen that Day above 30 per Cent.” The doctor responds by making “several Arguments” on how 
the “Price of all such things were precarious; that they were up one Day, and down another, and 
that in time they perhaps might rise as high as ever, and let the worst come, they would hardly sink 
so low as some People imagin’d.” The doctor prescribes a “continued Course of frugal 
Management in his Affairs at Home.” In addition to being a slow but sure way to recoup his losses, 
his “continual Employment” will help to “refresh his mind” with “the Succession of one easy and 
useful Project after another.” Yet despite these long speeches, the doctor admits that he can 
“discover nothing” that Pitfal had “aim’d at, but what was very reasonable, and what any Man in 
the same Condition would have done as well as he.”639  
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The case concludes with a debate between the doctor and the clergyman about motives of 
the Government’s recent plan to absorb the South Sea Company into their capital stock and to 
repay the investors’ principal with interest. The clergyman asks what “Motive could prompt those 
persons, who were already remarkable for their vast Possessions, to toil and struggle, and to watch 
every Opportunity of buying and selling to the greatest Advantage, as if they were the poorest 
Creatures upon Earth, toiling and labouring for Bread.” While the doctor holds that this was to 
increase the “Public Credit” the clergyman sermonizes that Avarice drives them as an “evil 
Humor” that runs through the whole civic body. But Pitfal, who “was deeps’t engag’d in the Affair, 
and had hitherto understood but little of the matter” stops the clergyman and asks him “[w]hat he 
judg’d be the Reason why the Stocks had risen so high? And why, all of a sudden, they should fall 
so low?”640 In an explanation similar to Hobbes’ accounts of collective passions, the clergyman 
hypothesizes that the “Eyes of all Persons” were turned upon those “principal Members” in the 
scheme as an example that “could not avoid being strictly follow’d.” When they pulled their 
investments, all others followed suit and sank the Public Credit lower than it should have gone. 
But at the same time, there was hope that the Stock may be restored, as the “Fear of Losing” would 
now hold off “many for some Time of becoming purchasers,” and what’s more, as the “Whole 
Nation was now in a manner link’d” to the affair, “it was not therefore improbable but such prudent 
Measures would be taken as would not only in time raise it to a moderate Height but also support 
it.”641 The episode would only be an instruction in civic morality, reminding those involved that 
“they were all Members of the same Body, at nothing in the End turn so much to their real Account, 
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as consulting the Interest of other Persons, as well as their own.”642 Pitfal is cheered, and the work 
concludes.  
Pitfal’s question—Why did the stock rise and fall?—is the now familiar melancholic 
problem of a passion that has no apparent occasion though now it is the individual’s passion but 
that of the “whole Nation.” The doctor still gives Pitfal the advice he would to any melancholic 
though recognizing that he has already followed a reasonable course of action. The clergyman is 
the one who recognizes that the cause must be attributed to something collective. The melancholic 
“evil Humor” of avarice that runs through the body politic is avarice. This is still imagined, 
however, in the rest of the work as an imaginative malady on the part of the individual. The familiar 
infinite causes of melancholy illness now begin to manifest a new universality: the commodity-
form. One woman is “disappointed of a Diamond Ring, a new white Damask Gown, and a large 
Silver Cup.”643 One man promises his wife “a new Damask-Bed...an easy Chair...with a Carpet 
for the Dining-Room” and is then driven “into the Bubbles” to fulfill these wishes.644 The domestic 
drama complicated by speculative possibilities deteriorates into nervous disorders of the 
individuals. Midriff's send-up of the bad investments of the “vaporous” speculators takes the idea 
of a melancholic object of imagination and inverts it: although everyone had their own imagination 
of desire, these are, in the end, all equivalent. They all desire luxury. The imagination is 
distempered, but this is now a collective disorder. But this satirical doctor moralizes the suffering 
of his melancholic patients, for though “[t]heir Sufferings were great indeed,” they “would not 
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have been so…had they not ty'd themselves in a thousand ridiculous Engagements, and, upon a 
false Presumption of being rich, run into many unnecessary Debts and Expences, which might well 
have been spar'd, till their Affairs were brought to a more certain Issue.”645 Although the 
moralizing message is clear—look beyond your own interest while prudently managing your own 
affairs—we may wonder whether these imperatives are consistent in the financial capitalism that 
reared its head in public so clearly in the Bubble. 
This study began with an argument that, in the eighteenth century, the problematic of 
melancholy was eclipsed by a medical program that sought to reduce causality. Here, in these 
works that associate “vapours” with financial speculation, we see a similar attempt to collapse the 
“motives” of those who look for occasions of personal advantage to the moral vice of avarice or 
vanity. Indeed, the very term “bubble” brings us back within the ambit of the relation of passion 
to motive. As we saw in Chapter 3, the commonplace of a pursuit that is a bubble was a melancholy 
topic, a means for criticizing motives. When Jaques moralizes on the solider who seeks the “bubble 
reputation/Even in the cannon's mouth,” he stands at a distance from the world of action and 
critiques the worldly desire for honor because of its transience and triviality. The eighteenth-
century application of this notion to a newly financialized public sphere transformed its meaning. 
The OED's earliest recorded use of “bubble” in a sense related to speculative investment comes 
from a satirical work of 1700, entitled Labour in vain: or, What signifies little or nothing. In an 
introductory dialogue imagined between the book's Printer and Author, the Printer asks what the 
title is to be. When the author responds, the Printer laments “Then I'm like to make a very hopeful 
Bargain this Morning; and grow Rich like a Jacobite, that would part with his Property, for a 
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Speculative Bubble.”646 The Author is ready with a retort: “Be not angry; for the same Estimate 
and Epithet the greatest Divines give to the whole World.”647 He here refers to what is now familiar 
to us as the vanitas topos from Ecclesiastes, omnia vanitas. But the satire inverts the significance: 
rather than a criticism of worldly action as vanity, as we saw with Jaques in Chapter 2, the vantias 
topos provides comfort: everything is in vain, so continue on as before. The financial “bubble” is 
the collective effect of a melancholic imagination.  
That the critique of imagination proliferated in satire was no accident. Nowhere is the 
connection between the genre and its object of attack more clearly elaborated than in Shaftesbury's 
A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm. In tackling this subject, Shaftesbury recalled Henry More's 
Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, discussed in Chapter 1. In Shaftesbury's famous letter, we still find 
that “[t]here is a Melancholy which accompanys all Enthusiasm,”648 and that “till the Melancholy 
be remov'd, and the Mind at liberty to hear what can be said against the Ridiculousness of an 
Extreme in either way.”649 Yet whereas More's conception of enthusiasm was a “misconceit of 
being Inspir'd” caused by an inflammation of black bile, Shaftesbury means by melancholy any 
presumption of seriousness. This is dangerous, because “[g]ravity is of the very essence of 
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imposture.”650 The remedy of satirical laughter, then, is not that it distracts the mind of the 
melancholic and activates her sluggish spirits, but instead that it diminishes the object of the 
imagination. We only know whether things are ridiculous “by applying the Ridicule, to see 
whether it will bear or no.”651 Satire becomes a genre for testing prudence. This is a wholly 
different laughter than Burton's Democritus Junior, who laughs at the world for its confusion of 
vain endeavors. Shaftesbury's satirical laughter seeks to eliminate melancholy and hold all things 
lightly.  
The notion of imagination that was used to explain the Bubble was part of a 
reconceptualization of the imagination itself that disarticulated it from the passions and its 
interpretive function. Robert Mitchell has argued that “when early eighteenth-century 
commentators attributed the fluctuations of public credit and the stability of the state to the 
imagination, they were not applying an existing notion of the imagination to new economic 
institutions but rather inventing a new concept.”652  The publication of the stock price's rises and 
falls in “publications such as John Freke’s The Price of the Several Stocks (1714–22) and John 
Castaing Jr.’s Course of the Exchange (1697–1810), as well as the stock listings included in most 
early eighteenth-century newspapers,” as the unexplained or speculatively accounting of the 
movements of these prices “highlighted the extent to which these paper instruments were part of a 
system that operated beyond state control, responsive only to collective “Opinion” or “Fancy.”“653 
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The eighteenth-century insouciance towards the inner workings of the imagination corresponds to 
the desire to assign a whole set of collective errors, moral, religious, and political to the 
individual’s mental life. Collective passion is reduced to the single principle of imaginative excess 
just as in medicine melancholic symptomatology was reduced to the principle regulating the 
animal economy or its conceptual cousins.  
Defoe, a complex figure in this history, was at once a frequent opponent of the “stock-
jobbers” and a public propagandist for the South Sea scheme. In his 1722 historical novel, A 
Journal of the Plague Year, Defoe includes a lengthy critique of public imagination. The general 
character of fear that comes with the plague leads people to false imaginations; the “terrors and 
apprehensions of the people led them into a thousand weak, foolish, and wicked things, which they 
wanted not a sort of people really wicked to encourage them to.” He discusses people's 
superstitious sightings of ghosts, fear of comets as portents, and even the classical commonplace 
of phantasia, discovering figures in a cloud. Defoe's narrator ascribes this to “hypochondriac 
fancies” that “represent Ships, armies, battles in the firmament.” His healthy, prudential advice 
comes in the form of a couplet: “Till steady eyes the exhalations solve, And all to its first matter, 
cloud, resolve.”654 The “first matter” must be the end of any chain of thoughts, for in it, and it 
alone, is the truth of the situation. In one passage, Defoe's narrator gives an extensive account of 
his encounter with the melancholic perceptions of a woman looking at a cloud:  
I think it was in March, seeing a crowd of people in the street, I joined with them 
to satisfy my curiosity, and found them all staring up into the air to see what a 
woman told them appeared plain to her, which was an angel clothed in white, with 
a fiery sword in his hand, waving it or brandishing it over his head. She described 
every part of the figure to the life, showed them the motion and the form, and the 
poor people came into it so eagerly, and with so much readiness; 'Yes, I see it all 
plainly,' says one; 'there's the sword as plain as can be.' Another saw the angel. One 
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saw his very face, and cried out what a glorious creature he was! One saw one thing, 
and one another. I looked as earnestly as the rest, but perhaps not with so much 
willingness to be imposed upon; and I said, indeed, that I could see nothing but a 
white cloud, bright on one side by the shining of the sun upon the other part. The 
woman endeavoured to show it me, but could not make me confess that I saw it, 
which, indeed, if I had I must have lied. But the woman, turning upon me, looked 
in my face, and fancied I laughed, in which her imagination deceived her too, for I 
really did not laugh, but was very seriously reflecting how the poor people were 
terrified by the force of their own imagination. However, she turned from me, called 
me profane fellow, and a scoffer; told me that it was a time of God's anger, and 
dreadful judgements were approaching, and that despisers such as I should wander 
and perish.655 
 
Defoe's narrator is not only unconvinced by the woman's ekphrasis of the cloudy omen, 
but he cannot even perceive it. His eyes have lost the imaginative capacity to see the cloud as 
anything but a cloud. In this, the woman's judgment is quite right: he is a “profane fellow” in a 
literal sense, as the hieroglyphs of past experience have fallen into a profane assumption of mere 
existence. This critique of public imagination was of a piece with concerns about financialization. 
Indeed, how Defoe describes the astrologers in his Plague Year is nearly identical with his earlier 
polemic against the stock-jobbers: “'tis a compleat System of Knavery; that 'tis a Trade founded in 
Fraud, born of Deceit, and nourished by Trick, Cheat, Wheedle, Forgeries, Falshoods, and all sorts 
of Delusions; Coining false News, this way good, that way bad; whispering imaginary Terrors, 
Frights, Hopes, Expectations, and then preying upon the Weakness of those, whose Imaginations 
they have wrought upon, whom they have either elevated or depress'd.”656 Imagination is no longer 
the condition for experience but precisely that subset of belief for which one has no experience.  
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Though it may first seem strange to conclude this dissertation on early modern melancholy 
with a story of financial speculation, the South Sea Bubble provides another view, alongside the 
medical history charted in the first chapter, of the eclipse of the problematic that has concerned 
me in this study. There I argued that the figure of the melancholic was no longer seen against the 
against the absent occasion of their passion but through a positive nosology of symptoms. At the 
same time, the South Sea Bubble was read as a problem of imaginative misprision of a situation. 
Now, however, it is not that the melancholic holds a different interpretation of their passion than 
others, as we saw in the theater in Chapter 4. In a certain sense, the aftermath of the South Sea 
Bubble crisis shifted public discourse to regard any interpretation of a situation as part of an 
imaginative folly. Just as Defoe's narrator's inability to see a figure in the cloud is a sign of his 
prudence, so too a limitation of the imagination to the realm of fiction changed the hegemonic 
narrative of what it meant to be in the world. What is nebulous in a situation should be seen only 
as that: the situation simply is cloudy.  
But if the clear-eyed satirist looking into the social collective moved by the whims of the 
market imagination is in the position of the doctor, what can be said for the collective melancholy 
of those unhappy subjects that are afflicted with its effects? Today, none of us can in good faith 
stand to the side of at once pervasive and inarticulable forces of global capitalism and say that we 
can look upon it as someone unaffected. We are all the melancholics of the South Sea Bubble. 
Perhaps, then, there is a melancholy topics for our collective passions that cannot be tethered to a 
single situation. While the scope of this project has limited its historical sources to primarily the 
contexts of 1580-1660, it is inevitable that anyone who has moved through these thickets wants to 
arrive at some clearing. What does this have to do with our present moment? How does this 
problem, emerging from a literary, medical, religious, and political context distant from our own 
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bring clarity to the ever-urgent problems of our own time? Though it is not possible to fully answer 
such questions in this conclusion, I do wish to provide some guiding propositions that would take 
this project into present concerns.  
Our own present moment is also “cloudy,” both in a prevailing mood of generalized 
discontent and an inability to articulate the causes of this discontent. The World Health 
Organization estimates that there are 300 million sufferers of depression globally, making it the 
largest single cause of disability in the world.657 While the reality of depression cannot be 
reasonably doubted, often the assertion that depression is real is accompanied by an insistence that 
it is a “biological” phenomenon. Attempts to articulate the social, political, and economic causes 
of depression are framed as “factors” that trigger this biological response. In this way, they are 
only accounted for as indirect and partial factors of depression. Nevertheless, there is mounting 
evidence that shows the close connection between common realities and individual mental health 
outcomes. A study in the British Journal of Psychiatry shows evidence of 10,000 “economic 
suicides” following upon the 2007 global financial crisis.658 At the beginning of their report, the 
authors cite the nineteenth-century French sociologist, Émile Durkheim, who wrote in his 1897 
book Suicide that “[i]t is a well-known fact that economic crises have an aggravating effect on 
suicidal tendency.”659  
While many have looked to the history of melancholia in order to better understand the 
modern epidemic of depression, this is not the primary goal of my project. Instead, the 
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reformulation of the melancholic problematic that appears in the modern era is best captured in 
Durkheim's theory of anomie developed most fully in his work on suicide. It is hard not to hear 
the early modern concern with idleness leading to melancholic disorders of the imagination when 
we read Durkheim saying that “Inactive or disrupted group life is seen to create unregulated 
individuals with “insatiable appetites” and “fevered imaginations.”660 But Durkheim recognized 
that anomie was not the product of an abnormal psychology, but instead its primary contributing 
factor was economic progress and its accompanying disasters.661  
Like Burton's definition of melancholy as a passion “without any apparent occasion,” 
anomie is a negative cause: it is the privation of nomos, the absence of a rule. It is the result of 
changes in social relations. As a new order of relations come into being, new ideas of these 
relations only develop slowly. This leads to an ideological disorientation. Durkheim assigned the 
cause of anomie principally to economic progress, because it “principally consist[s] in freeing 
industrial relations from all regulation.”662 According to Durkheim's theory, anomie itself becomes 
the motive for the anomic suicide or its correlative, the anomic homicide. The inability to articulate 
one's social position leads to an intense but undirected frustration that under certain circumstances 
breaks forth into violence against self and others. 
If a collective anomie describes the feeling of a population, the ability to articulate a cause 
for this common feeling becomes a source of power. Dangerous political formations like 
antisemitism are organized by recognizing a common emotional distress that is not able to be 
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accounted for and assigning responsibility for it to another group. Heinrich von Treitschke's early 
slogan of German antisemitism, Die Juden sind unser Unglück, or, “the Jews are our sorrow,” is a 
dark formulation of what occurs when the melancholic position of remaining uncertain about one's 
own Unglück collapses. But the formula's political power begins with its conclusion: unser 
Unglück. Within the slogan of hate we find a promise, already accepted as a fact, of fellow-feeling, 
a recognition that one's sorrow is a common bond with others. The first step is to establish that a 
feeling is common, but its crystallization into a political formation requires that a common cause 
of this feeling become accepted. It is the double movement—recognizing a common sadness and 
assigning it a cause—that organizes passion into the inchoate beginnings of a political party.  
Should anyone be in doubt, contemporary satire clarifies the connection between individual 
experiences of stress, anxiety, and depression and the possibility of this becoming a political force. 
In 2010, the Onion posted a satirical video titled “Overcome Stress By Visualizing It As A Greedy, 
Hook-Nosed Race Of Creatures.” Imitating the vapid promotion of self-help literature on morning 
talk shows, an invited guest trains the two anchors in “problem visualization.” She explains the 
process: “The first thing I like to do is imagine my money-related stress is the most disgusting 
terrifying creature I can think of. I like to imagine an ugly, greasy little creature with a hooked 
nose and oily black hair.” She calls him the “Grabbler because he's a greedy little monster who 
wants to grab-bel up all my money.” An anti-Semitic cartoon appears on the monitor behind them. 
She then instructs them to think of “all the problems your Grabbler is causing: he invented interest 
rates like the ones on your credit card, he's taking the jobs because grabbers only hire their own 
kind.” The “stress” is solved by imagining the Grabbler, “slowly disintegrating like a pile of ashes 
blown away by a purifying wind, and now you're in a peaceful meadow full of lilies swaying in a 
gentle breeze.” The dark humor of this satire is further darkened beyond humor when we see that 
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the highest-voted comment on the video, from user monolyth421, with 2,800 likes, reads, “How 
is it satire if it's true?”  
What use can we make of a history of melancholy for our life? My primary contention here 
is that the history of passion is the counterpoint to an insistence on the immediacy of feeling. The 
stakes are the interpretation of our emerging present. Rather than seeing a negative passion whose 
cause is unclear simply as a moment of ignorance, the articulation of a melancholy topics worked 
out in Chapter 2 shows that there are alternatives to causal explanation in the articulation of a 
passion. The justification of melancholic passion through the melancholy topics carved out a 
critical subject position. Although from the conventional viewpoint, the melancholic does not 
participate in action and withdraws into contemplation, I argue that melancholic rhetoric shows 
the contingency of conventional motives and in doing so opens a possibility for imagining new 
motives and forms of action.  
Yet the study of history fails to understand its subjects if it sees its subjects as also operating 
within the rubric of historicity, for it presumes that every orientation to action is either premised 
upon some version of historical understanding or reactive to historical content that it fails to grasp 
in its proper context. In his famous essay on the “Uses and Abuses of History for Life,” Nietzsche 
describes three uses and abuses of history for life: the antiquarian derives it from the details of the 
artifact, the monumentalist from the rule that derived from the example, and the critical historian 
from the oppositions derived from genealogy.663 Each of these positions has a privileged method 
for drawing significance from history.  
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We can blithely say that opposition to historical meaning is, of course, “historical,” in the 
sense that it emerges in historical context. But if history is to mean more than an account of past 
existents, we must recognize that our own modes of historical understanding are regularly resisted 
by the very artifacts we seek to understand. A recent movement in this direction has been the call, 
made so consistently, that we must attend to the “materiality” of these objects. We are to study the 
worm-eaten texts as if we were the worms who ate them. Yet such a position reproduces a historical 
position that it fails to understand. What is being practiced in this attention to material is very often 
a form of contemplation, one that seeks to shuffle off the historical coil of context through the 
hope of some illumination from matter. The contemplation of vanitas paintings, and, as I suggest 
we must assume, complementary practices of contemplating objects, was antihistorical: all action, 
both past and future, was already vain. This gave rise to an antihistorical mood in which past and 
future are felt through a similitude and so do not possess distinct qualities. In the same way, we do 
well to recall Durkheim's nostrum in Suicide: “The entire morality of progress and perfection is 
thus inseparable from a certain amount of anomie.”664 If the ultimate image of action's meaning, 
and therefore the meaning of history, is reducible to a forward line, the significance of any 
individual action is reducible to a point upon that line. Progress, as an image, fails to be a motive. 
Indeed, “progress” takes the locomotive direction that is implied in the early modern theory of 
motive and duplicates it within the imagination. Instead of an orientation, this leaves us 
disoriented.  
I argue we should attend to the imaginative orientation of our present moment. These 
orientations do not read themselves as historical objects but rather oppose the attempt to historicize 
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their action. That is, they do not attribute the results of action simply to historical causes. Where 
there is historical understanding, there is also an anti-history which opposes its mode of 
understanding. I name these three modes, respectively, the paranoiac, the apocalyptic, and the 
melancholic. Anti-history develops as a reaction to the imposition of historical meaning upon 
action. In this opposition, present orientations are anti-historical. As in the case of Nietzsche’s 
three “uses and abuses” of history, I too read each anti-historical position as having a privileged 
object of understanding: the paranoiac looks to the cipher, the apocalyptic to the sign, and the 
melancholic to the emblem. I will sketch, in broad strokes, a character of each position.   
To the paranoiac, the meaning of history is immanent, but it is hidden, obscured by a set 
of appearances that wish to hide the aggressive and malevolent intentions of things. The struggle 
in history is fought over meaning's encipherment and deciphering. The revealed meaning is not 
that of another, future time, as it is for the apocalyptist, but instead a restitution and advertisement 
of the motives behind all things. For everywhere that one might find purposiveness the paranoiac 
discovers purpose. History is both the emplotment of intriguers' intentions and their duplicitous 
communication that disguises them. History is its own kind of alien life, haunting and antagonizing 
those who are forced to live in it.  
From the apocalyptic position, history is a quality of time, but not its essential character. 
History may very well be progressing upon its own terms, but within history a moment of 
transcendence can emerge, presaging the meanings of all previous things that will be revealed after 
history. Historical understanding is here a struggle to overcome history, felt as an obscuring, dark 
force over the reign of truth and light. The sign is what emerges in history that shows its meaning 
is not historical. But the distance between history and its meaning cannot be traversed except 
through a radical violence. The violence that is within history is of a different order, for it follows 
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from the vanity that attends all ambition that cannot bring about its own transcendence. 
Apocalyptic violence seeks to kill history itself; it is in this way that the paranoiacs often make the 
prophet of end times their leader. The fearful paranoiacs seek deliverance from a strange, 
oppressive force but their prophets are motivated by the vision of a new force that will obsolesce 
the life of the present.  
Anti-history is an elaboration of passions that, in their mundane character, are common to 
us all: the fear of the paranoiac and the hope of the apocalyptic. Hobbes and Spinoza both argued 
that hope and fear were only two moments of the same passion, yet they failed to see that the 
imaginative component of each was different. If it is true that the provisionality of hope's desire 
means that it always contains a logical fear of the non-realization of its hope, the content of hope 
is not this provisionality but the image that it throws forward, not only into the future but also in 
its interpretation of the meaning of the past and present. Apocalyptic hope is an image of time's 
meaning. In this, it is not the simple complement of the paranoiac's fear. Fear, as Aristotle reminds 
us in the Rhetoric, causes us to deliberate. The decay of place and time that brings the image into 
the imagination means that the feared image cannot simply be fled: it first must be placed back 
into a perception of the present. The paranoiac's image is potentially anywhere, lurking behind an 
appearance. In this, the feared image becomes the hermeneutic of what is most present. The mood 
of presence becomes one of foreboding: the simply existing has less of an ontic claim than what 
can foretell, presage, or wink. Indeed, the existent is often discounted as mere appearance and in 
this way it is not to be accounted for as presence at all.  
To the emblematic position, history is the dead part of nature. But it is through the muteness 
of this death that it gives meaning to the living. Both natural and human history are linked by the 
death of what they study. The anatomy of melancholy is both gross and comparative. Burton's 
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topical organization of melancholy allowed for this non-phenomenon to appear and gave it an 
order necessary for its contemplation. But is also made possible the contemplation of its similitudes 
through time. Where the trope of the similitudo temporum gives to the monumental historian a 
warrant for taking history as an example, it functions as an anti-history for the melancholic. The 
similitude of times is not a reduction of their meanings to an underlying principle, but an opening 
of history as a field fallow for mutual illuminations. Emblematic meaning imposes no causal 
relation between the nodes of its similitudes. Indeed, any causal relation would collapse the 
emblem's significance.  
The emblematic position can be variously characterized as hopeful or fearful in that it 
imagines a better or worse future, but its mood is never either. Emblematic imagination suspends 
anticipation for an experience of savoring. In this, it sublimates the erotic into all things.  Sappho's 
famous characterization of erotic love as γλυκύπικρον, bittersweet, is precisely what the early 
modern manuals of contemplation instruct the contemplator to discover in experience. In Joseph 
Hall's The Art of Divine Meditation, the first rung on the ladder of contemplation is to “[l]et the 
heart...first conceive and feele in it selfe the sweetnesse or bitternesse of the matter meditated: 
which is never done, without some passion; nor expressed, without some hearty exclamation.”665 
The glukupikron is a topic for discovering the similitude of one's own passionate response to all 
possible objects.  
In each of the moments of anti-history here sketched, the image is paramount. Yet 
recognizing this returns us to a fundamental claim. Insofar as the imagination participates in 
                                                 
665 Qtd. in Louis Martz, The Poetry of Meditation: A Study of English Religious Literature of the Seventeenth 
Century (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1978), 336. 
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motive, all action contains an anti-historical element. This is not to say that the content of all 
thought should be identified with the imagination, but rather something stranger: all thought seeks 
to rest in an image. When thought is not captured by a sensible intuition (as much of thought is 
not), it either becomes irritating in its vagueness or as it sparks a desire to continue on its path in 
order to arrive at the imagination. Ernst Bloch, in his monumental Principle of Hope, wrote “let 
the daydreams grow really fuller, that is, clearer, less random, more familiar, more clearly 
understood and more mediated with the course of things.”666 The emblematic view is the attempt 
to take the various “daydreams” of the present and intensify this passion by bringing it to bear 
upon all experience.  
 The emblematic orientation also resists the ascriptions of the cause of common passions 
that, as I have argued above, are inherent in the formation of organized political violence. Without 
meaning to trivialize the serious, and according to Durkheim, often fatal consequences of anomie, 
we can recognize in its concept an earlier and surprising correspondence with the Kantian 
judgment of taste. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant argues that the judgment of taste is based only 
on the “purposiveness” of its object. It is possible, though, that there one can conceive of  a 
“[p]urposiveness...without an end, insofar as we do not place the causes of this form in a will, but 
can still make the explanation of its possibility conceivable to ourselves only by deriving it from 
a will.”667 We should interpret this in relation to an important remark in the first section of the 
Kritik that has received little notice. Kant argues that the representation or Vorstellung is referred 
                                                 
666 Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), 4. 
667 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 105. 
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not to a determinate concept, but to feeling, and specifically to Lebensgefühl, a feeling of life, that 
goes under the name of pain and pleasure.668  
I suspect that Kant's philosophical aside shows an insight that Kant did not fully develop, 
perhaps because its consequences would have spoiled the system he was attempting to construct. 
If pain and pleasure are not simple, static states, but only names for ranges of feeling on a 
continuum, we begin to see that the form of a reflective judgment is not as stable as Kant had 
hoped. When we refer the representation to a feeling, the articulation of that relationship cannot 
be coded in the binary of pleasure and pain if these are only vague names for a diapason of 
intensities. However, even an attempt to recognize the various intensities of pleasure and pain, to 
code them through their localization on the body and movement across it, will fail to incorporate 
a passion into the “feeling of life.” Insofar as pain and pleasure are not mediated through an object, 
they become alien experiences of passive transience. The articulation of an object of one's pain 
and pleasure is the attempt to move the merely experienced into experience, that is, the factical 
into the inventional.  
The articulation of this experience is not a recommendation of autobiography. It is 
precisely in the figure of the melancholic that an account of the self fails to articulate the passion, 
for she encounters both a surplus of possible causes and a sense that all of these fail to satisfy the 
experience of the pain itself. Melancholic articulation of experience requires imaginative creation. 
In his “Democritus Junior to the Reader,” Burton writes a utopia.669 Utopia is a topos through 
which the existent appears contingent and amenable to acts of imagination. Burton's closing 
                                                 
668 Ibid., 89-90. 
669 AM, 1.85-97. 
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remarks to his Anatomy—Be not solitary, be not idle—are a minimal program of melancholic 
solidarity. Though it may appear as simple advice to remain in the company of others and to keep 
busy (advice that Burton endorses many times in the Anatomy) we might also take it as a repeated 
insistence to melancholize. To “be not solitary” in melancholy is not only to be in the company of 
others, but to discover others within one's passion. This inquiry into melancholic passion is itself 
an activity that prevents idleness, as Burton himself admits: “I write of melancholy by being busy 
to avoid melancholy.” Utopia is not a vision of the future but an articulation of melancholy itself, 
having moved through the experience of not having an apparent occasion to discovering in this a 
similitude to problems that move far beyond one's experience. The material conditions that give 
rise to anomie also make possible an extension of the melancholy topics to social formations. It is 
precisely in the anomic condition of modern life subsumed under capitalistic production that the 
emblematic position becomes a potential for liberation. Melancholic utopia is a topical response 
to anomie, organizing the rules of a society around the possibility of new mode of feeling. As 
opposed to the apocalyptic utopia that places its image after history as history's true motive, the 
melancholic utopia is an imaginative landscape in which one can set the emblems one invents out 
of mundane experience.   
I offer one example. William Carlos Williams' poem titled “A Woman in Front of a Bank,” 
can be read as an emblem, like of those many in the Renaissance whose image was not made 
explicit through an engraving but required the reader to create it in their imagination. The poet 
perceives an apparently mundane scene of a “woman in front of a bank” but his perception is 
organized around the similitude of the columnar:  
The bank is a matter of columns, 
like . convention, 
unlike invention; but the pediments 
sit there in the sun 
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to convince the doubting of 
investments “solid 
as a rock” —upon which the world 
stands, the world of finance, 
 
the only world: Just there, 
talking with another woman while 
rocking a baby carriage 
back and forth stands a woman in 
 
a pink cotton dress, bare legged 
and headed whose legs 
are two columns to hold up 
her face, like Lenin’s (her loosely 
 
arranged hair profusely blond) or 
Darwin’s and there you 
have it: 
a woman in front of a bank.670 
 
The column that is “like convention” is the bank, whose real business of finance is the least 
solid of all, adopts onto itself the historical performance of solidity. The columns of “invention” 
are her legs that “hold up her face.” It is in the face that Williams pivots to another similitude: he 
sees there a similarity with the dual revolutions of politics and biology and its avatars of Lenin and 
Darwin. The women, and of course also the baby, are an emblem that the bank's world of self-
assured convention is not the “only” world.  
If, as discussed in Chapter 5, the imagination's materials are limited to “decaying sense,” 
decay nevertheless makes possible its creative power. The fading away of place, time, and occasion 
make the sensuous images of one's own experience recombinable elements of a yet to be 
determined, new image, preserving only the details of sense-experience that are made meaningful. 
                                                 
670 William Carlos Williams, Collected Poems: Vol. 2 (New York: New Directions Book, 1991), 126-7. 
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Whereas the concept takes the example merely as an instance of itself, the imaginative decay 
allows for a mediation of the most particular features of experience and its “communicability,” 
that is, its ability to be made common across other experiences. Imagination then allows us to 
move from a motive that is only ever an induction of past experiences to one that may break with 
the past precisely by imbuing its debris with a significance that the past, rendered strictly under 
the historian's gaze, would never admit. The logical manipulations of the topics open the factical 
experience into an array of predicates that allow it to be connected with other experiences. The 
imagination's graphic graftings-on of sense creates new “chimeras,” things that have-not-been—
but may-yet-be. Our present experience is not simply a subjective, monadical view, ever limited 
and partial, into the causes of an immediate future, but it can be, when taken up as an emblem, the 
meaning of some other experience, one yet to be realized. To the emblematical anti-historian, 
history appears not as the collection of sufficient reasons for the present but an imaginative 
exercise in exchanging the range of possible meaning. Historical detail becomes image, awaiting 
its inscriptio and subscriptio.   
Melancholic experience is always mediated: its articulation, moreover, takes the immanent 
content of experience as the light by which the meaning of something non-present is to be 
articulated. In Chapter 3, I articulated two opposed views of “experience” associated with the early 
modern “traveller”—one “politick,” the other melancholic. But the significance of this should not 
be analogized to modern uses of the term in which “experience” is both a prerequisite for hiring 
and what is sought after in the off-hours by beautiful souls. In a sense, the character of both of 
these apparently opposed uses of experience—what is for others, what is for self—are nevertheless 
identical in that its significance is immanent to what is experienced. To the melancholic traveller, 
movement is without motive. The melancholic traveller, like the celebrated figure of the flaneur 
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who emerged in the anomic metropolis of the nineteenth century, has only contemplation as an 
activity. Space becomes filled with stations that provide matter for this all-consuming activity. The 
movements of the “traveller” presume a different constitution of space than the crowd that rushes 
around them, one in which the present is already accomplished, treated as part of the nature morte 
of history. The dead are not unreal, nor are they inert. The decay of the organic world, and the 
corpse as an undifferentiated moment in it, is an emblem of the creative history of melancholy. 
The “decaying sense” of the past is the condition of the creation of something new. 
 345 
Bibliography 
---. Speaking Pictures: English Emblem Books and Renaissance Culture. London; New York: 
Longman, 2006. 
Abbadie, Jaques. The Art of Knowing Oneself, or An Enquiry Into the Sources of Morality, in Two 
Parts.. Oxford: L. Lichfield, 1698. 
Adams, Joseph Quincy. Chief pre-Shakespearean dramas: a selection of plays illustrating the 
history of the English drama from its origin down to Shakespeare. Houghton Mifflin 
Company, Cambridge, Mass.: 1924. 
Agricola, Rudolph. Rodolphi Agricolae Phrisii De inventione dialectica. Coloniae: Alopecium, 
1523. 
Ahmed, Sarah. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004. 
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.  
Babb, Lawrence. The Elizabethan Malady: A Study of Melancholia in English Literature from 
1580 to 1642. East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1951. 
Baldwin, Thomas Whitfield. William Shakespeare’s Small Latine & Lesse Greeke. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1944. 
Barr, Timothy. “Without Apparent Occasion: Recent Research on Melancholy.” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 80, no. 2 (April 2019), 313-332.  
Bartenschlager, Klaus. “The Love‐sick Tree; A note on Romeo and Juliet I, 1, 119 and Othello IV, 
3, 39.” English Studies, 59.2 (1978), 116–118. 
Bath, Michael. “Weeping Stags and Melancholy Lovers: The Iconography of As You Like It, II,i,” 
Emblematica 1 (1986), 13-52. 
Benjamin, Walter. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. London: Verso, 2009. 
Biesecker, Barbara A. “Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation from within the Thematic of 
'Différance',” Philosophy & Rhetoric 22, no. 2 (1989), 110-130.  
Bloch, Ernst. The Principle of Hope. Vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995. 
Blount, Thomas. Glossographia, or, A dictionary interpreting all such hard words of whatsoever 
language now used in our refined English tongue with etymologies, definitions and 
historical observations on the same : also the terms of divinity, law, physick, mathematicks 
and other arts and sciences explicated. 1661. 
 346 
Blunt, John. A True State of the South-Sea Scheme: as it was first form'd, &c…and an examination 
of the conduct of the directors. London: J. Peele, 1722. 
Boaistuau, Pierre. Theatrum Mundi. London: Thomas East, 1581. 
Boerhaave, Herman. Aphorismi. Lugduni Batavorum: Apud Johannem Vander Linden, 1715. 
Booth, Emily. A Subtle and Mysterious Machine: The Medical World of Walter Charleton (1619-
707). Dordrecht: Springer, 2005. 
Boyle, Robert. Occasional Reflections. London: Herringman, 1665. 
Bradner, Leicester. “The Xenophon Translation Attributed to Queen Elizabeth I.” Journal of the 
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 27 (1964), 324-326. 
Brann, Noel L. The Debate Over the Origin of Genius During the Italian Renaissance. Leiden: 
Brill, 2002. 
Bredekamp, Horst. Thomas Hobbes—Der Leviathan: Das Urbild es modernen Staatesund seine 
Gegenbilder, 1651-2001. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012. 
Brie, Friedrich WD. Englische Rokoko-Epik (1710-1730). München, M. Hueber, 1927. 
Brinckmair, L. The Warnings of Germany: By wonderfull signes, and strange prodigies seene in 
divers parts of that countrey of Germany, betweene the yeare 1618 and 1638. London: 
John Norton and John Okes, 1638. 
Brown, John. The Elements of Medicine of John Brown, M.D. London: J. Johnson, 1795. 
Brown, Theodore M. “Medicine in the Shadow of the Principia.” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 48, no. 4 (1987), 629-648. 
Buchanan, George. Baptistes, sive Calumnia, Tragoedia. London: John Field, 1642.  
Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009. 
BurkeZ---. De Iure Regni Apud Scotos. Edinburgh: T. Dawson, 1581. 
Burton, Robert. The Anatomy of Melancholy, eds. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K. Kiessling, 
Rhonda L. Blair, and J. B. Bambourgh. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 
Bury, Arthur. Not Fear, But Love: a Sermon Preached Before the Governors of the Charity for 
Relief of Poor Widows and Orphans of Clergy-men, at St. Mary le Bow, on the 7th Day of 
Decemb., 1682. Oxford: L. Lichfield, 1683. 
Caldwell, Dorigen. “The Paragone Between Word and Image in Impresa Literature.” Journal of 
the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 63 (2000), 277-286. 
 347 
Calvin, John. Harmonia ex tribus euangelistis composita, Matthaeo, Marco, et Lvca adivncto 
seorsum Iohanne, quòd pauca cum aliis communia habeat. Geneva: Nicolaus Barbirius & 
Thomas Courteau, 1563. 
Canfora, Davide. “La Topica del 'Principe' e l'Uso Umanistico delle Fonti in Poggio Bracciolini,” 
Humanistica lovaniensia, 45 (1996), 1-92. 
Carruthers, Mary. The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-
1200. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Caussin, Nicolas. La Cour Saincte, Ou Institution Chrestienne des Grands: Avec Les Exemples de 
ceux qui dans les Cours ont fleury en Saincteté. Lyons: Gay, 1646. 
Cave, Terence. The Cornucopian Text: Problems of Writing in the French Renaissance. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. 
Cheyne, George. The English Malady: or, A Treatise of Nervous Diseases of all Kinds: in three 
parts. London: 1733.  
Christian, Lynda G. Theatrum mundi: the history of an idea. Garland, New York: 1987.  
Clarke, Samuel. Medulla theologiae, or, The marrow of divinity : contained in sundry questions 
and cases of conscience, both speculative and practical : the greatest part of them collected 
out of the works of our most judicious, experienced and orthodox English divines, the rest 
are supplied by the author. London: Thomas Ratcliff, 1659. 
Clericuzio, Antonio. “The Internal Laboratory: The Chemical Reinterpretation of Medical Spirits 
in England (1650-1680).” in Alchemy and Chemistry in the 16th and 17th Centuries. Edited 
by Piyo Rattansi, 51-83. Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994. 
Cooper, Thomas. The Mysterie of the Holy Government of our Affections. London: Alsop, 1620. 
Cranz, F. Edward. “Lecture(s) du 'De Anima' à la Renaissance,” in Reorientations of Western 
Thought from Antiquity to the Renaissance. Edited by Nancy S. Struever. Aldershot, 
Hampshire; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006.  
Curtius, Ernst Robert. European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages. Translated by Willard 
Trask. New York: Pantheon Books, 1953. 
Cvetkovich, Ann. Depression: A Public Feeling. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014. 
Daly, Peter M. “Emblematic Poetry of Occasional Meditation.” German Life and Letters 25, no. 2 
(1972), 126-139. 
---. Emblem Theory: Recent German Contributions to the Characterization of the Emblem Genre. 
Nendeln/Liechtenstein: KTO Press, 1979. 
 348 
Daniel, Drew. The Melancholy Assemblage: Affect and Epistemology in the English Renaissance. 
New York: Fordham University Press, 2013. 
Danziger, Kurt. “Origins of the Schema of Stimulated Motion: Towards a Pre-history of Modern 
Psychology.” History of Science 21 (1983), 183-210. 
Davis, Audrey B. Circulation Physiology and Medical Chemistry in England, 1650-1680. 
Lawrence, KS: Coronado Press, 1973. 
de Gordon, Bernard, Constantinus Africanus, and Petrus Hispanus. Lilium medicinae. 1949. 
de Rijk, Lambertus Marie. “On The Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's Summule 
logicales.” Vivarium 6, no. 1 (1968), 1-34. 
de Sauvages, François Boissier. Nosologia methodica sistens morborum classes iuxta Syndehami 
mentem & Botanicorum ordinem. vol. 2, Amsterdam, 1768. 
de Saxonia, Hercules [Ercole Sassonia]. Opera practica. Padua: 1639. 
Defoe, Daniel. Anatomy of Exchange-Alley: or, A system of stock-jobbing, London: 1719. 
---. The Chimera, or, The French way of paying national debts, laid open. London: T. Warner, 
1720. 
Dockhorn, Klaus, and Marvin Brown. “Hans-Georg Gadamer's” Truth and Method”.” Philosophy 
& Rhetoric (1980), 160-180. 
Donne, John. Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions, Together With Death’s Duel. New York: 
Cosimo Classics, 2010 
---. Donne's satyr, containing 1. a short map of mundane vanity, 2. a cabinet of merry conceits, 3. 
certain pleasant propositions and questions with their merry solutions and answers : being 
very useful, pleasant and delightful to all, and offensive to none. London: R.W., 1662. 
Du Moulin, Pierre. The Teares of Heraclitus, or, The Miserie of Mankinde: The Vanitie f this Life, 
nd the Inconstancie of this World. London: John Grismond, 1635. 
Durkheim, Émile. Suicide: a Study in Sociology. London: Routledge, 2005. 
Dyde, Sean. “Cullen, a Cautionary Tale.” Medical History 59, no. 2 (2015), 222-240. 
Eliot, T.S. “Hamlet and His Problems.” In The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism. 
London: Methuen & Co., 1920. 
Erasmus, Desiderius, and Donald B. King. On Copia of Words and Ideas. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: 
Marquette University Press, 2007. 
Erasmus, Desiderius. Opera omnia, vols. 1-8. Leiden: 1703-1706. 
 349 
Essex, Robert Devereux, Phillip Sidney, and William Davison. Profitable Instructions: describing 
what speciall obseruations are to be taken by trauellers in all nations, states, and countries, 
pleasant and profitable. London: Benjamin Fisher, 1633. 
Estienne, Henri. The Art of Making Devises. Translated by Thomas Blount. London: Richard 
Royston, 1648. 
Evangeliou, Christos. “Aristotle's Doctrine Of Predicables And Porphyry's Isagoge.” Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 23, no. 1 (1985), 15-34. 
Febvre, Lucien. “La sensibilité et l'histoire: Comment reconstituer la vie affective d'autrefois?.” 
In Annales d'histoire sociale, vol. 3, no. 1-2, pp. 5-20. Cambridge University Press, 1941. 
Ferrand, Jaques. Erotomania, or, A treatise discoursing of the essence, causes, symptomes, 
prognosticks and cure of love or erotic melancholy. Oxford: L. Lichfield, 1640.  
Ficino, Marsilio. Opera Omnia. Edited by Oskar Kristeller. Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1959.  
Fish, Stanley Eugene. Self-consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-century 
Literature. University of California Press, 1972. 
Foucault, Michel. “The Discourse on Language,” in The Archaeology of Knowledge and the 
Discourse on Language. New York: Vintage Books, 2010.  
Fouke, Daniel Clifford, ed. The Enthusiastical Concerns of Dr. Henry More: Religious Meaning 
and the Psychology of Delusion. Vol. 71. Brill, 1997. 
Freud, Sigmund. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. In The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of 
Psycho-analysis, 1981. 
Fyfe, Andrew. A system of anatomy and physiology. Edinburgh & London: 1787. 
Gell, Alfred. Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013. 
Giard, Luce. “La production logique de l'Angleterre au XVIe siècle.” Les Ètudes 
Philosophiques (1985), 303. 
Gilbert, Neal W. Renaissance Concepts of Method. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.  
Ginzburg, Carlo. Fear, Reverence, Terror: Five Essays in Political Iconology. Florence: European 
University Institute, 2008. 
Giovo, Paulo. The Worthy Tract of Paulus Iovius. Translated by Samuel Daniel. London: Simon 
Waterson, 1585.  
Gisèle Venet, “Shakespeare—des humeurs aux passions,” Etudes Epistémè, 1 (2002), 85. 
 350 
Gowland, Angus. “Rhetorical Structure and Function in The Anatomy of Melancholy.” Rhetorica: 
A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 19, no. 1 (2001), 1-48. 
---. “The Problem of Early Modern Melancholy.” Past & Present 191, no. 1 (2006), 77-120. 
---. The Worlds of Renaissance Melancholy: Robert Burton in Context. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
Grafton, Anthony. “Starry Messengers: Recent Work in the History to Western 
Astrology.” Perspectives on Science 8, no. 1 (2000), 70-83. 
Guerrini, Anita. “A Scotsman on the Make’: The Career of Alexander Stuart.” In The Scottish 
Enlightenment: Essays in Reinterpretation. Edited by Paul Wood, 157-
76.  Rochester/Woodbridge, UK: The University of Rochester Press, 2000.  
---. “Isaac Newton, George Cheyne, and the 'Principia Medicinae'.” In The Medical Revolution of 
the Seventeenth Century, eds. Roger French and Andrew Wear, 222-45. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989.  
Guest, Clare Lapraik. The Understanding of Ornament in the Italian Renaissance. Boston: Brill, 
2006. 
Guibelet, Jourdain. Trois discours Philosophiques : Le I. de la comparaison de l'Homme avec le 
Monde. Le II. du Principe de la generation de l'Homme. Le III. de l' Humeur 
Melancholique. Evreux: LeMarié, 1603.  
Hall, Joseph. Characters of Vertues and Vices: in two Bookes. London: Bradwood, 1608. 
---. Occasionall meditations. London: M[iles] F[lesher], 1633. 
Hammond, James, Cuthbert Shaw, Edward Lovibond, and Thomas Penrose. The poems of 
Hammond, Shaw, Lovibond, Penrose. Chiswick: Press of C. Whittingham, 1822. 
Harrington, James. Horae consecratae, or, Spiritual pastime. concerning divine meditations upon 
the great mysteries of our faith and salvation : occasional meditations and gratulatory 
reflexions upon particular providences and deliverances, vouchsafed to the author and his 
family: also a scripture-catechisme dedicated to the service of his wife and children, and 
now published, together with other treatises mentioned in the following page for common 
use. London: Printed for the Author, 1682. 
Harris, Victor Irwin. All coherence gone. A study of the seventeenth century controversy over 
disorder and decay in the universe. London: Frank Cass & Co, 1966. 
Harvey, Christopher. The school of the heart; or, The heart of it self gone away from God brought 
back again to him, and instructed by him. In 47. emblems. By the author of the Sinagoge 
anext to Herberts poems. London: 1674. 
 351 
Heyd, Michael. Be Sober and Reasonable : the Critique of Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth and 
Early Eighteenth Centuries. Leiden: Brill, 2000. 
Hobbes, Thomas, and William Molesworth. Thomas Hobbes Malmesburiensis Opera 
philosophica quae latine scripsit omnia. London: 1839. 
Hobbes, Thomas. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. London: John Bohn, 
1839.  
HobbesZ---. Vita. London: 1681. 
Hollings, Edmund. Assertiones medicae de melancholia. Bamberg: 1602. 
Höltgen, Karl Josef. “Robert Burtons Anatomy of Melancholy: Struktur und Gattungsproblematik 
im Licht der ramistischen Logik.” Anglia-Zeitschrift für englische Philologie 1976, no. 94 
(1976), 388-403. 
Hopes, Jeffrey. “La Maladie anglaise” in French Eighteenth-Century Writing: From Stereotype to 
Individuation.” Studies in the Literary Imagination 44, no. 2 (2011), 109-132. 
Howell, Almonte C. “Res et verba: Words and Things.” ELH 13, no. 2 (1946), 131-142. 
Jackson, Stanley W. “Melancholia and mechanical explanation in eighteenth-century 
medicine.” Journal of the history of medicine and allied sciences 38, no. 3 (1983), 298-
319. 
Jackson, Stanley W. “Melancholia and the waning of the humoral theory.” Journal of the history 
of medicine and allied sciences 33, no. 3 (1978), 367-376. 
Jackson, Stanley W. Melancholia and depression: From hippocratic times to modern times. Yale 
University Press, 1986. 
Janson, Horst Woldemar. Apes and ape lore: in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Vol. 20. 
Warburg Institute, University of London, 1952. 
Jardine, Lisa. “The place of dialectic teaching in sixteenth-century Cambridge.” Studies in the 
Renaissance 21 (1974), 31-62. 
Josephus, Flavius. Jewish antiquities. Wordsworth Editions, 2006. 
Kahn, Victoria. Machiavellian rhetoric: From the counter-reformation to Milton. Princeton 
University Press, 1994. 
---. The Future of Illusion: Political Theology and Early Modern Texts. University of Chicago 
Press, 2014. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 352 
Kassell, Lauren. Medicine and magic in Elizabethan London: Simon Forman: astrologer, 
alchemist, and physician. Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Kinneir, David. A New Essay on the Nerves, and the Doctrine of the Animal Spirits Rationally 
Considered: with two dissertations on the gout, and on digestion. London: 1739.  
Kiséry, András. Hamlet's Moment: Drama and Political Knowledge in Early Modern England. 
Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Klibansky, Raymond, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl. Saturn and melancholy: Studies in the 
history of natural philosophy religion and art. 1964. 
La Chambre, Marin Cureau de. The characters of the passions written in French by the Sieur de 
la Chambre, Physitian to the Lord Chancellor of France. London: 1649. 
Langer, Ulrich, “Invention,” in Norton, Glyn P., and Hugh Barr Nisbet, eds. The Cambridge 
history of literary criticism: The Renaissance. Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Lawlor, Clark. “Fashionable Melancholy.” In Melancholy Experience in Literature of the Long 
Eighteenth Century, Palgrave Macmillan, London: 2011, 25-53. 
Lechner, Joan Marie. Renaissance concepts of the commonplaces: an historical investigation of 
the general and universal ideas used in all argumentation and persuasion with special 
emphasis on the educational and literary tradition of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Pageant Press, 1962. 
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding. 1st ed. 1 vols. London: Thomas 
Bassett, 1690. 
Lowes, John Livingston. “The loveres maladye of hereos.” Modern Philology 11, no. 4 (1914), 
491-546. 
Luther, Martin. Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Weimar: 1883-2007 
MacDonald, Michael. Mystical Bedlam: madness, anxiety and healing in seventeenth-century 
England. Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Manfield, 2nd edition, 1998. 
Mack, Peter. Renaissance argument: Valla and Agricola in the traditions of rhetoric and dialectic. 
Vol. 43. Brill, 1993. 
MacPhail, Eric M. Dancing Around the Well: The circulation of commonplaces in Renaissance 
humanism. Brill, 2014. 
Mailloux, Steven. “Enactment History, Jesuit Practices, and Rhetorical Hermeneutics,” 
in Theorizing histories of rhetoric, ed. Michelle Ballif. Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 2013. 
 353 
Mander, Nicholas. “Painted cloths: History, craftsmen and techniques.” Textile history 28, no. 2 
(1997), 119-148. 
Mandeville, Bernard. A Treatise on hypochondriack and hysterick passions. London, Dryden 
Leach: 1715. 
Mann, Wolfgang. Drydens Heroische Tragodien als Ausdruck höfischer Barockkultur in England 
Württemberg: Gatzer & Hahn, 1932. 
Maravall, José Antonio. Culture of the baroque: analysis of a historical structure. University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986. 
Martha Nussbaum, “The Role of Phantasia in Aristotle's Theory of Action,” in Aristotle's De Motu 
Animalium: Text with Translation, Commentary, and Interpretive Essays, Princeton: 1978. 
Martz, Louis Lohr. The poetry of meditation: a study in English religious literature. Yale 
University Press, New Haven: 1974. 
Mary Ann Lund, Melancholy, medicine, and religion in early modern England: Reading The 
Anatomy of Melancholy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Maxson, Brian Jeffery. “Kings and tyrants: Leonardo Bruni's translation of Xenophon's Hiero,” 
Renaissance Studies, 24.2 
Melanchthon, Phillip. Dialectica, Cologne: 1528.  
Melanchthon, Phillip. Elementa rhetorices in Opera Philosophica, Vol. 2: Principal writings on 
rhetoric. eds. William P. Weaver, Stefan Strohm, Volkhard Wels. 2017. 
Melanelius, Matthias Theodorus. De melancholia sive atrae bilis morbo ex Galeni, Rufis et Aetii 
Sicamii voluminibus doctissima collectanea, una cum Stephani Medici, cognomento 
Magistri, exquisitissimo oculari collyrio, nunc primum latine aedita, Antwerp, 1540. 
Ménuret de Chambaud J.-J. “Oeconomie animale.” In Encyclopédie. Diderot D., d’Alembert J. 
Paris: Le Breton, Tome XI, p. 359–365. 
Middleton, Thomas, Cyril Tourneur, and Reginald Anthony Foakes. The Revenger's Tragedy. 
Manchester University Press, 1996. 
Midriff, John. Observations on the Spleen and Vapours: Containing Remarkable Cases of Persons 
of Both Sexes, and All Ranks,... who Have Been Miserably Afflicted with Those Melancholy 
Disorders Since the Fall of South-Sea, and Other Publick Stocks. No. 1. J. Roberts, 
London: 1721. 
Miedema, Hessel. “The term emblema in Alciati.” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes (1968), 234-250. 
 354 
Milton, John. Doctrine & discipline of divorce: restor'd to the good of both sexes, from the 
bondage of canon law, and other mistakes, to the true meaning of Scripture in the law and 
gospel compar'd. London: 1643. 
Mitchell, Robert. ““ Beings that have existence only in ye minds of men”: State Finance and the 
Origins of the Collective Imagination.” The Eighteenth Century 49, no. 2 (2008), 117-139. 
More, Henry. Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, London & Cambridge: 1656. 
Mortensen, Daniel E. “The loci of Cicero.” Rhetorica 26, no. 1 (2008), 31-56. 
Moss, Ann. Printed commonplace-books and the structuring of Renaissance thought. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford: 1996. 
N. A. Glossaire français polyglotte, dictionnaire historique, étymologique, raisonné et usuel de la 
langue française et des ses noms propres, précédé d'une introduction renfermant l'histoire 
complète de la language française. 1847.  
N.A. A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes 
and Misdemeanors, from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783, vol. 3. London: T.C. 
Hansard, 1816. 
Nashe, Thomas. Nashes Lenten stuffe containing, the description and first procreation and 
increase of the towne of Great Yarmouth in Norffolke: with a new play neuer played before, 
of the praise of the red herring. Fitte of all clearkes of noblemens kitchins to be read: and 
not vnnecessary by all seruing men that haue short boord-wages, to be remembered. 
London: 1599. 
Nauta, Lodi. “From universals to topics: the realism of Rudolph Agricola, with an edition of his 
Reply to a Critic.” Vivarium 50, no. 2 (2012), 190-224. 
Newton, Isaac. Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica. London: 1713. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Untimely meditations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1997. 
Nifo, Agostino. Commentaria in Topica Aristotelis. Paris: 1542. 
Nutton, Vivian. Ancient medicine. Routledge, 2004. 
Oakley, Francis. “On the road from Constance to 1688: the political thought of John Major and 
George Buchanan.” Journal of British Studies 1, no. 2 (1962), 1-31. 
Ong, Walter J. Ramus, method, and the decay of dialogue: From the art of discourse to the art of 
reason. University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 2004. 
Oxenbridge, Daniel. General Observations and prescriptions in the practice of physic on several 
persons of quality, London: 1715. 
Pallavicino, Pietro Sforza. Opere edite ed inedite del card. Sforza Pallavicino, vol. 1. Rome: 1844. 
 355 
Paul, Helen. The South Sea Bubble: an economic history of its origins and consequences. 
Routledge, 2010. 
Pensky, Max. Melancholy Dialectics: Walter Benjamin and the Play of Mourning. University of 
Massachusetts,  1993. 
Pepys, Samuel, and Robert Latham. The diary of Samuel Pepys a new and complete transcription. 
HarperCollins, London: 2000. 
Peter of Spain. Tractatus, called afterwards Summule logicales. Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V. 
Assen: 1972. 
Pitcairn, Archibald, J. T. Desaguliers, and George Sewell. The whole works of Dr. Archibald 
Pitcairn, published by himself: wherein are discovered the true foundation and principles 
of the art of physic with cases and observations upon most distempers and medicines. 
London: 1727. 
Pitcairn, Archibald. The Philosophical and Mathematical Elements Of Physick: In Two Books; 
The First containing the Theory: The Second the Practice ; Compos'd for the Use of all 
who study the Art of Medicine. London: W. Innys, 1718. 
Plucknett, Theodore F. T. “The Relations Between Roman Law and English Common Law down 
to the Sixteenth Century: A General Survey.” University of Toronto Law Journal 3, no. 1 
(1939), 24-50. 
Pollard, Tanya. “A Kind of Wild Medicine: Revenge as Remedy in Early Modern 
England.” Revista canaria de estudios ingleses 50 (2005), 57-69. 
Pomata, Gianna. “Sharing cases: the Observationes in Early Modern Medicine.” Early Science 
and Medicine 15, no. 3 (2010), 193-236. 
Praz, Mario. Secentismo e marinismo in Inghilterra: John Donne—Richard Crashaw. La Voce, 
1925. 
Préaud, Maxime and Sophie Join-Lambert. Abraham Bosse: Savant Graveur: Tours, vers 1604-
1676. Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale de France, 2004. 
Pseudo-Galen, Definitiones medicae: Iona Philologo interprete, Freiburg im Breisgau: 1538. 
Puttenham, George. The arte of English poesie, contriued into three bookes: the first of poets and 
poesie, the second of proportion, the third of ornament. London: 1589. 
Quintilian, and H. E. Butler. The Institutio oratoria of Quintilian. London: 1921. 
Radden, Jennifer, ed. The nature of melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva. Oxford University 
Press, USA, 2002. 
 356 
RaddenZ---. Moody minds distempered: Essays on melancholy and depression. Oxford University 
Press on Demand, Oxford: 2009. 
Rahman, Fazlur, ed. Avicenna's psychology. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1952. 
Ramus, Petrus. Dialecticae Institutiones; Aristotelicae Animadversiones. Paris: 1543. 
Rattansi, Piyo M. “The Helmontian-Galenist Controversy in Restoration England.” Ambix 12, no. 
1 (1964), 1-23. 
Reeves, Aaron, Martin McKee and David Stuckler. “Economic suicides in the Great Recession in 
Europe and North America,” The British Journal of Psychiatry 205 (2014), 246-7. 
Régis, Louis Marie, O. P. L'opinion selon Aristote. Paris, J. Vrin; Inst. d'études médiévales, 
Ottawa: 1935. 
Renaker, David. “Robert Burton and Ramist Method.” Renaissance quarterly 24, no. 2 (1971), 
210-220. 
Reynolds, Edward. A treatise of the passions and faculties of the soul of man with the severall 
dignities and corruptions thereunto belonging. London: 1649. 
Robinson, Bryan. A treatise of the animal economy, viz. of the motion of the fluids thro' the vessels; 
of muscular motion, the motion of the blood, and respiration; of secretion; of the 
discharges of human bodies. Dublin: 1732. 
Robinson, Nicholas. A New System of the Spleen: Vapours, and Hypochondriack Melancholy: 
Wherein All the Decays of the Nerves, and Lownesses of the Spirits, are Mechanically 
Accounted For. To which is Subjoin'd, A Discourse Upon the Nature, Cause, and Cure, of 
Melancholy, Madness, and Lunacy. Samuel Aris, London: 1729. 
Rous, Francis. The arte of happines. Consisting of three parts, whereof the first searcheth out the 
happinesse of man. The second, particularly discouers and approues it- The third, sheweth 
the meanes to attayne and increase it. London: 1619. 
Rubinelli, Sara. Ars Topica: the classical technique of constructing arguments from Aristotle to 
Cicero. Springer Netherland, Berlin: 2010.  
Russell, Daniel. “Vanitas, ou l'illustration d'un texte absent.” Litteratures classiques 1 (2005), 49-
56. 
Schleiner, Winfried. Melancholy, genius, and utopia in the Renaissance. Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz, 1991.  
Schmidt, Jeremy. Melancholy and the care of the soul: Religion, moral philosophy and madness 
in early modern England. Routledge, 2016. 
 357 
Schmitt, Carl, and Simona Draghici. Hamlet or Hecuba: the interruption of time into play. Plutarch 
Press, Corvallis, OR: 2006.  
Sellars, Wilfrid. Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. Indianapolis: 1956. 
Sena, John F. “Melancholic Madness,”  and the Puritansm,” The Harvard Theological Review, 
Vol. 66, No. 3 (Jul., 1973), pp. 293-309. 
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, and A. J. Boyle. Thyestes. Oxford: 2017. 
Sennert, Daniel. Institutiones medicinae libri v. Wittenberg: 1620.  
Sherry, Richard. A treatise of schemes & tropes very profytable for the better vnderstanding of 
good authors, gathered out of the best grammarians &oratours by Rychard Sherry 
Londoner. London: 1550. 
Skinner, Quentin. Forensic Shakespeare. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
---. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume 2, The Age of Reformation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
Sloane, Thomas O. Donne, Milton, and the end of humanist rhetoric. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985. 
Starobinski, Jean. L'encre de la mélancolie. Paris: Le Seuil, 2013. 
Stearns, Peter N. and Carol Z. Stearns, “Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and 
Emotional Standards,” The American Historical Review 90, no. 4 (1985), 813-836. 
Sturm, Johann. Partitionum dialecticarum libri iiii. Paris: C. Wechelus, 1539. 
Swinnock, George. The works of George Swinnock. London: 1665. 
Sydenham, Thomas, and R. G. Latham. The works of Thomas Sydenham: in two volumes. London: 
1850.  
Taylor,  Jeremy. Doctor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures 
serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience: in four books, 
London: 1660. 
Temkin, Owsei. “Fernel, Joubert, and Erastus on the specificity of cathartic drugs.” Science, 
Medicine and Society in the Renaissance: Essays to Honor Walter Pagel (1972), 61-68. 
Temkin, Owsei. Galenism: Rise and Decline of a Medical Philosophy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1974.  
The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons: From the Restoration to the Present Time, 
Volume 6. London: 1742.  
 358 
The Polyanthos. Vol. 1. Boston: 1812. 
Traister, Barbara H. “New evidence about Burton's melancholy?.” Renaissance quarterly 29, no. 
1 (1976), 66-70. 
Tuke, Samuel. Description of the Retreat, an institution near York, for Insane Persons of the 
Scoiety of Friends. Containing an account of its origin and progress, the modes of 
treatment, and a statement of cases. By Samuel Tuke. With an Elevation and Plans of the 
Building. York: 1813. 
Turner, Robert Y. “The Causal Induction in Some Elizabethan Plays.” Studies in Philology 60, no. 
2 (1963), 183-190. 
Uhlig, Claus. “The Sobbing Deer”: As You Like It II.i.21-66 and the Historical 
Context.” Renaissance Drama 3 (1970), 79-109. 
Valency, Maurice Jacques. The Tragedies of Herod & Mariamne. No. 145. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1940. 
Valla, Lorenzo. Lavrentii Vallae opera. Turin: E. Garin, 1962.  
van Helmont, Jean Baptiste. Oriatrike, or, Physick Refined: the Common Errors Therein Refuted, 
and the Whole Art Reformed & Rectified: Being a New Rise and Progress of Philosophy 
and Medicine for the Destruction of Diseases and Prolongation of Life. London: L. Loyd, 
1662. 
van Veen, Otto. Emblemata, sive, Symbola a principibus, viris eeclesiasticis [sic] ac militaribus 
aliisque vsurpanda. Brussels: Hubertus Antonius, 1624. 
Verboon, Annemieke R. “The Medieval Tree of Porphyry: an Organic Structure of Logic,” in The 
Tree: Symbol, Allegory, and Mnemonic Device in Medieval Art and Thought. Edited by 
Pippa Salonius. Turnhour: Brepols, 2014. 
Visorius, Compendiosa librorum Rodolphi Agricolæ de inuentione dialectica epitome. Per 
Iohannem Visorium Cœnomanum. Paris: Apud S. Colinaeum, 1534. 
Wack, Mary Frances. Lovesickness in the Middle Ages: the “Viaticum” and its Commentaries. 
Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016. 
Ward, Edward. Labour in vain: or, What signifies little or nothing Viz. I. The poor man's 
petitioning at court. II. Expectation of benefit from a covetous man in his life-time. III. The 
marriage of an old man to a young woman. IV. Endeavours to regulate mens manners by 
preaching or writing. V. Being a Jacobite. VI. Confining an insolvent debtor. VII. Promise 
of secrecy in a conspiracy. VIII. An enquiry after a place. London: N.P., 1700. 
Wellek, René. “The concept of baroque in literary scholarship.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 5, no. 2 (1946), 77-109. 
 359 
Wells, Susan. “Genres as species and spaces: Literary and rhetorical genre in The anatomy of 
melancholy.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 47, no. 2 (2014), 113-136. 
Wels, Volkhard. Triviale Künste: die humanistische Reform der grammatischen, dialektischen und 
rhetorischen Ausbildung an der Wende zum 16. Jahrhundert. Berlin: Weidler, 2000. 
Wetherell, Margaret. "Trends in the Turn to Affect A Social Psychological Critique.” Body & 
Society 21, no. 2 (2015), 139-166. 
Whytt, Robert. Observations on the nature, causes, and cure of those diseases which have been 
commonly called nervous, hypochondriac, or hysteric, to which are prefixed some remarks 
on the sympathy of the nerves. Edinburgh: J. Balfour, 1765. 
Williams, R. Grant. “Disfiguring the Body of Knowledge: Anatomical Discourse and Robert 
Burton's” The Anatomy of Melancholy”.” ELH 68, no. 3 (2001), 593-613. 
Williams, William Carlos. The Collected Poems of William Carlos Williams: 1909-1939. Vol. 1. 
New York: New Directions Publishing, 1991. 
Willichus, Jodochus and David Chrytaeus, Iodoci Willichi Reselliani Erotematum Dialectices III, 
quibus accessit Davidis Chytraei de Studio Dialectices recte instituendo Libellus. Basileae: 
Guarinum, 1568. 
Wilson, Thomas. The arte of rhetorique for the vse of all suche as are studious of eloquence, sette 
forth in English. London: 1553. 
Wilson, Thomas. The rule of reason, conteinyng the arte of logique, set forth in Englishe. London: 
1551. 
Wittkower, Rudolf, and Margot Wittkower. Born under Saturn: the character and conduct of 
artists: a documented history from Antiquity to the French Revolution. New York: Random 
House, 1963. 
Wolff, Max. “Shakespeare als Kunstler des Barocks.” Internationale Monatsschrift, XI (1917), 
995-1021.  
Wölfflin, Heinrich, Guy Ballangé, and Bernard Teyssèdre. Renaissance and baroque. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1967. 
World Health Organization, “Depression and Other Common Mental Disorders: Global Health 
Estimates,” (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2017). 
Wright, Thomas. The Passions of the Minde in Generall, in sixe bookes. London: Valentyne Syms, 
1601. 
 
